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PRA - Public's Risk Assessment on Safety
In article , rk wrote:
I read these numbers in USA Today, found them kind of surprising: The public accepts some risk that astronauts will die. Only 17% considered any shuttle accidents "unacceptable." Slightly fewer than half, 43%, said they would accept one accident every 100 flights; 32% said they would accept an accident every 50 missions or fewer. Two shuttles have crashed in 113 flights. This is much less risk adverse than I thought. It's surprising to me, certainly... Does anyone know, as a reference, if similar polls were carried out over the past thirty, forty years? I'd be interested to see what the public thought circa 1983 or 1968... -- -Andrew Gray |
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PRA - Public's Risk Assessment on Safety
rk wrote:
I read these numbers in USA Today, found them kind of surprising: The public accepts some risk that astronauts will die. Only 17% considered any shuttle accidents "unacceptable." Slightly fewer than half, 43%, said they would accept one accident every 100 flights; 32% said they would accept an accident every 50 missions or fewer. Two shuttles have crashed in 113 flights. This is much less risk adverse than I thought. Problem is, they are risk averse in theory, but not so when confronted with reality. (Same way folks are for cutting taxes, but not services.) D. -- The STS-107 Columbia Loss FAQ can be found at the following URLs: Text-Only Version: http://www.io.com/~o_m/columbia_loss_faq.html Enhanced HTML Version: http://www.io.com/~o_m/columbia_loss_faq_x.html Corrections, comments, and additions should be e-mailed to , as well as posted to sci.space.history and sci.space.shuttle for discussion. |
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PRA - Public's Risk Assessment on Safety
Good to see you back Pat! By the way, I'll have a large pepperoni with
extra cheese. Make sure your delivery girl wears a thong please! Gene |
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PRA - Public's Risk Assessment on Safety
Gene DiGennaro wrote: Good to see you back Pat! By the way, I'll have a large pepperoni with extra cheese. Make sure your delivery girl wears a thong please! Gene Only if she's wearing a blue dress with FBI seizable spots on it...by the way, a friend and I ate a medium pepperoni with extra cheese, black olives, onion, and green peppers on it around 8 hours ago...and Linda Tripp didn't know a thing about it...to the best of my recollection at least. Patrick Clinton Flannery (no kidding...that's my real name) |
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PRA - Public's Risk Assessment on Safety
rk wrote:
Personal opinion: I think that many people realize that it's risky business and will accept that. However, that gets turned around for mishaps that could have and perhaps should have been prevented. From the evidence in hand, it remains unclear whether Columbia could have been prevented or mitigated. It possible in theory, but there is nothing to make a clear call one way or the other. I await with interest to see if the CAIB report is rational, or adopts the 'they shoulda tried everything, anything' approach. D. -- The STS-107 Columbia Loss FAQ can be found at the following URLs: Text-Only Version: http://www.io.com/~o_m/columbia_loss_faq.html Enhanced HTML Version: http://www.io.com/~o_m/columbia_loss_faq_x.html Corrections, comments, and additions should be e-mailed to , as well as posted to sci.space.history and sci.space.shuttle for discussion. |
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PRA - Public's Risk Assessment on Safety
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PRA - Public's Risk Assessment on Safety
rk wrote: The other key is the worst-case analysis. Two parts. First, during system and component analysis, this should ensure that the system will work properly under all credible combinations of conditions. For a failure, it would entail, say for the foam, how big of a piece can possible come off, as opposed to limiting the analysis to the existing database (and without dealing with the root cause you have double the problems). Next would be what is the worst-case on system safety for the largest piece that could have come off (as opposed to what has come off). To me it seems that the root cause of our crew losses in spaceflight hasn't been single point failures, but things that were in themselves not working optimally, and in combination with other less-than-optimally working systems led to catastrophic failure by unforeseen interactions; as examples: 1. Apollo 1- Pure oxygen environment; high pressure for ground test to simulate pressure differential in a vacuum; faulty wiring; combustibles in spacecraft; no quick-open hatch. 2. Challenger- Bad field joint design; cold weather launch causing O-ring failure to seat. 3. Columbia- ET foam shedding problem; possible deterioration of RCC panel's structural strength over period of years; inaccurate modeling of effect of debris strike on RCC panels. This is going to be a very difficult problem to solve...as it requires NASA to analyze failure modes that only manifest themselves when a perceived minor problem interacts with another perceived minor problem in an unanticipated way- maybe there should be a separate entity inside the agency, made up of top-quality engineers whose sole purpose is to locate such possible interactions, and issue "No-flights-till-fixed" orders when such a problem is found- to be effective, such a entity must not be beholden to NASA management in any way, so that the "keep quiet, and keep your job" mindset can be broken...if one were looking for some engineers to staff such a NASA department...then the engineers who were shooting those concerned e-mails back and forth about the damage to Columbia from the foam strike would be a good place to start. One obvious problem would be both the administrative and political pressure that could be used against the members of such a department, as their decisions could both cost the agency money and political pull when it comes to congressional funding