MSNBC (JimO) Scoops more Inside-NASA Shuttle Documents

From stmx3:
snip
I'd say that you are putting the cart before the horse. Full crew is
not required by the mission. Rather, the mission requires limited
crew.

Are you saying that the upcoming mission does not require a full crew
and NASA is planning on assigning more than necessary? That's hard for
me to believe but I'm not well-versed on the politics of crew selection.
But if it is true, then the additional crew members will be placed
needlessly at risk. Perhaps this thread should be revived once final
crew selection is made.

The view I've presented is that the core crew of four is enough to
accomplish the mission. This stands in stark contrast to the quote of
the space shuttle program mgr saying that six is the minimum number to
safely do the flight. This is the corner that I see he painted
himself into.

And yes, I agree that this thread will take on more relevance once
that decision has been made.

(...as was seen with that old argument regarding Ilan's classification
as a PS, not an MS.)

The line of reasoning you present looks sound to me. What it lacks is
conservatism. A similar argument could have been made with the 12
flights after -51L. I'm glad they didn't pack those crews. Trust
requires confidence, and confidence requires performance.


According to a response to your post regarding the crews for the 12 post
Challenger flights, the missions changed and consequently required
smaller crews. That indicates NASA was sensitive to not unnecessarily
risking lives. Something happened after those 12 flights...a creeping
complacency?...that gave NASA reason to believe they could start doing
more with the shuttle. I don't know if they passed a certain safety
upgrade milestone or if they fell under budgetary or schedule pressures
or if they slowly became blinded to the risk.

I see it as a matter of confidence, as previously stated. I don't see
much significant change in the level of risk during that period. Nor
in NASA's perception of that risk.

The bottom line is that I don't share your confidence in the shuttle
because of failure in it's demonstrated performance.

Now if you were to say that 12 flights at a reduced crew is overly
conservative, then I would agree.

Where do you draw the line, then? 6 flights? 3? At what point do you
start to consider that the shuttle is "operational"? I say that if you
accept the risk and have a history of experience and no major non-flight
tested changes are made, then go all out and do the missions that have
been previously planned, with a full complement if necessary.

ISS crew swapout is going to force that decision. I'd say that a
1-flt ramp up is reasonable. Fly -114 with a reduced crew and if
there are no severe issues, then that could establish confidence to
play space-taxi on the next launch.

But don't say 12 flights is too conservative while 1 is not conservative
enough...risk does not decrease with each successful launch.

But our awareness of risk *does*. This was the warning from STS-112.
It shouted out that SOFI needed more attention. It got ignored.

This is why confidence building is needed. You may think that you
have a handle on the risks, but empirical evidence can show you
otherwise.

That being said, there is public perception and politics to deal with,
and these may be justification for flying smaller crews for a time (that
time being based on the half-life for the storm to die down).

I'm not big on the strategy of adapting for the sake of perception.
Leadership is about *shaping* perception to facilitate your forward
progress.

A weathervane will never chart a course.

If, however, significant changes were made...e.g. new cockpit, new main
engines, new external tank design...then a "check flight" would be
warranted, with minimal crew.


You may have heard that on top of Return To Flight, there is a current
push within some JSC communities (such as CB) to launch -114 with a
brand new untried software load, known as "OI-30" (which stands for
Operational Increment #30, or something like that).

Not the most conservative approach. Bugs are found in each rev. I
guess their hope is that the bugs that get through aren't the
"Texas-size flying cockroach" kind of bugs.

No, I haven't heard. I'm not sure what the software testing program is
like. I have heard that it was a major component of getting ISS off the
ground, with many one-one's with G. Abbey every Saturday...

What fun! Ha. There's one man I don't understand. How can someone
who looks so depressive have such a powerful career? It's a mystery
to me. The man was an Air Force _tanker_ pilot!

If you told me that the MEDs screens come to life with the MS Windows
logo, I'd say we should start evacuating Titusville!

Let's hope that Houston does better than Redmond in the reliability
department.

snip
I'm sure that without exception they all would. For two reasons: I'd
say that they would be tempted by the prospect of recapturing their
fame as John Glenn did. Also, for the reason that when you're as old
as they are, you don't have as much to lose. The "bang/whimper"
thing.

But I don't see it as an issue of being feint hearted. Each and every
seat in the shuttle is a terrifying place to be on launch day.


