NASA Astronaut on Columbia Repair (and others)

jacob navia wrote:
Craig Fink a écrit :
Not the right letter, but Privatizing Earth to LEO might be.

So what would a letter to Michael Griffin look like to privatize Earth to
LEO manned space flight? To get NASA to push for legislation to encourage
it?

What would the legislation look like to encourage, nurture, support and
transition to thriving Earth to LEO market? Private Enterprise?


If "Private Enterprise" is so phantastic, why must it be "nurtured"
and "supported" with tax payer's money????

Damm it. It is PRIVATE so it doesn't need any public money!

That is lazy fair...


Ideas?


Yes, let the market decide!

Eric Chomko wrote:
jacob navia wrote:
Craig Fink a écrit :
Not the right letter, but Privatizing Earth to LEO might be.

So what would a letter to Michael Griffin look like to privatize Earth to
LEO manned space flight? To get NASA to push for legislation to encourage
it?

What would the legislation look like to encourage, nurture, support and
transition to thriving Earth to LEO market? Private Enterprise?


If "Private Enterprise" is so phantastic, why must it be "nurtured"
and "supported" with tax payer's money????

Damm it. It is PRIVATE so it doesn't need any public money!

That is lazy fair..."

Not the right thread, as the original post was pertaining to an
astronauts statements,

http://www.stpns.net/view_article.ht...43251064362304

Gutierrez said the fault lies in two words - engineering arrogance.

"NASA engineers were confident that they did everything right,"
Gutierrez said. "They were so sure everything would work as planned
they didn't think an escape system was necessary. The fact is, if
there had been an escape system on Columbia and Challenger, the crews
could have survived."

Actually the design shortcomings of the shuttle system had been known
for along time before the challenger tragedy, (ie no crew escape system
for more than a small percentage of the crew if in place, and only
usable for a small percentage of the flight) and therefore it is the
responsibility of managers and engineers to operate the space shuttle
system safely within it's known parameters, (ie launching on jan 28
1986 was a managerial decision to launch in the coldest wheather
despite engineers recommendations not to launch, and inspite of
evidence of srb "o-ring" burnthrough on the previous launch
sts-61c).

Tom

Eric Chomko wrote:
jacob navia wrote:
Craig Fink a écrit :
Not the right letter, but Privatizing Earth to LEO might be.

So what would a letter to Michael Griffin look like to privatize Earth to
LEO manned space flight? To get NASA to push for legislation to encourage
it?

What would the legislation look like to encourage, nurture, support and
transition to thriving Earth to LEO market? Private Enterprise?


If "Private Enterprise" is so phantastic, why must it be "nurtured"
and "supported" with tax payer's money????

Damm it. It is PRIVATE so it doesn't need any public money!

That is lazy fair...


Ideas?


Yes, let the market decide!"

Not the right thread, as the original post was pertaining to an
astronauts statements,

http://www.stpns.net/view_article.ht...43251064362304

Gutierrez said the fault lies in two words - engineering arrogance.

"NASA engineers were confident that they did everything right,"
Gutierrez said. "They were so sure everything would work as planned
they didn't think an escape system was necessary. The fact is, if
there had been an escape system on Columbia and Challenger, the crews
could have survived."

Actually the design shortcomings of the shuttle system had been known
for along time before the challenger tragedy, (ie no crew escape system
for more than a small percentage of the crew if in place, and only
usable for a small percentage of the flight) and therefore it is the
responsibility of managers and engineers to operate the space shuttle
system safely within it's known parameters, (ie launching on jan 28
1986 was a managerial decision to launch in the coldest wheather
despite engineers recommendations not to launch, and inspite of
evidence of srb "o-ring" burnthrough on the previous launch
sts-61c).

Tom

I was on a plane ride to Houston yesterday reading the book STILL HERE
by Ram Dass. A Southern Baptist minister sat next to me and was
apalled at my selection of reading material! lol. BOTH the southern
baptist and mindful guru would be apalled at the notion that we could
fix our bodies so they do not degenerate over time. The minister would
say God made us to age and to avoid it is to take us out of the natural
order of things that God made. The guru would say all such efforts are
attempts to deny the inevitability of our death and avoid the great
teaching death and suffering gives to all of us. Both would agree
whether they call it devil or ego, that this application of medical
science is wrong.

I would say that God is not dual to the minister,- that is, whether
something is a ministering angel or a vengeful demon depends a lot on
how you percieve things. And since truth is always true, it cannot
depend on how your view it.

