NASA Astronaut on Columbia Repair (and others)

For really long life spans we really need to understand the biology of
aging better. But this has been said better by others;

"It is one of the most remarkable things that in all of the biological
sciences there is no clue as to the necessity of death. ... This
suggests to me that is it not at all inevitable and that it is only a
matter of time before the biologists discover what it is that is
causing us the trouble and that this terrible universal disease or
temporariness of the human's body will be cured." -- Richard Feynman

Recent developments;

BioMEMS -

A Grayson "Multi-pulse Drug Delivery from a Resorbable Polymeric
Microchip Device," Nature Materials 2 (2003): 767-72.

Q. Bai and K. D. Wise,"Single-Unit Nerual Recording with Active
Microelectrode Arrays," IEEE Transactions on Biomedical Engineering
48.8 (August 2001):911-20

"'Microbots' Hunt Down Disease," BBC News, June 13,
2001,http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/health/1386440.stm

Sandia National Laboratories press release, "Pac-Man-Like
Microstructure Interacts with Red Blood Cells," August 15, 2001,
http://www.sandia.gov/media/NewsRel/NR2001/gobbler.htm

Freita NANOMEDICINE, vol. 1, Basic Capabilities

Here's what I see happening;

Heart Disease -- putting nanobots in the bloodstream that eat small
amounts of sugars and fats to power themselves and do nothing more than
propel themselves around the blood stream, moving the blood in the
process - reducing and eliminating the need for a functioning heart

Cancer -- putting nanobots in the blood and lymphatic augment the
natural controls on this disease by seeking out and destroying
cancerous cells wherever they are found.

Joints/Ligaments/Bones -- nanobots that infiltrate and maintain the
health of the skeletal structure of the body.

Diabetes/Liver/Lung/Stomach/Intestine Disorders -- nanobots that
monitor levels of important chemicals in the blood stream and in the
organs themselves to maintain artificially chemicals at their desired
levels - reducing or eliminating the need for functioning organs of
this type. .

Skin -- nanobots that monitor skin conditions and assist in maintaining
its youthful appearance and function.

Muscle -- nanobots that infiltrate muscles and maintain their level of
function and structure (including heart)

Brain/Nervous system -- nanobots that infiltrate the brain and nervous
system to maintain its level of function and operation.

Circulatory - nanobots that infiltrate the circulatory systemand
maintain its level of function and structure.

The development and perfection of these eight core populations of
nanobots would do much to arrest the aging process and extend the
lifespan of humans over very long periods of time.

Derek Lyons wrote:
"columbiaaccidentinvestigation"
wrote:

yet more handwaving and evasion.
Touch-twice life. Eat. Drink. Laugh.

-Resolved: To be more temperate in my postings.
Oct 5th, 2004 JDL

Now derek just answer how you would have stopped the launch of
challenger jan 28, 1986, without fallacious maneuvers or "self
stimulating your intellectual insecurities by attempting to boost up
you're own ego at the expense of others, so take off the blinders and
open youre eyes, and just read historical facts, as this is not about
calling me names, it is about the safety and success of our space
program...

(fallacious maneuver)
http://attitudeadjustment.tripod.com/Books/Logic.htm
"Why would people use these fallacious maneuvers when the results can
be so harmful? Generally, only two reasons exist:
1. The person has made a honest error in logic
2. The person has deliberately sidestepped logic in order to satisfy
his or her own ego
The first reason can generally be handled with little fanfare. Simply
point out the error in thinking, and guide the person to the correct
line of thinking while allowing the person to save face. This sort of
disagreement can sometimes be refreshing, allowing new insights and
mental connections not previously made. When fallacies are used for the
second reason, I like to call these fallacies slick maneuvers. Why?
Because they are frequently used to garner support for statements or
actions that inflate the person's ego
at the long-term expense of others."


ROGERS COMMISSION TESTIMONY
http://history.nasa.gov/rogersrep/v1ch5.htm
Report of the PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION on the Space Shuttle Challenger
Accident
Chapter V: The Contributing Cause of The Accident.
[82] The decision to launch the Challenger was flawed. Those who made
that decision were unaware of the recent history of problems concerning
the O-rings and the joint and were unaware of the initial written
recommendation of the contractor advising against the launch at
temperatures below 53 degrees Fahrenheit and the continuing opposition
of the engineers at Thiokol after the management reversed its position.
They did not have a clear understanding of Rockwell's concern that it
was not safe to launch because of ice on the pad. If the decisionmakers
had known all of the facts, it is highly unlikely that they would have
decided to launch 51-L on January 28, 1986.

