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NASA Astronaut on Columbia Repair (and others)
"columbiaaccidentinvestigation"
wrote: yet more handwaving and evasion. I should have done this a long time ago... plonk D. -- Touch-twice life. Eat. Drink. Laugh. -Resolved: To be more temperate in my postings. Oct 5th, 2004 JDL |
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NASA Astronaut on Columbia Repair (and others)
Derek Lyons wrote:"yet more handwaving and evasion"
Yeah derek, you post facts on another thread, but when confronted here you cant even back youre squawking up with some cited facts, just usenet namecalling (as you would rather hand wave history away and cherry pick youre way through life), so just read a little history and try again, or don't post youre monday morning quarterbacking about what boisjoly should have done, for you are wrong and you and historical facts show it. Once again I'll make it easy on you to explain "what you would have done in roger boijsoly's place", given the following factual history of the challenger tragedy specifically regarding srb O-ring seal burn through problems in cold weather launch conditions, that led to the tragic loss of the sts-51l crew, and challenger jan 28 1986. So, Derek I would like you to correlate you're thinking in this thread to the following historically correct documented facts from the rogers commission where they state the following: (*1). "The teleconference between Marshall Space Flight Center, Kennedy Space Center and Morton Thiokol, Incorporated, at Wasatch, Utah, focused attention on the advisability of launching mission 51-L and provided a clear opportunity for postponement", and stated about nasa's flight readiness review meetings prior to the tragic loss of sts-51l, (*2). "("STS 61-C (flight 24), launched on January 12, 1986, experienced nozzle joint O-ring erosion and blow-by and field joint O-ring erosion...." However, at the STS 51-L Level I Flight Readiness Review On January 15, 1986, Mr. Mulloy noted that there were "No 61-C Flight Anomalies," and that there were "No Major Problems or Issues.". And before you start youre rant about (good vs evil) again, please understand I have also provided the facts (and argued on a previous thread) to show how nasa managers would directly benefit from a full shuttle system quantitative risk assessment, in making their professional decisions to operate and retire the space shuttle safely within it's designed parameters and in compliance with all human space flight procedures. (*1) http://history.nasa.gov/rogersrep/v2appg.htm "Report of the PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident Volume 2: Appendix G - Human Factor Analysis Managers at Risk: The Human Factors of Launch Pressures The teleconference between Marshall Space Flight Center, Kennedy Space Center and Morton Thiokol, Incorporated, at Wasatch, Utah, focused attention on the advisability of launching mission 51-L and provided a clear opportunity for postponement. The decision should have been based on engineering judgments. However, other factors may have impeded or prevented effective communication and exchange of information. One factor which may have contributed significantly to the atmosphere of the teleconference at Marshall is the effect on managers of several days of irregular working hours and insufficient sleep. The extent of sleep loss was documented by Commission investigators who conducted interviews with the teleconference participants at Marshall and Kennedy specifically to reconstruct their daily activities during the five days preceding the accident. As shown in Figure 2, these interviews revealed that because of the launch scrub on January 27 certain key managers obtained only minimal sleep the night before the teleconference or had arisen so early in the morning that they had been awake and on duty for extended periods. 25 Time pressure, particularly that caused by launch scrubs and rapid turnarounds, increases the potential for sleep loss and judgment errors. This could be minimized by preventing launch support personnel, particularly managers, from combining launch support duty with office work on the same day. The willingness of NASA employees in general to work excessive hours, while admirable, raises serious questions when it jeopardizes job performance, particularly when critical management decisions are at stake." This link contains the shuttle flight readiness reviews with information that pertained to the o-ring problem prior to the launch of sts-51l (*2) http://history.nasa.gov/rogersrep/v2apph.htm "Report of the PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident Volume 2: Appendix H - Flight Readiness Review Treatment of O-ring Problems At the December 4, 1985 STS 61-C Shuttle Projects Board, Mr. Mulloy noted "SRM joint O-ring performance within experience base." The Commission's copy of the December 9, 1985 Marshall Center Board briefing was incomplete; however, at the December 11, 1985 Level I Flight Readiness Review, it was reported that there were "No 61-B flight anomalies.... STS 61-C (flight 24), launched on January 12, 1986, experienced nozzle joint O-ring erosion and