Advanced versions of the V-2 rocket

Pat Flannery wrote:

Of course at that point everyone involved in the program had their
collective foot stuck in the tar pit so deep that they had to keep
going


I thought we weren't going to talk about STS or ISS or ESAS in this
thread? :-)

OnOn Jul 11, 5:58 am, Pat Flannery wrote:
Eunometic wrote:
On Jul 9, 5:40 am, Pat Flannery wrote:

Eunometic wrote:



Comrade! Baikal booster! http://www.buran.ru/htm/strbaik.htmh...om/baikal.html

Link didn't work.



SNIP

After they got the V-2 that fell in Backebo, Sweden that had the
prototype Wasserfall radio guidance gear on it, they must have become
very suspicious that it was using radio guidance in some way:http://www.df.lth.se/~triad/rockets/indexen.html

Actually it wasn't a complete Wasserfall guidance system. Only the 3
axis gyroscopic unit (similar to the SG-66) that
took care of the initial phases of the missiles flight (takeoff, tilt-
over to an intercept course). The Kehl-Strasbourg
remote control unit used for the Fritz-X and Hs 293 guided missiles
was used but this was only an interim system
for test purposes.



Possibly the
allies
may have tried to direct some kind of Broad band noise or
scintilation
jamming but such measures are generally Of limited effectiveness
unless both the frequencies and modulation scheme Are known.

They could have some info on this via either radio monitoring, Enigma
intercepts, spies or anti-Nazi forces involved in the program.

People on both sides were wising up. Enigma might have alerted
someone
of the presence of a system but it did not disclose the modulation or
frequencies
used. Kehl-Strabourg was not compromised by signal intelligence:
that failed.
It was only compromised by the capture of missiles in italy and then
the effectiveness
of the spoof jamming is controversial and not decisive.

Even then I believe there was no enigma warning of the V1 at all.



From what I've read, only the propulsion cutoff was used operationally,
as that didn't require the two control transmitters, with as you point
out, the susceptibility to location of the launch site (although this
sounds more like a threat to the fixed launch bunkers than the mobile
missile transporters).

Hauersermann writes as if the system was used operationally.
About 20% of Launches used this system.

From what I've read only the thrust termination system was used
operationally, as they thought the steering system could be jammed, and
accuracy via gyro control was sufficiently accurate for bombarding London.

Radio guidance was used, particularly in short range launches where it
worked even
better since for short ranges it constrained the the flight postion
though not the
cross range speed which started to open up.


Security on its use was very high hence the allies didn't know of
it.

Note the transmitters were 14-20km away and thus nowhere near the
missiles.
The system was awkward to use because it was difficult to find a
location that
would accomodate both the transmitters, target and launch site all in
a line.





The problem with all this is that they were making the V-2 more and more
complex and expensive, when the thing was already a highly inefficient
design from a manufacturing point of view to move one ton of explosive
from France to somewhere in London.

In terms of the manufacturing cost of the V2.

When calculated as a system eg R+D costs and opperating costs other
major WW2 programs such as the B-29 are also lavish.

Yeah, but that leveled Tokyo without even using nuclear weapons, and
pummeled the Japanese war-making ability unto the ground.
London was still there and largely intact after the V-2 attacks.
The V-2 killed thousands of people, but other than that it had just
about zero influence on the progress of the war.

Becuase it was too late by about 6-12 months to
1 Have an impact in terms of production
2 achieve its technical potential.

Note that the B-29 and particulary the Lancaster (as the Manchester)
was crap in
it first year. The V1 never got the year.


I worked out the casualty figure per missile used years ago:
"They managed to spend a fortune of the Nazi's money (around 2 & 1/2
billion dollars in U.S. wartime dollars; including 2
billion for the A-4 and it's predecessors development alone between
1931-45) on a weapon that, in use, killed a average of around 1 & 3/4's
person per missile..
Out of curiosity, I looked up the facts and figures on casualties caused by
V-2's (or A-4's, for the purists) during W.W.II:
A total of approximately 3,170 V-2s were launched operationally at targets;
the vast majority at London, England and Antwerp, Belgium.
The V-2 attacks on England killed a total of 2,511 people.
The attacks on Belgium by both V-1's and V-2's killed a total of 6,448
people- assuming a breakdown of the type of weapons used to be the same as
the attacks on England, then around 44% of the deaths would be attributable
to V-2's; or around 2840 total.
If we include another, say, 200 deaths for other targets that came under V-2
attack, we come up with a total of around 5,550 total fatalities or a
average
of 1 and 3/4 killed per missile.
(Figures are from V-Missiles of the Third Reich, by Dieter
Holsken, Monogram Aviation Publications,1994, ISBN 0-914144-42-1)"


Those kind of statistics cut both ways.

Bomber command dropped about 1,200,000 tons of bombs
Killed about 450,000 civilians
lost 8,000 aircraft
killed 46,000 aircrew.

The V2 is actually more cost effective on that basis.





At 1 and 3/4 people killed by each rocket (and the vast majority of
those civilians, not military personnel), this was a pathetically inept
and unsuccessful weapon.

The records of Bomber Command and the 8th airforce are not better:
they killed mainly civilians. Infact their record is far worse.

Indirectly the USAAF killed a lot of German pilots, who had come up
to
protect their civilian population and were thus unavailable to
protect
German forces.


A MG-34 machine gun probably killed more people on average than a V-2,
and cost far, far, far, less.
Plus it would be killing military personnel engaged in hostilities
against you.


Wasn't the WW2 statistic that about 90,000 bullets were required to
kill one person.


Factor in pilot and crew training, aircrew losses, navigation aids,
maintenance crews,
hospitals, and tools, spare parts, airfield protection and the need to
provide escorts
and jamming systems then that B-29,B-26, Lancaster, Ju 88 isn't so
cheap anymore.

Factor in all those potatoes going into alcohol production for V-2s
while the German populace was beginning to experience food shortages,
and it doesn't look so cheap either.

Ethanol could be produced by several means derived from
petrochemicals,
not just fermentation-distillation. This was simply a good method of
decentralised production that didn't require a large and vulnerable
synthetic fuel plant.


Factor in all the fuel being used to move the V-2s from their assembly
area to there launch sites,

Minimal I'm sure. They mostly got their by train at night.


and yet more valuable resources are wasted.
The real killer here is all the money that was lavished on this project
at Peenemunde prior to it becoming operational.

Perhaps, but I still doubt it was all that bad. Penemunde could have
been kept trickling along in
1940-1942 at a higher rate with little impact and the result would
have been
a cheaper more developed weapon available earlier instead of one
rushed into
production with wide ranging limitations that were costly to correct
at a late
stage.

They were spending a fortune on a weapon system that didn't make any
strategic sense right from its very inception.

The von Braun team fed the Wermacht a line of B.S. regarding the
missile's accuracy (100 meters from aim point), and the Wermacht should
have had some outside source check up on the math they were using and
laughed them right out of the office.