To the guru I would say, that the ego and body is just as much a part
of our being as spirit and all functioning in balance are what we truly
are.

We will fix our bodies in a variety of ways to treat aging and maintain
our youthful vigor. We will create and use new classes of drugs to
open our minds biochemically and through direct nano-stimulation to
new levels of conciousness. And we will ultimately choose conciously
when we procreate and when we die.


wrote:
Mary Pegg writes:

wrote:

"It is one of the most remarkable things that in all of the biological
sciences there is no clue as to the necessity of death. ... This
suggests to me that is it not at all inevitable and that it is only a
matter of time before the biologists discover what it is that is
causing us the trouble and that this terrible universal disease or
temporariness of the human's body will be cured." -- Richard Feynman

Great physicist. Lousy biologist.

I think he was pretty good as a biologist. He came very close to sorting
out point deletion mutations, and it was mostly lack of time that stopped
him.

--
Paul Repacholi 1 Crescent Rd.,
+61 (08) 9257-1001 Kalamunda.
West Australia 6076
comp.os.vms,- The Older, Grumpier Slashdot
Raw, Cooked or Well-done, it's all half baked.
EPIC, The Architecture of the future, always has been, always will be.

wrote:"I was on a plane ride to Houston
yesterday reading the book STILL HERE"

Not the right thread, as the original post was pertaining to an
astronauts statements,

http://www.stpns.net/view_article.ht...43251064362304


Gutierrez said the fault lies in two words - engineering arrogance.


"NASA engineers were confident that they did everything right,"
Gutierrez said. "They were so sure everything would work as planned
they didn't think an escape system was necessary. The fact is, if
there had been an escape system on Columbia and Challenger, the crews
could have survived."


Actually the design shortcomings of the shuttle system had been known
for along time before the challenger tragedy, (ie no crew escape system

for more than a small percentage of the crew if in place, and only
usable for a small percentage of the flight) and therefore it is the
responsibility of managers and engineers to operate the space shuttle
system safely within it's known parameters, (ie launching on jan 28
1986 was a managerial decision to launch in the coldest wheather
despite engineers recommendations not to launch, and inspite of
evidence of srb "o-ring" burnthrough on the previous launch
sts-61c).


Tom

in article , jacob navia at
wrote on 11/26/06 9:22 AM:

Craig Fink a écrit :

Not the right letter, but Privatizing Earth to LEO might be.

So what would a letter to Michael Griffin look like to privatize Earth to LEO
manned space flight? To get NASA to push for legislation to encourage it?

What would the legislation look like to encourage, nurture, support and
transition to thriving Earth to LEO market? Private Enterprise?

If "Private Enterprise" is so phantastic, why must it be "nurtured" and
"supported" with tax payer's money????

Damm it. It is PRIVATE so it doesn't need any public money!

Ideas?

Yes, let the market decide!

Amen. These European socialists make me laugh. They never have quite grasped
the concept of "private".

George Evans

George Evans wrote: "Amen. These European socialists make me laugh.
They never have quite grasped the concept of "private".

Go troll some place else george, as the original topic was concerning
the following article.

http://www.stpns.net/view_article.ht...43251064362304

Gutierrez said the fault lies in two words - engineering arrogance.

"NASA engineers were confident that they did everything right,"
Gutierrez said. "They were so sure everything would work as planned
they didn't think an escape system was necessary. The fact is, if
there had been an escape system on Columbia and Challenger, the crews
could have survived."