Flaws In The Decision Making Process
In addition to analyzing all available evidence concerning the material
causes of the accident on January 28, the Commission examined the chain
of decisions that culminated in approval of the launch. It concluded
that the decision making process was flawed in several ways. The actual
events that produced the information upon which the approval of launch
was based are recounted and appraised in the sections of this chapter.
The discussion that follows relies heavily on excerpts from the
testimony of those involved in the management judgments that led to the
launch of the Challenger under conditions described.
That testimony reveals failures in communication that resulted in a
decision to launch 51-L based on incomplete and sometimes misleading
information, a conflict between engineering data and management
judgments, and a NASA management structure that permitted internal
flight safety problems to bypass key Shuttle managers.
The Shuttle Flight Readiness Review is a carefully planned,
step-by-step activity, established by NASA program directive SPO-PD
710.5A, 1 designed to certify the readiness of all components of the
Space Shuttle assembly. The process is focused upon the Level I Flight
Readiness Review, held approximately two weeks before a launch. The
Level I review is a conference chaired by the NASA Associate
Administrator for Space Flight and supported by the NASA Chief
Engineer, the Program Manager, the center directors and project
managers from Johnson, Marshall and Kennedy, along with senior
contractor representatives.
The formal portion of the process is initiated by directive from the
Associate Administrator for Space Flight. The directive outlines the
schedule for the Level I Flight Readiness Review and for the steps that
precede it. The process begins at Level IV with the contractors
formally certifying-in writing-the flight readiness of the elements for
which they are responsible. Certification is made to the appropriate
Level III NASA project managers at Johnson and Marshall. Additionally,
at Marshall the review is followed by a presentation directly to the
Center Director. At Kennedy the Level III review, chaired by the Center
Director, verifies readiness of the launch support elements.
The next step in the process is the Certification of Flight Readiness
to the Level II Program Manager at Johnson. In this review each Space
Shuttle program element endorses that it has satisfactorily completed
the manufacture, [83] assembly, test and checkout of the pertinent
element, including the contractors" certification that design and
performance are up to standard. The Flight Readiness Review process
culminates in the Level I review.
In the initial notice of the review, the Level I directive establishes
a Mission Management Team for the particular mission. The team assumes
responsibility for each Shuttle's readiness for a period commencing 48
hours before launch and continuing through post-landing crew egress and
the safing of the Orbiter. On call throughout the entire period, the
Mission Management Team supports the Associate Administrator for Space
Flight and the Program Manager.
A structured Mission Management Team meeting-called L-1-is held 24
hours, or one day, prior to each scheduled launch. Its agenda includes
closeout of any open work, a closeout of any Flight Readiness Review
action items, a discussion of new or continuing anomalies, and an
updated briefing on anticipated weather conditions at the launch site
and at the abort landing sites in different parts of the world. It is
standard practice of Level-I and II officials to encourage the
reporting of new problems or concerns that might develop in the
interval between the Flight Readiness Review and the L-1 meeting, and
between the L-1 and launch.
In a procedural sense, the process described... At approximately 8:45
p.m. Eastern Standard Time, Phase 2 of the teleconference commenced,
the Thiokol charts and written data having arrived at Kennedy Space
Center by telefax. (A table of teleconference participants is included
with Chronology of Events.) The charts presented a history of the
O-ring erosion and blow-by in the Solid Rocket Booster joints of
previous flights, presented the results of subscale testing at Thiokol
and the results of static tests of Solid Rocket Motors. In the
following testimony, Roger Boisjoly, Allan McDonald and Larry Mulloy
expressed their recollections of this teleconference up to the point
when an off-net caucus was requested: 9

Mr. Boisjoly: I expressed deep concern about launching at low
temperature. I presented Chart 2-1 with emphasis-now, 2-1, if you want
to see it, I have it, but basically that was the chart that summarized
the primary concerns, and that was the chart that I pulled right out of
the Washington presentation without changing one word of it because it
was still applicable, and it addresses the highest concern of the field
joint in both the ignition transient condition and the steady state
condition, and it really sets down the rationale for why we were
continuing to fly. Basically, if erosion penetrates the primary O-ring
seal, there is a higher probability of no secondary seal capability in
the steady state condition. And I had two sub-bullets under that which
stated bench testing showed O-ring not capable of maintaining contact
with metal parts, gap, opening rate to maximum operating pressure. I
had another bullet which stated bench testing showed capability to
maintain O-ring contact during initial phase (0 to 170 milliseconds of
transient). That was my comfort basis of continuing to fly under normal
circumstances, normal being within the data base we had.
I emphasized, when I presented that chart about the changing of the
timing function of the O-ring as it attempted to seal. I was concerned
that we may go from that first beginning region into that intermediate
region, from O to 170 being the first region, and 170 to 330 being the
intermediate region where we didn't have a high probability of sealing
or seating.
I then presented Chart 2-2 with added concerns related to the timing
function. And basically on that chart, I started off talking about a
lower temperature than current data base results in changing the
primary O-ring sealing timing function, and I discussed the SRM-15
[Flight 51-C, January, 1985] observations, namely, the 15A [Left SRM,
Flight 51-C] motor had 80 degrees arc black grease between the O-rings,
and make no mistake about it, when I say black, I mean black just like
coal. It was jet black. And SRM-15B [Right SRM, Flight 51-C] had a 110
degree arc of black grease between the O-rings. We would have low
O-ring squeeze due to low.....


[89] ....temperature which I calculated earlier in the day. We should
have higher O-ring Shore hardness.
Now, that would be harder. And what that material really is, it would
be likened to trying to shove a brick into a crack versus a sponge.
That is a good analogy for purposes of this discussion. I also
mentioned that thicker grease, as a result of lower temperatures, would
have a higher viscosity. It wouldn't be as slick and slippery as it
would be at room temperature. And so it would be a little bit more
difficult to move across it.
We would have higher O-ring pressure actuation time, in my opinion, and
that is what I presented.... These are the sum and substance of what I
just presented. If action time increases, then the threshold of
secondary seal pressurization capability is approached. That was my
fear. If the threshold is reached, then secondary seal may not be
capable of being pressurized, and that was the bottom line of
everything that had been presented up to that point.
Chairman Rogers: Did anybody take issue with you?
Mr. Boisjoly: Well, I am coming to that. I also showed a chart of the
joint with an exaggerated cross section to show the seal lifted off,
which has been shown to everybody. I was asked, yes, at that point in
time I was asked to quantify my concerns, and I said I couldn't. I
couldn't quantify it. I had no data to quantify it, but I did say I
knew that it was away from goodness in the current data base. Someone
on the net commented that we had soot blow-by on SRM-22 [Flight 61-A,
October, 1985] which was launched at 75 degrees. I don't remember who
made the comment, but that is where the first comment came in about the
disparity between my conclusion and the observed data because SRM-22
[Flight 61-A, October, 1985] had blow-by at essentially a room
temperature launch.
I then said that SRM-15 [Flight 51-C, January, 1985] had much more
blow-by indication and that it was indeed telling us that lower
temperature was a factor. This was supported by inspection of flown
hardware by myself. I was asked again for data to support my claim, and
I said I have none other than what is being presented, and I had been
trying to get resilience data, Arnie and I both, since last October,
and that statement was mentioned on the net.

Others in the room presented their charts, and the main telecon session
concluded with Bob Lund, who is our Vice President of....


