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#21
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Don't Desert Hubble
Jorge R. Frank wrote:
Charles Buckley wrote in : The ET tanks alone costs more than the replacement equipment for Hubble. Hmm? I'd sure like to see some sources for that. I've seen quotes of $200 million for the instruments alone on SM-4, let alone the gyros. That's at least three ETs right there. And most of that $200 million has *already* been spent. The last sentence you stated is the important one. This is a political,not technical decision and NASA is putting it back onto Congress to be *consistant*. You might want to tell O'Keefe that. He's certainly painting this as a technical (specifically, crew safety) decision. Congress has every right to override a political decision, but they would be understandably reluctant to override a technical decision. All of that comes from the CAIB. The CAIB is a political document. The reality of the situation is simple: If there was no huge backlog of ISS components, Shuttle would be grounded today. The decision to fly this this at all is a political decision. The crew safety issue is equally valid for both ISS and Hubble, but what most people keep missing is that applying the same standard to both ISS and non-ISS flights would more likely result in no flights to either than flights to both. He has a clear mandate to override the core safety requirements for ISS. Not Hubble. NASA just got crucified for not following basic safety requirements and now they are getting flamed for not waiving those requirements when something "important" comes along. No waiving of requirements is necessary. The CAIB certainly had no intention of painting NASA into a corner such that they couldn't service HST. Dr. Osheroff has already spoken up on that particular issue. (Hint: Read chapter 10 of the CAIB report. There is *no* requirement for ISS safe haven, nor a rescue shuttle for non-ISS missions.) There are other clauses though that do factor in. The requirement is for a risk assessment to be done which would meet certain requirements. Simply put: with a 98% safety record, they can't meet the limits. In Chapter 10 2.5.4.1 and 2.5.4.2. The specific numbers associated with the standards set really require outside capability - ie rescue or repair - to accomplish. If NASA were to slap down a 99% success rate for continued flights, how will they go about it? The drop-dead date for Shuttle is 2010. They don't really have any room for slippage. They have about 18 months, actually, based on the last manifest published before the new space policy was announced. http://www.caib.us/news/report/pdf/v...s/chapter6.pdf Start with findings F6.2-1 through F6.2-7 and the recommendation that follows. They are extremely critical of NASA's scheduling 18 months is a grand total of what? 5 or 6 launches? Assuming no slippage of any kind on anything in the pipeline. Figure on that 4-5 launch a year schedule for 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, and 2009. 20-25 remaining launches. http://spaceflight.nasa.gov/shuttle/future/ It shows 25 remaining ISS flights. Then, go to recommendation R6.4-1. That is the killer. That is the item that would have to be waivered for a Shuttle flight. The immediate goal of on-orbit inspection can be met, but they specifically include ISS assets in meeting those goals while non-ISS missions have to have independant capability. The ultimate goal portion is waiverable on ISS missions because they can use ISS assets near term and they are not going to be flying this beyond a short time related to finishing ISS construction. But, NASA isn't going to waiver that for flights that are not going to go to ISS since there is no way to fudge the numbers by applying ISS capabilities to the safety rating for the mission. The devil is in the details here. NASA has a very short critical time frame to accomplish it's primary mission with Shuttle. It has a pretty specific requirement in terms of repair capability and safety rating. It has a CAIB very critical of a schedule with no room for slippage. NASA has a very clear mandate from it's boss to complete ISS. It has nothing for Hubble. With the political fallout from Columbia, there is no chance they are going to stick their necks out on Hubble without the decision being imposed from the outside. O'Keefe is hitting the technical details and that is going to be his tack. If Congress or the President directs NASA to go thru with the Hubble recovery, then they have assumed the liability for it. |
#22
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Don't Desert Hubble
On Sat, 14 Feb 2004 12:32:34 -0700, Charles Buckley
wrote: 18 months is a grand total of what? 5 or 6 launches? Assuming no slippage of any kind on anything in the pipeline. Figure on that 4-5 launch a year schedule for 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, and 2009. 20-25 remaining launches. http://spaceflight.nasa.gov/shuttle/future/ It shows 25 remaining ISS flights. You forgot 2010 itself. 4-5 more launches, or almost a year of backup time. I don't think 2005 will get 5 launches though. 3-4 at best, since RTF is likely now in March, 2005. Brian |
#23
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Don't Desert Hubble
Charles Buckley wrote in