Actually the design shortcomings of the shuttle system had been known
for along time before the challenger tragedy, (ie no crew escape system
for more than a small percentage of the crew if in place, and only
usable for a small percentage of the flight) and therefore it is the
responsibility of managers and engineers to operate the space shuttle
system safely within it's known parameters, (ie launching on jan 28
1986 was a managerial decision to launch in the coldest wheather
despite engineers recommendations not to launch, and inspite of
evidence of srb "o-ring" burnthrough on the previous launch
sts-61c). Roger Boijoly has been quite outspoken through the years
describing what happened to the challenger and how the disaster could
have been avoided, (his story can be found at onlineethics.org posted
below *5) describing the nasa managerial disregard to his (and
colleages) recomendations not to launch challenger and the sts 51-L
crew on jan 28, 1986 led to the tragedy. The push by nasa to make the
shuttle stack lift more payload weight was implemented with sts-8, by
modifying the solid rocket boosters. A srb thrust modification was
implemented to increase payload lift capability resulting from a
stronger solid fuel propellant coupled with a lighter rocket casing.
The rogers commission concluded the information demonstrating a pattern
of "O ring" burn through was available (*1), but this information
was not integrated into the decision making process by nasa managers,
Boisjoly and others were disregareded by nasa officials, and sts-51l
was tragically launched on the morning of January 28, 1986. STS-61a,
sts-61b and specifically sts-61c the programs 24th flight srb post
flight inspection completed on January 12, demonstrated a pattern of
obvious problems with srb casing burn through and o ring failures
(NSTS-22301 *3). STS-61C flight landed January 18, 1986, just 10 days
prior to the last flight of challenger, and the death of the sts-51L
crew. The two records set that ill fated launch day of Jan 28, 1986,
still stand today, the commonly known coldest launch temp of , and the
lesser known fact that sts-51l utilized a lightweight srb casing and
still was the heaviest shuttle stack to launch at 4,529,681 lbs (*4).
The rogers commission concluded the lightweight SRB casings aggravated
the "joint rotation", a spacing in the O ring seal area that would
allow the hot gases a path to the rocket casing if filler putty had
suffered blow through, a common problem. The O ring failure occurred
after nasa managers clearly disregarded the Morton Thiokol engineer
Roger Boijoly's recommendation to not launch, demonstrating humans
erorred in the decision making process (a failure mode not demonstrated
in the stated risk analysis). But another the fact is the lightweight
srb casings utilized for challengers ascent jan 28, 1986 launching the
heaviest shuttle stack ever used in flight history were concluded to
being "aggravating" to the O ring failure which resulted in the
death of the sts-51L crew (Rogers commission report chapter VII Casing
Joint Design) (*2)

citations

(*1)
http://history.nasa.gov/rogersrep/v1ch4.htm
The Dynamic Characteristics of the Field Joint Seal
"The discussion of static factors which affect joint performance is
based on the assumption that motor segments remain perfectly round, and
that stacked segments are always a perfectly straight column. At launch
the boosters are subjected to forces which bend and twist them. These
forces cause physical changes in the shape of the boosters, actually
squashing them out-of-round and bending them along their entire length.
The dynamic effects of this out-of-roundness are most significant just
after booster ignition when the hold-down bolts have been released
because in the previous 6.6 seconds the boosters have actually been
bent forward by the thrust from the main engines. The elastic energy
stored in the entire system is then released, inducing a bending
vibration in the boosters. This bending causes the case to change its
shape from circular to elliptical, the maximum out-of-roundness
occurring on the 045-315 degree line on the outside of the right
booster. This deflection is a consequence of a vibration and occurs at
a frequency of about 3 cycles per second. The same occurs in the left
booster, only the deflection axis is oriented differently, being a
mirror image of that which takes place in the right side. The dynamic
effects cause an increase in the joint rotation, and, hence, increase
the gap between the tang and clevis by about 10 percent. Another
dynamic load results from the geometry of the struts which attach the
booster to the external tank. Strut P 12 is attached to the booster at
about the 314 degree point and imposes additional inertial forces on
the booster which tend to additionally increase the gap by 10 to 21
percent."


(*2)
Rogers commission report chapter VII Casing Joint Design
page 192 & 193 par
"Upon ignition of the Solid Rocket Motor fuel the operating pressure
increases to 922 psi at 40 degrees F within a little over one half
second (0.648 sec).16 The effect of this pressure increase is to cause
the casings to bulge out around their midsections while being
constrained by the thicker steel sections at the ends, much like a can
of soda after freezing. The casings change shape during the buildup of
motor pressure. This bulging has an effect on the joint. As in the case
of the frozen soda can, the wall of the casing near the joint is no
longer vertical, or perpendicular to the bottom, but angles out to meet
the larger diameter in the center of the casing. NASA calls this change
in angle at the joint "joint rotation." This joint rotation is a
component of an overall spacing problem
that includes: changes caused by casing wear and tear experienced
during refurbishment; case growth (swelling) from pressurizing the
casings; distortion that occurs during shipment of the loaded casings;
and the physical handling of the casings during stacking operations.
The joint rotation problem was aggravated when the steel casings were
made thinner to achieve a reduction in weight and thus an increase in
payload. The rotation problem was further aggravated by changing the
design of the propellant geometry to achieve greater thrust. This
increased the pressure within the casings and thereby increased the
"gap opening"17. These changes compromised the integrity of the
joint seals because joint rotation increases the spacing (gap) between
the tang and the O-ring grooves in the clevis"

