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Russia returns Soyuz rocket to flight



 
 
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  #11  
Old October 31st 18, 10:34 AM posted to sci.space.policy
Jeff Findley[_6_]
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Posts: 1,881
Default Russia returns Soyuz rocket to flight

In article ,
says...
God, I hope you never wind up in a safety critical job!


Safety clritical job needs to evaluate as many failure modes as
possible, not just focus on one you think is the answer.


Not if you're in charge of the Russian space program. Instead you
assign blame, start launching again even before the investigation
completes, and maybe, eventually, you'll actually announce the cause.
The last thing you do is "evaluate as many failure modes as possible"
because that would interfere with the launch schedule and make you look
bad to the higher ups. Some of those higher ups could make you
permanently disappear if you make Russia look bad.

Because of this, nothing ever truly gets "fixed" because the biggest
problem is cultural. This is evident in the data. Despite flying much
the same launch vehicles that have flown routinely since the 1960s (both
Soyuz and Proton), Russian launch vehicles fail a lot more than you'd
expect for such mature designs. This has resulted in international
commercial customers largely abandoning Russian launch vehicles in
recent years.

That's the bit that you seem to keep trying to hand-wave away. Who
really cares what *this* cause was when the culture largely ignores the
failure and most certainly doesn't look for all possible root causes?
The glaring evidence is that Russia doesn't even stop flying to do a
complete investigation. In this case, it was reported that the next
launch was delayed by one whole day! That extra day could not have
allowed for evaluating "as many failure modes as possible".

Russia has a safety culture based on shooting the messenger and
continuing to fly. It's the polar opposite of NASA's culture which
grounds everything for an indefinite amount of time and conducting a
wide open investigation into every last component of the vehicle, even
if it's completely unrelated to the incident.

Somewhere in the middle is a culture of continuous improvement where
workers are encouraged to come forward with safety concerns like, "Hey
boss, we accidentally bent this booster attachment pin with the crane,
so maybe we should ask the engineers if it's still o.k. to force it on
with a bunch of added lubricant?". While at the same time, this middle
ground for a failed launch would not result in the grounding of the
launch vehicle for years at a time (because if you're continuously
improving safety, you wouldn't accumulate the huge amount of "technical
debt" that was "uncovered" after Challenger).

Jeff
--
All opinions posted by me on Usenet News are mine, and mine alone.
These posts do not reflect the opinions of my family, friends,
employer, or any organization that I am a member of.
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  #12  
Old October 31st 18, 12:30 PM posted to sci.space.policy
Greg \(Strider\) Moore
external usenet poster
 
Posts: 635
Default Russia returns Soyuz rocket to flight

"Jeff Findley" wrote in message news:M
...

In article ,
says...
God, I hope you never wind up in a safety critical job!


Safety clritical job needs to evaluate as many failure modes as
possible, not just focus on one you think is the answer.


Not if you're in charge of the Russian space program. Instead you
assign blame, start launching again even before the investigation
completes, and maybe, eventually, you'll actually announce the cause.
The last thing you do is "evaluate as many failure modes as possible"
because that would interfere with the launch schedule and make you look
bad to the higher ups. Some of those higher ups could make you
permanently disappear if you make Russia look bad.

Because of this, nothing ever truly gets "fixed" because the biggest
problem is cultural. This is evident in the data. Despite flying much
the same launch vehicles that have flown routinely since the 1960s (both
Soyuz and Proton), Russian launch vehicles fail a lot more than you'd
expect for such mature designs. This has resulted in international
commercial customers largely abandoning Russian launch vehicles in
recent years.

That's the bit that you seem to keep trying to hand-wave away. Who
really cares what *this* cause was when the culture largely ignores the
failure and most certainly doesn't look for all possible root causes?
The glaring evidence is that Russia doesn't even stop flying to do a
complete investigation. In this case, it was reported that the next
launch was delayed by one whole day! That extra day could not have
allowed for evaluating "as many failure modes as possible".

Russia has a safety culture based on shooting the messenger and
continuing to fly. It's the polar opposite of NASA's culture which
grounds everything for an indefinite amount of time and conducting a
wide open investigation into every last component of the vehicle, even
if it's completely unrelated to the incident.

