The foam did not do it

It is very unlikely that foam shed from external tank on jan 16, 2003
actually impacted the Columbia's left wing during sts-107’s ascent
with enough force to cause a breach, or make the rcc fail, as stated by
the caib’s foam impact theory. The caib’s foam impact theory lacked
correlation of cause to effect, and left too many inconsistencies to
explain what happened to cause the loss of Columbia and the STS-107
crew.


Skylab 1’s 63 second anomaly during ascent & STS-107’s Foam Impact
demonstrates the lack of correlation provided by the caib, as opposed
to an investigation that directly correlated cause to effect. Skylab
1’s 63 second anomaly is an example of the direct effects of
supersonic air flowing into a vehicle during the ascent to orbit. The
Skylab 1 63 second anomaly was a direct effect of the air rushing in at
a high velocity through several openings in the vehicles aft end and up
an auxiliary tunnel where it pushed the meteor shield out into the
supersonic air stream. The similarities between STS-107 and Skylab1
are that an anomalous event of air rushing into the vehicle during
orbital ascent occurred. In the case of the Skylab1 63 second anomaly,
a sequence of anomalous events occurred during ascent that were
directly correlated to the effects of air pressure, or secondary
effects such as damage to the vehicle from the falling meteor shield.
Nasa correlated the cause air rushing into the Saturn V vehicle, and
the forces applied by air pressure to effects detected by the vehicles
internal sensors, other anomalies, as well as the vehicles reactions
during ascent of skylab1.

http://history.nasa.gov/skylabrep/SRch2.htm
“Early Indication of Anomalies
When the OWS Solar Array System was commanded to deploy, telemetered
data indicated that events did not occur as planned. The flight data
was analyzed by flight operations personnel to reveal the possible
source of the problem. At about R+60 seconds, the S-II telemetry
reflected power increased slightly. At about 63 seconds, numerous
measurements indicated the apparent early deployment and loss of the
MS. At this time, the vehicle was at about 28,600 feet altitude and at
a velocity of about Mach 1�.

http://history.nasa.gov/skylabrep/SRch3.htm
“63 Second Anomaly - Loss of MS
The Investigation Board, evaluated the telemetry data in order to
explain the various anomalies that occurred on Skylab 1. The first
anomalous indication was an increase in S-II telemetry reflected power
from a steady 1.5w beginning at R+ 59. 80 seconds. At this time the
telemetry forward power remained steady at 58.13w. By 61.04 seconds,
the reflected power had reached 1.75w, and by 80.38 seconds, the
reflected power had stabilized at about 2.0w. This abnormal increase in
power might be indicative of a vehicle physical configuration change
which altered the antenna ground plane characteristic.
Shortly after the telemetry reflected power increase, the MS torsion
rod 7 forward (measurement G7036) indicated a slight change toward the
deployed condition (see fig. 2-5 for instrumentation layout). This
occurred at R+60.12 seconds, and at 61.78 seconds the vehicle roll rate
decreased slightly from a normal value of 1.1 degrees per second
clockwise (CW) looking forward. Figure 3-1 is a graph of the roll rate
versus range time during the time of interest. The next torsion rod 7
forward sample at about 62.52 seconds revealed a further relaxation.
The increase in telemetry reflected power and the movement of torsion
rod 7 forward tend to indicate meteoroid shield lifting between
positions I and II (see fig. 2-5).
Between R+62.75 and 63.31 seconds, several vehicle dynamic measurements
indicated a significant disturbance. A sensor on the OWS film vault
showed an abnormal vibration at 62.75 seconds followed by disturbances
sensed by X and Y accelerometer pickups in the Instrument Unit (IU),
the pitch, yaw, and longitudinal accelerometers, and the pitch, yaw,
and roll rate gyros. At 62.78 seconds, the roll rate gyro sensed a
sudden CW roll rate resulting in a peak amplitude of 3.0 degrees per
second CW at 62.94 seconds. A sensor at the X upper mounting showed a
maximum peak-to-peak shock of 17.2 g's at 63.17 seconds. In addition,
the S-II engine actuators experienced pressure fluctuations caused by
vehicle movement against the inertia of the non-thrusting engine
nozzles.�

http://history.nasa.gov/skylabrep/SRch10.htm
�NASA Investigation Board Report On The INITIAL FLIGHT ANOMALIES OF
SKYLAB 1
CHAPTER X : SIGNIFICANT FINDINGS AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
Significant Findings
The launch anomaly that occurred at approximately 63 seconds after
lift-off was a failure of the meteoroid shield of the OWS. The SAS-2
wing tie downs were broken by the action of the meteoroid shield at 63
seconds. Subsequent loss of the SAS-2 wing was caused by retro-rocket
plume impingement on the partially deployed wing at 593 seconds. The
failure of the S-II interstage adapter to separate in flight was
probably due to damage to the ordnance separation device by falling
debris from the meteoroid shield.
The most probable cause of the failure of the meteoroid shield was
internal pressurization of its auxiliary tunnel. This internal
pressurization acted to force the forward end of the tunnel and
meteoroid shield away from the OWS and into the supersonic air stream.
The resulting forces tore the meteoroid shield from the OWS. The
pressurization of the auxiliary tunnel resulted from the admission of
high pressure air into the tunnel through several openings in the aft
end.
These openings we
(1) an Imperfect fit of the tunnel with the aft fairing;
(2) an open boot seal between the tunnel and the tank surface; and
(3) open stringers on the aft skirt under the tunnel.
The venting analysis for the tunnel was predicated on a completely
sealed aft end. The openings in the aft end of the tunnel thus resulted
from a failure to communicate this critical design feature among
aerodynamics, structural design, and manufacturing personnel. …�

http://history.nasa.gov/skylabrep/SRch3.htm
“Forward Interstage Internal Pressure Anomaly
Flight data indicated a deviation of the S-II forward interstage
pressure from analytical values commencing at approximately 63 seconds.
Inasmuch as the deviation from the analytical curve of internal
pressure versus time appeared to be coincident with the MS failure (see
fig. 3-21) it was postulated that a portion of the shield had punctured
the forward interstage. On this basis, it was possible to correlate the
flight data with either an assumed 2.0 square foot hole in the conical
section or an assumed 0.75 square foot hole in the cylindrical
section.�

http://history.nasa.gov/skylabrep/SRch6.htm
“Failure of Butterfly Hinges
The flight load on the butterfly hinges at 63 seconds after lift-off
was calculated to be 44 lbs/inch. This load is created by pretensioning
of the auxiliary tunnel frames prior to lift-off and by the
circumferential growth of the OWS due to internal pressurization.
Assuming uniform circumferential loading, the factor of safety of the
butterfly hinge on the auxiliary tunnel side was approximately 5 and on
the SAS-1 side was 11. Because of the friction between the MS and OWS
that must be overcome in rigging the shield for flight, the ground
loads on these hinges was undoubtedly higher than the flight loads.
This fact, and the high factor of safety of the hinges, leads to the
conclusion that they did not initiate the failure.
Failure of the Trunnion Bolts or Straps
Because of the friction between the MS and OWS, loads greater than the
flight load were probably imposed m the trunnion system in torquing up
the bolts for ground rigging. The calculated flight load, without
friction, on the trunnion bolts and straps at the 63 second event was
44 lbs/inch (see fig. 4-4). This load was arrived at by assuming that
during the boost phase there was sufficient acoustic and vibration
energies to distribute the load circumferentially even in the MS.�

Both sts-107’s damage to left wing from “foam impact�, and the
skylab 1 “open vents in the vehicles aft�, both occurred during
ascent and had openings through which high speed air could rush in to
the vehicles. The air started entering in through skylab1’s aft end
10 seconds before the vehicle had reached the maximum dynamic pressure,
which produced strong enough forces to the break components holding the
stations meteor shield in place during ascent. But the caib did not and
could not validate it’s own theory of high velocity foam impact
causing rcc failure, with the actual data from the many sensors whose
sole job was to detect the forces Columbia was encountering on Jan 16,
2003,.

January 16, 2003
In fact the caib did not and could not validate its own theory of high
velocity foam impact causing rcc failure, with the actual data from the
many sensors whose sole job was to detect the forces Columbia was
encountering on Jan 16, 2003. At the time of foam impact or FI=0
during ascent on Jan 16, 2003 the Columbia had past the point of
maximum dynamic pressures applied to it’s surface of approximately
580 lbs/sq ft, but was still experiencing pressures of approx 480
lbs/per square foot at met 82 seconds. Although these high aerodynamic
forces drop drastically the aerodynamic pressures remain above 30
lbs/square foot as the shuttle increases its velocity and altitude for
approximately another 30 seconds. The pressure of 30 lbs/sq ft is
significant in the fact the caib clearly demonstrated aerodynamic
forces acting on Columbia during reentry at these same pressures. But,
the caib could not demonstrate any significant direct effects of foam
impact causing the damage to Columbia’s left wing, nor any of the
internal effects associated with supersonic air entering the wings
leading edge even though these forces were appreciable, and long
lasting enough to be detected. The aerodynamic pressure at the time of
impact is extremely important in order for the caibs theory to be
valid, as the aerodynamic pressure becomes a major component in
providing the foam with enough energy to make the rcc material fail on
Columbia’s left wing during ascent. At the time of foam impact or FI
the supersonic air stream would have been disrupted by the foam itself,
therefore it is extremely likely that “sneak flow� should have
occurred immediately after FI=0 through the damaged rcc material, and
at the given the aerodynamic pressures provided by the caib.

Caib report volume 2 part 8, page 240 col1
“2.1 FREESTREAM CONDITIONS
During the STS-107 launch a large piece of debris was observed
falling from the External Tank at a MET = 81.699
seconds at the following freestream conditions:
MET: 81.7 seconds
Altitude: 6,5820 feet 12.47 miles
Mach:# 2.46
Velocity: 2,324.1 feet/second 1,584.6 miles/hour
Dynamic pressu 481.72 lb/ft2
Density: 1.783e-04 slug/ft3 7.1% Seal level density
Temperatu -88.1ºF
Alpha: 2.08 degrees
Beta: -0.09 degrees
Inboard elevons: 0.26 degrees
Outboard elevons: -4.85 degrees
Table 2-1. STS-107 freestream conditions at time of debris release
The freestream conditions and the vehicle geometry determine
the flowfield around the Space Shuttle at the time of
the debris release. This flowfield, along with the vehicle
acceleration, provides the force that causes the debris to
accelerate relative to the Space Shuttle Launch Vehicle.
The flowfield density and velocity combine to accelerate
the debris and the flowfield direction combined with the
aerodynamics of the debris determine the trajectory that the
debris will follow.�

The foam impact testing conducted by the caib showed various levels of
failure, all of which included providing a path for hot gasses to enter
the vehicle during reentry on February 1, 2003. But the caib provided
no Anomalous Pressure data to verify effects of high pressure air
entering through the damage that allegedly occurred at FI=0 at MET 82
seconds, when the aerodynamic pressures in the rcc cavity would have
register off scale during Columbia’s ascent on Jan 16, 2003.

Caib report volume 2 part 19, page 567 col1 par1
“Aerodynamic pressure readings from both the left and right wings
were similar. V07P8026A read 2.5 psi lower than previous flights, and
this appeared to be a simple case of the sensor becoming uncalibrated.
“

The Columbia’s leading edge wing spars had strain sensors like
V12G9921A to provide information on the wings structural support loads
during ascent and reentry. Ascent data from strain sensors like
V12G9921A should have detected some increased strain if a high velocity
foam impact occurred imparting 32,000 pounds of pressure per square
inch as the caib theorized. In fact, the caib provides no direct
correlation of a foam impact of the magnitude required for rcc failure,
from neither any of the accelerometer or strain gauge data, nor the
direct effects of temperature or pressure changes during
supersonic/hypersonic air flow occurring after MET of 81.7 seconds on
Jan 16, 2003 during STS-107’s ascent.