[90] ....Engineering, presenting his conclusions and recommendations
charts which were based on our data input up to that point. Listeners
on the telecon were not pleased with the conclusions and the
recommendations.
Chairman Rogers: What was the conclusion ?
Mr. Boisjoly: The conclusion was we should not fly outside of our data
base, which was 53 degrees. Those were the conclusions. And we were
quite pleased because we knew in advance, having participated in the
preparation, what the conclusions were, and we felt very comfortable
with that.
Mr. Acheson: Who presented that conclusion?
Mr. Boisjoly: Mr. Bob Lund. He had prepared those charts. He had input
from other people. He had actually physically prepared the charts. It
was about that time that Mr. Hardy from Marshall was asked what he
thought about the MTI [Morton Thiokol] recommendation, and he said he
was appalled at the MTI decision. Mr. Hardy was also asked about
launching, and he said no, not if the contractor recommended not
launching, he would not go against the contractor and launch.
There was a short discussion that ensued about temperature not being a
discriminator between SRM-15 [Flight 51-C] and SRM-22 [Flight 61-A],
and shortly after, I believe it was Mr. Kilminster asked if- excuse me.
I'm getting confused here. Mr. Kilminster was asked by NASA if he would
launch, and he said no because the engineering recommendation was not
to launch.
Then MTI management then asked for a five-minute caucus. I'm not sure
exactly who asked for that, but it was asked in such a manner that I
remember it was asked for, a five-minute caucus, which we put on- the
line on mute and went off-line with the rest of the net.
Chairman Rogers: Mr. Boisjoly, at the time that you made the-that
Thiokol made the recommendation not to launch, was that the unanimous
recommendation as far as you knew?
Mr. Boisjoly: Yes. I have to make something clear. I have been
distressed by the things that have been appearing in the paper and
things that have been said in general, and there was never one
positive, pro-launch statement ever made by anybody. There have been
some feelings since then that folks have expressed that they would
support the decision, but there was not one positive statement for
launch ever made in that room.

Open sharing of information is crucial to improving everybody's
understanding of the universe around us.
Tom

columbiaaccidentinvestigation wrote:

Now derek just answer how you would have stopped the launch of
challenger jan 28, 1986?

Please pay attention: Derek has already answered the question in full.
No further response is required.

--
Dave Michelson

Dave Michelson wrote:
columbiaaccidentinvestigation wrote:

Now derek just answer how you would have stopped the launch of
challenger jan 28, 1986?

Please pay attention: Derek has already answered the question in full.
No further response is required.

--
Dave Michelson


Actually derek (and others) have not answered what he or they would
have done in roger boisjoly's place on jan 28 1986, in attempting to
stop the tragic launch of sts-51l, would you like to answer for him, or
let him answer himself?

Now derek just answer how you would have stopped the launch of
challenger jan 28, 1986, without fallacious maneuvers or "self
stimulating your intellectual insecurities by attempting to boost up
you're own ego at the expense of others, so take off the blinders and
open youre eyes, and just read historical facts, as this is not about
calling me names, it is about the safety and success of our space
program...

(fallacious maneuver)
http://attitudeadjustment.tripod.com/Books/Logic.htm
"Why would people use these fallacious maneuvers when the results can
be so harmful? Generally, only two reasons exist:
1. The person has made a honest error in logic
2. The person has deliberately sidestepped logic in order to satisfy
his or her own ego
The first reason can generally be handled with little fanfare. Simply
point out the error in thinking, and guide the person to the correct
line of thinking while allowing the person to save face. This sort of
disagreement can sometimes be refreshing, allowing new insights and
mental connections not previously made. When fallacies are used for the
second reason, I like to call these fallacies slick maneuvers. Why?
Because they are frequently used to garner support for statements or
actions that inflate the person's ego
at the long-term expense of others."


ROGERS COMMISSION TESTIMONY
http://history.nasa.gov/rogersrep/v1ch5.htm
Report of the PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION on the Space Shuttle Challenger
Accident
Chapter V: The Contributing Cause of The Accident.
[82] The decision to launch the Challenger was flawed. Those who made
that decision were unaware of the recent history of problems concerning
the O-rings and the joint and were unaware of the initial written
recommendation of the contractor advising against the launch at
temperatures below 53 degrees Fahrenheit and the continuing opposition
of the engineers at Thiokol after the management reversed its position.
They did not have a clear understanding of Rockwell's concern that it
was not safe to launch because of ice on the pad. If the decisionmakers
had known all of the facts, it is highly unlikely that they would have
decided to launch 51-L on January 28, 1986.

Flaws In The Decision Making Process
In addition to analyzing all available evidence concerning the material
causes of the accident on January 28, the Commission examined the chain
of decisions that culminated in approval of the launch. It concluded
that the decision making process was flawed in several ways. The actual
events that produced the information upon which the approval of launch
was based are recounted and appraised in the sections of this chapter.
The discussion that follows relies heavily on excerpts from the
testimony of those involved in the management judgments that led to the
launch of the Challenger under conditions described.
That testimony reveals failures in communication that resulted in a
decision to launch 51-L based on incomplete and sometimes misleading
information, a conflict between engineering data and management
judgments, and a NASA management structure that permitted internal
flight safety problems to bypass key Shuttle managers.
The Shuttle Flight Readiness Review is a carefully planned,
step-by-step activity, established by NASA program directive SPO-PD
710.5A, 1 designed to certify the readiness of all components of the
Space Shuttle assembly. The process is focused upon the Level I Flight
Readiness Review, held approximately two weeks before a launch. The
Level I review is a conference chaired by the NASA Associate
Administrator for Space Flight and supported by the NASA Chief
Engineer, the Program Manager, the center directors and project
managers from Johnson, Marshall and Kennedy, along with senior
contractor representatives.
The formal portion of the process is initiated by directive from the
Associate Administrator for Space Flight. The directive outlines the
schedule for the Level I Flight Readiness Review and for the steps that
precede it. The process begins at Level IV with the contractors
formally certifying-in writing-the flight readiness of the elements for
which they are responsible. Certification is made to the appropriate
Level III NASA project managers at Johnson and Marshall. Additionally,
at Marshall the review is followed by a presentation directly to the
Center Director. At Kennedy the Level III review, chaired by the Center
Director, verifies readiness of the launch support elements.
The next step in the process is the Certification of Flight Readiness
to the Level II Program Manager at Johnson. In this review each Space
Shuttle program element endorses that it has satisfactorily completed
the manufacture, [83] assembly, test and checkout of the pertinent
element, including the contractors" certification that design and
performance are up to standard. The Flight Readiness Review process
culminates in the Level I review.
In the initial notice of the review, the Level I directive establishes
a Mission Management Team for the particular mission. The team assumes
responsibility for each Shuttle's readiness for a period commencing 48
hours before launch and continuing through post-landing crew egress and
the safing of the Orbiter. On call throughout the entire period, the
Mission Management Team supports the Associate Administrator for Space
Flight and the Program Manager.
A structured Mission Management Team meeting-called L-1-is held 24
hours, or one day, prior to each scheduled launch. Its agenda includes
closeout of any open work, a closeout of any Flight Readiness Review
action items, a discussion of new or continuing anomalies, and an
updated briefing on anticipated weather conditions at the launch site
and at the abort landing sites in different parts of the world. It is
standard practice of Level-I and II officials to encourage the
reporting of new problems or concerns that might develop in the
interval between the Flight Readiness Review and the L-1 meeting, and
between the L-1 and launch.
In a procedural sense, the process described... At approximately 8:45
p.m. Eastern Standard Time, Phase 2 of the teleconference commenced,
the Thiokol charts and written data having arrived at Kennedy Space
Center by telefax. (A table of teleconference participants is included
with Chronology of Events.) The charts presented a history of the
O-ring erosion and blow-by in the Solid Rocket Booster joints of
previous flights, presented the results of subscale testing at Thiokol
and the results of static tests of Solid Rocket Motors. In the
following testimony, Roger Boisjoly, Allan McDonald and Larry Mulloy
expressed their recollections of this teleconference up to the point
when an off-net caucus was requested: 9