I've never heard of that, nevertheless von Braun, with Fritz Mueller,
(the inventor of the SG-66 and the PIGA accelerometer) achieved
300 yards CEP on the Redstone Missile in 1952 after a little
disruption and a move from penemunde to hunstville alabama. Thats
270 meters. The only significant difference was the pressurized
gaseous bearings that the Germans were working on and finally
implemented in the USA. The US indigenous technology, the floated
gyro, came from Charles Drapper who combined it with the German
accelerometer but for a while the US had two competing gyro
technologies. the German derived gaseous bearing and the US floated
gyro on jewell pivot. Both were replaced by lasers accept in the
highest strategic areas where spinning gyros are still superior.

One might add the chopper stabalised DC amplifer but I it wasn't as
significant as the other gains.


For the Germans, with a high loss rate, it looks a lot better than a
manned bomber.

Production cost too me looked like less than half the cost of a Fw
190.

And a Fw-190 at least had a chance to shoot down a allied bomber,
thereby helping the war situation in some material way
A extra 1,500 of those might wave been worth having.
Factor in the R&D that went into the whole A4/V-2 program, and you'd
have at least 3,000 more Fw-190's in place of the V-2.

All fw 190s were doing by late 1944 was killing 19 year old pilots on
their first combats.
Sending a boy with 20 hours of training up against someone with 300
hours was
equivalent to murder.



Unit costs were about RM120,000 (about the same

Unit costs were about RM120,000 (about the same as a BMW801 engine of
the Fw 190)
and the cost of RM50,000 looked achievable. (Cost of a Ju 88 in 1942
was RM400,000)

The V2 represented a realistic way for the Reich to deliver 1000/tons
a month
With veritable impunity. Hitler wanted 4500-5500 missiles per month.

The way it was built was just fine
for bombarding the city, and even bringing the CEP down to 1km is
pointless without a nuclear warhead. With its Amatol warhead the only
thing that was going to make any difference would be if you could
somehow bring CEP down to 100 m, not 1 km.

I did some basic CEP calculations. Assuming production rates of 1000/
month
One could easily deliver 200/missiles per week to a specific target.

With what CEP?
Accuracy was a ovoid around eight miles wide by twelve miles long.
The missile is going to blow a crater about 60 feet wide on impact, and
do blast damage (though not as much as a V-1, because the warhead buried
itself on impact) to an area of around 600-900 feet wide.
In a area as large as its CEP that's not a very high density of damage
overall.

Dornberger reckoned at least 4.5km, some others 4km. The figure of
17km CEP against London comes from the effect of the double cross
sysrtem (which functioned against both the V1 and V2).

In the case of the V2 impact points the British reported the correct
impact
times of the missiles but correlated them with partial/selective
impact points that
had the effect of shifting the aim points about 11-12 km out of
London.

Correcting for the deception gets the CEP to 6km.

A 12 mile CEP is ludicrously bad.



Assuming the 1000m CEP then 50% of missiles would be within 1km, 43%
within the next
1-2km and 7% over 3km away.

Which is fine, but they never got that accuracy, so the mathematics is moot.

They got 6km. Getting rid of failures (a part of the inaccuracy was
failure) and then
getting rid of the manufacturing variation gets it down to about
4.5km. How long?
Given the outstanding progess (the penemunde team started to achieve
close to
100% reliabillity at one point) I would say it was only a matter of
weeks to months
to get CEP to 4.0-4.5km


This argument presupposes things that never happened, using a guidance
system that was never deployed.

Sure and the B-29 would have been ineffective without the eagle radar
or at least
H2X Meddo. Technology evolves and the technolgy of the V2 was being
evolved like any other.

They knew the accuracy of the weapon before they put it into service
from all of their test launchings, and it was pretty awful.

1/ A 4km radius CEP from the interim LEV-3 was achieved with series of
missiles so it was certainly possible.
2/ 2km by 3.7km elipse from the interim radio guidance system
for the SG-66 with its more comprehensive incorporation's and control
of parameters and higher precision components a doubling to
quadroupling of tollerance seems feasible.

The Redstone missile, if equiped with the juipeter system (ball and
disk intergrator as used in bomb sights) could probably have achieved
near 100m CEP.
Pershing certainly could.



Something along he lines of a super mortar than a field gun.
Of 1course at that point everyone involved in the program had their
collective foot stuck in the tar pit so deep that they had to keep
going, as if they admitted that the whole thing was a complete cock-up
from the word go, the Fuhrer would probably have them all shot as
traitors to the Reich, and point out that he hadn't liked the thing
until they talked him into it.

Stalin was capable of that behaviour, Hitler was not.

Th only thing that would have made this weapon, at its accuracy,
worthwhile is either a nuclear or biological warhead.
Raining down a few hundred tons of anthrax spores on London could have
been quite effective.
Within six months of doing that, the Allies would have rained down
several thousand tones of anthrax spores on Germany, possibly making it
uninhabitable to the present day, but there is seldom big gain without
big risk.
Going beyond this is like speculating that they had concentrated on SAMs
instead of V-weapons right from the beginning of the war; you can take
guesses on what the effects that would have had on the bomber offensive
against Germany, but it's all guesswork, because they didn't do it.

Of those 100 within 1 km there would be
a slight tendancy
To cluster around the aim point. About 33 would be within 500m and 8
within 250m and
2 within 125m and 1 within 90 meters. That's enough to take out an
oil refinery, aircraft plant
And do a lot of production disruption expecially if the warhead
becomes more effective eg
With a reliable airbust fuse.

They couldn't even figure out how to do a radio proximity fuze for their
AA shells, much less for something coming out of the sky at 3,000 mph
with a red-hot nose on it.

No, A electronic proximity fuse using electrostatic principles was
built and
over 1000 succesfully fired by late 1944.

During the 1944 period the Germans fired some 1000 FLAK rounds of a
Rheinmetall-Borsig electrostatic proximity fuse mainly from 88mm guns
against aicraft targets simulated by cables. Success rate was over
85%
with detonation range finally reaching 10-14 meters. The devices did
include shock hardened thermionic vacuum valves. The results of these
tests are available in BIOS documents (British Intelligence Objectives
Sub-Committee). The German code name was KUHGLOCKEN.
Electrostatic fuses are very countermeasures resistent. The over runs
brought an end to development and production.

References are "Truth About the Wunderwaffen" by Igor Witowski who
cites "Proximity Fuse Development - Rheinmettal Borsig A.G.
Mullhausen. CIOS report ITEM nos 3 file nos XXVI -1 (1945)

I've also come across to other references
KUHGLOCKE, Electrostatic by Rhinemetall-Borsig. Intended for missiles.
Prototypes only.

KUHGLOCKEN, Smaller hardened version designed for AA shells.



Less risky methods that required far higher
levels of collateral damage
and clearly there were many on the allied side who made no bones over
the fact that they
were killing the civilian population or 'dehousing' them.
"Civilization" disappears fairly quickly.

I seem to remember a town called Guernica where this happened first.
Something comes to mind about sowing the wind and reaping the whirlwind.