Somewhere in the middle is a culture of continuous improvement where
workers are encouraged to come forward with safety concerns like, "Hey
boss, we accidentally bent this booster attachment pin with the crane,
so maybe we should ask the engineers if it's still o.k. to force it on
with a bunch of added lubricant?". While at the same time, this middle
ground for a failed launch would not result in the grounding of the
launch vehicle for years at a time (because if you're continuously
improving safety, you wouldn't accumulate the huge amount of "technical
debt" that was "uncovered" after Challenger).

Jeff


Hmm, sounds almost like what SpaceX seems to be doing.
Continuous improvement over time.


--
Greg D. Moore
http://greenmountainsoftware.wordpress.com/
CEO QuiCR: Quick, Crowdsourced Responses. http://www.quicr.net
IT Disaster Response -
https://www.amazon.com/Disaster-Resp...dp/1484221834/

  #13  
Old October 31st 18, 03:56 PM posted to sci.space.policy
Fred J. McCall[_3_]
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Posts: 9,978
Default Russia returns Soyuz rocket to flight

JF Mezei wrote on Tue, 30 Oct 2018
16:22:01 -0400:

On 2018-10-28 22:21, Fred J. McCall wrote:

How do you know that a certain amount of bending wasn't considered
tolerable?


How do you know that it was?


I don't pretend to know.


Of course you do.


My point is that you reach hard conclusions
based on superficial media reports and refuse to consider that there are
many ways for that pin to be bent and nany ways where the rocket was
cleared for launch. You don't know if this was a frequent problem or
whether this was the first time this happened ever. You don't know
whether there was a documented fix or whether the crews thought of it
themselves.


Of course it means that. Look at their history.


Just because they quickly decide this was a one-off and proceed with
more launches does not mean that they don't go deeper to find out how
this happened. Just because the results don't get pubhlished by some
commission 3 years later in a hige bible doesn't mean that they don't
get to the bottom of it.


Of course it means that.


And just because top management are not forced to implement permanent
fixes doesn't mean that they don't know of the problem.


Of course it means they don't know. "Don't launch bent rockets".


My answer is much more likely than yours


Unless you are infolved in the investigation, you are not qualified to
provide an answer and declare any other to be invalid. They are all
speculative.


You're an idiot. Why didn't the guy who drilled the hole in the Soyuz
spacecraft report it?


I was merely ponting out that your answer is not the only possible one
and that the folks involved inside the company would likely be looking
at many possibilities as they go down the fault tree in terms of work
that was done, what was checked, waht was approved for flight.


You seem to think that the Russians operate like Americans. They
don't.


It could very well be that your answer ends up being the correct one.
But at this stage it can't be declared "correct".





given the culture of the organization,


You speculate on the culture of the organisation.


Speculate? No. I observe the historical facts. You should try that
some time.


The question isn't
whether there is a culture problem, the question is to find out why, in
this case, the existing culture cleared the rocket for launch. And it
isn't as simple as you might think , and I provided the example of what
if bent pins were documented as acceptable with a documented fix of
lubricant?


And I proved the example of monkeys flying out your butt.


all the bootless speculation you care to.


Pointing out other possibilities. You reach hard conclusions without
having access to actual evidence.


Poppycock.


God, I hope you never wind up in a safety critical job!


Safety clritical job needs to evaluate as many failure modes as
possible, not just focus on one you think is the answer.


You're willing to fly 'bent' rockets. I am not.


--
"Insisting on perfect safety is for people who don't have the balls to
live in the real world."
-- Mary Shafer, NASA Dryden
  #14  
Old October 31st 18, 04:02 PM posted to sci.space.policy
Fred J. McCall[_3_]
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Posts: 9,978
Default Russia returns Soyuz rocket to flight

JF Mezei wrote on Wed, 31 Oct 2018
10:20:01 -0400:

CBC reports today that the Soyuz accident was caused by a faulty sensor.

https://www.cbc.ca/news/technology/r...unch-1.4784356

A Soyuz rocket and spacecraft blast off on Oct. 11, 2018. The rocket
failed two minutes into the launch, forcing the spacecraft carrying two
astronauts to make an emergency landing. The failure has been traced to
a collision between two rocket stages caused by a faulty sensor. (Dmitri
Lovetsky/Associated Press)

So, the bent pin theory, and all the premature blame assigned to
westerners to poor quality control and bad culture etc may have been
premature.