Mr. Boisjoly: I expressed deep concern about launching at low
temperature. I presented Chart 2-1 with emphasis-now, 2-1, if you want
to see it, I have it, but basically that was the chart that summarized
the primary concerns, and that was the chart that I pulled right out of
the Washington presentation without changing one word of it because it
was still applicable, and it addresses the highest concern of the field
joint in both the ignition transient condition and the steady state
condition, and it really sets down the rationale for why we were
continuing to fly. Basically, if erosion penetrates the primary O-ring
seal, there is a higher probability of no secondary seal capability in
the steady state condition. And I had two sub-bullets under that which
stated bench testing showed O-ring not capable of maintaining contact
with metal parts, gap, opening rate to maximum operating pressure. I
had another bullet which stated bench testing showed capability to
maintain O-ring contact during initial phase (0 to 170 milliseconds of
transient). That was my comfort basis of continuing to fly under normal
circumstances, normal being within the data base we had.
I emphasized, when I presented that chart about the changing of the
timing function of the O-ring as it attempted to seal. I was concerned
that we may go from that first beginning region into that intermediate
region, from O to 170 being the first region, and 170 to 330 being the
intermediate region where we didn't have a high probability of sealing
or seating.
I then presented Chart 2-2 with added concerns related to the timing
function. And basically on that chart, I started off talking about a
lower temperature than current data base results in changing the
primary O-ring sealing timing function, and I discussed the SRM-15
[Flight 51-C, January, 1985] observations, namely, the 15A [Left SRM,
Flight 51-C] motor had 80 degrees arc black grease between the O-rings,
and make no mistake about it, when I say black, I mean black just like
coal. It was jet black. And SRM-15B [Right SRM, Flight 51-C] had a 110
degree arc of black grease between the O-rings. We would have low
O-ring squeeze due to low.....


[89] ....temperature which I calculated earlier in the day. We should
have higher O-ring Shore hardness.
Now, that would be harder. And what that material really is, it would
be likened to trying to shove a brick into a crack versus a sponge.
That is a good analogy for purposes of this discussion. I also
mentioned that thicker grease, as a result of lower temperatures, would
have a higher viscosity. It wouldn't be as slick and slippery as it
would be at room temperature. And so it would be a little bit more
difficult to move across it.
We would have higher O-ring pressure actuation time, in my opinion, and
that is what I presented.... These are the sum and substance of what I
just presented. If action time increases, then the threshold of
secondary seal pressurization capability is approached. That was my
fear. If the threshold is reached, then secondary seal may not be
capable of being pressurized, and that was the bottom line of
everything that had been presented up to that point.
Chairman Rogers: Did anybody take issue with you?
Mr. Boisjoly: Well, I am coming to that. I also showed a chart of the
joint with an exaggerated cross section to show the seal lifted off,
which has been shown to everybody. I was asked, yes, at that point in
time I was asked to quantify my concerns, and I said I couldn't. I
couldn't quantify it. I had no data to quantify it, but I did say I
knew that it was away from goodness in the current data base. Someone
on the net commented that we had soot blow-by on SRM-22 [Flight 61-A,
October, 1985] which was launched at 75 degrees. I don't remember who
made the comment, but that is where the first comment came in about the
disparity between my conclusion and the observed data because SRM-22
[Flight 61-A, October, 1985] had blow-by at essentially a room
temperature launch.
I then said that SRM-15 [Flight 51-C, January, 1985] had much more
blow-by indication and that it was indeed telling us that lower
temperature was a factor. This was supported by inspection of flown
hardware by myself. I was asked again for data to support my claim, and
I said I have none other than what is being presented, and I had been
trying to get resilience data, Arnie and I both, since last October,
and that statement was mentioned on the net.

Others in the room presented their charts, and the main telecon session
concluded with Bob Lund, who is our Vice President of....


[90] ....Engineering, presenting his conclusions and recommendations
charts which were based on our data input up to that point. Listeners
on the telecon were not pleased with the conclusions and the
recommendations.
Chairman Rogers: What was the conclusion ?
Mr. Boisjoly: The conclusion was we should not fly outside of our data
base, which was 53 degrees. Those were the conclusions. And we were
quite pleased because we knew in advance, having participated in the
preparation, what the conclusions were, and we felt very comfortable
with that.
Mr. Acheson: Who presented that conclusion?
Mr. Boisjoly: Mr. Bob Lund. He had prepared those charts. He had input
from other people. He had actually physically prepared the charts. It
was about that time that Mr. Hardy from Marshall was asked what he
thought about the MTI [Morton Thiokol] recommendation, and he said he
was appalled at the MTI decision. Mr. Hardy was also asked about
launching, and he said no, not if the contractor recommended not
launching, he would not go against the contractor and launch.
There was a short discussion that ensued about temperature not being a
discriminator between SRM-15 [Flight 51-C] and SRM-22 [Flight 61-A],
and shortly after, I believe it was Mr. Kilminster asked if- excuse me.
I'm getting confused here. Mr. Kilminster was asked by NASA if he would
launch, and he said no because the engineering recommendation was not
to launch.
Then MTI management then asked for a five-minute caucus. I'm not sure
exactly who asked for that, but it was asked in such a manner that I
remember it was asked for, a five-minute caucus, which we put on- the
line on mute and went off-line with the rest of the net.
Chairman Rogers: Mr. Boisjoly, at the time that you made the-that
Thiokol made the recommendation not to launch, was that the unanimous
recommendation as far as you knew?
Mr. Boisjoly: Yes. I have to make something clear. I have been
distressed by the things that have been appearing in the paper and
things that have been said in general, and there was never one
positive, pro-launch statement ever made by anybody. There have been
some feelings since then that folks have expressed that they would
support the decision, but there was not one positive statement for
launch ever made in that room.