Guernica: is a complicated story: the Spanish didn't bother to let
the Germans
know it was historically significant city nor did they understand or
were they
informed of the the whole basque-spannish ethnic issue. Non of the
decision makers
survive. The target was either the cross roads where republican
forces were marshaling or
the small arms factor. Casualties: the 850 or so dead is an
exaggeration. The bottom
end of causality figures is about 80. About 300 is commonly accepted
as a maximum.
Von Richtoffen was rash in bombing the area but no one knows why
exactly. Subract
stories of pilots staffing little girls (strafing of civilians
invariably evaporates when
hunted down to specific incidents and witnesses) we have an tragedy
bordering on a deliberate
atrocity form which the communist side achieved much propaganda.
Appalling yes but
unique no. The ****up by two naive and hapless Dutch officers and
German officers over
the Rotterdam bombing over time zone differences and last minute
abort flares and
Guernica is of course an opportunity for those that developed
'dehousing' to point the finger.

I don't recall the English being particularly pleasant to the Irish
well into the twentieth century
or the Scottish at Culloden. Gas was used against Kurds by the
British after a sort of token warning
and Canadians regarded murderous American behavior towards its Indians
as disgraceful.
disgusting.

I'm quite aware of moral posturing and its value and reasons and have
no illusions or much time for the nonsense.
There are plenty of people happy to point the finger but who protest a
mistake when their own side or cause is implicated. Of course both
sides always have a 'they did it first so we can do it 20 times over
now' mentality: on both sides (funny about that)

Monte Davis wrote:


I thought we weren't going to talk about STS or ISS or ESAS in this
thread? :-)

There is a similarity there, isn't there?
Don't forget the N-1... they were going to make that work even if it
meant blowing up half of Baikonur in the process. :-)

Pat

Eunometic wrote:


Link didn't work.

Try these:
http://www.russianspaceweb.com/baikal.html
http://www.buran.ru/htm/strbaik.htm
(Snip)
Yeah, but that leveled Tokyo without even using nuclear weapons, and
pummeled the Japanese war-making ability unto the ground.
London was still there and largely intact after the V-2 attacks.
The V-2 killed thousands of people, but other than that it had just
about zero influence on the progress of the war.


Becuase it was too late by about 6-12 months to
1 Have an impact in terms of production
2 achieve its technical potential.

Note that the B-29 and particulary the Lancaster (as the Manchester)
was crap in
it first year. The V1 never got the year.


You're forgetting one other factor he It was being built by slave
labor who were more than happy to do anything they could to sabotage it
during production if they though they wouldn't be caught doing it.
One technique was to urinate on the guidance system electronics. During
tests at the end of production this would pass fine; but within a few
days corrosion would set in that would make the unit unusable when the
missile was readied for launch.


I worked out the casualty figure per missile used years ago:
"They managed to spend a fortune of the Nazi's money (around 2 & 1/2
billion dollars in U.S. wartime dollars; including 2
billion for the A-4 and it's predecessors development alone between
1931-45) on a weapon that, in use, killed a average of around 1 & 3/4's
person per missile..
Out of curiosity, I looked up the facts and figures on casualties caused by
V-2's (or A-4's, for the purists) during W.W.II:
A total of approximately 3,170 V-2s were launched operationally at targets;
the vast majority at London, England and Antwerp, Belgium.
The V-2 attacks on England killed a total of 2,511 people.
The attacks on Belgium by both V-1's and V-2's killed a total of 6,448
people- assuming a breakdown of the type of weapons used to be the same as
the attacks on England, then around 44% of the deaths would be attributable
to V-2's; or around 2840 total.
If we include another, say, 200 deaths for other targets that came under V-2
attack, we come up with a total of around 5,550 total fatalities or a
average
of 1 and 3/4 killed per missile.
(Figures are from V-Missiles of the Third Reich, by Dieter
Holsken, Monogram Aviation Publications,1994, ISBN 0-914144-42-1)"



Those kind of statistics cut both ways.

Bomber command dropped about 1,200,000 tons of bombs
Killed about 450,000 civilians
lost 8,000 aircraft
killed 46,000 aircrew.

The V2 is actually more cost effective on that basis.


Ever read the numbers that died making it versus the number it killed in
combat? They were depriving themselves of more workers than the allies
of citizens.
If you are going to use slave labor at least use it to make something
that you really can hope to change the war situation with.
They lost an estimated 20,000 slave workers at Mittlebau-Dora on V-1/V-2
production:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mittelbau-Dora
There's some info on bomber costs versus explosive delivered he
http://www.spacedaily.com/reports/Th..._in_Space.html
As for the V-2's economics, from another posting:
"As a weapon the V-2 sucked. Even using your figures, we come to a
figure of total dead of
9,202 for Britain and Belgium, plus whatever the malfunctions amounted
to (say 500) so taking 9,702 and dividing it by your total production
and launch figures we arrive at 1.6 deaths per V-2 produced; or 2.7
deaths per V-2 actually used- for a terror weapon it seems about as
efficient as a well-placed hand grenade. The tremendous amount of money
that was spent on them would probably have generated far more deaths if
it had been spent on other military weapons, or merely on thousands and
thousands more V-1s; which was a far more effective weapon from the cost
point of view- from http://www.strandlab.com/buzzbombs/

'Afterwards, the Allies acknowledged that the V-1 was a tactical
success. It was also a very cost-effective weapon:
From a strictly dollar point of view, the V-1 cost the Germans less to
build and to operate than it cost the Allies in damage and
defense. A wartime British study [concluded that] using the German costs
as unity . . . it cost the defenders 1.46 for damage and loss of
production, 1.88 for the bombing, .30 for fighter interception, and .16
for static defenses, for a total ratio of 3.80:1 [in favor of the
Germans.]'

Mittelwerk production costs per V-1 were around 6,000 marks per
unit...so that 2 billion marks used on the V-2's would have built around
another 333,333 of them; even taking 1/2 that money and using it for
more launch sites as well as destruction of V-1's in airstrikes before
they were launched and you could have around 166,000 more V-1s heading
toward Britain and Belgium- using the total number of ground and
air-launched V-1s used against Britain as a guide- 10,492; and the total
that reached Britain itself after malfunctions, interceptions, and
anti-aircraft fire- 5,822- we come
up with an overall success rate of around 45% of the flying bombs
launched successfully reaching enemy territory.
These resulted in a total of 6,184 killed in England, and a further
17,981 severely wounded; extrapolating from these figures we find a
average fatality rate of around .58 per V-1 launched, and a wounding
rate of 1.7 per same. Taking this in combination with our earlier
estimate of 166,000 extra V-1 launches by the nonexistence of the V-2
program, and we end up with a total of around 96,280 more dead, and
282,200 severely wounded by V-1 attack bringing our total V-weapon
casualties to around 100,000 killed and around 300,000 severely injured.
This contrasts sharply with the effects of the actual V-1/V-2 attacks
which caused a total of 15,324 killed and 37,189 severely
injured between Britain and Belgium. If the money that went into V-2
design and construction was spent on V-1s instead, then there could have
been around 84,000 fewer people alive at the end of W.W. II."
The other advantage of building hoards more V-1s is that they _could_ be
defended against.
A V-1 barrage of that intensity would have tied up huge air defense
resources in Britain, and might well have swamped their ability to
defend against them, and the ability of the London fire-fighting forces
to deal with their damage.






