The Non-Innovator's Dilemma

(Arthur Hansen) writes:
A shuttle concept is not necessarily bad, as Japan and the EU both
have *unmanned* shuttle concepts that look very good. The EU one looks
pretty slick with painted on TPS.

The shuttle has the problems of being the *first* shuttle.

Look at how crappy the very first cars were. It was very common to get
flat tires fixed every thirty miles and other breakdowns.

Basically, NASA does not want human spacelfight to become economically
viable since by doing this, it will have shot itself in the head. Therefore
I think that Congressional pressure is needed to change NASA's goal: to
develop technology to make access to space economically viable.

NASA would love to both save money on human space-flight *and* keep
their budget. They'd love to switch that to other projects (like Mars
of NEO's asteroids).

But we have to get beyond 1.0 of the shuttle.

Yes, but the difference between the shuttle and the car, is that
governments let people buy and use cars so it could be made in big
quantities.

I agree, what we need is an industry building millions of space ship a
year. Then you will have space ships as secure as your car, and as
cheap. (Or you can compare to yachts if you prefer...).


--
__Pascal_Bourguignon__
http://www.informatimago.com/
Do not adjust your mind, there is a fault in reality.

In article ,
says...
h (Rand Simberg) wrote in message . ..
That's the title of my latest column at Tech Central Station, in which
I discuss why the economics of OSP make no sense.

http://www.techcentralstation.com/091903E.html

With regard to your commments on the NASA "culture":

As a former employee of both NACA and NASA, I would
say, just compare how the two organizations operated.
NACA was always very decentralized with many small
projects--some of which competed directly with each
other. I remember working at Ames on a transsonic
research program that recovered a drop missile that
recorded data with optical levers, etc. Langley
had a similar program that used telemetry. They
would compare notes. There may have been some
friendly rivalry, but never plots to kill one
another off to gain complete control of the program.

I worked for the National Academy of Sciences before
and after Sputnik--and worked indirectly for both
Drs. Van Allen, Pickering (then head of JPL), and
Homer Newell (NRL).

There was a bill in Congress to make JPL NASA, and
another to make ABMA NASA. But NACA was so well
liked and respected--thanks in part to gentlemen
like Hugh Dryden and thanks in part to the NACA culture,
that Jim Van Allen (a later vociferous critic) and
others testified in favor of NACA getting the job--
primarily because, well, it was NACA.

In 1959 while at NASA Headquarters, some of my
colleagues from NACA Langley complained: "We used
to complain about the USAF bureaucracy, but we've
already gotten worse."

How do we go back? Perhaps an Advisory Committee
again, with no big fiefdoms. In order to avoid
the big fiefdoms, the new organization cannot have
any huge programs like ISS or Space Shuttle.
Apollo was an opportunity, a trap, and an anomaly.
Apollo should not be part of the discussion. This
does not mean that NASA could not do things like
a manned Mars mission or a return to the moon. I
think the odds of something like that happening
would actually better with an NACA culture and a
robust commmercial space transportaion industry.

Best regards,
Len (Cormier)
PanAero, Inc. and Third Millennium Aerospace, Inc.
( http://www.tour2space.com )

Len, your occasional comments here are always intriguing. You were in
the midst of people and organizations that were making history. Have you
ever considered writing a book of your own?

--

Do not meddle in the affairs of dragons, for | Doug Van Dorn
thou art crunchy and taste good with ketchup |

Rand Simberg writes:

That's the title of my latest column at Tech Central Station, in which
I discuss why the economics of OSP make no sense.

One of the thing missing from your discussion is failure costs. When the Space
Shuttle has a launch failure, you lose a multi-billion dollar orbiter. What's
more, they then ground STS until the problem is considered fixed, during which
time they continue to pay the fixed costs of STS, plus the fixed costs of ISS,
even if it is reduced to a skeleton crew that can do little more than keep the
lights lit.

In contrast, if the OSP is qualified for two launchers, failure of one need not
ground the program. And a small OSP will cost a lot less to replace, even if it
isn't saved by the abort system.

Will McLean

On 20 Sep 2003 22:18:39 GMT, in a place far, far away,
(McLean1382) made the phosphor on my monitor glow
in such a way as to indicate that:

Rand Simberg writes:

That's the title of my latest column at Tech Central Station, in which
I discuss why the economics of OSP make no sense.

One of the thing missing from your discussion is failure costs. When the Space
Shuttle has a launch failure, you lose a multi-billion dollar orbiter. What's
more, they then ground STS until the problem is considered fixed, during which
time they continue to pay the fixed costs of STS, plus the fixed costs of ISS,
even if it is reduced to a skeleton crew that can do little more than keep the
lights lit.

In contrast, if the OSP is qualified for two launchers, failure of one need not
ground the program.

What if the OSP itself fails?

And a small OSP will cost a lot less to replace, even if it
isn't saved by the abort system.

That remains to be seen, based on the outrageous program cost
estimates coming out of NASA.

--
simberg.interglobal.org * 310 372-7963 (CA) 307 739-1296 (Jackson Hole)
interglobal space lines * 307 733-1715 (Fax) http://www.interglobal.org

"Extraordinary launch vehicles require extraordinary markets..."
Swap the first . and @ and throw out the ".trash" to email me.
Here's my email address for autospammers:

Rand Simberg wrote:

And a small OSP will cost a lot less to replace, even if it
isn't saved by the abort system.