blow-by and field joint O-ring erosion. The right-hand nozzle joint primary O-ring was eroded 0.011 inches over an 8 inch span at the 162° location. There was blow-by past the primary O-ring in the left-hand nozzle joint between the 255.6° and 334.8° positions. The primary O-ring in the left SRM aft field joint was eroded 0.004 inches over a 3.5 inch span at the 154° location... The STS 51-L SRB Board Flight Readiness Review On January 3, 1986, Shuttle Projects Board On January 8, 1986, and Marshall Center Board on January 13, 1986, all occurred before the STS 61-C SRBs were available for inspection. However, at the STS 51-L Level I Flight Readiness Review On January 15, 1986, Mr. Mulloy noted that there were "No 61-C Flight Anomalies," and that there were "No Major Problems or Issues."... STS 51-L (flight 25) was launched on January 28, 1986." Open sharing of information is crucial to improving everybody's understanding of the universe around us. Tom |
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NASA Astronaut on Columbia Repair (and others)
That previous RCC oxidation data were wrong and a repair like CAIB suggested therfore impossible - thats far beyond "the sake of a silly argument on Usenet." If your claim be true NASA would have long ago informed the Congress and the public about it. Managers at the program level may not necessarily have known the details. The Orbiter Return-to-Flight Working Group was a fairly low-level meeting. Sometimes technical presentations at that level are later presented directly to higher level meetings, but this particular presentation was never brought before either the PRCB or the Daily PRCB. And as you are the only one who draw that conclusion, isn`t it your duty to allert higher managment, Congress or even the New York Times about it? (What some regulars here accused Boisjoly in 1986 failed to do) Here we are. You have no data in front of you to prove your claims to yourself. You only might have the memory of something you heard once. But probably your memory mangled your own conclusion with what you heard. Thats more often the case then we want it to be. Look, face it. There is absolutly no evidence for your claim. You are the only source of this idea. No one else has brought it up. Even NASA data prior CAIB supports this CAIB conclusion. Well, I can assure you that the presentation exists. It is not just mangled memory; I have gone back and re-read it since this thread began, and I stand by my previous statements. So its no memory issue, fine. I can understand your skepticism and reluctance to take my word for it, but that is all I have to offer. If that is insufficient, then further discussion is pointless. Well Jorge, just to summarise it. You have an unpublished NASA report. From wich you (so far only you) draw a conclusion. This conclusion is not stated that way in the report. Your conclusion is that all prior 2004 RCC oxidation data was wrong, the oxidation rate is considerable higher. About +30 years of NASA testing/analysis on the issue is invalid, like the 2000 report we saw, the CAIB reports and other public statements. Meanwhile some of the loudest regulars here thankfully accepted your find. As you understand, I`m reluctant to join this funny club. In my view, we sucessfully traced back at least one of the Usenet Columbia myths. And killed another about the alleged need of a smooth RCC repair surface. All in all it was an interesting thread with you. -- JRF ## CrossPoint v3.12d R ## |
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NASA Astronaut on Columbia Repair (and others)
On Tue, 21 Nov 2006 18:20:10 GMT, (Derek Lyons)
wrote: "columbiaaccidentinvestigation" wrote: yet more handwaving and evasion. I should have done this a long time ago... plonk ....Yeah, you should have. He's a Znkfba in drag, obviously. OM -- ]=====================================[ ] OMBlog - http://www.io.com/~o_m/omworld [ ] Let's face it: Sometimes you *need* [ ] an obnoxious opinion in your day! [ ]=====================================[ |
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NASA Astronaut on Columbia Repair (and others)
OM wrote: bull and fluff that isnt worth anybody reading.. Gee OM, your nasty stinky bait isnt going to catch any fish today, so go troll insome other waters. So om let derek speak for himself, if he can, or if you can try and attempt to explain what you would have done in roger boisjoly's place to stop the launch of challenger the morning of jan 28 1986, with out your cheesey usenet bullying, otherwise you are essentially playing a game of "self stimulating your intellectual insecurities by attempting to boost up you're own ego at the expense of others" (*1). "The teleconference between Marshall Space Flight Center, Kennedy Space Center and Morton Thiokol, Incorporated, at Wasatch, Utah, focused attention on the advisability of launching mission 51-L and provided a clear opportunity for postponement", and stated about nasa's flight readiness review meetings prior to the tragic loss of sts-51l, (*2). "("STS 61-C (flight 24), launched on January 12, 1986, experienced nozzle joint O-ring erosion and blow-by and field joint O-ring erosion...." However, at