No doubt...acquiring that much kinetic energy in such a short time takes
guts. If you don't come to grips with that, you should get out of the
program. Besides, there are worse ways to die.

(Ed Givens comes to mind.)


~ CT

You may have heard that on top of Return To Flight, there is a current
push within some JSC communities (such as CB) to launch -114 with a
brand new untried software load, known as "OI-30" (which stands for
Operational Increment #30, or something like that).

Not the most conservative approach. Bugs are found in each rev. I
guess their hope is that the bugs that get through aren't the
"Texas-size flying cockroach" kind of bugs.

The people writing the Shuttle avionics software are one of very few -
maybe three to five - groups rated as "Level 5" by the Software Engineering
Institute - in fact, they're somewhat of a role model for that level.
No comparison to Redmond et al., who are around level 1 or 2.

Jan

Stuf4 wrote:
[snip]


I see it as a matter of confidence, as previously stated. I don't see
much significant change in the level of risk during that period. Nor
in NASA's perception of that risk.


[snip]

But don't say 12 flights is too conservative while 1 is not conservative
enough...risk does not decrease with each successful launch.


But our awareness of risk *does*. This was the warning from STS-112.
It shouted out that SOFI needed more attention. It got ignored.

Your statements appear contradictory. In the first, you imply NASA's
perception of the risk during the 12 flights following Challenger did
not change. In the 2nd, you say the awareness of the risk does change
over time. *THAT* was my earlier point...perhaps NASA became complacent
in assessing risk. Unless I am misreading you, you are not consistent
in your point of view.


This is why confidence building is needed. You may think that you
have a handle on the risks, but empirical evidence can show you
otherwise.

*Confidence building* is almost as nebulous as *safety culture*. You
should have the confidence before you risk lives. NASA's problem is
that they became OVERCONFIDENT (not yelling, just emphasizing).
Overconfidence comes from a successful flight, seemingly justifying the
risks you've taken. 50 or more successful flights lead to a safety
culture that doesn't insist on conducting stringent tests since this
imposes a risk and budget and schedule and besides, "we have confidence
that puny foam isn't going to bring down America's finest feat of
engineering."



That being said, there is public perception and politics to deal with,
and these may be justification for flying smaller crews for a time (that
time being based on the half-life for the storm to die down).


I'm not big on the strategy of adapting for the sake of perception.
Leadership is about *shaping* perception to facilitate your forward
progress.

I prefer to think that leadership is about leading. You're describing a
politician.

[snip]

No doubt...acquiring that much kinetic energy in such a short time takes
guts. If you don't come to grips with that, you should get out of the
program. Besides, there are worse ways to die.


(Ed Givens comes to mind.)

I take it he picked the leather upholstery over the antilock brakes.


~ CT

Jan C. Vorbrüggen wrote:
You may have heard that on top of Return To Flight, there is a current
push within some JSC communities (such as CB) to launch -114 with a
brand new untried software load, known as "OI-30" (which stands for
Operational Increment #30, or something like that).

Not the most conservative approach. Bugs are found in each rev. I
guess their hope is that the bugs that get through aren't the
"Texas-size flying cockroach" kind of bugs.


The people writing the Shuttle avionics software are one of very few -
maybe three to five - groups rated as "Level 5" by the Software Engineering
Institute - in fact, they're somewhat of a role model for that level.
No comparison to Redmond et al., who are around level 1 or 2.

Jan

Impressive! That speaks volumes as to the complexity of the code they
have had to deal with.

stmx3 writes:

Jan C. Vorbrüggen wrote:
The people writing the Shuttle avionics software are one of very few -
maybe three to five - groups rated as "Level 5" by the Software Engineering
Institute - in fact, they're somewhat of a role model for that level.
No comparison to Redmond et al., who are around level 1 or 2.

Impressive! That speaks volumes as to the complexity of the code they
have had to deal with.

Not really. This has more to do with your software development
processes and how you continuously improve it. It doesn't really
matter if you're applying these processes to shuttle avionics, a word
processor, or an operating system.

http://www.sei.cmu.edu/about/about.html

Jeff
--
Remove "no" and "spam" from email address to reply.
If it says "This is not spam!", it's surely a lie.

From Jeff Findley:
stmx3 writes:

Jan C. Vorbrüggen wrote:
The people writing the Shuttle avionics software are one of very few -
maybe three to five - groups rated as "Level 5" by the Software Engineering
Institute - in fact, they're somewhat of a role model for that level.
No comparison to Redmond et al., who are around level 1 or 2.

