Wash Post shuttle story six weeks behind NBC coverage

JimO: Please forgive the tone of this brag -- I think it's timely.

Today's 'Washington Post' (Aug 24) has a long narrative of the sequence of
events that led to the loss of space shuttle 'Columbia' on February 1. Of
particular interest is Sawyer's comments, "The ... predictions would turn
out to be correct about the nonlethal effects of the foam striking glassy
tiles. But later, in painful hindsight, a glaring misstep in the engineering
calculus would become clear: The team had assumed that the tile analysis
told them all they needed to know about the potential damage to the very
different RCC material as well. Conventional wisdom among the engineers was
that the RCC, designed to withstand higher temperatures than the tiles, was
also more resistant to impact damage. But they really did not know. Nobody
had tested the question. This fact had been clearly noted in Boeing's
written Jan. 23 assessment of the potential damage to Columbia: 'No SOFI
[spray on foam insulation] on RCC test data available.' The engineers had,
in effect, been guessing. And neither Ham nor any other manager challenged
the conclusion."

This is the very heart of the fatal flaw in NASA's decision-making. And it
is basically a rewrite of the groundbreaking analysis of this precise issue,
in my msnbc.com columns "The Hole in NASA's Safety Culture" (July 8)
http://www.msnbc.com/news/936070.asp?0cv=CB20, and "Post-Columbia NASA
hunkers down" (July 23), http://www.msnbc.com/news/943305.asp?0dm=C219T.

It's happened before -- when you publish an original insight too far in
advance, by the time the rest of the news media catches on and repeats it
(right down to the same word I used -- "guess"), it's become 'common
knowledge' not worthy of citation or credit grin!

The only remedy is for NBC to continue to 'own this story' by staying ahead
and continuing to break new facts, new analysis, new insights, new images --
which we intend to do!

This has been possible -- and will continue to be possible -- thanks to
insights shared by many, many people who trust us to get the story out
accurately, completely, and fairly -- the only possible route to recovery
for the program as a whole.

Jim O
281-337-2838

Columbia's 'Smoking Gun' Was Obscured
NASA Did Not See a Deadly Risk When Foam Struck Shuttle Wing
By Kathy Sawyer, Washington Post Staff Writer
Sunday, August 24, 2003; Page A01

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn...2003Aug23.html

"John Doe" wrote in message ...
James Oberg wrote:
calculus would become clear: The team had assumed that the tile analysis
told them all they needed to know about the potential damage to the very
different RCC material as well.

Funny, to me the obvious part is the following:

The initial analysis was done with the foam stratching the tiles, in which
case, the impact energy is not so great. But if the foam hits the leading
edge, then the angle of impact means that the energy of impact is far greater.
NASA's spokespersons never spoke of foam hitting the leading edge during the
first 2 weeks after the accident. Does anyone know if the engineering teams,
during their discussions during the flight, ever considered the case of the
foam hitting the leading edge head on ? or did they consider only foam
stratching tiles only ?

The Boeing impact study (currently a copy is at
http://38.201.67.7/shuttle/investiga...ing_030123.pdf)
actually showed major tile damage over a wide area (25 x 7 inches). It
predicted damage depth of 4.7 inches, where the tile was only 2.6-2.8 inches
thick. IOW the damage was far deeper than the tile, according to the Crater
prediction program.

The same study clearly said there was NO foam-on-RCC impact data available -- none.
They did have some kind of ice-on-RCC impact data, although no mass or
size figures are given for the ice. Based on this they assumed since foam was
softer it couldn't have damaged the RCC.

Taking that at face value, you'd *think* the summary would have been something like:

- Current images don't clearly show whether the foam hit the RCC leading
edge or the tile. We therefore have to assume both as possibilities.
- Crater indicates possible severe tile damage, depending on foam impact
angle and area. In some cases damage is deeper than the tile and 25" x 7" in area.
- No RCC foam impact damage data is available. However simple mechanics indicates
if the foam hit the RCC, the impact angle would be more oblique, hence associated
momentum transfer would be much greater than for an underbody tile strike.
- We cannot rule out TPS sufficiently significant to jeopardize reentry.

Rather what the Boeing study concluded was there was no flight risk.

-- Joe D.