The caib provided no Anomalous strain data to verify effects of foam an
impact of the magnitude required for rcc failure, occurred to Columbia
during ascent on Jan 16, 2003 at 81.7 seconds into flight.
Caib report volume 2 part 19, page 567 col2 par2
For the 131 strain gauges on the left and right wing structural
elements, 13 on the right wing showed some offset errors, including
V12G9081A, V12G9442A, V12G9452A, V12G9641A, V12G9642A, V12G9648A,
V12G9649A, V12G9651A, V12G9656A, V12G9629A, V12G9635A, V12G9636A, and
V12G9637A. By contrast, only 2 strain gauges on the left wing showed
any offset errors between STS-107 and prior flights, and these were
V12G9058A and V12G9921A. The latter of these, V12G9921A, is one of the
key sensors located on the spar panel immediately behind RCC panel #9.
Even on the expanded time scale plots covering 50-150 sec MET, there is
no evidence of any significant event around the ET foam debris impact
at 82 sec MET. There were a total of 52 strain gauges on the right and
left elevons, and all of these but one, V13G9749A which showed a slight
offset error, re-sponded similar to prior flight history.�

The caib attempted to provide a “simplified thermal math model�
correlation to an anomalous temperature sensor reading from sts-107’s
ascent
Caib report volume 2 part 7, page 174,175 col1 par1
“Additionally, there is another MADS measurement that had an
off-nominal signature during the ascent timeframe. The temperature
sensor on the leading edge spar behind RCC panel 9 showed a slightly
higher temperature rise than seen on any previous Columbia flight.
Figure 3-15 shows the loca-tion of the temperature sensor behind the
wing leading edge spar inside the wing. The slight temperature rise can
be seen in Figure 3-16. Note that most flights show a small rise in
this temperature during ascent due to aerodynamic heating.
STS-107 had a 7.5 degree Fahrenheit rise that started very early during
ascent (five to six minutes after launch). Al-though the data do not
prove that the RCC was breached during ascent, the data are consistent
with a possible flow path into the RCC cavity via damage in the RCC
panels 6 through 8 area. A simplified thermal math model was
con-structed and verified with flight data from STS-5. The model was
then correlated to the flight data from STS-107. Assum-ing the
equivalent heating from a 10 inch diameter hole in RCC panel 8, this
model nearly predicts both the ascent and entry temperature profiles
for the wing leading edge spar temperature sensor. Figure 3-17 compares
the model with the flight data for both ascent and entry.�

A 7.5 f deg temperature rise was attributed to the hole, but at (300 to
360)sec MET when foam impact occurred at 82 sec MET. This slight
temperature rise is the only thermal data to verify effects of
supersonic/hypersonic air entering through the damage that allegedly
occurred from foam impact, to Columbia during ascent on Jan 16, 2003.
The caib declared this temperature rise as insignificant.
Caib report volume 2 part 19, page 566 col2 par3
“Several temperature sensors showed some differences from prior
flight histories; however, these deviations are in gen-eral not very
significant.�

The caib provided an Anomalous accelerometer data reading at time the
alleged wing damage occurred, but made no correlation to verify effects
of foam a impact of the magnitude required for rcc failure, during the
Columbia’s ascent on jan 16, 2003.
Caib report volume 2 part 19, page 567-568 col2 par3
“One of the accelerometers on the left wing elevons, V08D9729A,
showed a single cycle sinusoidal pulse at 81.9 sec MET that was
approximately 2 g in amplitude, as compared to a background
vibration level which generally stayed well below 1 g...Boeing of
Huntington Beach performed a more thorough analysis of the remainder of
the wideband FDM ascent data and in general did not find much that was
anomalous.�

The caib did provide verification that a wind shear which occurred at
MET 57 seconds was within safe parameters during STS—107’s ascent
jan 16, 2003, clearly showing the sensor and analysis capabilities to
demonstrate such phenomena.
Caib report vol 1 page 34, col 1, par 3
“The wind shear at 57 seconds after launch and the Shuttle stack.s
reaction to it appears to have initiated a very low frequency
oscillation, caused by liquid oxygen sloshing in-side the External
Tank,4 that peaked in amplitude 75 seconds after launch and continued
through Solid Rocket Booster separation at 127 seconds after launch. A
small oscillation is not unusual during ascent, but on STS-107 the
amplitude was larger than normal and lasted longer. Less severe wind
shears at 95 and 105 seconds after launch contributed to the continuing
oscillation.�
Analysis of accelerometer data detected by Columbia’s sensors during
sts-107’s ascent established patterns in the environment that were
directly attributed to a random load of sloshing liquid oxygen in the
external tank. And yet the caib could not establish such a link to
the transient load created from a high velocity foam impact with a
great enough magnitude for rcc failure, as established by their foam
impact tests.
If the above statements by the caib are true and valid, it is
inconsistent that an impact of the magnitude required for rcc failure
actually occurred, and yet sensor data recorded no significant
information during or after the time of foam impact. And if the above
statements by the caib are true and valid, it is inconsistent that no
significant effects of rcc damage, were detect by Columbia sensors
during ascent on Jan 16 2003, and yet these same sensors detected the
important data “sneak flow� during reentry on Feb. 1 2003.


The only evidence of foam impact actually occurring provided by the
caib is photographic observations, not direct internal pressure,
strain, or temperature data from Columbia during STS-107 ascent on
jan16, 2003. The fact the photographic data does confirm foam impact
did occur , somewhere in the vicinity described by the caib, but the
caib never directly demonstrates a correlation to the effects foam
damage to Columbia’s left wing during ascent on Jan 16, 2003.
Instead the caib attempts to make a correlation of the theoretical
effects of wing damage during reentry feb1 2003, not during ascent when
the alleged damage (to the extent )was supposed to have been caused by
foam impact on Jan 16 2003, as nasa did with Skylab 1’s 63 second
anomaly. It is a fact the caibs whole premise rests on the existence
of a breach or wing damage, it is therefore the responsibility of the
caib to include the data to verify and validate its own theory through
correlation of the theory to facts in its final report. Given the fact
the caib failed to directly correlate the foam impact to alleged wing
damage leaves open the question if the wing was even damaged to the
magnitude that would allow superheated gases to enter the Columbia
during reentry on feb1 2003. The caib created new tests for foam
impact force verification, and yet once again failed to provide any
correlation between the forces required to cause the failure claimed in
its premise, to the actual data detect on Columbia Jan 16, 2003. As
nasa did with the skylab 1 63 second anomaly, validation of a given
premise must occur through a correlation between the theoretical, and
actual, which the caib simply failed to do with it’s foam impact
theory for Columbia’s accident on feb1 2003. Therefore it is highly
unlikely the foam impact “breached or damaged� the Columbiaduring
ascent on Jan 16, 2003, to the magnitude that would allow superheated
gases to enter Columbia’s left wing during reentry on feb1 2003,
causing the loss of the Columbia and the STS-107 crew.

On flight day 2 of the STS-107 mission, an unknown object departed from
the Columbia, which was not correlated to any event. This object
remained a mystery for the investigators of the accident, but analysis
did determine it was an object dislodging from the damaged area of
Columubia’s left wing.