: Jorge R. Frank wrote: Charles Buckley wrote in : The last sentence you stated is the important one. This is a political,not technical decision and NASA is putting it back onto Congress to be *consistant*. You might want to tell O'Keefe that. He's certainly painting this as a technical (specifically, crew safety) decision. Congress has every right to override a political decision, but they would be understandably reluctant to override a technical decision. All of that comes from the CAIB. The CAIB is a political document. The reality of the situation is simple: If there was no huge backlog of ISS components, Shuttle would be grounded today. The decision to fly this this at all is a political decision. The crew safety issue is equally valid for both ISS and Hubble, but what most people keep missing is that applying the same standard to both ISS and non-ISS flights would more likely result in no flights to either than flights to both. He has a clear mandate to override the core safety requirements for ISS. Not Hubble. A clear mandate from the *president*. But the president does not have sole responsibility for policy decisions. Congress, via its power of the purse, shares this responsibility. Painting this as purely a technical decision rather than a policy decision would be a good way to make Congress reluctant to step in and exercise their policy oversight responsibilities. NASA just got crucified for not following basic safety requirements and now they are getting flamed for not waiving those requirements when something "important" comes along. No waiving of requirements is necessary. The CAIB certainly had no intention of painting NASA into a corner such that they couldn't service HST. Dr. Osheroff has already spoken up on that particular issue. (Hint: Read chapter 10 of the CAIB report. There is *no* requirement for ISS safe haven, nor a rescue shuttle for non-ISS missions.) There are other clauses though that do factor in. The requirement is for a risk assessment to be done which would meet certain requirements. Simply put: with a 98% safety record, 98% only if you include 51L. The particular failure mode in that accident has since been designed out. they can't meet the limits. In Chapter 10 2.5.4.1 and 2.5.4.2. The specific numbers associated with the standards set really require outside capability - ie rescue or repair - to accomplish. Or standalone repair (see below). If NASA were to slap down a 99% success rate for continued flights, how will they go about it? Simply solving the ET foam-shedding problem should be sufficient, and is something they are already required to do prior to return-to-flight (R3.2- 1). Then, go to recommendation R6.4-1. That is the killer. That is the item that would have to be waivered for a Shuttle flight. The immediate goal of on-orbit inspection can be met, but they specifically include ISS assets in meeting those goals while non-ISS missions have to have independant capability. The ultimate goal portion is waiverable on ISS missions because they can use ISS assets near term and they are not going to be flying this beyond a short time related to finishing ISS construction. That was not the CAIB's intent. If NASA thinks that cancelling non-ISS flights will let them wriggle out of the standalone repair requirement, they are in for a confrontation with the CAIB. If NASA intends to fulfill every CAIB recommendation - as they have publicly pledged to do - then they will have to develop standalone repair capability anyway. (And as it turns out, NASA's solution for ISS-based repair will only work up to flight ISS-1J, and the most promising solution for ISS flights *after* 1J will also work for *standalone* repair. So the argument is moot - if NASA wants to complete ISS beyond 1J, they will be developing standalone repair anyway.) If there's *any* wriggle room for waiving a CAIB recommendation, in fact, it's probably with R9.2-1, the recertification requirement that resulted in the 2010 retirement date for the fleet. If NASA starts running into schedule pressure to complete ISS by the end of 2010, the CAIB would much rather let NASA waive R9.2-1 and let some flights slip into 2011, than rush the schedule at the end and raise the risk of an accident, or waste billions on a recertification that will only apply to a handful of flights. Or to put it more simply, if R9.2-1 and R6.2-1 collide, R6.2-1 will win. With the political fallout from Columbia, there is no chance they are going to stick their necks out on Hubble without the decision being imposed from the outside. O'Keefe is hitting the technical details and that is going to be his tack. Wouldn't that be deceptive? This is a policy decision about risk-vs-reward, not a technical decision about risk alone. The latter is entirely within O'Keefe's authority while the former belongs jointly to the president and Congress. If Congress or the President directs NASA to go thru with the Hubble recovery, then they have assumed the liability for it. Congress directed NASA to go thru with STS-107 in the first place (see CAIB vol. 1 p. 27) and yet practically no one has suggested they assume liability for it. Missions to ISS, missions to HST, missions to the moon, missions to Mars - all carry risks and rewards. Lunar and Mars missions are both far riskier than a mission to HST. A mission to HST may be marginally riskier than a mission to ISS. The reward... well, suffice to say that's a matter of perception, and O'Keefe's perception is not the only one that matters. -- JRF Reply-to address spam-proofed - to reply by E-mail, check "Organization" (I am not assimilated) and think one step ahead of IBM. |
#24
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Don't Desert Hubble
"Charles Buckley" wrote in message ... The ET tanks alone costs more than the replacement equipment for Hubble. References, please? |
#25
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Don't Desert Hubble
"Chosp" wrote in message news:hTHXb.69784$F15.14540@fed1read06...