the STS 51-L Level I Flight Readiness Review On January 15, 1986, Mr. Mulloy noted that there were "No 61-C Flight Anomalies," and that there were "No Major Problems or Issues.". And before you start youre rant about (good vs evil) again, please understand I have also provided the facts (and argued on a previous thread) to show how nasa managers would directly benefit from a full shuttle system quantitative risk assessment, in making their professional decisions to operate and retire the space shuttle safely within it's designed parameters and in compliance with all human space flight procedures. (*1) http://history.nasa.gov/rogersrep/v2appg.htm "Report of the PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident Volume 2: Appendix G - Human Factor Analysis Managers at Risk: The Human Factors of Launch Pressures The teleconference between Marshall Space Flight Center, Kennedy Space Center and Morton Thiokol, Incorporated, at Wasatch, Utah, focused attention on the advisability of launching mission 51-L and provided a clear opportunity for postponement. The decision should have been based on engineering judgments. However, other factors may have impeded or prevented effective communication and exchange of information. One factor which may have contributed significantly to the atmosphere of the teleconference at Marshall is the effect on managers of several days of irregular working hours and insufficient sleep. The extent of sleep loss was documented by Commission investigators who conducted interviews with the teleconference participants at Marshall and Kennedy specifically to reconstruct their daily activities during the five days preceding the accident. As shown in Figure 2, these interviews revealed that because of the launch scrub on January 27 certain key managers obtained only minimal sleep the night before the teleconference or had arisen so early in the morning that they had been awake and on duty for extended periods. 25 Time pressure, particularly that caused by launch scrubs and rapid turnarounds, increases the potential for sleep loss and judgment errors. This could be minimized by preventing launch support personnel, particularly managers, from combining launch support duty with office work on the same day. The willingness of NASA employees in general to work excessive hours, while admirable, raises serious questions when it jeopardizes job performance, particularly when critical management decisions are at stake." This link contains the shuttle flight readiness reviews with information that pertained to the o-ring problem prior to the launch of sts-51l (*2) http://history.nasa.gov/rogersrep/v2apph.htm "Report of the PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident Volume 2: Appendix H - Flight Readiness Review Treatment of O-ring Problems At the December 4, 1985 STS 61-C Shuttle Projects Board, Mr. Mulloy noted "SRM joint O-ring performance within experience base." The Commission's copy of the December 9, 1985 Marshall Center Board briefing was incomplete; however, at the December 11, 1985 Level I Flight Readiness Review, it was reported that there were "No 61-B flight anomalies.... STS 61-C (flight 24), launched on January 12, 1986, experienced nozzle joint O-ring erosion and blow-by and field joint O-ring erosion. The right-hand nozzle joint primary O-ring was eroded 0.011 inches over an 8 inch span at the 162° location. There was blow-by past the primary O-ring in the left-hand nozzle joint between the 255.6° and 334.8° positions. The primary O-ring in the left SRM aft field joint was eroded 0.004 inches over a 3.5 inch span at the 154° location... The STS 51-L SRB Board Flight Readiness Review On January 3, 1986, Shuttle Projects Board On January 8, 1986, and Marshall Center Board on January 13, 1986, all occurred before the STS 61-C SRBs were available for inspection. However, at the STS 51-L Level I Flight Readiness Review On January 15, 1986, Mr. Mulloy noted that there were "No 61-C Flight Anomalies," and that there were "No Major Problems or Issues."... STS 51-L (flight 25) was launched on January 28, 1986." Open sharing of information is crucial to improving everybody's understanding of the universe around us. Tom |
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NASA Astronaut on Columbia Repair (and others)
OM wrote: ...Yeah, you should have. He's a Znkfba in drag, obviously. Ain't monomania fun? :-) Pat |
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NASA Astronaut on Columbia Repair (and others)
On Mon, 20 Nov 2006 23:39:29 -0600, Pat Flannery
wrote: The Handwaving Sergeant At Arms notes the motion has been seconded, and calls for a vote. :-) ....All in favor? [Insert scene of all regulars whooping, hollering, stomping feet, and otherwise doing the Delta House display of approval] ....All opposed? [Insert scene from the "Ten Commandments", where Dathan, the sinners, and the Golden Calf are all swallowed up as the Earth cracks open and sends them all straight to Hell] ....They "Frack Yeahs!" have it. Congrats, Jorge! :-) OM -- ]=====================================[ ] OMBlog - http://www.io.com/~o_m/omworld [ ] Let's face it: Sometimes you *need* [ ] an obnoxious opinion in your day! [ ]=====================================[ |