Open sharing of information is crucial to improving everybody's
understanding of the universe around us.
Tom

On Wed, 22 Nov 2006 19:57:19 GMT, Dave Michelson
wrote:

Please pay attention: Derek has already answered the question in full.
No further response is required.

....Please pay attention: Derek has also killfiled the obvious Znkfba
troll. The only further response required is that you do the same.

OM
--
]=====================================[
] OMBlog - http://www.io.com/~o_m/omworld [
] Let's face it: Sometimes you *need* [
] an obnoxious opinion in your day! [
]=====================================[

OM wrote:
On Wed, 22 Nov 2006 19:57:19 GMT, Dave Michelson
wrote:

Please pay attention: Derek has already answered the question in full.
No further response is required.

...Please pay attention: Derek has also killfiled the obvious Znkfba
troll. The only further response required is that you do the same.

Now om that your reply is exactly what I am talking about, as you are
self stimulating your intellectual insecurities by attempting to boost
up you're own ego at the expense of others. So just get together
with youre "buddies" and answer how you would have stopped the
launch of challenger jan 28, 1986, without fallacious maneuvers or
calling me names, for you mistkanely think this discussion is about
one person, but in reality we are discussing the safety and success of
our space program...

(fallacious maneuver)
http://attitudeadjustment.tripod.com/Books/Logic.htm
"Why would people use these fallacious maneuvers when the results can
be so harmful? Generally, only two reasons exist:
1. The person has made a honest error in logic
2. The person has deliberately sidestepped logic in order to satisfy
his or her own ego
The first reason can generally be handled with little fanfare. Simply
point out the error in thinking, and guide the person to the correct
line of thinking while allowing the person to save face. This sort of
disagreement can sometimes be refreshing, allowing new insights and
mental connections not previously made. When fallacies are used for the
second reason, I like to call these fallacies slick maneuvers. Why?
Because they are frequently used to garner support for statements or
actions that inflate the person's ego
at the long-term expense of others."


ROGERS COMMISSION TESTIMONY
http://history.nasa.gov/rogersrep/v1ch5.htm
Report of the PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION on the Space Shuttle Challenger
Accident
Chapter V: The Contributing Cause of The Accident.
[82] The decision to launch the Challenger was flawed. Those who made
that decision were unaware of the recent history of problems concerning
the O-rings and the joint and were unaware of the initial written
recommendation of the contractor advising against the launch at
temperatures below 53 degrees Fahrenheit and the continuing opposition
of the engineers at Thiokol after the management reversed its position.
They did not have a clear understanding of Rockwell's concern that it
was not safe to launch because of ice on the pad. If the decisionmakers
had known all of the facts, it is highly unlikely that they would have
decided to launch 51-L on January 28, 1986.

Flaws In The Decision Making Process
In addition to analyzing all available evidence concerning the material
causes of the accident on January 28, the Commission examined the chain
of decisions that culminated in approval of the launch. It concluded
that the decision making process was flawed in several ways. The actual
events that produced the information upon which the approval of launch
was based are recounted and appraised in the sections of this chapter.
The discussion that follows relies heavily on excerpts from the
testimony of those involved in the management judgments that led to the
launch of the Challenger under conditions described.
That testimony reveals failures in communication that resulted in a
decision to launch 51-L based on incomplete and sometimes misleading
information, a conflict between engineering data and management
judgments, and a NASA management structure that permitted internal
flight safety problems to bypass key Shuttle managers.
The Shuttle Flight Readiness Review is a carefully planned,
step-by-step activity, established by NASA program directive SPO-PD
710.5A, 1 designed to certify the readiness of all components of the
Space Shuttle assembly. The process is focused upon the Level I Flight
Readiness Review, held approximately two weeks before a launch. The
Level I review is a conference chaired by the NASA Associate
Administrator for Space Flight and supported by the NASA Chief
Engineer, the Program Manager, the center directors and project
managers from Johnson, Marshall and Kennedy, along with senior
contractor representatives.
The formal portion of the process is initiated by directive from the
Associate Administrator for Space Flight. The directive outlines the
schedule for the Level I Flight Readiness Review and for the steps that
precede it. The process begins at Level IV with the contractors
formally certifying-in writing-the flight readiness of the elements for
which they are responsible. Certification is made to the appropriate
Level III NASA project managers at Johnson and Marshall. Additionally,
at Marshall the review is followed by a presentation directly to the
Center Director. At Kennedy the Level III review, chaired by the Center
Director, verifies readiness of the launch support elements.
The next step in the process is the Certification of Flight Readiness
to the Level II Program Manager at Johnson. In this review each Space
Shuttle program element endorses that it has satisfactorily completed
the manufacture, [83] assembly, test and checkout of the pertinent
element, including the contractors" certification that design and
performance are up to standard. The Flight Readiness Review process
culminates in the Level I review.
In the initial notice of the review, the Level I directive establishes
a Mission Management Team for the particular mission. The team assumes
responsibility for each Shuttle's readiness for a period commencing 48
hours before launch and continuing through post-landing crew egress and
the safing of the Orbiter. On call throughout the entire period, the
Mission Management Team supports the Associate Administrator for Space
Flight and the Program Manager.
A structured Mission Management Team meeting-called L-1-is held 24
hours, or one day, prior to each scheduled launch. Its agenda includes
closeout of any open work, a closeout of any Flight Readiness Review
action items, a discussion of new or continuing anomalies, and an
updated briefing on anticipated weather conditions at the launch site
and at the abort landing sites in different parts of the world. It is
standard practice of Level-I and II officials to encourage the
reporting of new problems or concerns that might develop in the
interval between the Flight Readiness Review and the L-1 meeting, and
between the L-1 and launch.
In a procedural sense, the process described... At approximately 8:45
p.m. Eastern Standard Time, Phase 2 of the teleconference commenced,
the Thiokol charts and written data having arrived at Kennedy Space
Center by telefax. (A table of teleconference participants is included
with Chronology of Events.) The charts presented a history of the
O-ring erosion and blow-by in the Solid Rocket Booster joints of
previous flights, presented the results of subscale testing at Thiokol
and the results of static tests of Solid Rocket Motors. In the
following testimony, Roger Boisjoly, Allan McDonald and Larry Mulloy
expressed their recollections of this teleconference up to the point
when an off-net caucus was requested: 9