"Charles Buckley" wrote in message ... The ET tanks alone costs more than the replacement equipment for Hubble. References, please? Funny about that. I've heard that the ET *and reburshing solid boosters* cost $114 or so million in 1997. http://groups.google.com/groups?q=co...s.com&rnum= 1 Meanwhile as Chosp mentions in this post, there is $180 million cost with the replacement equipment for the Hubble telescope. http://groups.google.com/groups?hl=e...com%26rnum%3D1 Sorry about the long Google links. But don't know of a better way to reference old USENET posts. Karl Hallowell |
#26
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Don't Desert Hubble
(Karl Hallowell) wrote in
m: Sorry about the long Google links. But don't know of a better way to reference old USENET posts. http://www.makeashorterlink.com/ http://tinyurl.com/ -- JRF Reply-to address spam-proofed - to reply by E-mail, check "Organization" (I am not assimilated) and think one step ahead of IBM. |
#27
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Don't Desert Hubble
In article , Karl
Hallowell wrote: Funny about that. I've heard that the ET *and reburshing solid boosters* cost $114 or so million in 1997. http://groups.google.com/groups?q=co...et+boosters%22 &hl=en&lr=&ie=UTF-8&oe=UTF-8&selm=5rej3f%24ot6%40usenet78.supernews. com&rnum=1 Meanwhile as Chosp mentions in this post, there is $180 million cost with the replacement equipment for the Hubble telescope. http://groups.google.com/groups?hl=e...UTF-8&threadm= c582c1e3.0401311024.3efcdcc%40posting.google.com&r num=1&prev=/groups %3Fq%3Dhallowell%2Bhubble%26hl%3Den%26lr%3D%26ie%3 DUTF-8%26oe%3DUTF- 8%26selm%3Dc582c1e3.0401311024.3efcdcc%2540posting .google.com%26rnum %3D1 Sorry about the long Google links. But don't know of a better way to reference old USENET posts. Message-IDs. Your post, if you look in the headers, had Message-ID: - this is a unique identifier, and wll pick that post out of a database. Handily, it's also what Google uses as its reference method.. if you look at a Google Groups search, try to pick out the string starting "selm=..." - the ... is the message-ID. So, your first link... let's look at it. http://groups.google.com/groups?q=co...et+boosters%22 &hl=en&lr=&ie=UTF-8&oe=UTF-8&selm=5rej3f%24ot6%40usenet78.supernews. com&rnum=1 [& seperates strings] http://groups.google.com/groups? - is fairly critical :-) q=cost+ET+%22solid+rocket+boosters%22 - is your search string - we've got a result, but it keeps the search string so it can highlight the words you're looking for. It can go. (%22 = ", I assume) hl=en - in English, but this is the default... lr= - dunno, but it's not even set to anything ie=UTF-8 oe=UTF-8 - not sure what either of these do; character-set? Both are on defaults, anyway... selm=5rej3f%24ot6%40usenet78.supernews.com - this is it! This string uniquely identifies the post you're quoting... the %40 is an @ sign. rnum=1 - I never did work out what this one does. So, your first link condenses down to http://groups.google.com/groups?selm....supernews.com (If you really want, you can shave a few more characters by cutting //groups.google.com/ to //google.com/, but...) Simple, really... thanks for the data, BTW ;-) -- -Andrew Gray |
#28
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Don't Desert Hubble
"Jorge R. Frank" wrote in message ... (Karl Hallowell) wrote in m: Sorry about the long Google links. But don't know of a better way to reference old USENET posts. http://www.makeashorterlink.com/ http://tinyurl.com/ One problem. The Google archives may last for centuries, if not longer. Will tinyurl.com or makeashorterlink.com last as long? I recommend using both, just in case these services go under. |
#29
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Don't Desert Hubble
"Bootstrap Bill" wrote:
"Jorge R. Frank" wrote: (Karl Hallowell) wrote: Sorry about the long Google links. But don't know of a better way to reference old USENET posts. http://www.makeashorterlink.com/ http://tinyurl.com/ One problem. The Google archives may last for centuries, if not longer. Will tinyurl.com or makeashorterlink.com last as long? I recommend using both, just in case these services go under. TinyURL claims that they are permanent. |
#30
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Don't Desert Hubble
"Scott M. Kozel" wrote in message ... "Bootstrap Bill" wrote: "Jorge R. Frank" wrote: (Karl Hallowell) wrote: Sorry about the long Google links. But don't know of a better way to reference old USENET posts. http://www.makeashorterlink.com/ http://tinyurl.com/ One problem. The Google archives may last for centuries, if not longer. Will tinyurl.com or makeashorterlink.com last as long? I recommend using both, just in case these services go under. TinyURL claims that they are permanent. So they say, but what will happen to their database if/when they go bankrupt? Their income seems to be coming from advertising links on thier web site. What happens when the next Internet depression hits? |
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