17. The Light Weight Casings, first used on STS-6, had thinner casing
walls than the standard steel casings. Light weight casings permitted
flight with heavier payloads. On STS-8, NASA began using the High
Performance Motor (HPM) which developed higher internal pressures while
using the light weight casings. The purpose of the HPM was to further
increase payload capacity"
18 , "Evaluation of TWR-12690 CD, Test Plan for Space Shuttle SRM
Lightweight inter Segment Joint Verification, dated June 10,1980", EP
25 (80-70), June 16, 1980, p. 2."



(*3)
http://ntrs.nasa.gov/archive/nasa/ca...1992075284.pdf
NSTS-22301, page 4
"SOLID ROCKET BOOSTER
The STS 61-C flight utilized lightweight solid rocket motor (SRM)
cases. SRM
propulsion performance was normal and within specification limits, with
propellant burn rates for both SRM's near predicted values. Solid
rocket booster (SRB) thrust differentials were within specification
throughout the flight....

A postflight evaluation of the SRM structure to determine the extent of
damage
revealed the following significant items:
a. A gas path was noted at the 154-degree position of the aft field
joint of the left S_M. Soot was found from the 140-degree to the
178-degree position, and soot was found in the primary groove from the
68-degree to the 183-degree (115 degrees arc) position. C-ring
damagewas noted at the 154-degree position with a maximumerosion depth
of 0.00_ inch and erosion length of 3.5 inches. The 0-ring was affected
by heat over a 14-inch length in this area.
b. A gas path was found from the 273.6-degree to the 309.6-degree (36
degrees arc) position of the left S_Mnozzle joint. Soot was found in
the primary 0-ring groove over the entire 360-degree circumference. A
potential impingement point was located at the 302.4-degree point;
however, no 0-ring damage was found.
c. A gas path was found at the 162-degree point with soot in the
primary 0-ring groove from the lOS-degree to the 220-degree (112
degrees arc) point on the right SRM nozzle joint. 0-ring damage was
found at the 162-degree point with the maximum erosion depth being
0.011 inch and the erosion length being 8 inches. The 0-rlng was
affected by heat over a 26-1nch length in this area.
d. A gas path was found on the outer surface of the igniter at the
130-degree point of the left SRM. Soot was found on the aft side of the
outer Gaskoseal, approaching the primary sea! over a 70-degree arc (130
to 200 degrees), and on the outer edge of the inner Gasko seal over a
130-degree arc (ii0 to 240 degrees), however, no seal damage was found.
e. A gas path was found on the outer surface of the igniter at the
250-degree point of the right S_. Soot was found on the inside edge of
the outer Gasko seal over the entire 360-degree circumference, however,
it did not progress beyond the edge of the seal. There was a slight
discoloration of the metal on both sides of the seal over the entire
360-degree circumference."


*4
http://www.nasa.gov/columbia/caib/PD...BOOK2/G11A.PDF
page 105


*5
Boijoly's information
http://www.onlineethics.org/moral/bo.../RB-intro.html



Open sharing of information is crucial to improving everybody's
understanding of the universe around us.
Tom

George Evans wrote: "Amen. These European socialists make me
laugh.They never have quite grasped the concept of "private".

Go troll some place else george, as the original topic was concerning
the following article.


http://www.stpns.net/view_article.ht...43251064362304

Gutierrez said the fault lies in two words - engineering arrogance.

"NASA engineers were confident that they did everything right,"
Gutierrez said. "They were so sure everything would work as planned
they didn't think an escape system was necessary. The fact is, if
there had been an escape system on Columbia and Challenger, the crews
could have survived."

