|
|
Thread Tools | Display Modes |
#12
|
|||
|
|||
The Non-Innovator's Dilemma
In article ,
says... h (Rand Simberg) wrote in message . .. That's the title of my latest column at Tech Central Station, in which I discuss why the economics of OSP make no sense. http://www.techcentralstation.com/091903E.html With regard to your commments on the NASA "culture": As a former employee of both NACA and NASA, I would say, just compare how the two organizations operated. NACA was always very decentralized with many small projects--some of which competed directly with each other. I remember working at Ames on a transsonic research program that recovered a drop missile that recorded data with optical levers, etc. Langley had a similar program that used telemetry. They would compare notes. There may have been some friendly rivalry, but never plots to kill one another off to gain complete control of the program. I worked for the National Academy of Sciences before and after Sputnik--and worked indirectly for both Drs. Van Allen, Pickering (then head of JPL), and Homer Newell (NRL). There was a bill in Congress to make JPL NASA, and another to make ABMA NASA. But NACA was so well liked and respected--thanks in part to gentlemen like Hugh Dryden and thanks in part to the NACA culture, that Jim Van Allen (a later vociferous critic) and others testified in favor of NACA getting the job-- primarily because, well, it was NACA. In 1959 while at NASA Headquarters, some of my colleagues from NACA Langley complained: "We used to complain about the USAF bureaucracy, but we've already gotten worse." How do we go back? Perhaps an Advisory Committee again, with no big fiefdoms. In order to avoid the big fiefdoms, the new organization cannot have any huge programs like ISS or Space Shuttle. Apollo was an opportunity, a trap, and an anomaly. Apollo should not be part of the discussion. This does not mean that NASA could not do things like a manned Mars mission or a return to the moon. I think the odds of something like that happening would actually better with an NACA culture and a robust commmercial space transportaion industry. Best regards, Len (Cormier) PanAero, Inc. and Third Millennium Aerospace, Inc. ( http://www.tour2space.com ) Len, your occasional comments here are always intriguing. You were in the midst of people and organizations that were making history. Have you ever considered writing a book of your own? -- Do not meddle in the affairs of dragons, for | Doug Van Dorn thou art crunchy and taste good with ketchup | |
#13
|
|||
|
|||
The Non-Innovator's Dilemma
Doug... wrote:
[to Len Cormier] Len, your occasional comments here are always intriguing. You were in the midst of people and organizations that were making history. Have you ever considered writing a book of your own? I'll second that. I hope he stays too busy building spaceships to write a book, but if you find the time, Len, I'll be first in line to buy it. .......Andrew -- -- Andrew Case | | |
#14
|
|||
|
|||
The Non-Innovator's Dilemma
"Doug..." wrote in message ...
In article , says... h (Rand Simberg) wrote in message . .. That's the title of my latest column at Tech Central Station, in which I discuss why the economics of OSP make no sense. http://www.techcentralstation.com/091903E.html With regard to your commments on the NASA "culture": As a former employee of both NACA and NASA, I would say, just compare how the two organizations operated. NACA was always very decentralized with many small projects--some of which competed directly with each other. I remember working at Ames on a transsonic research program that recovered a drop missile that recorded data with optical levers, etc. Langley had a similar program that used telemetry. They would compare notes. There may have been some friendly rivalry, but never plots to kill one another off to gain complete control of the program. I worked for the National Academy of Sciences before and after Sputnik--and worked indirectly for both Drs. Van Allen, Pickering (then head of JPL), and Homer Newell (NRL). There was a bill in Congress to make JPL NASA, and another to make ABMA NASA. But NACA was so well liked and respected--thanks in part to gentlemen like Hugh Dryden and thanks in part to the NACA culture, that Jim Van Allen (a later vociferous critic) and others testified in favor of NACA getting the job-- primarily because, well, it was NACA. In 1959 while at NASA Headquarters, some of my colleagues from NACA Langley complained: "We used to complain about the USAF bureaucracy, but we've already gotten worse." How do we go back? Perhaps an Advisory Committee again, with no big fiefdoms. In order to avoid the big fiefdoms, the new organization cannot have any huge programs like ISS or Space Shuttle. Apollo was an opportunity, a trap, and an anomaly. Apollo should not be part of the discussion. This does not mean that NASA could not do things like a manned Mars mission or a return to the moon. I think the odds of something like that happening would actually better with an NACA culture and a robust commmercial space transportaion industry. Best regards, Len (Cormier) PanAero, Inc. and Third Millennium Aerospace, Inc. ( http://www.tour2space.com ) Len, your occasional comments here are always intriguing. You were in the midst of people and organizations that were making history. Have you ever considered writing a book of your own? Thanks. I was young at the time and had a fly-on-the-wall status--which was quite interesting, I admit. However, I am too busy right now still trying to make something happen on my own. Best regards, Len (Cormier) PanAero, Inc. and Third Millennium Aerospace, Inc. ( http://www.tour2space.com ) |