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NASA Astronaut on Columbia Repair (and others)
On Wed, 22 Nov 2006 02:34:09 -0600, Pat Flannery
wrote: OM wrote: ...Yeah, you should have. He's a Znkfba in drag, obviously. Ain't monomania fun? :-) ....He needs to keep that kissing disease between himself and his ******* sons, then. OM -- ]=====================================[ ] OMBlog - http://www.io.com/~o_m/omworld [ ] Let's face it: Sometimes you *need* [ ] an obnoxious opinion in your day! [ ]=====================================[ |
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NASA Astronaut on Columbia Repair (and others)
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NASA Astronaut on Columbia Repair (and others)
OM """
Na, he wrote such fluff defending his in ability to debate me it deserves to be top posted, so instead he posts his candy assumptions in the form of gossip, i wont even bother repeating his words, just repeat the question he and others are avoiding. Hey om here is some more information from the rogers commission, directly pertaining to the management structure that roger boisjoly and others were finding necessary to convince that a launch in the cold weather morning of jan 28 1986, was not safe. Now om what I do find interesting is calling me a troll, when it is obvious once you were faced with real science in debating me, you couldn't produce credible source backing you're opinions, then like a child has used every arguing tactic in the book to save face. But OM it is really obvious by the endless rhetorical subjective debates that you would rather partake that you are in fact "self stimulating your intellectual insecurities by attempting to boost up you're own ego at the expense of others", which is not science, so don't think you're fooling anybody but yourself. So just answer how you would have stopped the launch of challenger jan 28, 1986, without fallacious maneuvers, so take off the blinders and open youre eyes (get dereks and pats help for the big words om as it seems you all are "buddys") and just read historical facts, as this is not about calling me names, it is about the safety and success of our space program... (fallacious maneuver) http://attitudeadjustment.tripod.com/Books/Logic.htm "Why would people use these fallacious maneuvers when the results can be so harmful? Generally, only two reasons exist: 1. The person has made a honest error in logic 2. The person has deliberately sidestepped logic in order to satisfy his or her own ego The first reason can generally be handled with little fanfare. Simply point out the error in thinking, and guide the person to the correct line of thinking while allowing the person to save face. This sort of disagreement can sometimes be refreshing, allowing new insights and mental connections not previously made. When fallacies are used for the second reason, I like to call these fallacies slick maneuvers. Why? Because they are frequently used to garner support for statements or actions that inflate the person's ego at the long-term expense of others." ROGERS COMMISSION TESTIMONY http://history.nasa.gov/rogersrep/v1ch5.htm Report of the PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident Chapter V: The Contributing Cause of The Accident. [82] The decision to launch the Challenger was flawed. Those who made that decision were unaware of the recent history of problems concerning the O-rings and the joint and were unaware of the initial written recommendation of the contractor advising against the launch at temperatures below 53 degrees Fahrenheit and the continuing opposition of the engineers at Thiokol after the management reversed its position. They did not have a clear understanding of Rockwell's concern that it was not safe to launch because of ice on the pad. If the decisionmakers had known all of the facts, it is highly unlikely that they would have decided to launch 51-L on January 28, 1986. Flaws In The Decision Making Process In addition to analyzing all available evidence concerning the material causes of the accident on January 28, the Commission examined the chain of decisions that culminated in approval of the launch. It concluded that the decision making process was flawed in several ways. The actual events that produced the information upon which the approval of launch was based are recounted and appraised in the sections of this chapter. The discussion that follows relies heavily on excerpts from the testimony of those involved in the management judgments that led to the launch of the Challenger under conditions described. That testimony reveals failures in communication that resulted in a decision to launch 51-L based on incomplete and sometimes misleading information, a conflict between engineering data and management judgments, and a NASA management structure that permitted internal flight safety problems to bypass key Shuttle managers. The Shuttle Flight Readiness Review is a carefully planned, step-by-step activity, established by NASA program directive SPO-PD 710.5A, 1 designed to certify the readiness of all components of