At 1 and 3/4 people killed by each rocket (and the vast majority of
those civilians, not military personnel), this was a pathetically inept
and unsuccessful weapon.


The records of Bomber Command and the 8th airforce are not better:
they killed mainly civilians. Infact their record is far worse.


At least at Hamburg and Dresden, it was their intention to cause as
much damage and as many casualties as possible in a terror campaign.
Which was also the intention of the Luftwaffe once the attacks on
British airfields switched to London during the Battle Of Britain, years
earlier in 1940.
The attack on Coventry was made with the idea of pretty much wiping the
city off of the map in retaliation for a RAF attack on Munich.
The big difference was that at the end of the war, attacks on London had
ceased and Germany had its rail infrastructure destroyed and its
petrochemical industry rendered useless.
So whatever else the V-weapons did, they didn't change the course of the
war, except for possibly slowing things up by a few weeks by having to
deal with defending against V-1s until their launch sites were bombed or
captured by ground forces.
Indirectly the USAAF killed a lot of German pilots, who had come up
to
protect their civilian population and were thus unavailable to
protect
German forces.



A MG-34 machine gun probably killed more people on average than a V-2,
and cost far, far, far, less.
Plus it would be killing military personnel engaged in hostilities
against you.



Wasn't the WW2 statistic that about 90,000 bullets were required to
kill one person.

Yup, and I'm pretty sure that you could afford those bullets with the
money left over from that V-2 we're trading for a machine gun or two.

Factor in pilot and crew training, aircrew losses, navigation aids,
maintenance crews,
hospitals, and tools, spare parts, airfield protection and the need to
provide escorts
and jamming systems then that B-29,B-26, Lancaster, Ju 88 isn't so
cheap anymore.

Factor in all those potatoes going into alcohol production for V-2s
while the German populace was beginning to experience food shortages,
and it doesn't look so cheap either.


Ethanol could be produced by several means derived from
petrochemicals,
not just fermentation-distillation.
That's the last thing they would want to do given their oil situation
during the war.
The reason they fueled it with alcohol rather than kerosene was that
they didn't want to start using kerosene in the quantities that the V-2
offensive required, and could convert some of their distilled liquor and
industrial alcohol industry into making rocket fuel fairly easily.
A lot of people overlook that a decided advantage of jets over
piston-powered aircraft in the Luftwaffe's eyes was that they didn't
need the the high octane gasoline the piston aircraft did, meaning more
usable aircraft fuel per barrel of crude oil or coal converted into oil.
This was simply a good method of
decentralised production that didn't require a large and vulnerable
synthetic fuel plant.


You still needed the distillation plant. Somewhere I read the story of a
V-2 rocket fuel plant that was buried underground with a giant concrete
bombproof lid on it. This distilled alcohol and produced LOX in the same
facility... right up till the day that the LOX vapors mixed with the
alcohol vapors, and blew the whole plant clean out of the ground.



Factor in all the fuel being used to move the V-2s from their assembly
area to there launch sites,


Minimal I'm sure. They mostly got their by train at night.


A lot of them in transport were parked in rail yards in daylight were
they were strafed by P-47s.
Gun camera footage of the warheads going off is most impressive.


and yet more valuable resources are wasted.

The real killer here is all the money that was lavished on this project
at Peenemunde prior to it becoming operational.


Perhaps, but I still doubt it was all that bad. Penemunde could have
been kept trickling along in
1940-1942 at a higher rate with little impact and the result would
have been
a cheaper more developed weapon available earlier instead of one
rushed into
production with wide ranging limitations that were costly to correct
at a late
stage.


They were spending a fortune on a weapon system that didn't make any
strategic sense right from its very inception.



The von Braun team fed the Wermacht a line of B.S. regarding the
missile's accuracy (100 meters from aim point), and the Wermacht should
have had some outside source check up on the math they were using and
laughed them right out of the office.


I've never heard of that,
Page 29 of Holsken's V-Missile book.
It was from a lecture Dornberger presented on December 14, 1939.
He stated that the A4 would be capable of launching from trains and
ships, have a range of 270 km and would only deviate from its target by
"some 100 m with regard to longitude and latitude"

nevertheless von Braun, with Fritz Mueller,
(the inventor of the SG-66 and the PIGA accelerometer) achieved
300 yards CEP on the Redstone Missile in 1952 after a little
disruption and a move from penemunde to hunstville alabama. Thats
270 meters.

That's still to much from the viewpoint of using a conventional one ton
high explosive warhead against against a point target; and to do it the
Redstone had a separate warhead compartment that used hydrogen peroxide
steering jets go keep it stabilized outside the atmosphere and help it
to correct its reentry trajectory as it descended.
That was something way beyond V-2 technology as even the precise
dynamics of reentry in regards to heating and air drag were unknown at
the time.
What gets overlooked a lot in examining secret weapons like the A9/A10
and Antipodal bomber is that until the captured V-2s and sounding
rockets started to get used after the war the upper atmosphere and how
it affected bodies entering it at hypersonic velocity were great
unknowns, which accounts for Sanger's antipodal bomber design with no
stabilization system to control it once it had exited the atmosphere on
its initial climb.
He apparently though it could steer itself aerodynamically at over 100
miles altitude.


For the Germans, with a high loss rate, it looks a lot better than a
manned bomber.

Production cost too me looked like less than half the cost of a Fw
190.

And a Fw-190 at least had a chance to shoot down a allied bomber,
thereby helping the war situation in some material way
A extra 1,500 of those might wave been worth having.
Factor in the R&D that went into the whole A4/V-2 program, and you'd
have at least 3,000 more Fw-190's in place of the V-2.


All fw 190s were doing by late 1944 was killing 19 year old pilots on
their first combats.
Sending a boy with 20 hours of training up against someone with 300
hours was
equivalent to murder.


Yeah, but the A-4/V-2 program was going on during the whole war; that
money could have been supplying Fw-190s in 1942, when there were still
plenty of pilots to fly them.


Unit costs were about RM120,000 (about the same

Unit costs were about RM120,000 (about the same as a BMW801 engine of
the Fw 190)
and the cost of RM50,000 looked achievable. (Cost of a Ju 88 in 1942
was RM400,000)

The V2 represented a realistic way for the Reich to deliver 1000/tons
a month
With veritable impunity. Hitler wanted 4500-5500 missiles per month.

The way it was built was just fine
for bombarding the city, and even bringing the CEP down to 1km is
pointless without a nuclear warhead. With its Amatol warhead the only
thing that was going to make any difference would be if you could
somehow bring CEP down to 100 m, not 1 km.

I did some basic CEP calculations. Assuming production rates of 1000/
month
One could easily deliver 200/missiles per week to a specific target.

With what CEP?
Accuracy was a ovoid around eight miles wide by twelve miles long.
The missile is going to blow a crater about 60 feet wide on impact, and
do blast damage (though not as much as a V-1, because the warhead buried
itself on impact) to an area of around 600-900 feet wide.
In a area as large as its CEP that's not a very high density of damage
overall.