It could very well be the Russians claiming it was a sensor problem to
hide bad quality control and bent pin. or not.


You don't read simple declarative English, do you?


--
"Ignorance is preferable to error, and he is less remote from the
truth who believes nothing than he who believes what is wrong."
-- Thomas Jefferson
  #15  
Old November 1st 18, 10:23 AM posted to sci.space.policy
Jeff Findley[_6_]
external usenet poster
 
Posts: 1,881
Default Russia returns Soyuz rocket to flight

In article ,
says...

CBC reports today that the Soyuz accident was caused by a faulty sensor.

https://www.cbc.ca/news/technology/r...unch-1.4784356

A Soyuz rocket and spacecraft blast off on Oct. 11, 2018. The rocket
failed two minutes into the launch, forcing the spacecraft carrying two
astronauts to make an emergency landing. The failure has been traced to
a collision between two rocket stages caused by a faulty sensor. (Dmitri
Lovetsky/Associated Press)


From what I read on Twitter (posted by Katya Pavlushchenko a self
professed "Space exploration enthusiast"), "He said, the cause of the
sensor failure is a mistake in assembling process on Baikonur". Also,
"He said the other Soyuz rockets booster packs, that are already
assembled, will be reassembled to exclude the repeat of the failure".

We'll see how the space news press presents this over the next few days.

So, the bent pin theory, and all the premature blame assigned to
westerners to poor quality control and bad culture etc may have been
premature.


From what I read, they tried to duplicate the issue with the bent pin
and crane but couldn't get the oxygen valve (which causes the tumbling)
to become damaged. So they did look into this possibility. Still, the
fact that such shoddy assembly practices even happened in the first
place absolutely supports the "poor quality control and bad culture"
assertion.

It could very well be the Russians claiming it was a sensor problem to
hide bad quality control and bent pin. or not.


If what I read on Twitter is an accurate translation from Russian to
English, this was still caused by "a mistake in assembling process on
Baikonur". Again, this also supports the "poor quality control and bad
culture" assertion.

Jeff
--
All opinions posted by me on Usenet News are mine, and mine alone.
These posts do not reflect the opinions of my family, friends,
employer, or any organization that I am a member of.
  #16  
Old November 1st 18, 11:37 AM posted to sci.space.policy
Jeff Findley[_6_]
external usenet poster
 
Posts: 1,881
Default Russia returns Soyuz rocket to flight

In article ,
says...

In article ,
says...

CBC reports today that the Soyuz accident was caused by a faulty sensor.

https://www.cbc.ca/news/technology/r...unch-1.4784356

A Soyuz rocket and spacecraft blast off on Oct. 11, 2018. The rocket
failed two minutes into the launch, forcing the spacecraft carrying two
astronauts to make an emergency landing. The failure has been traced to
a collision between two rocket stages caused by a faulty sensor. (Dmitri
Lovetsky/Associated Press)


From what I read on Twitter (posted by Katya Pavlushchenko a self
professed "Space exploration enthusiast"), "He said, the cause of the
sensor failure is a mistake in assembling process on Baikonur". Also,
"He said the other Soyuz rockets booster packs, that are already
assembled, will be reassembled to exclude the repeat of the failure".

We'll see how the space news press presents this over the next few days.

So, the bent pin theory, and all the premature blame assigned to
westerners to poor quality control and bad culture etc may have been
premature.


From what I read, they tried to duplicate the issue with the bent pin
and crane but couldn't get the oxygen valve (which causes the tumbling)
to become damaged. So they did look into this possibility. Still, the
fact that such shoddy assembly practices even happened in the first
place absolutely supports the "poor quality control and bad culture"
assertion.