the Space Shuttle assembly. The process is focused upon the Level I Flight Readiness Review, held approximately two weeks before a launch. The Level I review is a conference chaired by the NASA Associate Administrator for Space Flight and supported by the NASA Chief Engineer, the Program Manager, the center directors and project managers from Johnson, Marshall and Kennedy, along with senior contractor representatives. The formal portion of the process is initiated by directive from the Associate Administrator for Space Flight. The directive outlines the schedule for the Level I Flight Readiness Review and for the steps that precede it. The process begins at Level IV with the contractors formally certifying-in writing-the flight readiness of the elements for which they are responsible. Certification is made to the appropriate Level III NASA project managers at Johnson and Marshall. Additionally, at Marshall the review is followed by a presentation directly to the Center Director. At Kennedy the Level III review, chaired by the Center Director, verifies readiness of the launch support elements. The next step in the process is the Certification of Flight Readiness to the Level II Program Manager at Johnson. In this review each Space Shuttle program element endorses that it has satisfactorily completed the manufacture, [83] assembly, test and checkout of the pertinent element, including the contractors" certification that design and performance are up to standard. The Flight Readiness Review process culminates in the Level I review. In the initial notice of the review, the Level I directive establishes a Mission Management Team for the particular mission. The team assumes responsibility for each Shuttle's readiness for a period commencing 48 hours before launch and continuing through post-landing crew egress and the safing of the Orbiter. On call throughout the entire period, the Mission Management Team supports the Associate Administrator for Space Flight and the Program Manager. A structured Mission Management Team meeting-called L-1-is held 24 hours, or one day, prior to each scheduled launch. Its agenda includes closeout of any open work, a closeout of any Flight Readiness Review action items, a discussion of new or continuing anomalies, and an updated briefing on anticipated weather conditions at the launch site and at the abort landing sites in different parts of the world. It is standard practice of Level-I and II officials to encourage the reporting of new problems or concerns that might develop in the interval between the Flight Readiness Review and the L-1 meeting, and between the L-1 and launch. In a procedural sense, the process described... At approximately 8:45 p.m. Eastern Standard Time, Phase 2 of the teleconference commenced, the Thiokol charts and written data having arrived at Kennedy Space Center by telefax. (A table of teleconference participants is included with Chronology of Events.) The charts presented a history of the O-ring erosion and blow-by in the Solid Rocket Booster joints of previous flights, presented the results of subscale testing at Thiokol and the results of static tests of Solid Rocket Motors. In the following testimony, Roger Boisjoly, Allan McDonald and Larry Mulloy expressed their recollections of this teleconference up to the point when an off-net caucus was requested: 9 Mr. Boisjoly: I expressed deep concern about launching at low temperature. I presented Chart 2-1 with emphasis-now, 2-1, if you want to see it, I have it, but basically that was the chart that summarized the primary concerns, and that was the chart that I pulled right out of the Washington presentation without changing one word of it because it was still applicable, and it addresses the highest concern of the field joint in both the ignition transient condition and the steady state condition, and it really sets down the rationale for why we were continuing to fly. Basically, if erosion penetrates the primary O-ring seal, there is a higher probability of no secondary seal capability in the steady state condition. And I had two sub-bullets under that which stated bench testing showed O-ring not capable of maintaining contact with metal parts, gap, opening rate to maximum operating pressure. I had another bullet which stated bench testing showed capability to maintain O-ring contact during initial phase (0 to 170 milliseconds of transient). That was my comfort basis of continuing to fly under normal circumstances, normal being within the data base we had. I emphasized, when I presented that chart about the changing of the timing function of the O-ring as it attempted to seal. I was concerned that we may go from that first beginning region into that intermediate region, from O to 170 being the first region, and 170 to 330 being the intermediate region where we didn't have a high probability of sealing or seating. I then presented Chart 2-2 with added concerns related to the timing function. And basically on that chart, I started off talking about a lower temperature than current data base results in changing the primary O-ring sealing timing function, and I discussed the SRM-15 [Flight 51-C, January, 