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Beagle 2 Commission of Inquiry - Press Release
Paris, 20 May 2004 Press Release N° 27-2004 Beagle 2: lessons learned and the way forward The Commission of Inquiry on Beagle 2, jointly set up in February between ESA and the British National Space Centre (BNSC), has recently concluded its investigations. A joint ESA/BNSC press conference in London on Monday 24 May will be the platform to expand on the lessons learned from the recommendations issued by the Commission of Inquiry and the action plan adopted to implement such recommendations. The Mars Express spacecraft, carrying the Beagle 2 lander, was launched on 2 June last year, arriving in the vicinity of Mars in December. The separation of Beagle 2 from Mars Express took place flawlessly on 19 December. The satellite continued its mission with its successful insertion into a Mars orbit on 25 December, the day on which Beagle 2 was due to land. The first radio contact with Beagle 2 was expected shortly after the scheduled landing time but no signal was received. Many radio contacts were attempted over the following days and weeks, but without result. By early February it became clear that there was no prospect of communicating with Beagle 2 and a joint ESA/UK inquiry was set up to investigate the circumstances and possible reasons that prevented completion of the Beagle 2 mission. The Commission of Inquiry, including senior managers and experts from Europe and also from NASA and Russia held several meetings in the UK and at ESA, interviewed the key players -directors, managers, scientists, and engineers - involved in the development of Beagle 2, and has submitted its findings, assessments and recommendations. The report was submitted to the UK Minister for Science and Innovation and the Director General of ESA on 21 April and accepted. No single technical failure or shortcoming was unambiguously identified but a few credible causes for Beagle 2 loss were highlighted. [My highlights!] ******** More importantly, the Board made it clear that there were programmatic and organisational reasons that led to a high risk of Beagle 2 failure. ********* [That's a bit of an eyebrow raiser! "Programmatic" - I guess means "it was an experiment of opportunity" and therefore the package had to fit the available spare capacity, constraining the technology used for descent, with the inherent risk of not knowing the precise atmospheric conditions at the time, etc. But "organisational" ??] The outcome of the review carried out by the Commission of Inquiry is summarized in 19 recommendations to the British Authorities and ESA. These constitute the basis of lessons learned for the future. Both parties have accepted them fully. ESA will undertake a course of action to ensure their implementation. On Monday 24 May, BNSC invites media representatives to attend a press conference at: The Department of Trade and Industry Conference Centre 1 Victoria Street London SW1H 0ET Time: 08.45 Registration 0930 Press Conference The press conference will include: Lord Sainsbury, UK Science Minister Professor David Southwood, ESA Director of Space Science David Leadbeater, Deputy Director General BNSC Professor Colin Pillinger, Head of Planetary Sciences Research Institute, Open University For registration, please contact: Katie Bristowe, BNSC, on 020 7215 0807, or e-mail: The press conference can be followed remotely by phone by dialling + 44 (0) 870 600 0825. The participant passcode is 7659646# For further information: BNSC Steve Warren, Head of Information, Tel: +44 (0) 207 215 0806/0905 Fax: +44 (0) 207 215 0936 ESA Franco Bonacina, Head of Media Relations Division Tel. +33(0)1 53 69 7155 Fax. +33(0)1 53 69 7690 Cheers, keith |
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Interesting set of recommendations from the Commission of Inquiry (some of these points having been mentioned in this news group:-) From the Press Release: The recommendations of the Commission of Inquiry: Recommendation 1 Future lander missions should be under the responsibility of an Agency with appropriate capability and resources to manage it. The lander/orbiter mission should be managed as an integrated whole. Nationally-funded science instruments should be included in the lander on the same basis as on the orbiter. Recommendation 2 For future science payloads which are critical to overall mission success or have a very high public profile, the ESA Executive should make a formal, comprehensive assessment of all aspects of the proposals including technical, management and finance, and advise Space Science Policy Committee (SPC) accordingly before acceptance. If the assessment is not positive, ESA should advise the SPC not to accept the proposal. Recommendation 3 Sponsoring Agencies of nationally-funded contributions to ESA projects should ensure that the required financing is committed at the outset to meet the estimated Cost at Completion and require that a structured development programme is established. Recommendation 4 In addition to the ESA-led reviews of interfaces, formal Project Reviews of nationally-funded contributions to ESA missions should be undertaken by the sponsoring Agency to a standard agreed with ESA and should cover the entire project. Recommendation 5 When an independent review of a nationally-funded project, such as the Casani review of Beagle 2, is commissioned, it is essential that ESA and the Sponsoring Agency ensure that its