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Shuttle program extension?
How long would it take to build one or two new shuttles from scratch ?
Same core design, but with some of the improvements wanted by NASA (such as electric APUs). Someone had mentioned that it would cost about 2 billion to build one. (perhaps another billion for the second shuttle ?). This would allow NASA to implement many of the improvements to reduce costs, and retire the older shuttles instead of having them go through the recertification and major maintenance cycles needed after they've done ISS assembly. Would building new shuttles end up costing same ballpark as rebuilding the current ones ? They could keep one shuttle pad and maintain a few shuttle missions to LEO per year (to ISS' hubble etc). They could develop a re-entry capsule to be used as ISS espace pods (brought up by shuttles), and later scale those capsules up to be able to go to the moon on some new rocket. If NASA were to gear down to support only 2 or 3 shuttle flights per year, could it seriously lower its fixed costs on the ground ? I am thinking that if fast turnaround were no longer needed, wouldn't they require far fewer workers ? And with only 2 shuttles, wouldn't that free up some buildings used for shuttle maintenance ? |
#12
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Shuttle program extension?
"J Waggoner" wrote in message ... There is no reason the shuttles can't be maintained thru 2020 if necessary. Lets face it Griffin has been campaigning for this since Bush announced the back to the moon plan. The Russians have given shuttle fans a gift in this way. Remember the Shuttles were not to blame for the loss of Columbia or challenger. It was the SRB joint and the tank foam. The real blame of course sits with engineers who are human. With Challenger, the blame sits squarely on management's shoulders. The engineers recommended to *not* launch Challenger in such cold conditions. They had some data to back them up, but management wanted them to prove the shuttle would fail if they launched. Management turned safety upside down. With Columbia, some management decisions were equally silly. As testing on the ground showed, there was likely a huge hole in the wing leading edge, yet no attempt was made to look for the hole. Many of the post-Columbia TPS repair methods were originally concieved before STS-1 even flew. Obviously it was a mistake for NASA to slowly start treating the TPS as a maintenenace issue rather than a safety issue. Once you go down that road, there isn't any point in inspecting the TPS, since you couldn't fix it anyway, right? The mistake in this logic is that if the hole had been discovered while Columbia was in orbit, every attempt would have been made to save the crew. The engineers never had the opportunity to attempt a rescue like Apollo 13. Another method of launching the shuttle could always be revived. But I do think Orion will be slowed down and perfected. Its not good to rush a new program, you end up with disaster like Apollo One or Challenger. Look at the details of Ares I. That program is one giant hack on top of another. It needs to die a quiet death and be replaced with something more sane, like Orion launched by EELV's. The shuttle's paint shaker SRB's ought not be allowed on any future launch vehicle, manned or otherwise. Jeff -- A clever person solves a problem. A wise person avoids it. -- Einstein |
#13
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Shuttle program extension?
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Look at the details of Ares I. *That program is one giant hack on top of another. *It needs to die a quiet death and be replaced with something more sane, like Orion launched by EELV's. *The shuttle's paint shaker SRB's ought not be allowed on any future launch vehicle, manned or otherwise. I agree with the Aries I launcher(although I think continuing development of the J-2X powered second is a good idea), it would really save them a lot of money if they just simply man-rated both the Delta IV and the Atlas V (just like they did in the 60's with the Atlas and Titan II launchers). Also man-rating the two EELVs would have an additional benefit of reducing insurance premiums for satellite makers as a man-rated booster would be more reliable. |
#14
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Shuttle program extension?
wrote in message
... I agree with the Aries I launcher(although I think continuing development of the J-2X powered second is a good idea), it would really save them a lot of money if they just simply man-rated both the Delta IV and the Atlas V (just like they did in the 60's with the Atlas and Titan II launchers). Also man-rating the two EELVs would have an additional benefit of reducing insurance premiums for satellite makers as a man-rated booster would be more reliable. The Delta IV is already more 'man-rated' than any version of the Ares 1 is likely to be - lower vibration, smoother ride, proven reliability. |
#15
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Shuttle program extension?
John Doe wrote:
: :How long would it take to build one or two new shuttles from scratch ? :Same core design, but with some of the improvements wanted by NASA (such :as electric APUs). : Probably about a decade. : :Someone had mentioned that it would cost about 2 billion to build one. perhaps another billion for the second shuttle ?). : Preposterously low numbers. It cost almost $2 billion to build Endeavour at the time and it started with a full spares set that were 'free'. : :This would allow NASA to implement many of the improvements to reduce :costs, and retire the older shuttles instead of having them go through :the recertification and major maintenance cycles needed after they've :done ISS assembly. : How would it do that? One of the reason for retiring the Shuttle is that the operating costs are so high. : :Would building new shuttles end up costing same ballpark as rebuilding :the current ones ? : Define 'rebuilding'. : :They could keep one shuttle pad and maintain a few shuttle missions to :LEO per year (to ISS' hubble etc). : :They could develop a re-entry capsule to be used as ISS espace pods brought up by shuttles), and later scale those capsules up to be able :to go to the moon on some new rocket. : 'Scale up' means redesign. : :If NASA were to gear down to support only 2 or 3 shuttle flights per :year, could it seriously lower its fixed costs on the ground ? I am :thinking that if fast turnaround were no longer needed, wouldn't they :require far fewer workers ? And with only 2 shuttles, wouldn't that free :up some buildings used for shuttle maintenance ? : They're called 'fixed costs' because they're FIXED. They don't change no matter what your flight rate is. -- "Some people get lost in thought because it's such unfamiliar territory." --G. Behn |
#16
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Shuttle program extension?