Actually the design shortcomings of the shuttle system had been known
for along time before the challenger tragedy, (ie no crew escape system
for more than a small percentage of the crew if in place, and only
usable for a small percentage of the flight) and therefore it is the
responsibility of managers and engineers to operate the space shuttle
system safely within it's known parameters, (ie launching on jan 28
1986 was a managerial decision to launch in the coldest wheather
despite engineers recommendations not to launch, and inspite of
evidence of srb "o-ring" burnthrough on the previous launch
sts-61c). Roger Boijoly has been quite outspoken through the years
describing what happened to the challenger and how the disaster could
have been avoided, (his story can be found at onlineethics.org posted
below *5) describing the nasa managerial disregard to his (and
colleages) recomendations not to launch challenger and the sts 51-L
crew on jan 28, 1986 led to the tragedy. The push by nasa to make the
shuttle stack lift more payload weight was implemented with sts-8, by
modifying the solid rocket boosters. A srb thrust modification was
implemented to increase payload lift capability resulting from a
stronger solid fuel propellant coupled with a lighter rocket casing.
The rogers commission concluded the information demonstrating a pattern
of "O ring" burn through was available (*1), but this information
was not integrated into the decision making process by nasa managers,
Boisjoly and others were disregareded by nasa officials, and sts-51l
was tragically launched on the morning of January 28, 1986. STS-61a,
sts-61b and specifically sts-61c the programs 24th flight srb post
flight inspection completed on January 12, demonstrated a pattern of
obvious problems with srb casing burn through and o ring failures
(NSTS-22301 *3). STS-61C flight landed January 18, 1986, just 10 days
prior to the last flight of challenger, and the death of the sts-51L
crew. The two records set that ill fated launch day of Jan 28, 1986,
still stand today, the commonly known coldest launch temp of , and the
lesser known fact that sts-51l utilized a lightweight srb casing and
still was the heaviest shuttle stack to launch at 4,529,681 lbs (*4).
The rogers commission concluded the lightweight SRB casings aggravated
the "joint rotation", a spacing in the O ring seal area that would
allow the hot gases a path to the rocket casing if filler putty had
suffered blow through, a common problem. The O ring failure occurred
after nasa managers clearly disregarded the Morton Thiokol engineer
Roger Boijoly's recommendation to not launch, demonstrating humans
erorred in the decision making process (a failure mode not demonstrated
in the stated risk analysis). But another the fact is the lightweight
srb casings utilized for challengers ascent jan 28, 1986 launching the
heaviest shuttle stack ever used in flight history were concluded to
being "aggravating" to the O ring failure which resulted in the
death of the sts-51L crew (Rogers commission report chapter VII Casing
Joint Design) (*2)

citations

(*1)
http://history.nasa.gov/rogersrep/v1ch4.htm
The Dynamic Characteristics of the Field Joint Seal
"The discussion of static factors which affect joint performance is
based on the assumption that motor segments remain perfectly round, and
that stacked segments are always a perfectly straight column. At launch
the boosters are subjected to forces which bend and twist them. These
forces cause physical changes in the shape of the boosters, actually
squashing them out-of-round and bending them along their entire length.
The dynamic effects of this out-of-roundness are most significant just
after booster ignition when the hold-down bolts have been released
because in the previous 6.6 seconds the boosters have actually been
bent forward by the thrust from the main engines. The elastic energy
stored in the entire system is then released, inducing a bending
vibration in the boosters. This bending causes the case to change its
shape from circular to elliptical, the maximum out-of-roundness
occurring on the 045-315 degree line on the outside of the right
booster. This deflection is a consequence of a vibration and occurs at
a frequency of about 3 cycles per second. The same occurs in the left
booster, only the deflection axis is oriented differently, being a
mirror image of that which takes place in the right side. The dynamic
effects cause an increase in the joint rotation, and, hence, increase
the gap between the tang and clevis by about 10 percent. Another
dynamic load results from the geometry of the struts which attach the
booster to the external tank. Strut P 12 is attached to the booster at
about the 314 degree point and imposes additional inertial forces on
the booster which tend to additionally increase the gap by 10 to 21
percent."


(*2)
Rogers commission report chapter VII Casing Joint Design
page 192 & 193 par
"Upon ignition of the Solid Rocket Motor fuel the operating pressure
increases to 922 psi at 40 degrees F within a little over one half
second (0.648 sec).16 The effect of this pressure increase is to cause
the casings to bulge out around their midsections while being
constrained by the thicker steel sections at the ends, much like a can
of soda after freezing. The casings change shape during the buildup of
motor pressure. This bulging has an effect on the joint. As in the case
of the frozen soda can, the wall of the casing near the joint is no
longer vertical, or perpendicular to the bottom, but angles out to meet
the larger diameter in the center of the casing. NASA calls this change
in angle at the joint "joint rotation." This joint rotation is a
component of an overall spacing problem
that includes: changes caused by casing wear and tear experienced
during refurbishment; case growth (swelling) from pressurizing the
casings; distortion that occurs during shipment of the loaded casings;
and the physical handling of the casings during stacking operations.
The joint rotation problem was aggravated when the steel casings were
made thinner to achieve a reduction in weight and thus an increase in
payload. The rotation problem was further aggravated by changing the
design of the propellant geometry to achieve greater thrust. This
increased the pressure within the casings and thereby increased the
"gap opening"17. These changes compromised the integrity of the
joint seals because joint rotation increases the spacing (gap) between
the tang and the O-ring grooves in the clevis"