1985] observations, namely, the 15A [Left SRM, Flight 51-C] motor had 80 degrees arc black grease between the O-rings, and make no mistake about it, when I say black, I mean black just like coal. It was jet black. And SRM-15B [Right SRM, Flight 51-C] had a 110 degree arc of black grease between the O-rings. We would have low O-ring squeeze due to low..... [89] ....temperature which I calculated earlier in the day. We should have higher O-ring Shore hardness. Now, that would be harder. And what that material really is, it would be likened to trying to shove a brick into a crack versus a sponge. That is a good analogy for purposes of this discussion. I also mentioned that thicker grease, as a result of lower temperatures, would have a higher viscosity. It wouldn't be as slick and slippery as it would be at room temperature. And so it would be a little bit more difficult to move across it. We would have higher O-ring pressure actuation time, in my opinion, and that is what I presented.... These are the sum and substance of what I just presented. If action time increases, then the threshold of secondary seal pressurization capability is approached. That was my fear. If the threshold is reached, then secondary seal may not be capable of being pressurized, and that was the bottom line of everything that had been presented up to that point. Chairman Rogers: Did anybody take issue with you? Mr. Boisjoly: Well, I am coming to that. I also showed a chart of the joint with an exaggerated cross section to show the seal lifted off, which has been shown to everybody. I was asked, yes, at that point in time I was asked to quantify my concerns, and I said I couldn't. I couldn't quantify it. I had no data to quantify it, but I did say I knew that it was away from goodness in the current data base. Someone on the net commented that we had soot blow-by on SRM-22 [Flight 61-A, October, 1985] which was launched at 75 degrees. I don't remember who made the comment, but that is where the first comment came in about the disparity between my conclusion and the observed data because SRM-22 [Flight 61-A, October, 1985] had blow-by at essentially a room temperature launch. I then said that SRM-15 [Flight 51-C, January, 1985] had much more blow-by indication and that it was indeed telling us that lower temperature was a factor. This was supported by inspection of flown hardware by myself. I was asked again for data to support my claim, and I said I have none other than what is being presented, and I had been trying to get resilience data, Arnie and I both, since last October, and that statement was mentioned on the net. Others in the room presented their charts, and the main telecon session concluded with Bob Lund, who is our Vice President of.... [90] ....Engineering, presenting his conclusions and recommendations charts which were based on our data input up to that point. Listeners on the telecon were not pleased with the conclusions and the recommendations. Chairman Rogers: What was the conclusion ? Mr. Boisjoly: The conclusion was we should not fly outside of our data base, which was 53 degrees. Those were the conclusions. And we were quite pleased because we knew in advance, having participated in the preparation, what the conclusions were, and we felt very comfortable with that. Mr. Acheson: Who presented that conclusion? Mr. Boisjoly: Mr. Bob Lund. He had prepared those charts. He had input from other people. He had actually physically prepared the charts. It was about that time that Mr. Hardy from Marshall was asked what he thought about the MTI [Morton Thiokol] recommendation, and he said he was appalled at the MTI decision. Mr. Hardy was also asked about launching, and he said no, not if the contractor recommended not launching, he would not go against the contractor and launch. There was a short discussion that ensued about temperature not being a discriminator between SRM-15 [Flight 51-C] and SRM-22 [Flight 61-A], and shortly after, I believe it was Mr. Kilminster asked if- excuse me. I'm getting confused here. Mr. Kilminster was asked by NASA if he would launch, and he said no because the engineering recommendation was not to launch. Then MTI management then asked for a five-minute caucus. I'm not sure exactly who asked for that, but it was asked in such a manner that I remember it was asked for, a five-minute caucus, which we put on- the line on mute and went off-line with the rest of the net. Chairman Rogers: Mr. Boisjoly, at the time that you made the-that Thiokol made the recommendation not to launch, was that the unanimous recommendation as far as you knew? Mr. Boisjoly: Yes. I have to make something clear. I have been distressed by the things that have been appearing in the paper and things that have been said in general, and there was never one positive, pro-launch statement ever made by anybody. There have been some feelings since then that folks have expressed that they would support the decision, but there was not one positive statement for launch ever made in that room. Open sharing of information is crucial to improving everybody's understanding of the universe around us. Tom |
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