How good were climate models 30 years ago?

On Aug 8, 10:44*am, Chris L Peterson wrote:
On Wed, 8 Aug 2012 03:41:37 -0700 (PDT), wrote:
The real design flaw is that the reactors didn't really have a fail-
safe mode, WRT cooling water supply. *The contingency plans at FD were
essentially non-existent.

That is a fundamental design flaw that cannot be fixed. Ever. The
problem with nuclear power in its current form is that it depends on
engineering and human procedure for safety.

Essentially, the fuel must always be immersed in water, which is not
an unsurmountable problem, nor one that would require high-tech to
solve. (Hint: water flows downhill.)

That combination
guarantees failure, and failure is not an option with nuclear power,
because there are so many failure scenarios that have massive economic
and social costs. The fact that the failure rate for any given reactor
is very small is substantially offset by the degree of damage a single
failed reactor can produce.

The failure rates are not "very small." There are only a few hundred
commercial reactors, but already there have been at least three major
accidents.

On 8/18/2012 4:21 PM, wrote:
On Aug 8, 10:44 am, Chris L Peterson wrote:
On Wed, 8 Aug 2012 03:41:37 -0700 (PDT), wrote:
The real design flaw is that the reactors didn't really have a fail-
safe mode, WRT cooling water supply. The contingency plans at FD were
essentially non-existent.

That is a fundamental design flaw that cannot be fixed. Ever. The
problem with nuclear power in its current form is that it depends on
engineering and human procedure for safety.

Essentially, the fuel must always be immersed in water, which is not
an unsurmountable problem, nor one that would require high-tech to
solve. (Hint: water flows downhill.)

That combination
guarantees failure, and failure is not an option with nuclear power,
because there are so many failure scenarios that have massive economic
and social costs. The fact that the failure rate for any given reactor
is very small is substantially offset by the degree of damage a single
failed reactor can produce.

The failure rates are not "very small." There are only a few hundred
commercial reactors, but already there have been at least three major
accidents.


He did say for any given reactor.

I would just point out that they were preventable accidents. Like I
offered originally, TMI was scary, but a success story. Albeit also a
cautionary tale about why we need to have the strictest of regulations
in place with regulators who are scared enough about the technology to
be extremely well educated in every field of expertise involved to
assure that the failure modes are covered well.

But, the idea of a a physical model that would not enter runaway in the
first place is obviously the right direction for the tech.

Just saying.

On Aug 18, 5:16*pm, Steve wrote:
On 8/18/2012 4:21 PM, wrote:









On Aug 8, 10:44 am, Chris L Peterson wrote:
On Wed, 8 Aug 2012 03:41:37 -0700 (PDT), wrote:
The real design flaw is that the reactors didn't really have a fail-
safe mode, WRT cooling water supply. *The contingency plans at FD were
essentially non-existent.

That is a fundamental design flaw that cannot be fixed. Ever. The
problem with nuclear power in its current form is that it depends on
engineering and human procedure for safety.

Essentially, the fuel must always be immersed in water, which is not
an unsurmountable problem, nor one that would require high-tech to
solve. *(Hint: water flows downhill.)

That combination
guarantees failure, and failure is not an option with nuclear power,
because there are so many failure scenarios that have massive economic
and social costs. The fact that the failure rate for any given reactor
is very small is substantially offset by the degree of damage a single
failed reactor can produce.

The failure rates are not "very small." *There are only a few hundred
commercial reactors, but already there have been at least three major
accidents.

He did say for any given reactor.

Irrelevant.

Only by looking at how often there is a serious accident among the
entire population of reactors/plants can we talk about failure rates.
One can now hazard a guess that there could be another major accident
somewhere within ten years or sooner. Twenty to thirty years might be
more likely. Or maybe up to now we have just been very lucky.

The original estimate of a serious Space Shuttle accident was about 1
in 78 per flight IIRC. The actual rate was chillingly similar.

I would just point out that they were preventable accidents.

Most "accidents" are "preventable."

Like I
offered originally, TMI was scary, but a success story.

Reactor destroyed, some radiation releases, public relations fiasco.

Albeit also a
cautionary tale about why we need to have the strictest of regulations
in place with regulators who are scared enough about the technology to
be extremely well educated in every field of expertise involved to
assure that the failure modes are covered well.

But, the idea of a a physical model that would not enter runaway in the
first place is obviously the right direction for the tech.

The spent fuel at Fukushima is a problem all on its own. It will
catch fire without water. Techs still can't get close enough to deal
with it.

On 8/18/2012 5:47 PM, wrote:
On Aug 18, 5:16 pm, Steve wrote:

cautionary tale about why we need to have the strictest of regulations
in place with regulators who are scared enough about the technology to
be extremely well educated in every field of expertise involved to
assure that the failure modes are covered well.

But, the idea of a a physical model that would not enter runaway in the
first place is obviously the right direction for the tech.

The spent fuel at Fukushima is a problem all on its own. It will
catch fire without water. Techs still can't get close enough to deal
with it.


Which sort of brings us back to my original point, and lament, that the
science involved has been neglected rather than advanced over the past
40 years (plus or minus a few) because dirty energy was cheap and
readily available.

Now it's not, and no one was in hot pursuit of electric vehicles with
nukes out of the picture because the trade off between burning fossil
fuel to make electricity and burning fossil fuel to run a fleet of ICEs
is insignificant to the overall supply.

I think. Anyway, it's late, and I'm out of here.

On Aug 19, 12:36*am, Steve wrote:
On 8/18/2012 5:47 PM, wrote:

On Aug 18, 5:16 pm, Steve wrote:
cautionary tale about why we need to have the strictest of regulations
in place with regulators who are scared enough about the technology to
be extremely well educated in every field of expertise involved to
assure that the failure modes are covered well.

But, the idea of a a physical model that would not enter runaway in the
first place is obviously the right direction for the tech.

The spent fuel at Fukushima is a problem all on its own. *It will
catch fire without water. *Techs still can't get close enough to deal
with it.

Which sort of brings us back to my original point, and lament, that the
science involved has been neglected rather than advanced over the past
40 years (plus or minus a few) because dirty energy was cheap and
readily available.

Leading some to use hundreds of gallons of dirty heating oil to keep a
large house warm, while the Chukchi have been using much greener ways
to keep warm all along..