17. The Light Weight Casings, first used on STS-6, had thinner casing
walls than the standard steel casings. Light weight casings permitted
flight with heavier payloads. On STS-8, NASA began using the High
Performance Motor (HPM) which developed higher internal pressures while
using the light weight casings. The purpose of the HPM was to further
increase payload capacity"
18 , "Evaluation of TWR-12690 CD, Test Plan for Space Shuttle SRM
Lightweight inter Segment Joint Verification, dated June 10,1980", EP
25 (80-70), June 16, 1980, p. 2."



(*3)
http://ntrs.nasa.gov/archive/nasa/ca...1992075284.pdf
NSTS-22301, page 4
"SOLID ROCKET BOOSTER
The STS 61-C flight utilized lightweight solid rocket motor (SRM)
cases. SRM
propulsion performance was normal and within specification limits, with
propellant burn rates for both SRM's near predicted values. Solid
rocket booster (SRB) thrust differentials were within specification
throughout the flight....

A postflight evaluation of the SRM structure to determine the extent of
damage
revealed the following significant items:
a. A gas path was noted at the 154-degree position of the aft field
joint of the left S_M. Soot was found from the 140-degree to the
178-degree position, and soot was found in the primary groove from the
68-degree to the 183-degree (115 degrees arc) position. C-ring
damagewas noted at the 154-degree position with a maximumerosion depth
of 0.00_ inch and erosion length of 3.5 inches. The 0-ring was affected
by heat over a 14-inch length in this area.
b. A gas path was found from the 273.6-degree to the 309.6-degree (36
degrees arc) position of the left S_Mnozzle joint. Soot was found in
the primary 0-ring groove over the entire 360-degree circumference. A
potential impingement point was located at the 302.4-degree point;
however, no 0-ring damage was found.
c. A gas path was found at the 162-degree point with soot in the
primary 0-ring groove from the lOS-degree to the 220-degree (112
degrees arc) point on the right SRM nozzle joint. 0-ring damage was
found at the 162-degree point with the maximum erosion depth being
0.011 inch and the erosion length being 8 inches. The 0-rlng was
affected by heat over a 26-1nch length in this area.
d. A gas path was found on the outer surface of the igniter at the
130-degree point of the left SRM. Soot was found on the aft side of the
outer Gaskoseal, approaching the primary sea! over a 70-degree arc (130
to 200 degrees), and on the outer edge of the inner Gasko seal over a
130-degree arc (ii0 to 240 degrees), however, no seal damage was found.
e. A gas path was found on the outer surface of the igniter at the
250-degree point of the right S_. Soot was found on the inside edge of
the outer Gasko seal over the entire 360-degree circumference, however,
it did not progress beyond the edge of the seal. There was a slight
discoloration of the metal on both sides of the seal over the entire
360-degree circumference."


*4
http://www.nasa.gov/columbia/caib/PD...BOOK2/G11A.PDF
page 105


*5
Boijoly's information
http://www.onlineethics.org/moral/bo.../RB-intro.html



Open sharing of information is crucial to improving everybody's
understanding of the universe around us.
Tom

George Evans wrote:


Amen. These European socialists make me laugh. They never have quite grasped
the concept of "private".



Yes, but we showed them what Corporals could do! :-)

Nappy and Adolf

Pat Flannery wrote:...
Na, i wont post his writings as they are more off topic trash

Gee pat why dont you try acting like you do in the discussion about the
gemini escape capsule as you seem to be able to act civil and stay on
topic, why dont you try that here otherwise troll some where else bud,
and If you do post here address the trash you posted before otherwise
change your stinky bait.


http://www.stpns.net/view_article.ht...43251064362304

Gutierrez said the fault lies in two words - engineering arrogance.

