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Briefing at 8:30 pm Central
The briefing on whether to repair or not is going to start at 8:30 pm
Central time. You can see it at www.nasa.gov. -- Danny Deger NASA offered me $15,000 to take down my web site. Take a look and see why. www.dannydeger.net |
#2
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Briefing at 8:30 pm Central
"Danny Deger" wrote in message ... The briefing on whether to repair or not is going to start at 8:30 pm Central time. You can see it at www.nasa.gov. NASA just anounced they are NOT going to repair the tile damage. -- Danny Deger NASA offered me $15,000 to take down my web site. Take a look and see why. www.dannydeger.net |
#3
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Briefing at 8:30 pm Central
Danny Deger wrote:
The briefing on whether to repair or not is going to start at 8:30 pm Central time. You can see it at www.nasa.gov. Well, what did you think? |
#4
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Briefing at 8:30 pm Central
Very well thought out. Tested thoroughly. Discussed endlessly.
John Shannon along with the rest of the MMT are extremely qualified to sort through the data and make the decision. I agree with the decision, but I am a bit disappointed, I would have liked to have seen how the repair would hold up to real conditions. Having said that however, the rationale to not do the repair is sound, and I agree. On Thu, 16 Aug 2007 21:13:11 -0500, Craig Fink wrote: Danny Deger wrote: The briefing on whether to repair or not is going to start at 8:30 pm Central time. You can see it at www.nasa.gov. Well, what did you think? Jim in Houston. Contrary to popular opinion RN does not mean Real Nerd! Teddy Roosevelt's mother said: "Fill what is empty, empty what is full, and scratch where it itches" -- Posted via a free Usenet account from http://www.teranews.com |
#5
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Briefing at 8:30 pm Central
"Jim in Houston" wrote in message ... Very well thought out. Tested thoroughly. Discussed endlessly. John Shannon along with the rest of the MMT are extremely qualified to sort through the data and make the decision. I agree with the decision, but I am a bit disappointed, I would have liked to have seen how the repair would hold up to real conditions. Having said that however, the rationale to not do the repair is sound, and I agree. Agreed - though I too am a little disappointed. However it will still be interesting to see how both the fluid dynamics analysis and arc jet tests compare with the post-re-entry TPS condition. |
#6
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Prudence Lost
Agreed, the MMT leader comes off very well in the news conference talking
about a subject he probably knows very little about, only having a crash course on the subject over the last week. You have to remember, in reality he is most likely a manager who has been away from any technical work for quite some time and is just parroting what he recently learned. Intelligent, but still just parroting others, while at the same time leading the direction of the investigation to a conclusion, which seemed to be the one he favored. Do nothing, don't do the Prudent thing. Which would have been to fix and study the repair. All their time was spent justifying the imprudent course of action. Shades of Columbia To me, I see some shades of Columbia in the path the MMT went down. Well only because I followed the Columbia investigation very closely. First, one of the major contributing factors to the Columbia Disaster is still present. That there must be proof positive that there is a "major" problem before they will consider doing something. In Columbia's case this was to "prove" that there was major damage to the wing "tiles" before further action is taken, obtaining pictures. In this case, prove something is majorly wrong before a repair will be considered. Instead of just fixing the problem and coming home with the vehicle in the "best" shape possible. Second, the analysis ended when unexpected results were reached. In Columbia's case, the results indicated that the RCC would be fully penetrated by the impact. This result was then quickly explained away with words about modeling inaccuracies of the crater program that was many orders of magnitude outside it's database. They didn't believe the results and used a few thoughts and word to go from the RCC being fully penetrated to zero damage. The Columbia MMT just dropped the RCC analysis at that point and concentrated on "tile" damage. On this flight, the unexpected results are with respect to all the entry damage aft of the ding that occurred in the arc jet. I really know nothing about inaccuracies of the arc jet facility, who knows maybe they get the type of "entry" tunneling damage all the time. And, having been seen many times before in the arc jet facility, is well understood. I don't know, maybe this is the case. If not, then it truely is an unexpected result of the test that was explained away with words, and the analysis ending without a real understanding of the "new" phenomena that occurred during the test. The explanation, that it is turbulent flow, the boundary layer is very thin, shock waves from the arc jet itself. Was it simply explained away with words or is it something that is well understood? Third, incorrect models used. In Columbia's case, the "crater" program was created and used to assess damage to the RCC coating, small impact to what is a rigid surface with no flexing. Like scuffing of a little coating on a rigid thing. The actual impact was much larger, affecting much more than the coating, actually flexing the graphite/carbon composite matrix. Which really doesn't flex well, it's brittle and fractures. On this flight, it seemed to me that the CFD study concentrated on the hole, didn't assess any entry damage at all like that seen in the arc jet. I sure hope this tunneling is a common test artifact and not something new, that it is well understood and has been studied many times before. So that is was appropriate to leave it out of the CFD study. I don't expect to see any reporters coming up with the right questions for the MMT Mission Status Briefing and News Conference. So, here are the question that I missed the answers to, "How many times has tunneling damage been seen in the arc jet facility", "How well is this tunneling phenomena understood?", "When was this phenomena studied, how many times was it studied?". Maybe they were already asked and answers, and I missed that part of the news conference. On the risk