It could very well be the Russians claiming it was a sensor problem to
hide bad quality control and bent pin. or not.


If what I read on Twitter is an accurate translation from Russian to
English, this was still caused by "a mistake in assembling process on
Baikonur". Again, this also supports the "poor quality control and bad
culture" assertion.


The news conference was only a few hours ago (according to the time
stamps on Twitter).

Forgot the cites. Searching for a primary source... Wow, it doesn't
get any more "primary" than this:

State Corporation ROSKOSMOS
https://www.roscosmos.ru/25664/

Of course, it's in Russian. Oh well, we have the technology. From
Google Translate:

Roscosmos. Press conference on the results of the work of the
State Commission to determine the causes of the emergency
situation that occurred on October 11, 2018
....
The reason for abnormal separation is the failure to open
the lid of the nozzle cover of the oxidizer tank of the "D"
block due to the deformation of the sensor of the separation
contact sensor (bending to 6 degrees 45') allowed when
assembling the "bag" at the Baikonur cosmodrome. The cause
of the RN accident is operational in nature and extends to
the groundwork collected in the ?package? of the Soyuz type
LV.

Well, there you go. The guys assembling the launch vehicle absolutely
effed it up. They bent the contact sensor to more than six degress
during assembly. And, of course, no one reported it, no one caught it
in an inspection, nothing to see here, just launch it and hope for the
best.

These are signs of a screwed up quality control culture, IMHO.

Jeff
--
All opinions posted by me on Usenet News are mine, and mine alone.
These posts do not reflect the opinions of my family, friends,
employer, or any organization that I am a member of.
  #17  
Old November 4th 18, 12:04 AM posted to sci.space.policy
Fred J. McCall[_3_]
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Posts: 9,978
Default Russia returns Soyuz rocket to flight

JF Mezei wrote on Sat, 3 Nov 2018
14:54:23 -0400:

Roscosmos released on-board video of soyuz failure.

https://youtu.be/CrzlMTRVt_I

(booster separation starts roughly 1:23 into video).

Youtube hint: use the "." and "," keys in paused video to
advance/reverse frame by frame).

Also: at roughly 1:26, there appears to be a large portion of video
skipped). And the times in video don't match actual time since launch.


Which confirms exactly what I said happened based on the ground video,
that you claimed wasn't of sufficient resolution to see anything.
Imagine that!


The Roscosmos press release on the issuance of report:
(google translation)
https://translate.google.com/transla...%2F&edit-text=


It does confirm the damaged occiured during final assembly at Baikonour
(so not during manufacturing or transport).


Which you steadfastly argued against. Imagine that!


But contrary to media reports that some claimed "confirmed" what
happened, it wasn't a bent pin that the crews coated with lubricant so
the booster could be slid into place, but rather a very small "push
button" pin designed to detect when separation begins in order to open
an O2 valve to act as reverse thruster at the top of booster to move it
down and out of main rocket.


You need to go read everything that 'some' said again. 'Some' said
that the problem was obviously that the O2 valve on one of the
strap-ons didn't open because they failed to get separation signal.
This is the point where you were arguing about 'pyros'. A list of
possible causes for why this could have happened was given by 'some'
that included 'bad sensor', which is what this was. Now, how do you
supposed that pin got bent. Something to do with them jockeying
around trying to get the strap-on connected due to the larger bent
pin, perhaps? Or do you think that's just all coincidental?

The opening of the O2 valve doesn't act as a 'reverse thruster', by
the way. It acts as a LATERAL thruster to 'push' the top of the
strap-on away from the core stage. 'Some' explained this to you
multiple times, but you're usually so busy arguing with 'some' that
your mind is firmly closed.


It is also not clear whether the assembly workers noticed this or not.
(If not, then the assembly process itself would need to ensure such
sensors are not damaged during mating).


Well, I'm pretty sure there's nothing in the assembly process now that
says "go ahead and damage sensors during mating", so it kind of goes
without saying that you aren't supposed to. There actually IS a
documented tolerance on how much 'bend' is allowable in that sensor
pin, by the way. It's a maximum of six degrees and 45 minutes. Since
there's a tolerance, one assumes it should be checked.


