Return To The SSME

http://www.nasaspaceflight.com/2008/...ential-switch/

The rubes continue to flail around while the clock runs out.

On Dec 27, 6:54*am, kT wrote:
http://www.nasaspaceflight.com/2008/...rgoes-evaluati...

The rubes continue to flail around while the clock runs out.

Going down with the republican Mafia/cabal good ship LOLLIPOP may be
the only option. That way they get to look more pathetic and thus
might qualify for a federal bailout. Too bad BHO is taking over our
bankrupt and energy starved nation before we get suckered into yet
another fiasco.

~ Brad Guth Brad_Guth Brad.Guth BradGuth BG / “Guth Usenet”

Just observing all this makes me wonder if anyone actually looked back at
things that occurred before. Seems that the obvious problem of the plume
environment was never considered until far too late, yet it presumably has
been considered in the past as the smes design was made to cope with close
proximity of engines.
If one can simplify the design, why reinvent the wheel, or use a different
whell less well suited to the road, so to speak.

One thing does worry me though. Short termism. OK so the engines might work
out to be cheaper if the Shuttle carries on a bit longer and the political
decisions of keeping workers is in there, but does this mean that the long
term cost of a program which is supposed to go on far a long time is sound?
Sounds like someone out in the future could say this is far too costly.

Brian

--
Brian Gaff....Note, this account does not accept Bcc: email.
graphics are great, but the blind can't hear them
Email:
__________________________________________________ __________________________________________________ __________


"kT" wrote in message
...
http://www.nasaspaceflight.com/2008/...ential-switch/

The rubes continue to flail around while the clock runs out.

Brian Gaff wrote:
Just observing all this makes me wonder if anyone actually looked back at
things that occurred before. Seems that the obvious problem of the plume
environment was never considered until far too late, yet it presumably has
been considered in the past as the smes design was made to cope with close
proximity of engines.

It's a first order 'obvious' engineering consideration, an engineering
'**** test' would have stopped this in committee on the very first day.

1) RS-68 is a massive and inefficient engine compared to the SSME.

2) RS-68 is a fluid hog at startup, and has a well known hydrogen flare.

3) If you want to fly RS-68s, you can fly the Delta IV Medium and Heavy.

If one can simplify the design, why reinvent the wheel, or use a different
whell less well suited to the road, so to speak.

Because Michael Griffin is a ****ing idiot engineer. He is incompetent.
Clearly this idiotic idea was originally rammed through the committee.

Who would be in any position to do such a thing? Michael Griffin!

One thing does worry me though. Short termism. OK so the engines might work
out to be cheaper if the Shuttle carries on a bit longer and the political
decisions of keeping workers is in there, but does this mean that the long
term cost of a program which is supposed to go on far a long time is sound?

Sounds like someone out in the future could say this is far too costly.

Someone in the past already commented on the engineering failure of it.

The only reason I was enthusiastic about it was the fact that they were
going to use hydrogen, they were going to build a ten meter tank, and
that tank could be reengined with SSMEs, which with the addition of the
SRBs, would easily be capable of delivering that core stage to orbit.

I commented on this way back in early 2006 when it was first proposed.

The problem still remains :

1) the foam insulation.

2) the expendability of it.

Expendability is easily solve. Deliver the core stage to orbit where the
engines can be recovered and gigantic spaceships can be constructed.

The foam problems still remain as the fundamental engineering science of
rocket science, something America has abandoned with Michael Griffin.

On Dec 28, 6:41*am, kT wrote:
Brian Gaff wrote:
Just observing all this makes me wonder if anyone actually looked back at
things that occurred before. Seems that the obvious problem of the plume
environment was never considered until far too late, yet it presumably has
been considered in the past *as the smes design was made to cope with close
proximity of engines.

It's a first order 'obvious' engineering consideration, an engineering
'**** test' would have stopped this in committee on the very first day.

1) RS-68 is a massive and inefficient engine compared to the SSME.

2) RS-68 is a fluid hog at startup, and has a well known hydrogen flare.

3) If you want to fly RS-68s, you can fly the Delta IV Medium and Heavy.

If one can simplify the design, why reinvent the wheel, or use a different
whell less well suited to the road, so to speak.

Because Michael Griffin is a ****ing idiot engineer. He is incompetent.
Clearly this idiotic idea was originally rammed through the committee.

Who would be in any position to do such a thing? Michael Griffin!