#15
|
|||
|
|||
The Non-Innovator's Dilemma
heh heh well for what it's worth I too have concerns about the sense of
building an OSP and am glad you brought attention to its cost vs capability. |
#16
|
|||
|
|||
The Non-Innovator's Dilemma
"Rand Simberg" wrote in message ... That's the title of my latest column at Tech Central Station, in which I discuss why the economics of OSP make no sense. http://www.techcentralstation.com/091903E.html I see several flaws with your argument. 1) By using development costs for the OSP vs. not including them for the shuttle you compare apples on oranges making the cost comparison worthless. 2) Using three launches have nothing to do with rocket capabilities. The heavy versions of both the Delta and Atlas could launch a Big Gemini with lots of cargo mass left over totaling more people and more cargo then the shuttle. It has to do with reducing risks even though it raises costs. 3) The vast majority of the 12 billion cost estimates has to do with "man rating" Atlas and Delta not the OSP itself. Most cost estimates put the cost of a 4 man capsule at around 4 billion. The full man rating does not have to be done until after the OSP is flying as a lifeboat and cargo vehicle, both do not need to be rated until after it is carrying men to orbit delaying greatly the cost of man rating the rockets. At the same time the lower failure rate is beneficial in and of itself saving billions in lost satellites. 4) If you are using 3 OSP flights to replace a shuttle flight and you replace at least 4 shuttle flights a year that totals 12 not 4 or 8. If you replace 6 shuttle flights then you have 18 flights. 5) If they use the capsule version they will be reasonably cheap. There is no reason a private company with its own rocket could not buy an OSP. All they need is the ability to launch 8 tons to LEO, less if they want to sell suborbital flights. 6) Reusability is in the early stages not all that important. Without sufficient rate of launches to support a decent number of vehicles and absorb fixed costs reusability can easily raise costs. 7) Delta and Atlas rockets at low launch rates cost less then $100 million. Shuttle flights cost right now over $600 million. Even at an extra $100 million you only have the same cost not more for a safer vehicle. With a little luck and decent launch rates you should be able to get launch costs under $100 million. Based on 4 people and 500 kg of cargo that is around $20 million a person considerably cheaper then the shuttle at around $50 million. |
#17
|
|||
|
|||
The Non-Innovator's Dilemma
|
#18
|
|||
|
|||
The Non-Innovator's Dilemma
"Dholmes" wrote in message ... "Rand Simberg" wrote in message ... That's the title of my latest column at Tech Central Station, in which I discuss why the economics of OSP make no sense. http://www.techcentralstation.com/091903E.html I see several flaws with your argument. 1) By using development costs for the OSP vs. not including them for the shuttle you compare apples on oranges making the cost comparison worthless. No. If we're back in 1972 making this decision, then including shuttle development costs would be important. However, at this point, that money has been spent. So it's already accounted for. You want to count it twice. 2) Using three launches have nothing to do with rocket capabilities. The heavy versions of both the Delta and Atlas could launch a Big Gemini with lots of cargo mass left over totaling more people and more cargo then the shuttle. It has to do with reducing risks even though it raises costs. 3) The vast majority of the 12 billion cost estimates has to do with "man rating" Atlas and Delta not the OSP itself. Most cost estimates put the cost of a 4 man capsule at around 4 billion. The full man rating does not have to be done until after the OSP is flying as a lifeboat and cargo vehicle, both do not need to be rated until after it is carrying men to orbit delaying greatly the cost of man rating the rockets. At the same time the lower failure rate is beneficial in and of itself saving billions in lost satellites. Lower failure rate has yet to be demonstrated. Is that 4 billion a capsule? Or for X capsules? 4) If you are using 3 OSP flights to replace a shuttle flight and you replace at least 4 shuttle flights a year that totals 12 not 4 or 8. If you replace 6 shuttle flights then you have 18 flights. 5) If they use the capsule version they will be reasonably cheap. There is no reason a private company with its own rocket could not buy an OSP. All they need is the ability to launch 8 tons to LEO, less if they want to sell suborbital flights. 6) Reusability is in the early stages not all that important. Without sufficient rate of launches to support a decent number of vehicles and absorb fixed costs reusability can easily raise costs. 7) Delta and Atlas rockets at low launch rates cost less then $100 million. Shuttle flights cost right now over $600 million. Even at an extra $100 million you only have the same cost not more for a safer vehicle. With a little luck and decent launch rates you should be able to get launch costs under $100 million. Based on 4 people and 500 kg of cargo that is around $20 million a person considerably cheaper then the shuttle at around $50 million. |