of a space walk, the risk is to one astronaut. The risk of flying a damaged vehicle on entry is to all seven astronauts, therefore seven times as great. Is, 7 X SpaceWalkRisk EntryDamageRisk? All the risk discussion is just a bunch of value judgments, and of minimal value, no one really knows the risk. That being said, I'd put they're risk of flying this damaged vehicle on entry at greater than 2%. Two percent is the risk they started with on the ground. Prudence Lost In an earlier MMT meeting he said something about running a repaired ding case in the arc jet. This never happened. Along the path to the decision, Prudence got lost. The dissenting voice seems to have been the JSC Engineering Group who wanted to look at the benefits of a repair. The final words of the JSC Engineering Group was that it was the prudent thing to do. In other words NASA is doing the imprudent thing in not really considering the repair option to it's fullest. Any repair would eliminate the vertical face in the hole, which NASA seems to realize is causing the unexplained, or explained away, or is it well understood, arc jet entry damage aft of the launch damage. The Prudent thing to do, is to have the vehicle in the best shape possible before entry. The Prudent thing to do, is to repair the damage, then study the repair to see if it needs an additional adjustment. It's not too late, until the deorbit burn. Hopefully NASA will change it's collective mind and do the Prudent thing. -- Craig Fink Courtesy E-Mail Welcome @ -- MichaelJP wrote: "Jim in Houston" wrote in message ... Very well thought out. Tested thoroughly. Discussed endlessly. John Shannon along with the rest of the MMT are extremely qualified to sort through the data and make the decision. I agree with the decision, but I am a bit disappointed, I would have liked to have seen how the repair would hold up to real conditions. Having said that however, the rationale to not do the repair is sound, and I agree. Agreed - though I too am a little disappointed. However it will still be interesting to see how both the fluid dynamics analysis and arc jet tests compare with the post-re-entry TPS condition. |
#7
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Prudence Lost
On Fri, 17 Aug 2007 08:54:59 -0500, in a place far, far away, Craig
Fink made the phosphor on my monitor glow in such a way as to indicate that: Agreed, the MMT leader comes off very well in the news conference talking about a subject he probably knows very little about, only having a crash course on the subject over the last week. You have to remember, in reality he is most likely a manager who has been away from any technical work for quite some time and is just parroting what he recently learned. Intelligent, but still just parroting others, snip You and reality have been unacquainted for quite some time. |
#8
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Briefing at 8:30 pm Central
"Craig Fink" wrote in message
... Danny Deger wrote: The briefing on whether to repair or not is going to start at 8:30 pm Central time. You can see it at www.nasa.gov. Well, what did you think? My disappoint is how poorly NASA was prepared to do the repair. 1. No antenna coverage on the belly and possible loss of comm with the crew. Comm between the arm operator and the crew on the end of the boom is VERY important. 2. NASA has never used the goo in space. 3. None of the onboard crew members has ever used the goo in training. Based on these factors, I don't blame NASA for not wanting to do the repair. I hope they work these issues so they can have higher confidence in their ability to do an under the belly repair if it is needed in the future. First and foremost they need to make sure they have comm with a crewman working on the belly of the shuttle. I can't believe they haven't developed this capability yet. But, I do think getting data on the goo on an actual entry would have been good data to help assess a future, more severe problem. If the shuttle takes a hit that might be fatal, but might be repairable, NASA is going to have a tough time deciding if they are going to throw the shuttle away or risk a crewed entry. Danny Deger |
#9
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Briefing at 8:30 pm Central
Danny Deger wrote:
"Craig Fink" wrote in message ... Danny Deger wrote: The briefing on whether to repair or not is going to start at 8:30 pm Central time. You can see it at www.nasa.gov. Well, what did you think? My disappoint is how poorly NASA was prepared to do the repair. 1. No antenna coverage on the belly and possible loss of comm with the crew. Comm between the arm operator and the crew on the end of the boom is VERY important. 2. NASA has never used the goo in space. 3. None of the onboard crew members has ever used the goo in training. Based on these factors, I don't blame NASA for not wanting to do the repair. I hope they work these issues so they can have higher confidence in their ability to do an under the belly repair if it is needed in the future. First and foremost they need to make sure they have comm with a crewman working on the belly of the shuttle. I can't believe they haven't developed this capability yet. But, I do think getting data on the goo on an actual entry would have been good data to help assess a future, more severe problem. If the shuttle takes a hit that might be fatal, but might be repairable, NASA is going to have a tough time deciding if they are going to throw the shuttle away or risk a crewed entry. Testing on the trailing edge was brought up during the Columbia Disaster by one of the Board Members. She mentioned it was done really early in the Shuttle Program. Looks like NASA might actually find the trailing edge of the vehicle again and actually do a real study of the goo. I agree with the disappointment, in that they repair option unknowns became part of the decision process when it should been a non-issue as it was to have been studied during the return to flight after Columbia. |
#10
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Briefing at 8:30 pm Central
Looks like NASA might actually find the trailing edge of
the vehicle again and actually do a real study of the goo. That would be one BIG benefit from repairing it with goo, if the risk was acceptable. They'd have an opportunity to evaluate how well goo worked, which could be extremely valuable in future missions. In fact, I'm wondering if it's feasible for them to place some goo in a more safely accessible area before re-entry, just for testing purposes. Ron M. |
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