Caib report vol 1, page 63 paragraph 2:
“After exhaustive radar cross-section analysis and testing, coupled
with bal-listic analysis of the objects orbital decay, only a fragment
of RCC panel would match the UHF radar cross-section and ballistic
coefficients observed by the Space Surveil-lance network. Such an RCC
panel fragment must be ap-proximately 140 square inches or greater in
area to meet the observed radar cross-section characteristics. Figure
3.5-1 shows RCC panel fragments from Columbia.s right wing that
represent those meeting the observed characteristics of object
2003-003B.10 Note that the Southwest Research Institute foam impact
test on panel 8 (see Section 3.8) created RCC fragments that fell into
the wing cavity. These pieces are consistent in size with the RCC panel
fragments that exhibited the required physi-cal characteristics
consistent with the Flight Day 2 object.�

Radar observation determined the flight day 2 object had a cross
sectional area of approximately 140 sq inches. The caib then
established a possible correlation of the flight day 2 object. The
correlation provided by the caib for the flight day 2 object’s
observed radar characteristics was to the approximate size of dislodged
rcc fragments as a result of the foam impact testing. But this
correlation provided by the caib establishes only effect (flight day 2
object observation in this case), to effect of (foam impact test
results showing rcc fragment size in this case). But the caib does
not establish wing damage to columbia occurring during ascent on jan
16, 2003, thus does not establish cause to effect.

Nor does nasa exactly establish what the flight day 2 object was,
please note,
Caib report volume 1, page 64 col 1 par 1
“Findings:
F3.5-1 The object seen on orbit with Columbia on Flight Day 2 through 4
matches the radar cross-section and area-to-mass measurements of an RCC
panel fragment.
F3.5-2 Though the Board could not positively identify the Flight Day 2
object, the U.S. Air Force ex-clusionary test and analysis processes
reduced the potential Flight Day 2 candidates to an RCC panel fragment.
“
In addition if the actual pieces detected in orbit were rcc material
which composes the outer surface of the shuttles wings leading edges,
then dimensions of the damage or breach size would be approximately 140
sq inches, the size of the object. In fact the for the flight day 2
object to be rcc fragment or fragments they would have had to remained
“lodged in place� inside the rcc cavity at 81.9 MET throughthe
rest of ascent, et separation, orbital insertion, and several orbital
cycles (hot to cold) with out becoming dislodged. In addition the caib
provided no direct rcs jet firings other than a several hour window
were the rcc fragment could have become dislodged by forces created by
the crew. The caib’s explanation for the flight day 2 object lacks
positive identification of what the object was, and what force
displaced it from its lodged position somewhere in the rcc cavity. The
foam did not breach Columbias left wing on ascent on jan 16 2003, or
the on board sensors would have detected it.

One possible solution for object 2003-003B (flight day 2 object) is a
satellite known as starshine 4. The startshine project was created to
gauge the changing atmospheric drag of objects in orbit. In the year
2002 the sun unpredictably reached a double peak in the solar maximum
cycle, marked by the high amount of sunspots and solar storms. The
increased solar activity causes an expansion in the earths atmosphere,
accelerating orbital decay rates, and burning up orbiting objects
earlier than predicted. Starshine's 2 and 3 to de-orbited much faster
than originally calculated, prompting the next starshine (4 &5) to
launch ahead of schedule in a manifest change. Starshine 4 has the
approximate right cross sectional dimension as the flight day 2 object.
Starshine 5, had mirrors on it's surface that only reflected light in a
specific wavelength (only visible from the starfire facility), much
different than the sunlight reflecting student polished mirrors of
starshine 1.

http://azinet.com/starshine/descript.htm
“Starshine 2 descended into the lower atmosphere and flamed out on
April 26, 2002. The fact that it’s orbital lifetime was so much
shorter than that of Starshine 1 was due to its slightly lower
deployment altitude, coupled with unusually high solar activity during
the double peak of solar cycle 23. For further details on the double
peak,
A third satellite, Starshine 3, was launched on an Athena I unmanned
launch vehicle out of the Kodiak Launch Complex, Alaska, on September
29, 2001, into a 470 km (294 statute mile) high circular orbit,
inclined 67 degrees to the earth's equator. This orbit was chosen to
make the satellite visible to observers located from the equator all
the way up to latitudes of 70 degrees north and south of the equator.
Starshine 3 was nearly a meter in diameter (37 inches), weighed 91
kilograms (200 pounds) and carried 1500 mirrors that were polished by
approximately 40,000 students in 1000 schools in 30 countries.
It also carried thirty one laser retro-reflectors on its surface.
Additional instrumentation included an integrated power supply,
consisting of combined solar cells and thin film batteries, as well as
an amateur radio telemetry transmitter, a command receiver, a
rechargeable battery, a secondary solar array, signal-conditioning
circuitry, and an antenna array. This satellite was initially spun at 5
degrees per second by its Lightband deployment system, and that spin
rate decreased essentially to zero by the end of its third month in
orbit, as measured by its radio telemetry system. Starshine 3 completed
7434 orbits of the earth before flaming out in the earth's upper
atmosphere on January 21, 2003. This was nearly two years earlier than
originally predicted, because of the previously mentioned double peak
in Solar Cycle 23.
Starshine 4 is presently being assembled and tested, and its 1000
mirrors have been polished by 1000 schools and other participating
groups in 43 countries. A count of the number of participating
individuals has not yet been completed. Starshine 4 was originally
scheduled for launch on Space Shuttle Atlantis’s STS-114 mission to
the International Space Station on January 16, 2003. However, it has
been removed from the manifest, in favor of a Control Moment Gyro that
is needed on the International Space Station to replace one that
failed. When Starshine 4 does fly, it will carry 31 optical
retroreflectors identical to those on Starshines 2 and 3. It will also
carry a Starshine 5 subsatellite in its interior and will release
Starshine 5 into its own orbit about one minute after being itself
deployed from Atlantis. Comparison of the relative decay rates of the
orbits of Starshines 4 and 5 will allow us to derive atmospheric
densities more precisely than we have been able to do previously.�
The flight day 2 object was tracked until decay
Caib report volume 1, page 63 col 1 par 1
“7. January 20, 8:45 – 11:45 p.m.: 2003-003B orbit de-cays.Last
track by Navy Space Surveillance System�

The following document than contains a contradiction, for it lists the
payload configuration only found on STS-107, except item C, but the
time for starshine 4 was desired to be on a jan 2003 mission, because
of starshine 3’s expected orbital decay.