Also, in this failure, the booster, in not distancing its top portion
from core, moved down, with the top of booster ripping through the core
and causing core's propellant to be released.


Pretty much what 'some' said happened and you argued against.


(In the video one can see some long cable-like thing dragging after,
indicating more damage than simple dent in engine bell.


Again, let's go back to how 'some' explained to you that separation
works on this vehicle. As the strap-on loses thrust, it starts to
'lag' the rest of the vehicle. This trips the separation sensor (the
thing that was bent, so that didn't happen). This sends a signal to
both ends of the strap-on. The signal to the top opens the O2 valve.
The signal to the bottom fires the only pyros involved in the
separation which are used to sever some data cables. Since the signal
wasn't sent (bad sensor), the pyros didn't fire and what you see there
is probably the data cable ripped lose from the strap-on because it
was still connected to the core stage.

Seriously, Mayfly, does ANY of this sound AT ALL familiar to you?


QUESTION: at that altitude, would releasing large amounts of kerosene
cause an explosion or would it remain unignited except for propelland
falling behind core's exhaust where there might be some lefover O2
availabls?


Why do you think it would explode? What's the ignition source? So
even disregarding the lack of oxygen, it's unlikely to explode.


Obviously, internally, they know far more than they are releasing to the
media in terms of how/why the sensor was damaged, whether the workers
knew of it or didn't notice etc etc.

So there really isn't enough information available to make judgement on
the problems that allowed this to happen.


Oh, be serious! Damaged during assembly and either no one checked, no
one noticed, or no one reported the possibility, or some combination
of the above. When you have to jack about getting things to mate
correctly, damage is likely. This is precisely the cultural problem
'some' have pointed out repeatedly and that you have steadfastly
argued against, even now.


--
"Some people get lost in thought because it's such unfamiliar
territory."
--G. Behn
  #18  
Old November 4th 18, 01:24 PM posted to sci.space.policy
Jeff Findley[_6_]
external usenet poster
 
Posts: 1,881
Default Russia returns Soyuz rocket to flight

In article ,
says...

Roscosmos released on-board video of soyuz failure.

https://youtu.be/CrzlMTRVt_I

(booster separation starts roughly 1:23 into video).

Youtube hint: use the "." and "," keys in paused video to
advance/reverse frame by frame).

Also: at roughly 1:26, there appears to be a large portion of video
skipped). And the times in video don't match actual time since launch.

The Roscosmos press release on the issuance of report:
(google translation)
https://translate.google.com/transla...%2F&edit-text=


It does confirm the damaged occiured during final assembly at Baikonour
(so not during manufacturing or transport).

But contrary to media reports that some claimed "confirmed" what
happened, it wasn't a bent pin that the crews coated with lubricant so
the booster could be slid into place, but rather a very small "push
button" pin designed to detect when separation begins in order to open
an O2 valve to act as reverse thruster at the top of booster to move it
down and out of main rocket.


And yet this shoddy workmanship *did* happen and was tested to see if it
could have caused the incident. It didn't, but that's like saying Ford
forgot to put several lug nuts on a new car, but it ended up crashing
due to an improperly installed ABS sensor. So, no need to worry about
the people installing the lug nuts, because they didn't cause this
particular accident. SMH.

It is also not clear whether the assembly workers noticed this or not.
(If not, then the assembly process itself would need to ensure such
sensors are not damaged during mating).


No, it's not clear. What is clear is that the sensor was bent during
assembly. The Russians are giving little more detail than that. And of
course NASA isn't going to give us more detail. Everything is fine! Of
course we're going to continue to launch astronauts on Soyuz. Just move
along. There is nothing to see here!

Also, in this failure, the booster, in not distancing its top portion
from core, moved down, with the top of booster ripping through the core
and causing core's propellant to be released.


Yeah, that's really bad. The release of pressure in the tank resulted
in a very large, sudden, force on the stack which caused it to
immediately tumble. IMHO, it's highly likely that the tumbling is what
caused the automatic abort system to activate. When your launch vehicle
rotation rates indicate that things are *literally* going sideways, you
have a huge problem.