Yes, of course we can all see the wood for the trees now. I just wonder if
the real problem is that reading something, and comprehending what it says
are two very different things, ofthen you see and read what you expect to
se. Quite how you sort this problem out I'm not sure. I guess you use a
shadow team or something, a bit like you use multiple computers in safety
critical processes. I mean why would the human system be able to get the
right answer if it malfunctioned any more than a single computer would.

Brian

--
Brian Gaff....
graphics are great, but the blind can't hear them
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No revelation. Ron Dittemore's first press conference pretty much summed it
up.

Columbia's 'Smoking Gun' Was Obscured
NASA Did Not See a Deadly Risk When Foam Struck Shuttle Wing
By Kathy Sawyer, Washington Post Staff Writer
Sunday, August 24, 2003; Page A01

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn...2003Aug23.html







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My two cents worth would be this: don't add level upon level of bureaucracy.
What you want is the right person in the right place at the right time. Like
for example, someone who's been around for 25 years, has seen it all five or
six times, and doesn't give a rat's a$$ about becoming a VP. Just someone
who tells it like it is. Such people are rare these days: they aren't
considered team players.

Yes, they are also much too difficult to control by their bosses...

In addition, you need the people that do the "lateral coupling" - that
know about or are interested in several areas/departments, and avoid bad
things happenening because "nobody told me that...".

Jan

In article ,
James Oberg wrote:
This is the very heart of the fatal flaw in NASA's decision-making. And it
is basically a rewrite of the groundbreaking analysis of this precise issue,
in my msnbc.com columns "The Hole in NASA's Safety Culture" (July 8)
http://www.msnbc.com/news/936070.asp?0cv=CB20, and "Post-Columbia NASA
hunkers down" (July 23), http://www.msnbc.com/news/943305.asp?0dm=C219T.

If it had been written before February 1, then it might have been
"groudbreaking". When Richard Blomberg said in Congressional testimony
in April 2002, "I have never been as worried for space shuttle safety as
I am right now," that was a timely statement. Who reported on it then?
Your story now is just grubbing for priority.

And it's misleading too, because the mission management team did not crash
the shuttle. They passed up a desperate chance to save the shuttle at the
last hour, which is not the same thing. I really feel sorry for the MMT:
they were left holding the bag, and any mistakes they made look awful.

The real problem was that the foam hit the shuttle in the first place.
As the CAIB report explains, NASA manned spaceflight let it happen because
the space shuttle is an experimental vehicle with an operational mission.
It goes all the way back to the beginning of space shuttle flights.
As the CAIB report quoted Ronald Reagan from 1982:

[b]eginning with the next flight, the Columbia and her sister ships
will be fully operational, ready to provide economical and routine
access to space for scientific exploration, commercial ventures,
and for tasks related to the national security.

The space shuttle has always dragged along this millstone of unrealistic
expectations. That's why it crashed.
--
/\ Greg Kuperberg (UC Davis)
/ \
\ / Visit the Math ArXiv Front at http://front.math.ucdavis.edu/
\/ * All the math that's fit to e-print *

On Thu, 28 Aug 2003 19:01:57 +0000 (UTC),
(Greg Kuperberg) wrote:
the space shuttle is an experimental vehicle with an operational mission.
It goes all the way back to the beginning of space shuttle flights.
As the CAIB report quoted Ronald Reagan from 1982:

[b]eginning with the next flight, the Columbia and her sister ships
will be fully operational, ready to provide economical and routine
access to space for scientific exploration, commercial ventures,
and for tasks related to the national security.

The space shuttle has always dragged along this millstone of unrealistic
expectations. That's why it crashed.

Who orginally set up the unrealistic expectations? Nasa marketed the
thing as a space truck from day one.

Botch
ROMAN: I tell you what I see when I look out there. I see the undeveloped resources of Minnesota, Northern Wisconsin, and Michigan. I see a syndicated development consortium exploiting over a billion and a half dollars in forest products. I see a paper mill and if the strategic metals are there, a mining operation. A greenbelt between the condos on the lake and a waste management facility focusing on the newest rage in toxic waste, medical refuse. Infected bandages, body parts, IV tubing, contaminated glassware, entrails,syringes, fluids, blood, low grade radioactive waste all safely contained sunken in the lake and sealed for centuries. Now I ask you what do you see?


CHET: I just see trees.