That remains to be seen, based on the outrageous program cost
estimates coming out of NASA.


And you have a better and more plausible cost estimate upon which
you make this bold proclamation? I'm sure we'd all love to see it.

Brett

On Sat, 20 Sep 2003 23:50:19 GMT, in a place far, far away, Brett Buck
made the phosphor on my monitor glow in such a
way as to indicate that:

Rand Simberg wrote:

And a small OSP will cost a lot less to replace, even if it
isn't saved by the abort system.


That remains to be seen, based on the outrageous program cost
estimates coming out of NASA.


And you have a better and more plausible cost estimate upon which
you make this bold proclamation? I'm sure we'd all love to see it.

Better than what? My column used NASA's own cost estimates, and in
fact, I even lowballed them, and it still comes out too much. If the
total development cost is twelve billion (which is one of the numbers
that's been bandied about), how many vehicles does that include? What
does it imply about the production cost per vehicle?

--
simberg.interglobal.org * 310 372-7963 (CA) 307 739-1296 (Jackson Hole)
interglobal space lines * 307 733-1715 (Fax) http://www.interglobal.org

"Extraordinary launch vehicles require extraordinary markets..."
Swap the first . and @ and throw out the ".trash" to email me.
Here's my email address for autospammers:

Doug... wrote:
[to Len Cormier]
Len, your occasional comments here are always intriguing. You were in
the midst of people and organizations that were making history. Have you
ever considered writing a book of your own?

I'll second that. I hope he stays too busy building spaceships to write a
book, but if you find the time, Len, I'll be first in line to buy it.

.......Andrew
--
--
Andrew Case |
|

Rand Simberg writes:

Better than what? My column used NASA's own cost estimates, and in
fact, I even lowballed them, and it still comes out too much. If the
total development cost is twelve billion (which is one of the numbers
that's been bandied about), how many vehicles does that include?

Do you have a citation that attributes a "total development cost" of $12
billion for OSP to any named source within NASA?

While a number around $12 billion has been bandied about, I've yet to see any
source more specific than "Congressional staffers and industry experts"

Have you?

The honest answer would be "It depends. You can satisfy the requirements with a
lot of different vehicles. A small capsule, and a module with multiple berthing
ports would work. So would something like an HL-20. And how many test flights
does development include, if any?"

I'll wager that somewhere along the line a reporter got an honest and informed,
but fuzzy, answer, and wanted something more specific. And so he hunted around
until he got someone who would give him something more quotable. And he found
an unnamed source that said " Well, it's NASA. And it's a multi-year program.
I'll bet the whole thing runs to $13 billion or more..."

And that figure got repeated again and again., without distinguishing between
program cost and R&D.


Will McLean

Rand Simberg writes:

What if the OSP itself fails?

Then, worst case, they ground the OSP until they find the problem. The launch
infrastructure continues to launch other payloads, and remains productive.

And the OSP may or may not be grounded entirely. If you consider the two fatal
Soyuz accidents, neither would have grounded a Progress.

Will McLean

"Doug..." wrote in message ...
In article ,
says...
h (Rand Simberg) wrote in message . ..
That's the title of my latest column at Tech Central Station, in which
I discuss why the economics of OSP make no sense.

http://www.techcentralstation.com/091903E.html

With regard to your commments on the NASA "culture":

As a former employee of both NACA and NASA, I would
say, just compare how the two organizations operated.
NACA was always very decentralized with many small
projects--some of which competed directly with each
other. I remember working at Ames on a transsonic
research program that recovered a drop missile that
recorded data with optical levers, etc. Langley
had a similar program that used telemetry. They
would compare notes. There may have been some
friendly rivalry, but never plots to kill one
another off to gain complete control of the program.

I worked for the National Academy of Sciences before
and after Sputnik--and worked indirectly for both
Drs. Van Allen, Pickering (then head of JPL), and
Homer Newell (NRL).

There was a bill in Congress to make JPL NASA, and
another to make ABMA NASA. But NACA was so well
liked and respected--thanks in part to gentlemen
like Hugh Dryden and thanks in part to the NACA culture,
that Jim Van Allen (a later vociferous critic) and
others testified in favor of NACA getting the job--
primarily because, well, it was NACA.

In 1959 while at NASA Headquarters, some of my
colleagues from NACA Langley complained: "We used
to complain about the USAF bureaucracy, but we've
already gotten worse."

How do we go back? Perhaps an Advisory Committee
again, with no big fiefdoms. In order to avoid
the big fiefdoms, the new organization cannot have
any huge programs like ISS or Space Shuttle.
Apollo was an opportunity, a trap, and an anomaly.
Apollo should not be part of the discussion. This
does not mean that NASA could not do things like
a manned Mars mission or a return to the moon. I
think the odds of something like that happening
would actually better with an NACA culture and a
robust commmercial space transportaion industry.

Best regards,
Len (Cormier)
PanAero, Inc. and Third Millennium Aerospace, Inc.
( http://www.tour2space.com )

Len, your occasional comments here are always intriguing. You were in
the midst of people and organizations that were making history. Have you
ever considered writing a book of your own?

Thanks. I was young at the time and had a fly-on-the-wall
status--which was quite interesting, I admit. However, I
am too busy right now still trying to make something
happen on my own.

Best regards,
Len (Cormier)
PanAero, Inc. and Third Millennium Aerospace, Inc.
( http://www.tour2space.com )