http://code916.gsfc.nasa.gov/Public/...s/freestar.htm
FLIGHT ACTIVITY REQUIREMENTS
The FREESTAR payload is a complex secondary payload flown as a
Hitchhiker payload through the GSFC Code 870 Shuttle Small Payloads
Project. FREESTAR consists of seven separate experiments and the
Hitchhiker (HH) Carrier (HHC) avionics mounted on a cross-bay HH
Multipurpose Equipment Support Structure (MPESS). The carrier avionics
provides the interface to the electrical systems, the payload power
control, and command and telemetry capabilities.
a) The Mediterranean Israeli Dust Experiment (MEIDEX) payload will
primarily investigate the geographical variation of the optical,
physical and chemical properties of desert aerosol properties,
including the location and temporal variation of its sinks, sources and
transport.
b) The Shuttle Ozone Limb Sounding Experiment (SOLSE) payload is a
Hitchhiker Junior (HH-J) payload managed by the GSFC Code 870 Shuttle
Small Payloads Project and GSFC Code 916 Atmospheric Chemistry and
Dynamics Branch.
c) The Student Tracked Atmospheric Research Satellite for Heuristic
International Networking Experiment-2 (STARSHINE-2) is a small
non-recoverable satellite managed by the Rocky Mountain NASA Space
Grant Consortium/Utah State University and sponsored By NASA/HQ Code F.
d) The Critical Viscosity of Xenon-2 (CVX-2) experiment will measure
the viscosity of Xenon at temperatures very near its liquid-vapor
critical point (Tc = ~16.7Æ’ C).
e) The Solar Constant Experiment-3 (SOLCON-3) is designed to accurately
measure the solar constant and identify variations in the value during
a solar cycle
f) The Low Power Transceiver (LPT) experiment is a low power, light
weight software programmable transceiver prototype technology
demonstration that is being developed by NASA as a low cost S-band
spacecraft navigation and communication device.
g) The Prototype Synchrotron Radiation Detector (PSRD) experiment will
measure the cosmic ray background data in support of the development of
the SRD for the Alpha Magnetic Spectrometer-02 (AMS-02).�

Given the fact that Starshines 2 and 3 had already decayed from their
respective orbits. And given the fact the desired launch date, for
starhine 4 of jan 2003 correlates with STS-107 launch of jan 16, 2003.
And given the fact the payload manifest for STS-107 included a
starshine satellite as starshine 4, with 5 would be the next to launch
in January 2003, it is therefore plausible that starshine 4 was in fact
the 2003-003B object or the flight day 2 object.


CAIB’s own admitted INOCONSITENCIES
Caib report volume 2 part 19, page 570 col2 par3
“Remaining, Unexplained Inconsistencies…
…events within the left wheel well still raise some unanswered
questions. First is the unexplained cause for the slight but distinctly
abnormal rise in the temperature of the left hydraulic brake line point
D, V58T1703A, located on the aft end of the in-board wheel well wall,
at the early time of GMT 13:52:17 (EI + 488 sec). The left hydraulic
brake line temperatures at points A and C, V58T1700A and V58T1702A,
also recorded anomalous rises slightly thereafter at GMT 13:52:41 (EI +
512 sec). All three of these sensors inside the left wheel well
responded anomalously prior to the failures of sensors with their cable
harnesses routed on the upper outboard wheel well wall and thus
presumably before the breach of the left wheel well wall.�

No evidence was provided for he alleged causal event, therefore the
caib did not verify, nor validate it’s own theory, and by it’s own
admission could not resolve some inconsistencies. We must keep an open
mind and accept new explanations, from information that matches the
evidence better, and with fewer inconsistencies, that is how we advance
our understanding of the universe.

columbiaaccidentinvestigation wrote:
It is very unlikely that foam shed from external tank on jan 16, 2003
actually impacted the Columbia's left wing during sts-107's ascent
with enough force to cause a breach, or make the rcc fail, as stated by
the caib's foam impact theory.

Uh - baloney.

First - take a freshman physics course and understand the concept of
kinetic energy. Or if you already took a freshman physics course take
it again and this time open up the textbook.

Then understand the concept of a ballsitics coefficient.

Until you can actually comprehend those concepts you don't know what
you're talking about.

Then read the CAIB document where they determined the velocity of the
debris -
http://caib.nasa.gov/news/documents/impact_velocity.pdf

Because the falling form has a very large surface area and relatively
low mass it quickly slowed down as soon as it separated from Columbia,
resulting in Columbia's wing in effect running into the foam at about
500 miles per hour.

Now do the calculations for a 1.67 pound piece of *anything* travelling
at 500 miles per hour. It's the equivalent force of a compact car
hitting a brick wall head-on at 9 miles per hour.

Then understand that the contract specifications for the RCC call for
them to withstand the force of just .006 foot-pounds. That's the
equivalent amount of force of a penny dropped from a height of about a
foot (actually a bit less if the penny is in a vacuum). Of course
that's the contract value (essentially saying the RCC did not have to
have the strength to withstand any impacts) and the actual RCCs were
much higher, according to the CAIB the measured strength of the RCC
varied as much as 70% because it wasn't controlled. (The purpose for
the RCC is to protect against heat - not impacts).

Philip Chien's book "Columbia - Final Voyage" goes into the technical
details for a non-technical audience. His webpage also has a bit of
information on the cause and effect. Check -
http://www.sts107.info/investigation/foam/foam.htm


Rob

The purpose of this investigation has been to independently establish a
cause for the loss of Columbia and the STS-107 crew. The caib uses the
plasma as a catch all solution, but seems to be bound once again by a
“modest breach� of 140 sq inches, and the real physical properties
of plasma, thus “sneak flow� had to occur. This unique flow of
matter was even explained by a caib member as “smart plasma�.
Let’s take a moment and step back, most things or explanations in the
physical universe appear complicated, but when we finally do understand
them, we usually find how simple the solution was. So when the
explanation for an accident is so convoluted and new physical
properties are invented, it’s time to be open to a different
solution. As I have been analyzing the caib report there are many
statements for which I could not find satisfactory answers, or factual
scientifically arrived conclusions. It is very healthy for questions,
and debate to take place when such events happen in history, or we may
never learn from our mistakes. For instance the starfire image is not
used by the caib in any conclusions or findings, but is placed amongst
the final conclusions, without mention of the fact that an asymmetric
profile would demonstrate anomalous thermal events. Presentation of
information is a choice of the authors, not the reader, and publishers
of scientific information have an obligation to present information in
an unbiased manner. If a theory is true it is reproducible, and
subject to peer review, then questioning a report or theory does not
require motivation, nor is the reader responsible for burden of proof,
but instead it is the caib’s foam impact theory.