Dornberger reckoned at least 4.5km, some others 4km. The figure of
17km CEP against London comes from the effect of the double cross
sysrtem (which functioned against both the V1 and V2).

In the case of the V2 impact points the British reported the correct
impact
times of the missiles but correlated them with partial/selective
impact points that
had the effect of shifting the aim points about 11-12 km out of
London.

From what I've read that was even after the double-cross system walked
them out of London; that was the average deviation from the selected aim
point, wherever the aim point happened to be.
From http://www.astronautix.com/lvs/v2.htm

"What was the accuracy of the V-2? This question reduces to one of
philosophy - if a missile misses the aim point by half the range, does
that shot count against the missile's accuracy calculation or is it a
failure, counted in the reliability calculation? Tests of prototype
V-2's in 1943 indicated a 4.5 km CEP (circular error probable - the
radius within which 50% of the shots impact). 100% of the shots fell
within 18 km of the target. A radio beam guidance update system was
introduced in December 1944, which in tests produced a 2 km CEP. In
reality, in the campaign against Britain, 518 rockets were recorded as
falling in the Greater London Air Defence Zone of 1225 fired, implying
an average CEP of 12 km."

Even with the movement of the aim point outwards from the center of the
city, that's nothing to get excited about.
And that's only CEP; 49 percent of the missile were falling outside of
that area.
Given its range of 300 km, even if you are talking about an accuracy of
4.5 km, that means it is deviating 1.5% percent from the aim point.
Imagine shooting a rifle at someone 100 feet away and knowing your
bullet would have 51% chance of hitting within a foot-and-a-half wide
circle.
A rifle with tat accuracy would be considered not suitable for military
service.
If the 12 km figure is accepted then your bullet has a a 51% chance of
hitting inside of a four-foot-wide-circle.
At this point I'm pretty sure I could throw rocks with more accuracy
than a V-2's CEP, and I can guarantee you a baseball pitcher could beat
it hands-down.
Like I stated earlier, what you've got here is a super siege mortar,
not a precision weapon.
And trying to up it's accuracy isn't going to up it enough to make it
capable of hitting a precise target, so it's not really worth doing,
given the extra time and expense it would entail.
In comparison CEP of B-17 bombing in WW II was 3,300 feet:
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/news....aspx?id=29272
Or about 1 km. that's far, far, better than even the most optimistic
assessment of V-2 accuracy.

Correcting for the deception gets the CEP to 6km.

A 12 mile CEP is ludicrously bad.



Assuming the 1000m CEP then 50% of missiles would be within 1km, 43%
within the next
1-2km and 7% over 3km away.

Which is fine, but they never got that accuracy, so the mathematics is moot.


They got 6km. Getting rid of failures (a part of the inaccuracy was
failure) and then
getting rid of the manufacturing variation gets it down to about
4.5km. How long?
Given the outstanding progess (the penemunde team started to achieve
close to
100% reliabillity at one point) I would say it was only a matter of
weeks to months
to get CEP to 4.0-4.5km



This argument presupposes things that never happened, using a guidance
system that was never deployed.


Sure and the B-29 would have been ineffective without the eagle radar
or at least
H2X Meddo. Technology evolves and the technolgy of the V2 was being
evolved like any other.


When we razed Tokyo, we did it from around 10,000 feet using no radar at
all; just flew right over it and dropped as many incendiaries as possible.


They knew the accuracy of the weapon before they put it into service
from all of their test launchings, and it was pretty awful.


1/ A 4km radius CEP from the interim LEV-3 was achieved with series of
missiles so it was certainly possible.
2/ 2km by 3.7km elipse from the interim radio guidance system
for the SG-66 with its more comprehensive incorporation's and control
of parameters and higher precision components a doubling to
quadroupling of tollerance seems feasible.

The Redstone missile, if equiped with the juipeter system (ball and
disk intergrator as used in bomb sights) could probably have achieved
near 100m CEP.
Pershing certainly could.


Yeah, but again you are talking about missile from a decade later than
V-2, that had all the experience of the V-2 to look back on, plus a lot
better conditions to be constructed in.
Sort of like saying the P-26 could really have been something if it had
been equipped with a Merlin engine, or the P-35 with a Nene turbojet.




Something along he lines of a super mortar than a field gun.
Of 1course at that point everyone involved in the program had their
collective foot stuck in the tar pit so deep that they had to keep
going, as if they admitted that the whole thing was a complete cock-up
from the word go, the Fuhrer would probably have them all shot as
traitors to the Reich, and point out that he hadn't liked the thing
until they talked him into it.


Stalin was capable of that behaviour, Hitler was not.


Yeah...right...Hitler was a really nice guy.
I'm pretty sure I could find you several million ghosts who might
disagree with that, starting with the population of Lidice.
Remember why Hitler didn't want them to build the V-2?
Because it might hit that sphere of ice that surrounds the Earth at
around 100 km altitude and all that water could fall in, like during
Noah's flood. Then the Moon might fall in next, the way that one did
that destroyed Atlantis.
That makes even Stalin look rational by comparison.



Th only thing that would have made this weapon, at its accuracy,
worthwhile is either a nuclear or biological warhead.
Raining down a few hundred tons of anthrax spores on London could have
been quite effective.
Within six months of doing that, the Allies would have rained down
several thousand tones of anthrax spores on Germany, possibly making it
uninhabitable to the present day, but there is seldom big gain without
big risk.
Going beyond this is like speculating that they had concentrated on SAMs
instead of V-weapons right from the beginning of the war; you can take
guesses on what the effects that would have had on the bomber offensive
against Germany, but it's all guesswork, because they didn't do it.


Of those 100 within 1 km there would be
a slight tendancy
To cluster around the aim point. About 33 would be within 500m and 8
within 250m and
2 within 125m and 1 within 90 meters. That's enough to take out an
oil refinery, aircraft plant
And do a lot of production disruption expecially if the warhead
becomes more effective eg
With a reliable airbust fuse.

They couldn't even figure out how to do a radio proximity fuze for their
AA shells, much less for something coming out of the sky at 3,000 mph
with a red-hot nose on it.


No, A electronic proximity fuse using electrostatic principles was
built and
over 1000 succesfully fired by late 1944.

During the 1944 period the Germans fired some 1000 FLAK rounds of a
Rheinmetall-Borsig electrostatic proximity fuse mainly from 88mm guns
against aicraft targets simulated by cables. Success rate was over
85%
with detonation range finally reaching 10-14 meters. The devices did
include shock hardened thermionic vacuum valves. The results of these
tests are available in BIOS documents (British Intelligence Objectives
Sub-Committee). The German code name was KUHGLOCKEN.


Now, according to Ian Hogg's "German Secret Weapons Of The Second World War"
Kuhlglocke did get tested as a proximity fuze for _missiles_, not shells.
It relied on passing through the electrostatic field generated by a
aircraft due to its ionized exhaust.
Kuhlglockchen was a smaller version for artillery shells, and it never
left the drawing board.

brought an end to development and production.

References are "Truth About the Wunderwaffen" by Igor Witowski who
cites "Proximity Fuse Development - Rheinmettal Borsig A.G.
Mullhausen. CIOS report ITEM nos 3 file nos XXVI -1 (1945)

I've also come across to other references
KUHGLOCKE, Electrostatic by Rhinemetall-Borsig. Intended for missiles.
Prototypes only.