One thing does worry me though. Short termism. OK so the engines might work
out to be cheaper if the Shuttle carries on a bit longer and the political
decisions of *keeping workers is in there, but does this mean that the long
term cost of a program which is supposed to go on far a long time is sound?
*Sounds like someone out in the future could say this is far too costly.

Someone in the past already commented on the engineering failure of it.

The only reason I was enthusiastic about it was the fact that they were
going to use hydrogen, they were going to build a ten meter tank, and
that tank could be reengined with SSMEs, which with the addition of the
SRBs, would easily be capable of delivering that core stage to orbit.

I commented on this way back in early 2006 when it was first proposed.

The problem still remains :

1) the foam insulation.

2) the expendability of it.

Expendability is easily solve. Deliver the core stage to orbit where the
engines can be recovered and gigantic spaceships can be constructed.

The foam problems still remain as the fundamental engineering science of
rocket science, something America has abandoned with Michael Griffin.

Why not use a robust composite basalt insulated ET?

If not SSMEs, then why not otherwise use Russian engines?

Why not use h2o2+synfuel?

~ BG

BradGuth wrote:
On Dec 28, 6:41 am, kT wrote:
Brian Gaff wrote:
Just observing all this makes me wonder if anyone actually looked back at
things that occurred before. Seems that the obvious problem of the plume
environment was never considered until far too late, yet it presumably has
been considered in the past as the smes design was made to cope with close
proximity of engines.
It's a first order 'obvious' engineering consideration, an engineering
'**** test' would have stopped this in committee on the very first day.

1) RS-68 is a massive and inefficient engine compared to the SSME.

2) RS-68 is a fluid hog at startup, and has a well known hydrogen flare.

3) If you want to fly RS-68s, you can fly the Delta IV Medium and Heavy.

If one can simplify the design, why reinvent the wheel, or use a different
whell less well suited to the road, so to speak.
Because Michael Griffin is a ****ing idiot engineer. He is incompetent.
Clearly this idiotic idea was originally rammed through the committee.

Who would be in any position to do such a thing? Michael Griffin!

One thing does worry me though. Short termism. OK so the engines might work
out to be cheaper if the Shuttle carries on a bit longer and the political
decisions of keeping workers is in there, but does this mean that the long
term cost of a program which is supposed to go on far a long time is sound?
Sounds like someone out in the future could say this is far too costly.
Someone in the past already commented on the engineering failure of it.

The only reason I was enthusiastic about it was the fact that they were
going to use hydrogen, they were going to build a ten meter tank, and
that tank could be reengined with SSMEs, which with the addition of the
SRBs, would easily be capable of delivering that core stage to orbit.

I commented on this way back in early 2006 when it was first proposed.

The problem still remains :

1) the foam insulation.

2) the expendability of it.

Expendability is easily solve. Deliver the core stage to orbit where the
engines can be recovered and gigantic spaceships can be constructed.

The foam problems still remain as the fundamental engineering science of
rocket science, something America has abandoned with Michael Griffin.

Why not use a robust composite basalt insulated ET?

Well, there is always the trusty old cement ET. A little heavy though.

If not SSMEs, then why not otherwise use Russian engines?

Because America should be building reusable second generation rockets
with the SSMEs that we already have. I'm not even suggesting that we
restart the assembly line, because the lead time for brazed nozzles is
something like four years or more, I'm just saying use the 14 we have.

As long as we are not purposely tossing them into the ocean, we're good.

On Dec 28, 7:05*am, kT wrote:
BradGuth wrote:
On Dec 28, 6:41 am, kT wrote:
Brian Gaff wrote:
Just observing all this makes me wonder if anyone actually looked back at
things that occurred before. Seems that the obvious problem of the plume
environment was never considered until far too late, yet it presumably has
been considered in the past *as the smes design was made to cope with close
proximity of engines.
It's a first order 'obvious' engineering consideration, an engineering
'**** test' would have stopped this in committee on the very first day..

1) RS-68 is a massive and inefficient engine compared to the SSME.

2) RS-68 is a fluid hog at startup, and has a well known hydrogen flare.

3) If you want to fly RS-68s, you can fly the Delta IV Medium and Heavy.

If one can simplify the design, why reinvent the wheel, or use a different
whell less well suited to the road, so to speak.
Because Michael Griffin is a ****ing idiot engineer. He is incompetent..
Clearly this idiotic idea was originally rammed through the committee.

Who would be in any position to do such a thing? Michael Griffin!