Impressive! That speaks volumes as to the complexity of the code they
have had to deal with.

Not really. This has more to do with your software development
processes and how you continuously improve it. It doesn't really
matter if you're applying these processes to shuttle avionics, a word
processor, or an operating system.

http://www.sei.cmu.edu/about/about.html

I would agree that the chances of a shuttle crashing due to a software
glitch is very small. The point was why take a chance when you have
proven flown software available? It becomes a risk trade with any
potential safety gains in the new version.


~ CT

From stmx3:
Stuf4 wrote:
[snip]


I see it as a matter of confidence, as previously stated. I don't see
much significant change in the level of risk during that period. Nor
in NASA's perception of that risk.


[snip]

But don't say 12 flights is too conservative while 1 is not conservative
enough...risk does not decrease with each successful launch.


But our awareness of risk *does*. This was the warning from STS-112.
It shouted out that SOFI needed more attention. It got ignored.

Your statements appear contradictory. In the first, you imply NASA's
perception of the risk during the 12 flights following Challenger did
not change. In the 2nd, you say the awareness of the risk does change
over time. *THAT* was my earlier point...perhaps NASA became complacent
in assessing risk. Unless I am misreading you, you are not consistent
in your point of view.

To restate for clarity...

Our awareness of risk doesn't change much when nothing goes wrong, but
close calls *will* increase our awareness.

This is why confidence building is needed. You may think that you
have a handle on the risks, but empirical evidence can show you
otherwise.

*Confidence building* is almost as nebulous as *safety culture*. You
should have the confidence before you risk lives. NASA's problem is
that they became OVERCONFIDENT (not yelling, just emphasizing).
Overconfidence comes from a successful flight, seemingly justifying the
risks you've taken. 50 or more successful flights lead to a safety
culture that doesn't insist on conducting stringent tests since this
imposes a risk and budget and schedule and besides, "we have confidence
that puny foam isn't going to bring down America's finest feat of
engineering."

I see it more as a matter of cold probability, along these lines:

Q- "What are the odds that this foam shedding problem is going to hit
the orbiter?"

A- "We think that they are small and we are willing to take that
risk."

So I would agree with your assessment of overconfidence strictly from
this probability aspect.


I'm sure you've heard that the latest word from NASA (new since this
thread) is that STS-114 *will* be treated as a test mission, a
confidence builder if you will.

snip
Besides, there are worse ways to die.


(Ed Givens comes to mind.)

I take it he picked the leather upholstery over the antilock brakes.

Ha.


~ CT

"Stuf4" wrote in message

You may have heard that on top of Return To Flight, there is a current
push within some JSC communities (such as CB) to launch -114 with a
brand new untried software load, known as "OI-30" (which stands for
Operational Increment #30, or something like that).

Not the most conservative approach. Bugs are found in each rev. I
guess their hope is that the bugs that get through aren't the
"Texas-size flying cockroach" kind of bugs.

Each OI flies "untried" once, according to your logic. However, "untried" is
a grossly misleading and ignorant use of the word in this case. The software
is run in actual GPC hardware in rigorous testing - after lots of prior
rigorous testing - well prior to flight. It can take years for software
changes to be certified, and make their way into operational loads, and by
then the testing has been exhaustive. Additionally, the new software
release, if I am not mistaken, will include changes that directly address
lessons learned in STS-107.

What would you have them do?

This new software, ironically, capitalizes on the advantages of MEDS.

Yes, with safety-conscious software changes. Would you rather they not fly
with software that gives the crew more situational awareness?
[http://www.space.com/missionlaunches...s_020516.html]

Jon

(Stuf4) writes:

I would agree that the chances of a shuttle crashing due to a software
glitch is very small. The point was why take a chance when you have
proven flown software available? It becomes a risk trade with any
potential safety gains in the new version.

Because the benefits of the bug fixes and enhancements to the software
might just outweigh the risks, especially considering the high level
of quality in this particular software development group.

Jeff
--
Remove "no" and "spam" from email address to reply.
If it says "This is not spam!", it's surely a lie.

stmx3 wrote
[...]
I suppose...if you're feint hearted.

This sounds like shadow boxing to me, which makes me faint.

/dps

(no aplogies intended)