KUHGLOCKEN, Smaller hardened version designed for AA shells.



Less risky methods that required far higher
levels of collateral damage
and clearly there were many on the allied side who made no bones over
the fact that they
were killing the civilian population or 'dehousing' them.
"Civilization" disappears fairly quickly.

I seem to remember a town called Guernica where this happened first.
Something comes to mind about sowing the wind and reaping the whirlwind.


Guernica: is a complicated story: the Spanish didn't bother to let
the Germans
know it was historically significant city nor did they understand or
were they
informed of the the whole basque-spannish ethnic issue. Non of the
decision makers
survive. The target was either the cross roads where republican
forces were marshaling or
the small arms factor. Casualties: the 850 or so dead is an
exaggeration. The bottom
end of causality figures is about 80. About 300 is commonly accepted
as a maximum.
Von Richtoffen was rash in bombing the area but no one knows why
exactly. Subract
stories of pilots staffing little girls (strafing of civilians
invariably evaporates when
hunted down to specific incidents and witnesses) we have an tragedy
bordering on a deliberate
atrocity form which the communist side achieved much propaganda.
Appalling yes but
unique no. The ****up by two naive and hapless Dutch officers and
German officers over
the Rotterdam bombing over time zone differences and last minute
abort flares and
Guernica is of course an opportunity for those that developed
'dehousing' to point the finger.

If they are saying "Germany did it first" they are correct.
And this isn't the only time something happened like this; during WW I
Germany bombers and Zeppelins hit cities without much concern for
civilian casualties, and a group of German battlecruisers opened fire on
British east coast resort towns with no naval facilities in them with
the intention of causing as much fear in the populace as possible, so
that the Royal Navy would be forced to defend them, and divert some of
its ships from the blockade of the Baltic ports.
I don't recall the English being particularly pleasant to the Irish
well into the twentieth century
or the Scottish at Culloden.

They treated the Irish badly, but they didn't shove them into labor
camps to build weapons for them while they starved to death.

Gas was used against Kurds by the
British after a sort of token warning
and Canadians regarded murderous American behavior towards its Indians
as disgraceful.
disgusting.


Well, we didn't shove them into labor camps to build weapons for us as
they starved to death.
And nowadays, it's the white man who gets to walk the trail of tears in
many cases: http://www.indiancasinos.com/
As the cunning red man feeds him firewater, then takes his money and
gives him only brightly colored chips in return.

"Ha-ha.
Many White Man will be scalped in Tepee Of Chance tonight.
They leave without even shirt on back.
They come back though.
Soon all their houses shall be Indian land again, as prophecy foretold.
Ours forever, as long as roulette wheel spins and beer flows."


I'm quite aware of moral posturing and its value and reasons and have
no illusions or much time for the nonsense.

It's sort of like two people in a fight when the cop shows up.
First question: "Who threw the first punch?"
And the London Blitz came well before Hamburg and Dresden.
You remarked on Stalin earlier.
Considering the Germany invaded Russia twice inside of thirty years, and
were responsible for getting 1,700,000 Russians killed the first time
around, and another 23,600,000 killed in WW II (over 13% of the
population; Hitler really did literally decimate the Soviet population)
: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_War_II_casualties
....I think Stalin showed incredible restraint in the way he dealt with
Germany after the war...I would have expected him to kill every man,
woman, and child in the the part of the country the Soviets occupied,
and salt the soil.
Certainly Hitler had something along those lines in mind for the
Russians, so it would only be turnabout of unfair play.

Pat

On Wed, 11 Jul 2007 15:03:05 -0500, Pat Flannery
wrote:

If you are going to use slave labor at least use it to make something
that you really can hope to change the war situation with.

....Unless your goal isn't to use the slaves to keep employment costs
low, but to get a job done as much as possible while eliminating the
"undesirables". That was the "logic" behind the Mittelwork and the
rest of the camps, and it has brought about some questions over the
years as to just what Nazi Germany could have accomplished if they
hadn't gone the "Final Solution" route and killed off six million-plus
of the total population of the extent of the Third Reich.

OM
--
]=====================================[
] OMBlog - http://www.io.com/~o_m/omworld [
] Let's face it: Sometimes you *need* [
] an obnoxious opinion in your day! [
]=====================================[

OM wrote:
...Unless your goal isn't to use the slaves to keep employment costs
low, but to get a job done as much as possible while eliminating the
"undesirables". That was the "logic" behind the Mittelwork and the
rest of the camps, and it has brought about some questions over the
years as to just what Nazi Germany could have accomplished if they
hadn't gone the "Final Solution" route and killed off six million-plus
of the total population of the extent of the Third Reich.


Did you read this?:
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/...n2267927.shtml
They had 17 million people locked up.
I knew the anal-retentive *******s would keep paperwork on all this, so
the 50 million pages of documents come as no surprise.
The really appalling thing about all this is how they set this up; if
you want slave labor, then keep the slaves and feed them.
if you want to do extermination, then just kill them.
But what they came up with...slowly starving people to death as they
used them as slave labor, and working out the calorie intake vs. work
done math to get the optimal amount of work done at lowest food cost as
they starve to death, thereby saving the cost of bullets or Zyklon B, is
something that would be thought disgusting by the likes of Tamerlane or
Attila the Hun.

Pat

Pat Flannery writes:

OM wrote:
...Unless your goal isn't to use the slaves to keep employment costs
low, but to get a job done as much as possible while eliminating the
"undesirables". That was the "logic" behind the Mittelwork and the
rest of the camps, and it has brought about some questions over the
years as to just what Nazi Germany could have accomplished if they
hadn't gone the "Final Solution" route and killed off six million-plus
of the total population of the extent of the Third Reich.

Did you read this?:
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/...n2267927.shtml
They had 17 million people locked up.
I knew the anal-retentive *******s would keep paperwork on all this, so
the 50 million pages of documents come as no surprise.

Did you know they used computers to organize the Holocaust? Well, punch
cards and associated machinery. Made sieving for Jews a highly efficient
job: after the census in 1939 they had data of all German citizens on
punch cards, including "race". IBM delivered that, by the way.


Jochem

--
"A designer knows he has arrived at perfection not when there is no
longer anything to add, but when there is no longer anything to take away."
- Antoine de Saint-Exupery

On Jul 13, 7:53 am, Jochem Huhmann wrote:
Pat Flannery writes:
OM wrote:
...Unless your goal isn't to use the slaves to keep employment costs
low, but to get a job done as much as possible while eliminating the
"undesirables". That was the "logic" behind the Mittelwork and the
rest of the camps, and it has brought about some questions over the
years as to just what Nazi Germany could have accomplished if they
hadn't gone the "Final Solution" route and killed off six million-plus
of the total population of the extent of the Third Reich.

Did you read this?:
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/...n2267927.shtml
They had 17 million people locked up.
I knew the anal-retentive *******s would keep paperwork on all this, so
the 50 million pages of documents come as no surprise.