"NASA engineers were confident that they did everything right,"
Gutierrez said. "They were so sure everything would work as planned
they didn't think an escape system was necessary. The fact is, if
there had been an escape system on Columbia and Challenger, the crews
could have survived."

Actually the design shortcomings of the shuttle system had been known
for along time before the challenger tragedy, (ie no crew escape system
for more than a small percentage of the crew if in place, and only
usable for a small percentage of the flight) and therefore it is the
responsibility of managers and engineers to operate the space shuttle
system safely within it's known parameters, (ie launching on jan 28
1986 was a managerial decision to launch in the coldest wheather
despite engineers recommendations not to launch, and inspite of
evidence of srb "o-ring" burnthrough on the previous launch
sts-61c). Roger Boijoly has been quite outspoken through the years
describing what happened to the challenger and how the disaster could
have been avoided, (his story can be found at onlineethics.org posted
below *5) describing the nasa managerial disregard to his (and
colleages) recomendations not to launch challenger and the sts 51-L
crew on jan 28, 1986 led to the tragedy. The push by nasa to make the
shuttle stack lift more payload weight was implemented with sts-8, by
modifying the solid rocket boosters. A srb thrust modification was
implemented to increase payload lift capability resulting from a
stronger solid fuel propellant coupled with a lighter rocket casing.
The rogers commission concluded the information demonstrating a pattern
of "O ring" burn through was available (*1), but this information
was not integrated into the decision making process by nasa managers,
Boisjoly and others were disregareded by nasa officials, and sts-51l
was tragically launched on the morning of January 28, 1986. STS-61a,
sts-61b and specifically sts-61c the programs 24th flight srb post
flight inspection completed on January 12, demonstrated a pattern of
obvious problems with srb casing burn through and o ring failures
(NSTS-22301 *3). STS-61C flight landed January 18, 1986, just 10 days
prior to the last flight of challenger, and the death of the sts-51L
crew. The two records set that ill fated launch day of Jan 28, 1986,
still stand today, the commonly known coldest launch temp of , and the
lesser known fact that sts-51l utilized a lightweight srb casing and
still was the heaviest shuttle stack to launch at 4,529,681 lbs (*4).
The rogers commission concluded the lightweight SRB casings aggravated
the "joint rotation", a spacing in the O ring seal area that would
allow the hot gases a path to the rocket casing if filler putty had
suffered blow through, a common problem. The O ring failure occurred
after nasa managers clearly disregarded the Morton Thiokol engineer
Roger Boijoly's recommendation to not launch, demonstrating humans
erorred in the decision making process (a failure mode not demonstrated
in the stated risk analysis). But another the fact is the lightweight
srb casings utilized for challengers ascent jan 28, 1986 launching the
heaviest shuttle stack ever used in flight history were concluded to
being "aggravating" to the O ring failure which resulted in the
death of the sts-51L crew (Rogers commission report chapter VII Casing
Joint Design) (*2)

citations

(*1)
http://history.nasa.gov/rogersrep/v1ch4.htm
The Dynamic Characteristics of the Field Joint Seal
"The discussion of static factors which affect joint performance is
based on the assumption that motor segments remain perfectly round, and
that stacked segments are always a perfectly straight column. At launch
the boosters are subjected to forces which bend and twist them. These
forces cause physical changes in the shape of the boosters, actually
squashing them out-of-round and bending them along their entire length.
The dynamic effects of this out-of-roundness are most significant just
after booster ignition when the hold-down bolts have been released
because in the previous 6.6 seconds the boosters have actually been
bent forward by the thrust from the main engines. The elastic energy
stored in the entire system is then released, inducing a bending
vibration in the boosters. This bending causes the case to change its
shape from circular to elliptical, the maximum out-of-roundness
occurring on the 045-315 degree line on the outside of the right
booster. This deflection is a consequence of a vibration and occurs at
a frequency of about 3 cycles per second. The same occurs in the left
booster, only the deflection axis is oriented differently, being a
mirror image of that which takes place in the right side. The dynamic
effects cause an increase in the joint rotation, and, hence, increase
the gap between the tang and clevis by about 10 percent. Another
dynamic load results from the geometry of the struts which attach the
booster to the external tank. Strut P 12 is attached to the booster at
about the 314 degree point and imposes additional inertial forces on
the booster which tend to additionally increase the gap by 10 to 21
percent."