recommendations are properly dispositioned and those which are agreed are actioned and followed up through a formal process. Recommendation 6 For future projects, Heads of Agreement or similar formal arrangements between co-operating entities, ESA, and national sponsors, should be put in place at the outset of projects and should include formal consultations at key stages of the projects to jointly consider its status. Recommendation 7 Fixed price contracting should be avoided solely as a mechanism for controlling costs, and used only where the sponsor and contractor are in alignment on the requirements and scope of the work and the sharing of risks between them. Both parties should be confident that the contractor has sufficient margins to manage his uncertainties and risks. Recommendation 8 For future high-profile/high-risk projects, ESA and any Sponsoring Agency should manage the expectations of the outcome of the project in a balanced and objective way to prepare for both success and failure. Recommendation 9 At the start of a programme, the funding authority (ies) should require that there is system-level documentation. This is necessary to provide all partners with the technical requirements for the project and sufficient design description and justification such that the margins and risks being taken in each partner?s area of responsibility are visible. Recommendation 10 Future planetary missions should be designed with robust margins to cope with the inherent uncertainties, and they should not be initiated without adequate and timely resources to achieve that. Recommendation 11 Future planetary entry missions should include a minimum telemetry of critical performance measurements and spacecraft health status during mission critical phases such as entry and descent. Recommendation 12 For future planetary entry missions, a more robust communications system should be used, allowing direct commanding of the lander for essential actuations and resets without software involvement enabling recoveries in catastrophic situations. Recommendation 13 Planetary probe missions involving high-level shocks from pyros and other events should undergo representative shock environmental testing at system level. Recommendation 14 Adequate and realistic deployment tests should be performed, and sufficient time and resources must be available in the development of a new planetary mission. Recommendation 15 Elimination of internal connectors for mass saving should be avoided if at all possible. But if unavoidable, a stringent system of check and independent crosscheck should be followed during the final wiring operation. Recommendation 16 A back-up for the entry detection event (T0) must be included in the design of planetary entry probes. Recommendation 17 Future planetary entry missions should include a release of the back cover and front shield, which is aerodynamically stable and analytically predictable to avoid uncontrolled contact of front shield with the lander. Recommendation 18 Sufficient difference between ballistic coefficients of all separated items, e.g. back covers assembly and the main parachute, or other positive means, must be ensured to exclude collision after separation. Recommendation 19 Adequate competencies in air bag and parachute technology must be available for future European planetary missions, making best use of existing expertise e.g. in USA and Russia. Cheers, keith |
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Martin Frey wrote in
: (Keith Dancey) wrote: Interesting set of recommendations from the Commission of Inquiry keith Those ought to do it. No more missions ever - but by 'eck will they be well managed. As well as being prohibitively expensive and stifflingly bureaucratic, taking forever to develop only to find that they'll still miss orbital entry by several billion kms because someone somewhere forgot to translate from Pounds to Euros... ho hum |
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Just reading this BBC article: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/sci/tech/2950700.stm Beagle 2 was been the recipient of small contributions from here, there and everywhere. So academia/SMEs used these tiny funds to build the thing whilst struggling with issues ranging from airbag problems to media promotion!! In retrospect I think getting this project into martian space was huge triumph against the odds whether we landed there or not. The majority of the british public has no interest in space. If you think the NASA has problems acquiring funds, thats nothing compared to what the british public response would be to increasing funding for ESA/BNSC missions. I think Colin Pilllinger and his team did a great job, my only concern is whether us british space fans will see another ESA/British mission ever!!! *sigh* Dre |
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Dre wrote:
In retrospect I think getting this project into martian space was huge triumph against the odds whether we landed there or not. Absolutely right. The majority of the british public has no interest in space. Here I think you are wrong, there was a masssive increase in interest precisely because it was a British project, not seen as part of the "European" project. I think Colin Pilllinger and his team did a great job, my only concern is whether us british space fans will see another ESA/British mission ever!!! *sigh* Amen. steve |
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