(In the video one can see some long cable-like thing dragging after,
indicating more damage than simple dent in engine bell.

QUESTION: at that altitude, would releasing large amounts of kerosene
cause an explosion or would it remain unignited except for propelland
falling behind core's exhaust where there might be some lefover O2
availabls?


I swear we went over this when SpaceX lost a Falcon 9 on the pad when
the COPV let loose. It's a very similar situation. Here we go again.

To obtain an explosion, you'd have to have pre-mixing of kerosene and
LOX. That didn't happen. So there could be no explosion. But, again,
the kerosene and LOX tanks are under pressure (to maintain the required
head pressure at the pump inlets), so just releasing that pressure is
what caused the stack to immediately tumble. No "explosion" required.
If anyone calls it an explosion, they're technically wrong.

Obviously, internally, they know far more than they are releasing to the
media in terms of how/why the sensor was damaged, whether the workers
knew of it or didn't notice etc etc.


We have no idea. It's hard to tell how honest someone is being when
they know if they give the "wrong" answer, the consequences are going to
be dire. It's the Russians we're talking about. Their safety culture
is completely broken, IMHO. The floggings will continue until morale
(and reliability) improves.

So there really isn't enough information available to make
judgement on the problems that allowed this to happen.


Bull****. They have a broken safety culture. Look at their launch
record over the last 20 years. Look at all versions of the Soyuz and
Proton launch vehicles. This information is in Wikipedia, so it's dead
simple to find. Look at both "failures" and "partial failures".

Soyuz 2, their latest and "greatest" version of the R-7 family, has an
absolutely horrible reliability record. You can calculate the failure
rate yourself from the available data. And do note that Soyuz 2 is the
vehicle that they will use exclusively for crewed Soyuz capsule launches
in a scant two years. Again, look at the tables under planned launches
of Soyuz 2 and you'll see that the first crewed flight will be in 2020,
if memory serves.

So when you say "there really isn't enough information available to make
judgment on the problems that allowed this to happen", I disagree
completely. Designs that are heavily based on vehicles that have been
flying for more than half a century should *not* fail at the rate that
Soyuz 2 is failing. That is your root cause.

The Russian launch program has a failed safety culture. This is why
future Russian launches will continue to fail at an unacceptably high
rate. You can see the train wreck approaching in the Soyuz 2 tables on
Wikipedia. It's only a matter of time before a crew dies.

Jeff
--
All opinions posted by me on Usenet News are mine, and mine alone.
These posts do not reflect the opinions of my family, friends,
employer, or any organization that I am a member of.
  #19  
Old November 4th 18, 11:55 PM posted to sci.space.policy
Fred J. McCall[_3_]
external usenet poster
 
Posts: 9,978
Default Russia returns Soyuz rocket to flight

JF Mezei wrote on Sun, 4 Nov 2018
15:29:29 -0500:

On 2018-11-03 20:04, Fred J. McCall wrote:

Which confirms exactly what I said happened based on the ground video,
that you claimed wasn't of sufficient resolution to see anything.
Imagine that!


This video was Released Nov 1. You made your claims that the fault was
conformed well before that. And you mentioned it was a bent pin, as in
bent mounting pin and mentioned they had to lubricate it to slide the
booster onto it.


Because at the level of 'failed separation' it was confirmed in less
than a day. A day or so later THE RUSSIANS said it was a bent pin and
THE RUSSIANS mentioned they had to lubricate it to get first and
second stage assembled.

You really do have the memory of a mayfly coupled with the reading
comprehension of the average kindergartner.

You need to go read everything that 'some' said again. 'Some' said
that the problem was obviously that the O2 valve on one of the
strap-ons didn't open because they failed to get separation signal.


No.


Yes. Stop lying. Go back and read it all again.


"some" said it was a bent pin and they had to lubricate it because
they couldn't slide the booster on otherwise.


Which I assumed kept the separation signal from being honored by the
LOX valve. Do you bother to read complete sentences?