The above are nothing but concentration camp records, records of a
system that was actually smaller than the Soviet Gulag system.

The style of writing is undignified, sensationalist. There is nothing
new.


Did you know they used computers to organize the Holocaust? Well, punch
cards and associated machinery. Made sieving for Jews a highly efficient
job: after the census in 1939 they had data of all German citizens on
punch cards, including "race". IBM delivered that, by the way.

Jochem

There is absolutely NO evidence that punch cards (Hollerith IBM
machines) or German census data was used at all although it is a
common misconception that is deliberately spread and there is plenty
of credible evidence to refute this. There was in fact a high degree
of privacy in the German census which was tabulated with these
machines and obtained demographic data.

The "holocaust industry' is like any other industry or charity; it
employs nearly 10,000 full time professionals in the USA alone and
they must be funded and fed.

Some, only some, of these people will be dishonest or less than
rigorous with the truth and or self deceiving in order to keep
adaquete funds flowing for their important mission. Embarrassing
major corporations is a great way of extracting hundreds of millions.
Obtaining hundreds of millions of dollars is exactly what has been
achieved.

Unortunately the accusation of "Holocaust Denier", "Child Molester"
or "Whitch" are similar in that the accusations constitutes sufficient
evidence to secure a conviction. Hence any old nonsense can sometimes
be stated with limited fear of correction.

I can refer you to one article that you can obtain from the IEEE

Locating the victims: the nonrole of punched card technology andcensus
work
Kistermann, F.W.
Ahornstr. 8, Holzgerlingen, Germany;

This paper appears in: Annals of the History of Computing, IEEE
Publication Date: Apr-Jun 1997
Volume: 19, Issue: 2
On page(s): 31-45
ISSN: 1058-6180
References Cited: 102
CODEN: IAHCEX
INSPEC Accession Number: 5570909
Digital Object Identifier: 10.1109/85.586070
Posted online: 2002-08-06 21:29:02.0
Abstract

Provides information regarding the development of punched card
technology for use in both census and commercial applications. After
describing the different types of technology and how they were used,
this article provides a detailed description of census requirements-
and, in particular, the German censuses of 1925, 1933 and 1939-in an
effort to counter arguments that German authorities used the results
of these censuses during the Holocaust period. Extensive references
are provided to enable others to have access to information from that
era.


"Census work entails the evaluation of collected data that are
grouped, summarized, and tabulated. An individual case is not of
interest, and therefore a personal identification is not necessary in
the punched cards. The punched cards of the 1925 and 1933 Prussian
and the 1939 German censuses show no identification of an
individual. The card layouts show that no use was made of names
and addresses."

"Summary
Nazi organizations and bureaucratic administrations instituted and
used every means and procedure to identify, locate, isolate, deprive,
exclude, and deport the Jews. These institutions used ordinary
office equipment and supplies: paper, forms, index cards,
pencil, ink and pen, and typewriters. However, without further
discovery of documentary proof, which seems most unlikely and
even unnecessary, there is no evidence that Hollerith machines
and census work were used, as indicated in published articles and
books and in the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum. Hilberg
describes the problems in writing and talking about the Holocaust
in his 1994 book Unerbetene Erinnerung.95 The title of the book's
English written manuscript reads: The Politics of Memory. I will
let the readers of this article draw their own conclusions as to how
this title might apply to this subject.
Conclusion
This article began by describing the development of the punched
card technology and its application in census work. Special attention
was given to three German censuses, namely, those of 1925,
1933, and 1939 because they are the ones most often discussed in
the Holocaust literature and I wanted to make sure that I presented
the technical facts about them. I then mentioned a few words
IEEE Annals of the History of Computing, Vol. 19, No. 2, 1997 · 43
about how difficult it was, with the equipment then available, to
install Centralized Personal Punched Card Files, especially if the
use of names and addresses is needed. The reason for going into
this matter is the general view that the Nazis used punched card
technology to identify and locate the victims of the Holocaust.
This view has been put forward in the pages of this journal, and I
believe that some of the facts have been misinterpreted. I hope I
have managed to correct them.
N. Metropolis and J. Worlton96 have written about errors in the
history of data processing, and, in that article, they give rules for
workers in the field. Their first and fourth rules a
1. Allow no published errors to go uncorrected. Only through a
vigorous weeding process can we hope to stop the propagation
of the seeds of error.
4. Remember that the basis of scientific history is bibliography.
Start with a good bibliography and end with a better one.
In 1968, Eugene Ferguson in his Bibliography of the History of
Technology97 says, "Every scholar owes his successors at least
one solid piece of bibliography." I hope the attached citations will
be of help to future scholars.
Acknowledgment
I have, again, to thank Dr. Michael R. Williams, the Editor-in-
Chief of this journal, for his extensive help and generously given
time in making my English readable.
References
[1] F. Hiess, Methodik der Volkszählungen. Jena, Germany: Gustav
Fischer, 1931.
[2] H. Petzold, Rechnende Maschinen: Eine historische Untersuchung
ihrer Herstellung und Anwendung vom Kaiserreich bis zur
Bundesrepublik,
Düsseldorf, Germany: VDI Verlag, 1985.
[3] J.R. Beniger, The Control Revolution: Technological and Economic
Origins of the Information Society, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
Univ. Press, 1986.
[4] M. Campbell-Kelly, ICL-A Business and Technical History. Oxford,
England: Clarendon Press, 1989.
[5] A.L. Norberg, "High-Technology Calculation in the Early 20th
Century: Punched Card Machinery in Business and Government,"
Technology and Culture, vol. 31, no. 4, pp. 753-779, 1990.
[6] L. Heide, "From Invention to Production: The Development of
Punched-Card Machines by F.R. Bull and K.A. Knutsen 1918-
1930," Annals of the History of Computing, vol. 13, no. 3, pp. 261-
272, 1991.
[7] J.W. Cortada, Before the Computer: IBM, NCR, Burroughs, and
Remington Rand and the Industry They Created, 1865-1956. Princeton,
N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1993.
[8] J. Yates, "Co-Evolution of Information-Processing Technology and
Use: Interaction Between the Life Insurance and Tabulating
Industries,"
Business History Rev., vol. 67, pp. 1-51, Spring 1993.
[9] J. van den Ende, "The Number Factory: Punched-Card Machines at
the Dutch Central Bureau of Statistics," Annals of the History of
Computing, vol. 16, no. 3, pp. 15-24, 1994.
[10] F.W. Kistermann, "The Invention and Development of the Hollerith
Punched Card: In Commemoration of the 130th Anniversary of the
Birth of Herman Hollerith and for the 100th Anniversary of Large
Scale Data Processing," Annals of the History of Computing, vol. 13,
no. 3, pp. 245-259, 1991.
[11] F.W. Kistermann, "The Way to the First Automatic Sequence-
Controlled Printing Calculator: The 1935 DEHOMAG D 11 Tabulator,"
Annals of the History of Computing, vol. 17, no. 2, pp. 33-49,
1995.
[12] G. Aly and K.H. Roth, Die restlose Erfassung. Volkszählen,
Identifizieren,
Aussondern im Nationalsozialismus. Berlin: Rotbuch Verlag,
1984.
[13] R. Lindner, B. Wohak, and H. Zeltwanger, Planen, Entscheiden,
Herrschen: Vom Rechnen zur Elektronischen Datenverarbeitung.
Reinbek bei Hamburg and Rowohlt/München, Germany: Deutsches
Museum, 1984.
[14] P. Edmonds, "More Grim Prizes for a Holocaust Museum,"
Philadelphia
Inquirer, Mar. 14, 1990, p. 10-A.
[15] M. Kernan, "A National Memorial Bears Witness to the Tragedy of
the Holocaust," Smithsonian Magazine, 1993, pp. 50-63.
[16] A. Stone, "Visitors See Humanity at Its Worst," USA Today, Apr.
15, 1993, pp. 1A, 2A, 5A.
[17] F.W. Kistermann, Population Census Work and Punched Card
Tabulators. Research Report, Holzgerlingen, Sept. 1993. [not
published]
[18] D.M. Luebke and S. Milton, "Locating the Victim: An Overview of
Census-Taking, Tabulation Technology, and Persecution in Nazi
Germany," Annals of the History of Computing, vol. 16, no. 3, pp.
25-39, 1994.
[19] F.W. Kistermann, Analysis of Luebke-Milton's IEEE Annals 1994
Paper, Holzgerlingen, Jan. 1995. [not published]
[20] Letter from the Secretary of the Interior Transmitting a Report
of
Examination and Review of the Census Office, Apr. 4, 1892, 52nd
Congress, 1st Session, Ex. Doc. No. 69, pp. 1-32.
[21] L.E. Truesdell, The Development of Punch Card Tabulation in the
Bureau of the Census 1890-1940 With Outlines of Actual Tabulation
Programs. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,
1965.
[22] T.C. Martin, "Counting the Nation by Electricity," Electrical
Eng.,
vol. 12, no. 184, pp. 521-530, Nov. 11, 1891.
[23] Anon., "Hollerith's Electric Tabulating System," Railroad
Gazette,
vol. 27, pp. 246-248, Apr. 19, 1895.
[24] E.W. Byrn, "The Mechanical Work of the Twelfth Census,"
Scientific
Amer., vol. 86, no. 16, p. 275, 1902.
[25] G.D. Austrian, Herman Hollerith: Forgotten Giant of Information
Processing. New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1982.
[26] R. Feindler, Das Hollerith-Lochkarten-Verfahren für maschinelle
Buchhaltung und Statistik. Berlin: Reimar Hobbing, 1929.
[27] H.P. Hartkemeier, Principles of Punched-Card Machine Operation.
New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1942.
[28] H.P. Hartkemeier, Data Processing: How to Program and Operate
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New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1966.
[29] H.W. Cadow, Punched-Card Data Processing. Chicago: Science
Research Assoc., Inc., 1973.
[30] Anon., "The Tabulator: No. IV," Engineer (London), vol. 61, pp.
279-280, Mar. 17, 1911.
[31] Anon., "Hollerith" Census Equipment: A Description of "Hollerith"
Machines and Equipment Specially Suitable for Use in the Production
of Census and Other Similar Statistics. London: British Tabulating
Machine Co., 1929.
[32] Anon., "Census Tabulating Machine," Engineer (London), vol. 131,
pp. 532-533, 535, May 20, 1921.
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On Jul 12, 3:54 pm, OM wrote:
On Wed, 11 Jul 2007 15:03:05 -0500, Pat Flannery
wrote:

If you are going to use slave labor at least use it to make something
that you really can hope to change the war situation with.

...Unless your goal isn't to use the slaves to keep employment costs
low, but to get a job done as much as possible while eliminating the
"undesirables". That was the "logic" behind the Mittelwork and the
rest of the camps, and it has brought about some questions over the
years as to just what Nazi Germany could have accomplished if they
hadn't gone the "Final Solution" route and killed off six million-plus
of the total population of the extent of the Third Reich.

The design, testing and engineering of the A4 or V2 intrinsically had
nothing to do with the use of forced labor. It was just an
ingeniously built airframe that was in fact much easier to make than a
normal fighter like the hundreds of thousands made in the USA, Soviet
Union, Germany, Italy and UK. My understanding is that most of the
deaths associated with V2 production come from those forced to
excavate the under-ground bomb proof facilities rather than those
constructing the missiles. Forced labor became necessary when planed
for 1000/missiles month was pushed to 4500-5500 missiles/month and
when extra time for proper production planing was denied.

I've made a study of the use of forced labour and slave labour over
history and it Generally doesn't pay in the long or even short term.

Forced labor covers a multitude of conditions. It could be a Dutch
youth forced to take on a bakers apprenticeship in Germany who was
great full for something he mightn''t have otherwise gotten (I know
someone), or or someone forced to work on a farm where the farmer had
to be cautioned for treating the labor too well (too much food), or
someone who met their German wife there, to those working in small to
medium businesses and free to move within a kilometer of the town all
the way through to the worst conditions (generally associated with
some kind of trivial political activity such as handing out
pamphlets). It could be bad or not depending on who you worked for.
Generally bigger companies could be worse, due to the nature of such
organizations and due to the fact that pathological structures would
arise with often other prisoners being among the worse offenders.

Back to slavery and forced labour: it seldom works for two reasons.
1 Free labour is generally 4 times more productive and needs less
supervision. This was the case in the old south when a black slave
was compared to a white freeman. Economically black slavery achieved
nothing except maybe making making white working people poor while
making a few slave owners rich to the detriment of working class
whites.
2 Using forced labour prevents the evolution of human ingenuity
ranging from better processes, automation etc. The Romans used steam
for gimicks such as opening temple doors but they never evolved to use
it as motive power for anything. Why should they: they had slaves and
immigrants.

Messerschmitt was using a least one 'robot' riveting machine that
could locate a point drill and rivet it on a wing or fuselage. It was
fairly dumb but in that it simply did a repetitive task (at a
different location and orientation). Without forced labour such
machines would perhaps have been pressed forward. Most of the
technical developments of the Reich that fed the German post war
economic miracle stem from technical developments not the use of cheap
or slave labor. Stamping to eliminate fabrication and machining was
raised to a high form in WW2 Germany. Also the magnetic amplifier
was at least as reliable as the transistor and was 100 times more
reliable than the vacuum tubes the allies could use because they had
plentifully labor and caused a revolution in power electronics in the
west till the 1960s. One reason Germany fell behined Japan in the
use of robots and precision mass production is because the German
political and economic elite began importing Turkish labour to
undercute home grown German labour and thereby also retarding the
automation industry.

On Fri, 13 Jul 2007 04:58:16 -0700, wrote:

2 Using forced labour prevents the evolution of human ingenuity
ranging from better processes, automation etc. The Romans used steam
for gimicks such as opening temple doors but they never evolved to use
it as motive power for anything. Why should they: they had slaves and
immigrants.

....I can actually see someone trying to come up with a hybrid theory
that will explain the reason as to why the Roomba a) took so long to
show up and b) isn't 100% perfect is that domestic labor by illegals
is still so damn cheap :-)

OM
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