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#131
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Derek Lyons wrote: The data and discussion is fascinating; but the question I started out this subthread with still stands: Other than an interesting exercise in data analysis; what's the *point*? That's completely eluding me also. The failure mode isn't changed by his hypothesis...whatever that may be. Pat |
#132
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#133
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On Tue, 08 Mar 2005 20:28:12 +0000, Henry Spencer wrote:
... But the SRB nozzle is recessed a bit into the motor, so the very bottom of the motor casing is actually below the nozzle inlet, and liquid slag can (and does) accumulate there. The result, once the motor has been burning a while, is a pool of liquid which slops over into the nozzle frequently. Whenever it slops, you get a small pressure spike, because the liquid momentarily narrows the gas flow path a bit. So this is continous? I thought it was only a startup problem... -- Chuck Stewart "Anime-style catgirls: Threat? Menace? Or just studying algebra?" |
#134
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As Scott pointed out the slag is primarily
a startup problem. I pointed out no such thing. Slag is a constant and never-ending problem throughout the burn of the motor. Henry was correct in pointing out the aluminum oxide component of it; strictly speakign it's a mix of burned and unburned aluminum. Makes for some neato desktop display pieces (a co-worker has some aluminum "bubbles"), but it's also a sign of incomplete combustion. Slag issues are different between horizontal and vertical firings as well. |
#135
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So this is continous?
Yup. So long as there's aluminum in the propellant, there's slag. |
#136
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There's a
pretty big hole in the RH SRB, and a massive performance shortfall in the same. Neither of which would ahve been catastrophic for the crew of a CEV launcher. Mission coudl well have been over (maybe they could have made it to orbit, maybe not), but those issues were not deadly. In fact, the performance shortfall woudl have *improved* the chances of escape. |
#137
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Daniel still won't come clean on exactly what he's trying to
illustrate here I admit to some mystification as well. I see, so far, only two interestign things in the data: the goofy presentation format which, it turns out, is partly due to Daniel's tinkering, and the performance dropoff seen aroudn 59 seconds in the right-hand booster. That performance dropoff is interesting in its own right, but is easily explained by the fact there was a honkin' big hole in the side of the motor. If someone was sufficiently interested (and that someone is not me), they could use the data to determine the growth rate of the hole, factor the growing extra port area into motor pressure, predict a *new* theoretical performance prediction of the motor, and then try to figure out what effect that performance change woudl have on the Shuttle, in particular what gimbal angles woudl be required of the two SRM nozzles and the SSME's to keep the shuttle pointed into the air, and then figure out at what point in time the maximum gimbal angles are reached - and consequently the theoretical maximum lifetime of the Shuttle. This has, I'm sure, already been done. A co-worker recently worked on a study of thrust imbalance assuming various horrible things happening to the nozzle; the data was sent to NASA, who then turned it around into neato CG animations showing the Shuttle stack going nuts. |
#138
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"Pat Flannery" wrote in message
... Derek Lyons wrote: The data and discussion is fascinating; but the question I started out this subthread with still stands: Other than an interesting exercise in data analysis; what's the *point*? That's completely eluding me also. The failure mode isn't changed by his hypothesis...whatever that may be. Pat I am not nor have I ever professed to be a rocket/scientist/chemist/aerospace engineer (or even a combination of some of them such as Herb) but I did take a temporary start up assignment at Grumman in which I was cleared to work there in a sensitive capacity in 2003 (verify it if you like) and left under great conditions for a better assignment. So does that count enough for a laymen's question here that is on topic? It's a simple question that Herb alluded to but Daniel glossed over. Go back to March 6th if you wish. It is also readily available free reading in the Roger's Report and I assume everyone has read that? The ice team (or whatever they are technically called, I am an Investigator not an Engineer) found lots of ice on the left booster. Am I wrong there? I have even seen pictures of the ice and the team. Even I know my right hand from my left so Herb, where was the water coming from if the air was so dry? Are you (Herb) discussing smoke coming from the left, or the right on your March 6th post? Paul Maxson |
#139
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On 8 Mar 2005 14:14:46 -0800, wrote:
This has, I'm sure, already been done. A co-worker recently worked on a study of thrust imbalance assuming various horrible things happening to the nozzle; the data was sent to NASA, who then turned it around into neato CG animations showing the Shuttle stack going nuts. ....And if you're not sharing copies of this, I'm gonna send LaToilet over to your place with a bottle of Cold Duck and wearing nothing but a pink neglige'. OM -- "No ******* ever won a war by dying for | http://www.io.com/~o_m his country. He won it by making the other | Sergeant-At-Arms poor dumb ******* die for his country." | Human O-Ring Society - General George S. Patton, Jr |
#140
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Chuck Stewart wrote: So this is continous? I thought it was only a startup problem... How would you like to design a nozzle gimbal seal that has to work while getting sloshed in molten aluminum? That must be fun. You know, Rusty may know the location of every space-related PDF in existence, but a PDF of everything Henry knows would take a whole tree's worth of paper to print out. Pat |
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