You made your claims of
factual confirmed caused at the time that was the rumour.


I made my claims based on statements by the head of the responsible
agency.


Now you are
claiming you always claimed it was a push button sensor that was bent
and that you know this all allong.


Nope. I haven't said what you claim. Again, go back and read my
'guess' that you were so derisive of. One of the possible causes for
the LOX valve to not open (which is what I said happened) that I gave
was 'bad sensor'.

You know, if you spent even half the effort pulling your head out of
your ass and actually researching and analyzing things that you do
trying to play 'gotcha' with me you would sound a lot brighter. Your
failure to do so can only indicate that your head is too firmly lodged
up your ass and that you are incapable of actual research and
analysis.


This is the point where you were arguing about 'pyros'.


It was always known that pyros released the lower portion of the booster
and that the boosters could they drop of their support (which they
normally pushed against) at the top of booster.


Bloody hell! As I have explained multiple times THAT IS NOT HOW IT
WORKS. Read slowly. Phone a friend and have them explain it to you.

The pyros release SOME DATA CABLES. THERE IS NO STRUCTURAL SUPPORT
THROUGH THE BOTTOM ATTACHMENT POINT. ALL STRUCTURAL SUPPORT IS
THROUGH THE BALL JOINT AT THE TOP OF THE STRAP-ONS. And that ball
joint isn't really 'attached' to the core stage, either. Inertia
separates the whole works when the strap-on runs out of fuel and is no
longer accelerating while the core stage is.

Does ANY of that sound at all familiar, Mayfly? I ask because I've
explained it more times than I can count now.


The opening of the O2 valve doesn't act as a 'reverse thruster', by
the way. It acts as a LATERAL thruster to 'push' the top of the
strap-on away from the core stage.


And how do you know it isn't diagonal? The booster needs to drop out of
the top coupling and then move away. Yes, what you see in video is
booster moving away, but that angle does not allow you to see any
vertical thrust vector. The timing matters here because sideways push
while the booster still exert some positive upwards force against the
ball coupling would prevenet side movement from the O2 thurster.


Oh Jesus ****ing Christ! This, too, has been explained to you
repeated. Google "Korolev Cross", you nitwit. Look at separation
videos where everything worked and notice how the tops of the
strap-ons fly straight out from the core stage on separation. Think
about how a 'reverse thruster' is the very last thing you want, since
that gives you exactly what happened during the accident only faster,
you idiot.


(sequence is pyros fire while engines still running and then engines
start to move lower part away, engines cut out, and the O2 thruster
fires at a time when hopefully the thrust from engines is gone.


Absolutely wrong AND THIS HAS BEEN EXPLAINED TO YOU MULTIPLE TIMES!
The pyros on the cabling at the lower attachment point and the opening
of the LOX valve ARE TRIGGERED BY THE SAME SEPARATION SENSOR. That
sensor triggers because thrust from the strap-ons has dropped so much
that the upper ball joint is no longer held in firm contact and the
strap-ons have started to 'lag' the stack.


without saying that you aren't supposed to. There actually IS a
documented tolerance on how much 'bend' is allowable in that sensor
pin, by the way. It's a maximum of six degrees and 45 minutes. Since
there's a tolerance, one assumes it should be checked.


I read that the failed sensor was bent by 6 and some. I didn't read it
as this being the tolerance.


You read it incorrectly.


I do not know if the crews noticed the bend or not. This is not in the
press release. Unless you have an official copy of the report, you
can't know that either, so it is speculation.


You don't know much of anything and what you do know is apparently
almost all wrong. You should stop arguing with people who know more
than you do.


Pretty much what 'some' said happened and you argued against.


No, "some" argued it was a bent pin that held the booster which because
bent, didn't let it separate. (aka, structural support, not just a push
button switch).


Your defective reading skills have let you down yet again. NO ONE
said what you claim 'some' said.



works on this vehicle. As the strap-on loses thrust, it starts to
'lag' the rest of the vehicle. This trips the separation sensor (the
thing that was bent, so that didn't happen). This sends a signal to
both ends of the strap-on. The signal to the top opens the O2 valve.
The signal to the bottom fires the only pyros involved in the
separation which are used to sever some data cables.