LACK OF CORRELATION what force was used for foam impact, and what force
what used for correlation to sts-107’s ascent data?

Caib report vol2 part d12 page 382
“Impact on Panel #8 for Test Impact Condition
A computation was performed for the impact test condi-tions on the
Panel #8 impact, where the angles were =5.5, =5.0, with an
impact speed of 777 ft/s (237 m/s). The ge-ometry of Panel #8 is more
complicated, as there are various thicknesses of RCC in the panel as
described above. “

Caib report vol2 part d12 page 380
“RCC Panel #8
777 ft/s (237 m/s) =5.5°, =5.0° 25.5� up from carrier panel
7.3� from 7-8 T-seal 30° clocking angle Load: 9150 lb (4.07×109
dynes) Panel stress: 43.2 ksi (298 MPa) Rib stress: 33.4 ksi (230 MPa)
Displacement: 2.5 in (63 mm) Velocity: 137 ft/s (41.8 m/s) “

Critical thinking and use of logic is important for the application of
the science. Cross referencing and analysis of the caib’s foam
impact theory, reveals a lack of correlation. The caib provided many
many facts, but did not correlate the forces required for rcc failure
at the time foam impact to any sensor data on Columbia from ascent on
jan 16, 2003.


Below is a just a sampling of the sources I have used in conducting
three years of research. All the information that I have used to show
the invalidity of foam impact causing a breach has come strictly from
nasa and caib sources. The simple fact remains the caib could not and
did not verify foam impact causing a breach through columbia’s own
sensor data, and we have all learned the hard way when a vehicle is
speaking to you as Columbia could through her sensors, we should
listen. The foam did not breach Columbias left wing on ascent on jan
16 2003, or the on board sensors would have detected it, that is a
fact.

1. caib report vol 1,
vol 2 part 1-20, vol III part 1-4 ,vol IV part 1-IV,vol V part 1-13,
vol 6 part 1-10
2. STS-107 Flight rules, STS-107 in flight anomalies, STS-107 shift
reports 1-16, STS-107 MMT team notes jan 16-30, STS-107 press kit
4. STS-90 orbiter processing notes, STS-90 in flight anomalies,
5. STS-93 orbiter processing notes, STS-93 in flight anomalies,
6. STS-109 orbiter processing notes, STS-109 in flight anomalies,
7. Nasa/cr-1998-208859
8. Nasa Technical Memorandum 104267
9. Nasa/tp-2003-210780
10. Ntsb/aar-02/01 pb2002-910402
11. Nsts 104046 revision d
12. Nasa-hdbk-7005 march 13, 2001
13. “Hypervelocity impact resistance of reinforced carbon–carbon/
carbon–foam thermal protection systems
M. Grujicic a,*, B. Pandurangan a, C.L. Zhao a, S.B. Biggers a, D.R.
Morgan b
a Department of Mechanical Engineering, Clemson University, 241
Engineering Innovation Building,
Received 24 March 2005; accepted 20 July 2005�
14. Nasa Technical Memorandum 88281
15. Nasa Technical Memorandum 104761
16. Space Shuttle Program Flight Planning and Assessment
Engineering Design
17. Final Report: September 12, 1996
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) DC-XA
Clipper Graham Mishap Investigation Report
18. “A MODEL OF COMMUNICATION IN SUPPORT OF
DISTRIBUTED ANOMALY RESPONSE AND REPLANNING�
19. http://www.space.com/missionlaunches...ch_030129.html
20. http://www.aero.org/news/current/picosat-jpl.html
21. http://nssdc.gsfc.nasa.gov/spacewarn/spx591.html
22. http://celestrak.com/NORAD/documentation/tle-fmt.shtml
23. http://www.michiganaero.com/satellit...ng/index.shtml
24. http://legislative.nasa.gov/hearings/readdy9-23.html
25. INTRODUCTION TO THEORY OF HYPERSONIC
FLOW AND AEROTHERMODYNAMICS OF
ATMOSPHERIC ENTRY
26. http://spaceflight.nasa.gov/shuttle/...e/sodb/212.pdf
27
http://www.globalsecurity.org/space/...u.html#sts-apu
28. Space Travel A Technological Frontier
Alan R. De Old, Joseph W. Judge, Terri-Lynn Judge
Davis Publications, Inc, Worcester, and Massachusetts: 1989
29. Space Technology
Kenneth Gatland
Harmony Books, NY, NY: 1981
30. Houston Chronicle.com
HoustonChronicle.com - Special Report: Columbia's Last mission
http://www.chron.com/content/chronic...ned/index.html
31 NASA STS 107 mission home page http://spaceflight.nasa.gov/shuttle/

On Tue, 21 Feb 2006 13:15:10 -0600, columbiaaccidentinvestigation wrote
(spamming neurotic troll crap)

PLONK


--
Herb

There ain't no such thing as a free lunch.
~ RAH

Because the falling form has a very large surface area and relatively
low mass it quickly slowed down as soon as it separated from Columbia,
resulting in Columbia's wing in effect running into the foam at about
500 miles per hour.


Can you clarify (for this non-physicist) what you mean by "running into the
foam". Surely you are not saying the foam dislodged from above the wing? If
so how did it come to hit the underside of the wing?

Katipo

There is foam above, as it were, the wing.

In any case with either the main conclusions, or the ones presented here,
which apart from the sensor data, I feel very much that its unlikely that
this could happen, I see no other proof either.

The facts are that nobody can ever be 100 percent sure of exactly what
happened, but there are enough smoking guns littered about to have a damn
good idea. Unfortunately sensors are only as good as the results they have
been proven to give, and depending on how they are mounted and the direction
of the impact can give some ambiguous results.

Interesting reading, but it does not change anything, even if it were true.
The facts are that impacts to the wing in this area are more dangerous than
the designers catered for, and thus you either have to be sure nothing hits
it, or beef it up a lot.

Brian

--
Brian Gaff....Note, this account does not accept Bcc: email.
graphics are great, but the blind can't hear them
Email:
__________________________________________________ __________________________
__________________________________


"Katipo" wrote in message
...
|
| Because the falling form has a very large surface area and relatively
| low mass it quickly slowed down as soon as it separated from Columbia,
| resulting in Columbia's wing in effect running into the foam at about
| 500 miles per hour.
|
|
| Can you clarify (for this non-physicist) what you mean by "running into
the
| foam". Surely you are not saying the foam dislodged from above the wing?
If
| so how did it come to hit the underside of the wing?
|
| Katipo
|
|
|
|

The caib did not verify it’s own theory, with correlation, this is
not the designers responsibility, but the authors of the theory for the
cause of the loss of Columbia and the sts-107 crew.