requests, as there is a definite "let's keep launching" mentality at NASA...and understandably so- as the press loves to jump on the agency when there are launch delays (in fact, one can make the argument with some certainty that the press ridicule of NASA due to the multiple delays to Challenger's last launch was a very major factor in the flawed decision to launch the shuttle on that very cold day.) Maybe we should look to another institution for an answer- maybe, like the justices of the Supreme Court, such an entity should be made up of skilled engineers with a lot of years under their belts, who are appointed for say a long term on the promulgated "Flight Safety Investigation And Assurance Board", and then retire on reaching age 65; but other than going completely berserk, can't be taken off of the board for any reason whatsoever- a number would have to be chosen for membership on the board which would be small enough to allow decisive action, yet large enough to encompass all of the technologies embraced by the manned spaceflight challenge with competence and intimate knowledge; as well as insulate such a board from the flawed decision making or grandstanding on the part of one or more members; what, say 13 to 25 total? Pat |
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PRA - Public's Risk Assessment on Safety
On 25 Aug 2003 17:50:01 GMT, in a place far, far away, Pat Flannery
made the phosphor on my monitor glow in such a way as to indicate that: To me it seems that the root cause of our crew losses in spaceflight hasn't been single point failures, but things that were in themselves not working optimally, and in combination with other less-than-optimally working systems led to catastrophic failure by unforeseen interactions; as examples: That's true of any well-designed system, by definition. http://www.interglobal.org/weblog/ar...50.html#002950 -- simberg.interglobal.org * 310 372-7963 (CA) 307 739-1296 (Jackson Hole) interglobal space lines * 307 733-1715 (Fax) http://www.interglobal.org "Extraordinary launch vehicles require extraordinary markets..." Swap the first . and @ and throw out the ".trash" to email me. Here's my email address for autospammers: |
#9
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PRA - Public's Risk Assessment on Safety
rk wrote:
I did some reading on the recent study last year between NASA and the Navy: 07.17.03 - NASA/Navy Benchmarking Exchange (NNBE) That one is high on my to-be-read list. Note that they use terms such as "maximum reasonable assurance" - that differs from "maximum assurance." This is similar to radiation training, ALARA, "as low as reasonably achievable." Yep, the ol' tunnel trio: Time, Distance, and Shielding One can never drive the risk to zero since that would require n levels of redundancy, n infinite. That's where "acceptable risk" comes in. The definition of "acceptable risk" is of course quite subjective. Yep. It's made worse when the perceived risk is driven by the assumption that "routine" = "safe as a nursery school". D. -- The STS-107 Columbia Loss FAQ can be found at the following URLs: Text-Only Version: http://www.io.com/~o_m/columbia_loss_faq.html Enhanced HTML Version: http://www.io.com/~o_m/columbia_loss_faq_x.html Corrections, comments, and additions should be e-mailed to , as well as posted to sci.space.history and sci.space.shuttle for discussion. |
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PRA - Public's Risk Assessment on Safety
"Jorge R. Frank" wrote:
(Derek Lyons) wrote: From the evidence in hand, it remains unclear whether Columbia could have been prevented or mitigated. It possible in theory, but there is nothing to make a clear call one way or the other. The decision-making process for the Columbia accident actually falls into two phases: pre-flight and in-flight. This is distinct from the Challenger accident where *all* the critical decisions were made pre-flight; post-SRB ignition, nothing could have been done to save the Challenger crew. And arguably the same is true post SRB ignition for Columbia. Sure there were possibilities, but none with significant and elevated risks themselves. Worse yet, all of those hinge on early detection and decisive action. With regard to the in-flight decision-making, I agree with you. Pre-flight, I'm not so sure. There was a process by which the ET foam-shedding became to be seen as a maintenance issue rather than a safety-of-flight issue. By the time the current generation of managers was in place, it was an issue that had been dealt with by their predecessors for a long time. The real problem in a system as fragile as the STS, is that there are darn few preventive or corrective maintenance issues that *aren't* ultimately safety of flight issues. Separating the two, and prioritizing and managing them is a decidedly non-trivial task. (And for the man who can figure a testable, repeatable, and sustainable method for doing so, the world is his oyster.) An argument could be made that the fleet should have been grounded after STS-112, when it was discovered that foam had been shed from the ET bipod ramp (for the first time in over a decade, IIRC). This would have required recognition of the foam-shedding as a safety-of-flight issue rather than a maintenance issue. However, the shuttle program faces thousands of maintenance issues all the time. How does a manager pick the safety-of- flight "signal" out of the maintenance "noise"? That's the part that perplexes me, and others as well. Given the history of groundings in the last half decade, what made the foam different? I probably need to read _Normal Accidents_ some time; from other posts I gather that it addresses some of these issues, so that I can stop asking stupid questions. It's a damm good read. D. -- The STS-107 Columbia Loss FAQ can be found at the following URLs: Text-Only Version: http://www.io.com/~o_m/columbia_loss_faq.html Enhanced HTML Version: http://www.io.com/~o_m/columbia_loss_faq_x.html Corrections, comments, and additions should be e-mailed to , as well as posted to sci.space.history and sci.space.shuttle for discussion. |
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