NRO woes, and others

Cover story in this week's US News and World Report:

http://www.usnews.com/usnews/issue/0...news/11nro.htm
http://www.usnews.com/usnews/issue/0...s/11nro.b1.htm
http://www.usnews.com/usnews/issue/0...s/11nro.b2.htm

U.S. News & World Report
August 11, 2003
Lack Of Intelligence
America's secret spy satellites are costing you billions, but
they can't even get off the launch pad
By Douglas Pasternak

Quite interesting, perhaps not all that surprising to NRO-watchers.

Allen Thomson wrote:

Cover story in this week's US News and World Report:

http://www.usnews.com/usnews/issue/0...news/11nro.htm
http://www.usnews.com/usnews/issue/0...s/11nro.b1.htm
http://www.usnews.com/usnews/issue/0...s/11nro.b2.htm

U.S. News & World Report
August 11, 2003
Lack Of Intelligence
America's secret spy satellites are costing you billions, but
they can't even get off the launch pad
By Douglas Pasternak

Quite interesting, perhaps not all that surprising to NRO-watchers.

All quite classified stuff, at least in the past.

However, the referenced article reads like a hatchet job by someone
with an agenda.

I would not normally try to blame NRO for booster failures such as
that of the Titan. The main reason for mentioning it was to tie
Teets to that set of failures and to advance the claim that he was
forced out of his job at Lockheed-Martin because of that failure
and got "rewarded" by a high level government position.

OK, I can think of a time back in the 1960's when I worked for
a few years at Lockheed where a manager failed at one program
at Lockheed Burbank and moved to Lockheed Sunnyvale where
he took charge of another program because of the experience
he gained on the failed project. It appeared that the higher level
people at Burbank let him transfer to Sunnyvale without providing
any negative information about him, so I am not claiming something
like this never happens.

I just have some skepticism about the U.S. News and World Report
article.

Mike Walsh

On Mon, 04 Aug 2003 18:59:13 GMT, in a place far, far away, Michael
Walsh made the phosphor on my monitor glow in
such a way as to indicate that:

OK, I can think of a time back in the 1960's when I worked for
a few years at Lockheed where a manager failed at one program
at Lockheed Burbank and moved to Lockheed Sunnyvale where
he took charge of another program because of the experience
he gained on the failed project. It appeared that the higher level
people at Burbank let him transfer to Sunnyvale without providing
any negative information about him, so I am not claiming something
like this never happens.

I saw many managers rewarded for failure (and punished for success)
when I was at Rockwell. Actually, the classic example of it was when
NASA budget was chopped after a successful Apollo, and gets increases
every time it screws up (e.g., Challenger, Columbia, Space Station).

--
simberg.interglobal.org * 310 372-7963 (CA) 307 739-1296 (Jackson Hole)
interglobal space lines * 307 733-1715 (Fax) http://www.interglobal.org

"Extraordinary launch vehicles require extraordinary markets..."
Swap the first . and @ and throw out the ".trash" to email me.
Here's my email address for autospammers:

Michael Walsh wrote in message ...
I have also seen a project recovered from failure by people who came in
after the original people who messed things up bailed out. Then when
success was achieved some of the original group crawled back on board
at the end and got more credit than the people who rescued the project.

I won't provide any details on this one or where it happened.

I have been around at several companies which are now parts
of Boeing, Lockheed Martin and Northrup-Grumman.

Mike Walsh


A classic example of this is the old Martin B-10 of the 1930's. Often
she is touted as the first bomber with enclosed canopies and turrets,
leading the way for the bombers of WW2; a thoroughly Modern Millie.
When Martin first designed the bomber, the Air Corps was not
impressed. The B-10 prototype had open cockpits, draggy nacelles and
was seriously lacking in performance. It was the Air Corps engineers
at Wright Field who designed the turrets and canopies along with the
nacelles and grafted them onto the B-10. Yet it was and is the Martin
Co. that continues to recieve praise for "an aircraft ahead of its
time". I know my fellow Martin Museum members will kill me for making
such a statement!


Gene DiGennaro
Baltimore, Md USA

Michael Walsh wrote:


B

: I would not normally try to blame NRO for booster failures such as
: that of the Titan. The main reason for mentioning it was to tie
: Teets to that set of failures and to advance the claim that he was
: forced out of his job at Lockheed-Martin because of that failure
: and got "rewarded" by a high level government position.

Of course, failure is not always the fault of the manager. This
is particularly true when the manager (despite his/her protests) is
given an unrealistic task. I can recall a few cases where managers just
shook their heads (and fired off their memos) when tasked with building
unbelievably performing systems at unbelievably low costs on unbelievably
short times frames. In the case of government employees this was
particularly true when their were "political" reasons for a task or contract
such as favoring a contractor (and associated pols) or throwing a bone to
some unsatsfied military consumer.
I would also suggest that a root problem with the satellite design
and procurement system is that so much control of it has left the hands
of the actual designers -- instead the performances specs are often literally
"dreamed up" by consumers. This is particularly true with the continued
militarization of the recon program --- the military doesn't just want
intelligence it wants *targeting data*, and is famous for generating gold
plated ideas. Of course, consumer input is important, but the process
increasingly reminds me of what often happens when you let the actual
consumer (vice the design experts) 'create their own'. I am reminded of
an episode of the Simpsons where the "Homer-mobile" is created, thus bringing
down an automotive empire.
A poster in an engineers cubicle "Aim High. But not at your chin,
please."

regards,
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