J Waggoner wrote:
On Tue, 2 Sep 2008 15:38:39 -0400, "Jeff Findley" wrote: "Derek Lyons" wrote in message ... J Waggoner wrote: As for the facilities if necessary Launch Pad C could always be built. Between the great expense and difficulty for very little return, the chances of that are roughly equal to the chances I'll sprout wings and fly to the moon under my own power. More likely the shuttle will continue flying and Ares I problems will keep getting worse, to the point where that program is cancelled. Jeff This wasn't about the pads first all, that was an aside. If you want to start a pad thread go ahead, be my guest. Here's a clue for you - you don't control what is discussed in what thread. There is no reason the shuttles can't be maintained thru 2020 if necessary. There is a difference between what is theoretically possible, and what is practically doable. Keeping the Shuttles flying for another twelve years will be hellaciously expensive as they (and their supporting infrastructure) will require ever increasing maintenance as they age. What other problems, like the Kapton wiring of a decade ago, lurk? Another method of launching the shuttle could always be revived. But I do think Orion will be slowed down and perfected. Its not good to rush a new program, you end up with disaster like Apollo One or Challenger. Given that neither Apollo 1 or Challenger was caused by programs being rushed, I fail to see your point. Doubly so since by any rational measurement Orion isn't being rushed either. D. -- Touch-twice life. Eat. Drink. Laugh. http://derekl1963.livejournal.com/ -Resolved: To be more temperate in my postings. Oct 5th, 2004 JDL |
#17
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Shuttle program extension?
"Jeff Findley" wrote:
"J Waggoner" wrote in message .. . There is no reason the shuttles can't be maintained thru 2020 if necessary. Lets face it Griffin has been campaigning for this since Bush announced the back to the moon plan. The Russians have given shuttle fans a gift in this way. Remember the Shuttles were not to blame for the loss of Columbia or challenger. It was the SRB joint and the tank foam. The real blame of course sits with engineers who are human. With Challenger, the blame sits squarely on management's shoulders. The engineers recommended to *not* launch Challenger in such cold conditions. They had some data to back them up, but management wanted them to prove the shuttle would fail if they launched. Management turned safety upside down. Of course, once again, the engineers mistakes go umentioned - because management is blame. Always and forever. D. -- Touch-twice life. Eat. Drink. Laugh. http://derekl1963.livejournal.com/ -Resolved: To be more temperate in my postings. Oct 5th, 2004 JDL |
#18
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Shuttle program extension?
Derek Lyons wrote: Given that neither Apollo 1 or Challenger was caused by programs being rushed, I fail to see your point. Doubly so since by any rational measurement Orion isn't being rushed either. Apollo 1 was certainly caused by the program being rushed (or "Go Fever" as the astronauts referred to it). Challenger was due to trying to maintain a unrealistic flight rate. Pat |
#19
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Shuttle program extension?
"Derek Lyons" wrote in message ... "Jeff Findley" wrote: With Challenger, the blame sits squarely on management's shoulders. The engineers recommended to *not* launch Challenger in such cold conditions. They had some data to back them up, but management wanted them to prove the shuttle would fail if they launched. Management turned safety upside down. Of course, once again, the engineers mistakes go umentioned - because management is blame. Always and forever. I used to have a good link for this one... Here we go, straight from the Rogers Commission Report: http://science.ksc.nasa.gov/shuttle/.../Chapter-5.txt Quote from above: The decision to launch the Challenger was flawed. Those who made that decision were unaware of the recent history of problems concerning the O-rings and the joint and were unaware of the initial written recommendation of the contractor advising against the launch at temperatures below 53 degrees Fahrenheit and the continuing opposition of the engineers at Thiokol after the management reversed its position. They did not have a clear understanding of Rockwell's concern that it was not safe to launch because of ice on the pad. If the decision makers had known all of the facts, it is highly unlikely that they would have decided to launch 51-L on January 28, 1986. I think that just about does it. The engineers at Thiokol knew there were problems with the o-rings when launching in cold weather. They were opposed to launching in cold weather. They were overruled by Thiokol management. Also, NASA management was pushing Rockwell around as well (on the issue of ice on the launch vehicle): "In this situation, NASA appeared to be requiring a contractor to prove that it was not safe to launch, rather than proving it was safe." Even though ice turned out to not be an issue in this case, NASA's decision making process was clearly flawed when it came to safety. There was a whole boatload of recommendations about safety and safety processes that came out of the Rogers Commission Report. IMHO, safety is something that has to be managed very carefully. So, just how was the Challenger disaster the fault of the engineers? Jeff -- A clever person solves a problem. A wise person avoids it. -- Einstein |
#20
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Shuttle program extension?
"Jeff Findley" wrote:
So, just how was the Challenger disaster the fault of the engineers? Have you ever actually studied the Challenger accident as opposed to quoting soundbites? D. -- Touch-twice life. Eat. Drink. Laugh. http://derekl1963.livejournal.com/ -Resolved: To be more temperate in my postings. Oct 5th, 2004 JDL |
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