(*2)
Rogers commission report chapter VII Casing Joint Design
page 192 & 193 par
"Upon ignition of the Solid Rocket Motor fuel the operating pressure
increases to 922 psi at 40 degrees F within a little over one half
second (0.648 sec).16 The effect of this pressure increase is to cause
the casings to bulge out around their midsections while being
constrained by the thicker steel sections at the ends, much like a can
of soda after freezing. The casings change shape during the buildup of
motor pressure. This bulging has an effect on the joint. As in the case
of the frozen soda can, the wall of the casing near the joint is no
longer vertical, or perpendicular to the bottom, but angles out to meet
the larger diameter in the center of the casing. NASA calls this change
in angle at the joint "joint rotation." This joint rotation is a
component of an overall spacing problem
that includes: changes caused by casing wear and tear experienced
during refurbishment; case growth (swelling) from pressurizing the
casings; distortion that occurs during shipment of the loaded casings;
and the physical handling of the casings during stacking operations.
The joint rotation problem was aggravated when the steel casings were
made thinner to achieve a reduction in weight and thus an increase in
payload. The rotation problem was further aggravated by changing the
design of the propellant geometry to achieve greater thrust. This
increased the pressure within the casings and thereby increased the
"gap opening"17. These changes compromised the integrity of the
joint seals because joint rotation increases the spacing (gap) between
the tang and the O-ring grooves in the clevis"

17. The Light Weight Casings, first used on STS-6, had thinner casing
walls than the standard steel casings. Light weight casings permitted
flight with heavier payloads. On STS-8, NASA began using the High
Performance Motor (HPM) which developed higher internal pressures while
using the light weight casings. The purpose of the HPM was to further
increase payload capacity"
18 , "Evaluation of TWR-12690 CD, Test Plan for Space Shuttle SRM
Lightweight inter Segment Joint Verification, dated June 10,1980", EP
25 (80-70), June 16, 1980, p. 2."



(*3)
http://ntrs.nasa.gov/archive/nasa/ca...1992075284.pdf
NSTS-22301, page 4
"SOLID ROCKET BOOSTER
The STS 61-C flight utilized lightweight solid rocket motor (SRM)
cases. SRM
propulsion performance was normal and within specification limits, with
propellant burn rates for both SRM's near predicted values. Solid
rocket booster (SRB) thrust differentials were within specification
throughout the flight....

A postflight evaluation of the SRM structure to determine the extent of
damage
revealed the following significant items:
a. A gas path was noted at the 154-degree position of the aft field
joint of the left S_M. Soot was found from the 140-degree to the
178-degree position, and soot was found in the primary groove from the
68-degree to the 183-degree (115 degrees arc) position. C-ring
damagewas noted at the 154-degree position with a maximumerosion depth
of 0.00_ inch and erosion length of 3.5 inches. The 0-ring was affected
by heat over a 14-inch length in this area.
b. A gas path was found from the 273.6-degree to the 309.6-degree (36
degrees arc) position of the left S_Mnozzle joint. Soot was found in
the primary 0-ring groove over the entire 360-degree circumference. A
potential impingement point was located at the 302.4-degree point;
however, no 0-ring damage was found.
c. A gas path was found at the 162-degree point with soot in the
primary 0-ring groove from the lOS-degree to the 220-degree (112
degrees arc) point on the right SRM nozzle joint. 0-ring damage was
found at the 162-degree point with the maximum erosion depth being
0.011 inch and the erosion length being 8 inches. The 0-rlng was
affected by heat over a 26-1nch length in this area.
d. A gas path was found on the outer surface of the igniter at the
130-degree point of the left SRM. Soot was found on the aft side of the
outer Gaskoseal, approaching the primary sea! over a 70-degree arc (130
to 200 degrees), and on the outer edge of the inner Gasko seal over a
130-degree arc (ii0 to 240 degrees), however, no seal damage was found.
e. A gas path was found on the outer surface of the igniter at the
250-degree point of the right S_. Soot was found on the inside edge of
the outer Gasko seal over the entire 360-degree circumference, however,
it did not progress beyond the edge of the seal. There was a slight
discoloration of the metal on both sides of the seal over the entire
360-degree circumference."


*4
http://www.nasa.gov/columbia/caib/PD...BOOK2/G11A.PDF
page 105


*5
Boijoly's information
http://www.onlineethics.org/moral/bo.../RB-intro.html



Open sharing of information is crucial to improving everybody's
understanding of the universe around us.
Tom