Mr. Boisjoly: I expressed deep concern about launching at low
temperature. I presented Chart 2-1 with emphasis-now, 2-1, if you want
to see it, I have it, but basically that was the chart that summarized
the primary concerns, and that was the chart that I pulled right out of
the Washington presentation without changing one word of it because it
was still applicable, and it addresses the highest concern of the field
joint in both the ignition transient condition and the steady state
condition, and it really sets down the rationale for why we were
continuing to fly. Basically, if erosion penetrates the primary O-ring
seal, there is a higher probability of no secondary seal capability in
the steady state condition. And I had two sub-bullets under that which
stated bench testing showed O-ring not capable of maintaining contact
with metal parts, gap, opening rate to maximum operating pressure. I
had another bullet which stated bench testing showed capability to
maintain O-ring contact during initial phase (0 to 170 milliseconds of
transient). That was my comfort basis of continuing to fly under normal
circumstances, normal being within the data base we had.
I emphasized, when I presented that chart about the changing of the
timing function of the O-ring as it attempted to seal. I was concerned
that we may go from that first beginning region into that intermediate
region, from O to 170 being the first region, and 170 to 330 being the
intermediate region where we didn't have a high probability of sealing
or seating.
I then presented Chart 2-2 with added concerns related to the timing
function. And basically on that chart, I started off talking about a
lower temperature than current data base results in changing the
primary O-ring sealing timing function, and I discussed the SRM-15
[Flight 51-C, January, 1985] observations, namely, the 15A [Left SRM,
Flight 51-C] motor had 80 degrees arc black grease between the O-rings,
and make no mistake about it, when I say black, I mean black just like
coal. It was jet black. And SRM-15B [Right SRM, Flight 51-C] had a 110
degree arc of black grease between the O-rings. We would have low
O-ring squeeze due to low.....


[89] ....temperature which I calculated earlier in the day. We should
have higher O-ring Shore hardness.
Now, that would be harder. And what that material really is, it would
be likened to trying to shove a brick into a crack versus a sponge.
That is a good analogy for purposes of this discussion. I also
mentioned that thicker grease, as a result of lower temperatures, would
have a higher viscosity. It wouldn't be as slick and slippery as it
would be at room temperature. And so it would be a little bit more
difficult to move across it.
We would have higher O-ring pressure actuation time, in my opinion, and
that is what I presented.... These are the sum and substance of what I
just presented. If action time increases, then the threshold of
secondary seal pressurization capability is approached. That was my
fear. If the threshold is reached, then secondary seal may not be
capable of being pressurized, and that was the bottom line of
everything that had been presented up to that point.
Chairman Rogers: Did anybody take issue with you?
Mr. Boisjoly: Well, I am coming to that. I also showed a chart of the
joint with an exaggerated cross section to show the seal lifted off,
which has been shown to everybody. I was asked, yes, at that point in
time I was asked to quantify my concerns, and I said I couldn't. I
couldn't quantify it. I had no data to quantify it, but I did say I
knew that it was away from goodness in the current data base. Someone
on the net commented that we had soot blow-by on SRM-22 [Flight 61-A,
October, 1985] which was launched at 75 degrees. I don't remember who
made the comment, but that is where the first comment came in about the
disparity between my conclusion and the observed data because SRM-22
[Flight 61-A, October, 1985] had blow-by at essentially a room
temperature launch.
I then said that SRM-15 [Flight 51-C, January, 1985] had much more
blow-by indication and that it was indeed telling us that lower
temperature was a factor. This was supported by inspection of flown
hardware by myself. I was asked again for data to support my claim, and
I said I have none other than what is being presented, and I had been
trying to get resilience data, Arnie and I both, since last October,
and that statement was mentioned on the net.

Others in the room presented their charts, and the main telecon session
concluded with Bob Lund, who is our Vice President of....


[90] ....Engineering, presenting his conclusions and recommendations
charts which were based on our data input up to that point. Listeners
on the telecon were not pleased with the conclusions and the
recommendations.
Chairman Rogers: What was the conclusion ?
Mr. Boisjoly: The conclusion was we should not fly outside of our data
base, which was 53 degrees. Those were the conclusions. And we were
quite pleased because we knew in advance, having participated in the
preparation, what the conclusions were, and we felt very comfortable
with that.
Mr. Acheson: Who presented that conclusion?
Mr. Boisjoly: Mr. Bob Lund. He had prepared those charts. He had input
from other people. He had actually physically prepared the charts. It
was about that time that Mr. Hardy from Marshall was asked what he
thought about the MTI [Morton Thiokol] recommendation, and he said he
was appalled at the MTI decision. Mr. Hardy was also asked about
launching, and he said no, not if the contractor recommended not
launching, he would not go against the contractor and launch.
There was a short discussion that ensued about temperature not being a
discriminator between SRM-15 [Flight 51-C] and SRM-22 [Flight 61-A],
and shortly after, I believe it was Mr. Kilminster asked if- excuse me.
I'm getting confused here. Mr. Kilminster was asked by NASA if he would
launch, and he said no because the engineering recommendation was not
to launch.
Then MTI management then asked for a five-minute caucus. I'm not sure
exactly who asked for that, but it was asked in such a manner that I
remember it was asked for, a five-minute caucus, which we put on- the
line on mute and went off-line with the rest of the net.
Chairman Rogers: Mr. Boisjoly, at the time that you made the-that
Thiokol made the recommendation not to launch, was that the unanimous
recommendation as far as you knew?
Mr. Boisjoly: Yes. I have to make something clear. I have been
distressed by the things that have been appearing in the paper and
things that have been said in general, and there was never one
positive, pro-launch statement ever made by anybody. There have been
some feelings since then that folks have expressed that they would
support the decision, but there was not one positive statement for
launch ever made in that room.