ASCENT INFORMATION
The breach allegedly was “initiated� when a piece of foam detatched
from the external tank and struck the wing in the lower vicinity of rcc
panel 8, at MET 81.9 seconds, at an altitude of 65,820 feet and
traveling at 1,600 mph.

The caib stated clearly the alleged event of high velocity foam impact
was not detected by Columbia many sensors.

Caib report volume 2 part 19, page 571 col2 par2
“The MADS/OEX data has proven extremely valuable to the analysis of
the accident and the validation of various scenarios. This, however,
has been largely fortuitous. It was only pure happenstance that the
Columbia (OV-102) was, by far, the most extensively instrumented of all
the orbiter fleet and thus had the OEX sensor suite to record such
de-tailed data.�


CAIB Vol II D19 page 566 par 5
“Ascent data from both the OEX and OFI instrumentation systems is
largely unremarkable. Particular interest is in the time frame around
82 seconds Mission Elapsed Time (MET), around which the foam debris
strike from the ex-ternal tank (ET) is best centered. As detailed
below, none of the sensors in the PCM OEX suite recorded any
significant disturbance which could be linked to a debris strike around
this period of time�

Caib report volume 2 part 19, page 567 col2 par2
For the 131 strain gauges on the left and right wing structural
elements, 13 on the right wing showed some offset errors, including
V12G9081A, V12G9442A, V12G9452A, V12G9641A, V12G9642A, V12G9648A,
V12G9649A, V12G9651A, V12G9656A, V12G9629A, V12G9635A, V12G9636A, and
V12G9637A. By contrast, only 2 strain gauges on the left wing showed
any offset errors between STS-107 and prior flights, and these were
V12G9058A and V12G9921A. The latter of these, V12G9921A, is one of the
key sensors located on the spar panel immediately behind RCC panel #9.
Even on the expanded time scale plots covering 50-150 sec MET, there is
no evidence of any significant event around the ET foam debris impact
at 82 sec MET. There were a total of 52 strain gauges on the right and
left elevons, and all of these but one, V13G9749A which showed a slight
offset error, re-sponded similar to prior flight history.�

Caib report vol 1 page 34, col 1, par 3
“The wind shear at 57 seconds after launch and the Shuttle stack.s
reaction to it appears to have initiated a very low frequency
oscillation, caused by liquid oxygen sloshing in-side the External
Tank,4 that peaked in amplitude 75 seconds after launch and continued
through Solid Rocket Booster separation at 127 seconds after launch. A
small oscillation is not unusual during ascent, but on STS-107 the
amplitude was larger than normal and lasted longer. Less severe wind
shears at 95 and 105 seconds after launch contributed to the continuing
oscillation.�

But strain gauge sensor V12G9921A data was used to present a case for a
breach “burn through� during reentry an effect, not the foam impact
or cause. Please note the caibs own words describing the sensor
V12G9921A’s during Columbia’s reentry.

Caib report vol2 part d19 page 552 col 1&2 par 2
“From GMT 13:48:39 to 13:50:09 (EI + 270 to 360 sec), the recorded
strain climbs anomalously, reaching at peak of +180 in/in. At GMT
13:51:39 (EI + 450 sec), the strain reverses sign, and then peaks in
the opposite direction at GMT 13:52:04 (EI + 475 sec) to a value of
ï€*140 in/in. At GMT 13:52:04 (EI + 475 sec), the strain abruptly
reduces by a small amount, and then remains constant and negative up
until GMT 13:52:24 (EI + 495 sec), at which point the signal bounces up
and down in a completely unphysical manner, continuing on through GMT
13:52:59 (EI + 530 sec), when it flatlines at a bias value slightly
above zero. The non-physi-cal behavior beginning at GMT 13:52:24 (EI +
495 sec) is presumed to result from the burn through of the left wing
leading edge spar at a point somewhere along the length of the cable to
this sensor.�

Caib report vol2 part d19 page 552 col 2 par 1
There was some initial speculation that the erratic behavior over the
time span of EI + 495 to 530 seconds was actually a damped mechanical
vibration, resulting from some mechanical impact or sudden loading
change in the spar. However, the damping rate and the oscillation
frequency that would be represented by this response are not consistent
with the expected mechanical response from a honeycomb spar which would
normally be quite rigid and oscillate at a much higher acoustic
frequency.�

Flight engineers analyze the many waves that are propagating throughout
the shuttle, et, srb stack during ascent. Analysis of these
oscillations or waves gives indicators as to what force is being
applied to the orbiter stack, and how that force has affected a
particular shuttle launch. Analysis includes pattern detection of a
given phenomena, and separation of the sensor detected waves from
others for better understanding the orbiters stacks physical
properties.

The caib presented absolutely no data from sts-107’s ascent that
demonstrated a high frequency oscillation in the honeycomb spar as
would be detected from an impact. The rcc responding to a high
velocity foam impact would transfer energy through it’s attachment
fitting, to it’s supporting structure were impact forces would be
detected as a strain change in the left wings leading edge spar, yet no
such event was detected during STS-107’s ascent. The Columbia’s
leading edge wing spars had strain sensors like V12G9921A to provide
information on the wings structural support loads during ascent and
reentry. Ascent data from strain sensors like V12G9921A should have
detected some increased strain if a high velocity foam impact occurred
imparting 32,000 pounds of pressure per square inch as the caib
theorized. The sensors were functioning during ascent providing lots
of information about the forces sts-107 was incurring during ascent.

Analysis of information detected by Columbia’s sensors during
sts-107’s ascent established patterns of forces that can were
directly attributed to a stimulus, yet the caib could not establish
such a link to the high velocity foam impact. In fact the caib only
presented information of very slight temperature and pressure
differences from other flights, but no significant behavior was noted
that would signify a high velocity foam impact. In reaching it’s
conclusions for the loss of the STS-107 crew, and Columbia the caib
used extensive explanations, but did not correlate cause foam impact in
this case to effect a breach or damaged left wing. Instead the caib
only correlated the theoretical effects of a foam impact or breach in
this case, to theoretical effects or plasma flow. Correlation of
effect to effect does not establish cause, thus cannot be used in
validation of any theory.

Hole size?
The caib provides only a basic correlation of hole size from it's
vast testing to the actual flight data. But the caib does not provide
consitancy with possible hole sizes amongst its testing, and therefore
does not correlate testing results to each other that math actual
flight data from sts-107.