No. Pyros fire first, then thrust is cut, then thursters fire. Read up
and look at the video.


Absolutely ****ing wrong. Look up how the bloody R-7 works.


They want bottom of engines to be pushed away before the top also does
the same otherwise as the top moves away, the bottom might hit the
core's engine bells.


Absolute horse****. Again, go look up how R-7 staging works.



Oh, be serious! Damaged during assembly and either no one checked, no
one noticed, or no one reported the possibility, or some combination
of the above.


So you know the assembly and sequence so precisely that you can judge
this? There are many gizmnos where, after you put 2 parts together, you
can't verify that all is well between the 2 parts, you just assume they
are. When you assemble with hands, you can feel that the parts mated
smoothly. When you assemble large parts, it isn't so easy to feel that
everything went well.


When you have to resort to "if it don't fit, force it" it is pretty
obvious regardless. Well, except to you because you're remarkably
stupid and bull-headed.


You are quick to assign human fault because the Russians have bad
quality control history. But, unless you are familiar with actual
proceduires and wity the actual report, you can't proclaim to know that
this is something they check for post assmebly.


Just how do you think "damaged during assembly" happens when humans
assemble things, Mayfly? Magic ****ing unicorns, perhaps?


The procedures may very well call for a check. But unless you can see
the actual procedures, you can't make that proclamation as "fact".


You wouldn't know a 'fact' if one crawled up your ass so it could be
right in front of your eyes.


When you have to jack about getting things to mate
correctly, damage is likely.


Without gettng the actual official report (and the real internal report
if the "official" one is tainted by politicial priorities), you can't
know what really happenned. You can only speculate.


Again, just how do you think something like this gets damaged during
assembly, Mayfly? Monkeys flying out your butt?


Also, the press replease mentions the push button was bent during
assembly. This is sufficiently vague. does assembly refer to final
mating? or does it refler to when thyey take the booster out of a
flatbed train car/truck and move it to a storage position prior to
mating? Was it bent when they picked it up to mate? or was it bent when
it contacted the core as it was being mated?

When the damage occired matters a lot in terms of discovering it and
whether they allowed mating with deffective sensor or mated and coudln't
have know it was damaged during mating.


Do you know what the word 'assembly' means? It's pretty much
synonymous with 'mating' in this context. But you are so adamantly
stupid that you refuse to give up on your 'ramdom act of magic did it'
theory.

If you start getting responses from me that just amount to "bull****"
or "wrong", you need to understand THAT IT STEMS FROM YOUR STUBBORN
INABILITY TO UNDERSTAND THINGS THAT HAVE BEEN EXPLAINED TO YOU HALF A
DOZEN TIMES OR MORE.


--
"Ignorance is preferable to error, and he is less remote from the
truth who believes nothing than he who believes what is wrong."
-- Thomas Jefferson
  #20  
Old November 5th 18, 12:08 AM posted to sci.space.policy
Fred J. McCall[_3_]
external usenet poster
 
Posts: 9,978
Default Russia returns Soyuz rocket to flight

JF Mezei wrote on Sun, 4 Nov 2018
16:02:28 -0500:

On 2018-11-04 08:24, Jeff Findley wrote:

I swear we went over this when SpaceX lost a Falcon 9 on the pad when
the COPV let loose. It's a very similar situation. Here we go again.


Falcon 9 happened at ground in dense air with lost of availabhel ambient
Oxygen.

I was asking specifically at that altutude whether ambient air would be
sufficient to support combustion.


Already asked and answered. Pay attention.


I assume there is still sufficient wind at that altitude that fuel
leaking from core would quickly move down to below the stack ? (as well
as continued acceration of core done by core's engines before they shut).


You assume incorrectly. Essentially no air means essentially no wind.



The Russian launch program has a failed safety culture.


No.


Yes. Stop being stubbornly stupid.


--
"Ignorance is preferable to error, and he is less remote from the
truth who believes nothing than he who believes what is wrong."
-- Thomas Jefferson
 




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