Open sharing of information is crucial to improving everybody's
understanding of the universe around us.
Tom

wrote:

"It is one of the most remarkable things that in all of the biological
sciences there is no clue as to the necessity of death. ... This
suggests to me that is it not at all inevitable and that it is only a
matter of time before the biologists discover what it is that is
causing us the trouble and that this terrible universal disease or
temporariness of the human's body will be cured." -- Richard Feynman

Great physicist. Lousy biologist.

On Thu, 23 Nov 2006 01:30:21 GMT, in a place far, far away, Mary Pegg
made the phosphor on my monitor glow in such a
way as to indicate that:

wrote:

"It is one of the most remarkable things that in all of the biological
sciences there is no clue as to the necessity of death. ... This
suggests to me that is it not at all inevitable and that it is only a
matter of time before the biologists discover what it is that is
causing us the trouble and that this terrible universal disease or
temporariness of the human's body will be cured." -- Richard Feynman

Great physicist. Lousy biologist.

And why do you think him wrong?

Of course, it may be that the discovery won't be by biologists...

OM wrote:

On Mon, 20 Nov 2006 23:39:29 -0600, Pat Flannery
wrote:



The Handwaving Sergeant At Arms notes the motion has been seconded, and
calls for a vote. :-)



...All in favor?



Aye.

Pat

Pat Flannery wrote:"The Handwaving Sergeant At Arms notes the motion
has been seconded, and Calls for a vote. Favor? Aye"

Pat firstly you must be informed about history to cast a real vote but
it is obvious you are self stimulating your intellectual insecurities
by attempting to boost up you're own ego at the expense of others.
So just get together with youre "buddies as all of seem to be in a
love fest" and answer how you would have stopped the launch of
challenger jan 28, 1986, without fallacious maneuvers or calling me
names, for you mistkanely think this discussion is about one person,
but in reality we are discussing the safety and success of our space
program...

(fallacious maneuver)
http://attitudeadjustment.tripod.com/Books/Logic.htm
"Why would people use these fallacious maneuvers when the results can
be so harmful? Generally, only two reasons exist:
1. The person has made a honest error in logic
2. The person has deliberately sidestepped logic in order to satisfy
his or her own ego
The first reason can generally be handled with little fanfare. Simply
point out the error in thinking, and guide the person to the correct
line of thinking while allowing the person to save face. This sort of
disagreement can sometimes be refreshing, allowing new insights and
mental connections not previously made. When fallacies are used for the
second reason, I like to call these fallacies slick maneuvers. Why?
Because they are frequently used to garner support for statements or
actions that inflate the person's ego
at the long-term expense of others."


ROGERS COMMISSION TESTIMONY
http://history.nasa.gov/rogersrep/v1ch5.htm
Report of the PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION on the Space Shuttle Challenger
Accident
Chapter V: The Contributing Cause of The Accident.
[82] The decision to launch the Challenger was flawed. Those who made
that decision were unaware of the recent history of problems concerning
the O-rings and the joint and were unaware of the initial written
recommendation of the contractor advising against the launch at
temperatures below 53 degrees Fahrenheit and the continuing opposition
of the engineers at Thiokol after the management reversed its position.
They did not have a clear understanding of Rockwell's concern that it
was not safe to launch because of ice on the pad. If the decisionmakers
had known all of the facts, it is highly unlikely that they would have
decided to launch 51-L on January 28, 1986.

Flaws In The Decision Making Process
In addition to analyzing all available evidence concerning the material
causes of the accident on January 28, the Commission examined the chain
of decisions that culminated in approval of the launch. It concluded
that the decision making process was flawed in several ways. The actual
events that produced the information upon which the approval of launch
was based are recounted and appraised in the sections of this chapter.
The discussion that follows relies heavily on excerpts from the
testimony of those involved in the management judgments that led to the
launch of the Challenger under conditions described.
That testimony reveals failures in communication that resulted in a
decision to launch 51-L based on incomplete and sometimes misleading
information, a conflict between engineering data and management
judgments, and a NASA management structure that permitted internal
flight safety problems to bypass key Shuttle managers.
The Shuttle Flight Readiness Review is a carefully planned,
step-by-step activity, established by NASA program directive SPO-PD
710.5A, 1 designed to certify the readiness of all components of the
Space Shuttle assembly. The process is focused upon the Level I Flight
Readiness Review, held approximately two weeks before a launch. The
Level I review is a conference chaired by the NASA Associate
Administrator for Space Flight and supported by the NASA Chief
Engineer, the Program Manager, the center directors and project
managers from Johnson, Marshall and Kennedy, along with senior
contractor representatives.
The formal portion of the process is initiated by directive from the
Associate Administrator for Space Flight. The directive outlines the
schedule for the Level I Flight Readiness Review and for the steps that
precede it. The process begins at Level IV with the contractors
formally certifying-in writing-the flight readiness of the elements for
which they are responsible. Certification is made to the appropriate
Level III NASA project managers at Johnson and Marshall. Additionally,
at Marshall the review is followed by a presentation directly to the
Center Director. At Kennedy the Level III review, chaired by the Center
Director, verifies readiness of the launch support elements.
The next step in the process is the Certification of Flight Readiness
to the Level II Program Manager at Johnson. In this review each Space
Shuttle program element endorses that it has satisfactorily completed
the manufacture, [83] assembly, test and checkout of the pertinent
element, including the contractors" certification that design and
performance are up to standard. The Flight Readiness Review process
culminates in the Level I review.
In the initial notice of the review, the Level I directive establishes
a Mission Management Team for the particular mission. The team assumes
responsibility for each Shuttle's readiness for a period commencing 48
hours before launch and continuing through post-landing crew egress and
the safing of the Orbiter. On call throughout the entire period, the
Mission Management Team supports the Associate Administrator for Space
Flight and the Program Manager.
A structured Mission Management Team meeting-called L-1-is held 24
hours, or one day, prior to each scheduled launch. Its agenda includes
closeout of any open work, a closeout of any Flight Readiness Review
action items, a discussion of new or continuing anomalies, and an
updated briefing on anticipated weather conditions at the launch site
and at the abort landing sites in different parts of the world. It is
standard practice of Level-I and II officials to encourage the
reporting of new problems or concerns that might develop in the
interval between the Flight Readiness Review and the L-1 meeting, and
between the L-1 and launch.
In a procedural sense, the process described... At approximately 8:45
p.m. Eastern Standard Time, Phase 2 of the teleconference commenced,
the Thiokol charts and written data having arrived at Kennedy Space
Center by telefax. (A table of teleconference participants is included
with Chronology of Events.) The charts presented a history of the
O-ring erosion and blow-by in the Solid Rocket Booster joints of
previous flights, presented the results of subscale testing at Thiokol
and the results of static tests of Solid Rocket Motors. In the
following testimony, Roger Boisjoly, Allan McDonald and Larry Mulloy
expressed their recollections of this teleconference up to the point
when an off-net caucus was requested: 9