#19
|
|||
|
|||
The Non-Innovator's Dilemma
On Sun, 21 Sep 2003 07:02:57 CST, in a place far, far away, "Dholmes"
made the phosphor on my monitor glow in such a way as to indicate that: "Rand Simberg" wrote in message .. . That's the title of my latest column at Tech Central Station, in which I discuss why the economics of OSP make no sense. http://www.techcentralstation.com/091903E.html I see several flaws with your argument. 1) By using development costs for the OSP vs. not including them for the shuttle you compare apples on oranges making the cost comparison worthless. Nope. I addressed that in the column. You can't compare sunk costs to avoidable ones, at least if you're trying to make a rational economic decision. 2) Using three launches have nothing to do with rocket capabilities. The heavy versions of both the Delta and Atlas could launch a Big Gemini with lots of cargo mass left over totaling more people and more cargo then the shuttle. It has to do with reducing risks even though it raises costs. I don't understand what you're saying here, or the relevance. 3) The vast majority of the 12 billion cost estimates has to do with "man rating" Atlas and Delta not the OSP itself. So? It's still a cost that has to be amortized. 4) If you are using 3 OSP flights to replace a shuttle flight and you replace at least 4 shuttle flights a year that totals 12 not 4 or 8. If you replace 6 shuttle flights then you have 18 flights. How do you figure? You can't count the cargo flights. 5) If they use the capsule version they will be reasonably cheap. That remains to be seen. There is no reason a private company with its own rocket could not buy an OSP. No, but there are many reasons that it wouldn't--the high costs. All they need is the ability to launch 8 tons to LEO, less if they want to sell suborbital flights. 6) Reusability is in the early stages not all that important. Without sufficient rate of launches to support a decent number of vehicles and absorb fixed costs reusability can easily raise costs. That was exactly the point of the column. 7) Delta and Atlas rockets at low launch rates cost less then $100 million. Shuttle flights cost right now over $600 million. Even at an extra $100 million you only have the same cost not more for a safer vehicle. With a little luck and decent launch rates you should be able to get launch costs under $100 million. Based on 4 people and 500 kg of cargo that is around $20 million a person considerably cheaper then the shuttle at around $50 million. You apparently didn't read the column carefully. -- simberg.interglobal.org * 310 372-7963 (CA) 307 739-1296 (Jackson Hole) interglobal space lines * 307 733-1715 (Fax) http://www.interglobal.org "Extraordinary launch vehicles require extraordinary markets..." Swap the first . and @ and throw out the ".trash" to email me. Here's my email address for autospammers: |
#20
|
|||
|
|||
The Non-Innovator's Dilemma
"Dholmes" wrote:
2) Using three launches have nothing to do with rocket capabilities. The heavy versions of both the Delta and Atlas could launch a Big Gemini with lots of cargo mass left over totaling more people and more cargo then the shuttle. It has to do with reducing risks even though it raises costs. ... 4) If you are using 3 OSP flights to replace a shuttle flight and you replace at least 4 shuttle flights a year that totals 12 not 4 or 8. If you replace 6 shuttle flights then you have 18 flights. I think we also have to consider what the future needs will be. After ISS is assembled, would there be a need for launching crews *and* payloads together? For satellites, space telescopes, etc. there is a need for a *single* launch. For crew rotations carrying a small amount of payload there is need for a *single* launch. I find this comparison in Rand's column off target. Also, there is some value in having a crewed vehicle that is operationally simpler, has fewer crit 1 items, and has viable abort modes that cover a far wider range of the flight envelope than is currently available with shuttle. There are a few companies out there now that are working hard trying to make an attempt at a short, suborbital flight (the links that Rand provided in his column when referring to private ventures: "having its [NASA] high-cost myths exposed as private entities start to show the way to affordable and safe human spaceflight"). As much as I find Scaled Composite's current endeavor fascinating to follow, let's keep in mind that there is a big difference between what it takes to go from 2,000 mph in a suborbital arc to 17,500 mph and LEO - the ideal energy required (per pound) scales roughly with the square of the velocity. I also want to see safe and affordable routine access to space become available, and I am curious as to just how cheap and safe Rand thinks a private company could do it, compared to the current way (or proposed future, as with OSP) it is being done. How much should it cost a private enterprise to develop and test a four person space transportation vehicle? How much should it cost, per flight, to operate? In other words, how far off the mark are we, now? Jon |
Thread Tools | |
Display Modes | |
|
|