Caib report vol 1, page 63 paragraph 2:
"After exhaustive radar cross-section analysis and testing, coupled
with bal-listic analysis of the objects orbital decay, only a fragment
of RCC panel would match the UHF radar cross-section and ballistic
coefficients observed by the Space Surveil-lance network. Such an RCC
panel fragment must be ap-proximately 140 square inches or greater in
area to meet the observed radar cross-section characteristics."

Caib report vol v part 13 page 92 par 6
"4.4.2 Damage Progression Theory and Supporting Aero
Based on the damage assessment and timeline period correlations covered
in Section 4.4.1, the
following is a postulated damage progression theory based on the
results of the aerodynamic
investigation. This damage progression, approached from an aerodynamic
perspective, is
consistent with the working scenario and attempts to maintain
consistency with other data from the
investigation. References are made to figures which include a
combination of aerodynamic
extraction results and the major timeline events noted.
An initial WLE breach (small hole or slot) in an RCC panel exists at
entry interface. By EI + 300 sec
thermal events are occurring internal to the WLE cavity, however no
identifiable aerodynamic
increments are observed."

Caib report vol v part 13 page 521 par 7
"A comparison of the times at which these critical events occur
during the entry is shown in Table 6-7. As expected, failure times are
accelerated for the 10 inch case compared with the 6 inch due to the
higher levels of internal heating. Thermal response of instrumentation
within the left wing of STS-107 have suggested the initial breach
through the spar occurred at 491 seconds after entry interface. With a
predicted spar breach time of 470 seconds, the 6 inch provides a better
comparison to flight data than the 10 inch case. As shown in Figure
6-82, better agreement for the 6 inch damage case can also be seen by
comparing the temperature response of V09T9895 (panel 9 spar rear
facesheet thermocouple)"


Caib report vol v part 13 page 92 par 6
Holes Through Wing
Limited parametric studies of simulated damage in the form of a wing
breach from the windward surface to the leeward surface were attempted
in this facility and were primarily associated with aerodynamic testing
(see Section 4.3.1). Initially, circular holes dimensionally consistent
with the width of a carrier panel (approximately 4 inches full scale)
were placed at the interfaces for carrier panels 5, 9, 12, and 16. The
holes were found to force boundary layer transition on the windward
surface to the damage site. The model and IR setup for the aerodynamic
tests at this point in time precluded imaging the side fuselage. Since
the model also incorporated damage in the form of missing RCC panel 6,
it is believed that effects (if any) from the carrier panel holes would
have been dominated by the disturbance from the missing RCC panel. TPS
damage in the form of a much larger breach through the wing was
attempted, but the side fuselage heating measurements were considered
qualitative due to compromised phosphor coatings on the models that
were used. The holes were orientated normal to the wing chord and were
located near the left main landing gear door. One hole location was
approximately located at the center of the forward bulkhead
(X=1040-inches in Orbiter coordinates) and the second location was near
the center of the outboard bulkhead (Y=167-inches in Orbiter
coordinates). At each location, the wing hole diameter was
systematically changed from 0.0625 to 0.125 and 0.25-inch at wind
tunnel scale (8.3, 16.7, and 33.3-inchfull scale). While the
compromised phosphor coating considerably degraded the image quality,
it was evident that no change in side surface heating was apparent for
any tested combination of location or diameter."

Surface heating on reentry was indifferent to hole size, not plasma
flow internal to the wing. The caib did not resolve inconsistencies,
nor provide correlation and therefore their theory of foam impact
causing a breach has not be proven or validated.

The buttler did it.

The caib, and all of those who support it did a huge amount of
scientific study in the fields of plasma flow, and material properties.
The achievement by the caib in producing the Columbia accidents final
report is a credit to all of the supporting people and facilities. In
fact my respect for the entire shuttle program has grown immensely from
the original designers who succeeded in making a wonderful machine, the
astronauts for being the best, flight engineers who study ever detail
of every mission, and the thousands of technicians whose immense
responsibility is to maintain the orbiter fleet and all of the support
equipment. The nation owes all of these people credit for the
contributions and accomplishments in making the nations space program
what it is today, even with the Columbia tragedy.

The space shuttle is a marvelous vehicle, an engineering accomplishment
for all to admire. The space shuttles have taught us the next
generation of reusable vehicles requires an extremely well planned out
and fully funded maintenance program. No one single malicious or
negligent act caused the Columbia accident, in fact the tragedy
occurred in from a synergy of technical and bureaucratic problems
coming together. The bureaucratic problems can be traced to the
changes made from the challenger accident, almost two decades ago (ie.
catastrophic loss clause). A nation struggling with budget problems
did not protect funding for the shuttle program, when law makers
demanded more productivity for the funding provided by congress. Lost
in the shuffle was a direct handle of orbiter fleet maintenance, as
nasa worked on construction of the space station, and juggled many
funds, in tighter budget times. Nasa had never maintained an aging
fleet of spacecraft, and the lawmakers, nor the nations people stopped,
and took understand what we were asking of our space program. As time
passed the orbiter fleet especially the Columbia became much like that
pick up truck use only when we need it, but we certainly don't take
care of it like we used to, so when it breaks we can only blame
ourselves.

We need to realistically fund maintenance of the current orbiter fleet,
to ensure safety as well as completion of the space station.
Additional the simple fact that a current technology and science has
not produced a new vehicle with a leading edge that can properly
dissipate the heat of reentry, another tribute to the current orbiter
fleet and it's thermal protection system. Expendable vehicles can
and should act only as a transition to the next generation vehicle,
only if a properly funded and maintained orbiter fleet cannot. The
Columbia did not fail us, we failed it, which is why the vehicle and
sts-107 crew were lost. I don't think anybody want to repeat mistakes
that cripple our space program, nor make light of such a tragedy.

When I was 13 in 82' I attended the 4th columbia landing, at Edwards
it was absolutely incredible, as there were about 300,000 people who
were there as well. The booms were low and you could slightly feel the
pressure wave, the smooth silent descent of the Columbia was covered by
the chase planes. But the predominant feeling was the grace at which
it gently touched down after traveling so fast and steeply downward.
We all got an extra treat as this was the same day the challenger was
rolled out, and was flying to florida. It was great as the 747 with
the challenger on its back climbed up and circled overhead tilting the
newest shuttle toward the crowd. The ironic twist is both the
challenger and Columbia are gone now, making it an even more precious
moment, but perhaps this is why im so motivated to pursue such a
daunting task.