One thing does worry me though. Short termism. OK so the engines might work
out to be cheaper if the Shuttle carries on a bit longer and the political
decisions of *keeping workers is in there, but does this mean that the long
term cost of a program which is supposed to go on far a long time is sound?
*Sounds like someone out in the future could say this is far too costly.
Someone in the past already commented on the engineering failure of it..

The only reason I was enthusiastic about it was the fact that they were
going to use hydrogen, they were going to build a ten meter tank, and
that tank could be reengined with SSMEs, which with the addition of the
SRBs, would easily be capable of delivering that core stage to orbit.

I commented on this way back in early 2006 when it was first proposed.

The problem still remains :

1) the foam insulation.

2) the expendability of it.

Expendability is easily solve. Deliver the core stage to orbit where the
engines can be recovered and gigantic spaceships can be constructed.

The foam problems still remain as the fundamental engineering science of
rocket science, something America has abandoned with Michael Griffin.

Why not use a robust composite basalt insulated ET?

Well, there is always the trusty old cement ET. A little heavy though.

If not SSMEs, then why not otherwise use Russian engines?

Because America should be building reusable second generation rockets
with the SSMEs that we already have. I'm not even suggesting that we
restart the assembly line, because the lead time for brazed nozzles is
something like four years or more, I'm just saying use the 14 we have.

As long as we are not purposely tossing them into the ocean, we're good.

That's not good enough. You know those Russians have the better
engines, and they certainly cost less per given trust than anything
NASA has to offer.

BTW, the basalt composite ET is superior in insulation and at offering
less inert mass. The h2o2+synfuel alternative is simply another win-
win most anyway you'd care to look at it.

~ BG

kT wrote

The foam problems still remain as the fundamental engineering science of
rocket science, something America has abandoned with Michael Griffin.


The "foam problem" is only a problem when you mount the crew vehicle in
tandem with the booster the way the STS does. Put the crew vehicle on
the top and shed foam till the cows come home, who cares? So long as
there is nothing important to hit foam shedding is not an issue. Hell,
put the CV on top and forget about putting foam on the thing at all.

On Dec 28, 7:58*pm, Leopold Stotch wrote:
kT wrote



The foam problems still remain as the fundamental engineering science of
rocket science, something America has abandoned with Michael Griffin.

The "foam problem" is only a problem when you mount the crew vehicle in
tandem with the booster the way the STS does. *Put the crew vehicle on
the top and shed foam till the cows come home, who cares? *So long as
there is nothing important to hit foam shedding is not an issue. *Hell,
put the CV on top and forget about putting foam on the thing at all.

Because of ice loading?

~ BG

"Leopold Stotch" wrote in message
news:kVX5l.500909$yE1.187414@attbi_s21...
kT wrote

The foam problems still remain as the fundamental engineering science
of rocket science, something America has abandoned with Michael
Griffin.


The "foam problem" is only a problem when you mount the crew vehicle
in tandem with the booster the way the STS does. Put the crew vehicle
on the top and shed foam till the cows come home, who cares? So long
as there is nothing important to hit foam shedding is not an issue.
Hell, put the CV on top and forget about putting foam on the thing at
all.

I think there's a major problem here, about *what is* good engineering?
As I look at today's industrial base for getting out to space, seems to
me it has largely degenerated into a business of getting money. Like
medicine, in recent decades. If you then bring in the military, maybe
you see reasons for heaving a great lumpy airframe up into space rather
than simpler up-and-maybe-return vehicles. The airframe yields much
greater cross-range capability, a military value. So it turned out
sending out airframes was harder to do than expected in advance and
apparently less rewarding, and here we are today.

With all those people and institutions boiling around the space
business, could someone step back from the mess and develop a history of
it? I'd like to see that. And I view Elon Musk's SpaceX with
considerable hope, but how soon will Big Money and Big Military step in
and take it over? With what consequences in this violent universe to
our human future?

In my view, we need some people to step out and affirm, the reason for
going out to space is it's where the future is. The best outline of
this that I have seen is Frederick Jackson Turner's paper in 1893 about
the frontier in America's development. If you know something about
today's space technology and about what was thrown away when Apollo was
killed, you can translate Turner's paper from what he wrote in the late
1800's into a very plausible outline of a possible future to come. And
I believe that future is almost sure to happen, but I'm not so sure its
base will be American.

Titeotwawki -- mha [sci.space.policy 2008 Dec 29]