Mr. Boisjoly: I expressed deep concern about launching at low
temperature. I presented Chart 2-1 with emphasis-now, 2-1, if you want
to see it, I have it, but basically that was the chart that summarized
the primary concerns, and that was the chart that I pulled right out of
the Washington presentation without changing one word of it because it
was still applicable, and it addresses the highest concern of the field
joint in both the ignition transient condition and the steady state
condition, and it really sets down the rationale for why we were
continuing to fly. Basically, if erosion penetrates the primary O-ring
seal, there is a higher probability of no secondary seal capability in
the steady state condition. And I had two sub-bullets under that which
stated bench testing showed O-ring not capable of maintaining contact
with metal parts, gap, opening rate to maximum operating pressure. I
had another bullet which stated bench testing showed capability to
maintain O-ring contact during initial phase (0 to 170 milliseconds of
transient). That was my comfort basis of continuing to fly under normal
circumstances, normal being within the data base we had.
I emphasized, when I presented that chart about the changing of the
timing function of the O-ring as it attempted to seal. I was concerned
that we may go from that first beginning region into that intermediate
region, from O to 170 being the first region, and 170 to 330 being the
intermediate region where we didn't have a high probability of sealing
or seating.
I then presented Chart 2-2 with added concerns related to the timing
function. And basically on that chart, I started off talking about a
lower temperature than current data base results in changing the
primary O-ring sealing timing function, and I discussed the SRM-15
[Flight 51-C, January, 1985] observations, namely, the 15A [Left SRM,
Flight 51-C] motor had 80 degrees arc black grease between the O-rings,
and make no mistake about it, when I say black, I mean black just like
coal. It was jet black. And SRM-15B [Right SRM, Flight 51-C] had a 110
degree arc of black grease between the O-rings. We would have low
O-ring squeeze due to low.....


[89] ....temperature which I calculated earlier in the day. We should
have higher O-ring Shore hardness.
Now, that would be harder. And what that material really is, it would
be likened to trying to shove a brick into a crack versus a sponge.
That is a good analogy for purposes of this discussion. I also
mentioned that thicker grease, as a result of lower temperatures, would
have a higher viscosity. It wouldn't be as slick and slippery as it
would be at room temperature. And so it would be a little bit more
difficult to move across it.
We would have higher O-ring pressure actuation time, in my opinion, and
that is what I presented.... These are the sum and substance of what I
just presented. If action time increases, then the threshold of
secondary seal pressurization capability is approached. That was my
fear. If the threshold is reached, then secondary seal may not be
capable of being pressurized, and that was the bottom line of
everything that had been presented up to that point.
Chairman Rogers: Did anybody take issue with you?
Mr. Boisjoly: Well, I am coming to that. I also showed a chart of the
joint with an exaggerated cross section to show the seal lifted off,
which has been shown to everybody. I was asked, yes, at that point in
time I was asked to quantify my concerns, and I said I couldn't. I
couldn't quantify it. I had no data to quantify it, but I did say I
knew that it was away from goodness in the current data base. Someone
on the net commented that we had soot blow-by on SRM-22 [Flight 61-A,
October, 1985] which was launched at 75 degrees. I don't remember who
made the comment, but that is where the first comment came in about the
disparity between my conclusion and the observed data because SRM-22
[Flight 61-A, October, 1985] had blow-by at essentially a room
temperature launch.
I then said that SRM-15 [Flight 51-C, January, 1985] had much more
blow-by indication and that it was indeed telling us that lower
temperature was a factor. This was supported by inspection of flown
hardware by myself. I was asked again for data to support my claim, and
I said I have none other than what is being presented, and I had been
trying to get resilience data, Arnie and I both, since last October,
and that statement was mentioned on the net.

Others in the room presented their charts, and the main telecon session
concluded with Bob Lund, who is our Vice President of....


[90] ....Engineering, presenting his conclusions and recommendations
charts which were based on our data input up to that point. Listeners
on the telecon were not pleased with the conclusions and the
recommendations.
Chairman Rogers: What was the conclusion ?
Mr. Boisjoly: The conclusion was we should not fly outside of our data
base, which was 53 degrees. Those were the conclusions. And we were
quite pleased because we knew in advance, having participated in the
preparation, what the conclusions were, and we felt very comfortable
with that.
Mr. Acheson: Who presented that conclusion?
Mr. Boisjoly: Mr. Bob Lund. He had prepared those charts. He had input
from other people. He had actually physically prepared the charts. It
was about that time that Mr. Hardy from Marshall was asked what he
thought about the MTI [Morton Thiokol] recommendation, and he said he
was appalled at the MTI decision. Mr. Hardy was also asked about
launching, and he said no, not if the contractor recommended not
launching, he would not go against the contractor and launch.
There was a short discussion that ensued about temperature not being a
discriminator between SRM-15 [Flight 51-C] and SRM-22 [Flight 61-A],
and shortly after, I believe it was Mr. Kilminster asked if- excuse me.
I'm getting confused here. Mr. Kilminster was asked by NASA if he would
launch, and he said no because the engineering recommendation was not
to launch.
Then MTI management then asked for a five-minute caucus. I'm not sure
exactly who asked for that, but it was asked in such a manner that I
remember it was asked for, a five-minute caucus, which we put on- the
line on mute and went off-line with the rest of the net.
Chairman Rogers: Mr. Boisjoly, at the time that you made the-that
Thiokol made the recommendation not to launch, was that the unanimous
recommendation as far as you knew?
Mr. Boisjoly: Yes. I have to make something clear. I have been
distressed by the things that have been appearing in the paper and
things that have been said in general, and there was never one
positive, pro-launch statement ever made by anybody. There have been
some feelings since then that folks have expressed that they would
support the decision, but there was not one positive statement for
launch ever made in that room.

Open sharing of information is crucial to improving everybody's
understanding of the universe around us.
Tom