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RCS Load Simulators
For those of you who have been insisting that these load simulators
completely take the place of any actual functioning of the valves in the RCS, I have news for you. I've spent the past almost seven hours having conversations with various people on this and other Apollo One issues. One of those people is a person who has become a friend of mine; he was also a friend of Gus Grissom's. He worked for Chrysler (who was one of many contractors on Apollo One) until shortly before the fire. He left because his protests about safety went unanswered. I asked him about these simulators--by the way, his job was GSE. That's all he did. He said, and I'm about to quote, that the Plug's Out Test, "It's a mess." Because of those simulators, you have some systems being operated on external power, others on internal power, and it would basically take a genius to sort out which was which. There is NOT going to be a simple answer to this one. That particular test is too convoluted. What I DO know is this: Two of the twelve valves Ed tried to open did not open. THAT was no simulation; it was a fact, and it is documented via schematic. You're just going to have to stand by and wait to see where all the chips fall on that one. LaDonna |
#2
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"LaDonna Wyss" wrote in message om... I've spent the past almost seven hours having conversations with various people on this and other Apollo One issues. Such as? One of those people is a person who has become a friend of mine Clearly a man of limited taste in his later years. What's his name? he was also a friend of Gus Grissom's. He's clearly fallen on hard times. He said, and I'm about to quote, that the Plug's Out Test, "It's a mess." Cite, please. There is NOT going to be a simple answer to this one. Nobody but you ever pretended there was. Two of the twelve valves Ed tried to open did not open. Cite, please. |
#3
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How am I supposed to "cite" a telephone conversation? Would you PLEASE
grow up? The citation for the valves is in the VOICE TRANSCRIPT. 23:06 is when he reports 12 gray bars. You'll have to pull up the valve photograph on Scott's website for the schematic. It's on the first page as an "exhibit." It's erroneously labelled something like "A & C React Valves" or something like that. You'll be able to tell which one it is; there are only a couple of schematics in the group (OH, it might say "logic." You'll just have to check the list.) And NO, I'm looking into why Ed had 12 grey bars when he should only have had ten. Something was wrong, but I don't know what yet. LaDonna LaDonna |
#4
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"LaDonna Wyss" wrote in message om... For those of you who have been insisting that these load simulators completely take the place of any actual functioning of the valves in the RCS, I have news for you. I've spent the past almost seven hours having conversations with various people on this and other Apollo One issues. One of those people is a person who has become a friend of mine; he was also a friend of Gus Grissom's. He worked for Chrysler (who was one of many contractors on Apollo One) until shortly before the fire. He left because his protests about safety went unanswered. I asked him about these simulators--by the way, his job was GSE. That's all he did. He said, and I'm about to quote, that the Plug's Out Test, "It's a mess." Because of those simulators, you have some systems being operated on external power, others on internal power, and it would basically take a genius to sort out which was which. There is NOT going to be a simple answer to this one. That particular test is too convoluted. What I DO know is this: Two of the twelve valves Ed tried to open did not open. THAT was no simulation; it was a fact, and it is documented via schematic. You're just going to have to stand by and wait to see where all the chips fall on that one. LaDonna I worked on the Saturn program (digital random vibration analysis, mostly in SCAT and SAP originally, before the days of FAP) at the Slidell Computing Facility in 1965, as well as with Dr. Wehrner von Braun's telemetry engineers at MSFC on trips to Huntsville that year. I met him once, during a meeting in the cafeteria. I also became well acquainted with a brilliant NASA engineer working at Michaud. He later wrote part of the Rogers Report while at MSFC and more recently he was transferred to Goddard or Langley as a very high-ranking NASA director. I can confirm that Chrysler management during the 1965-1966 time period was in approximately the same state of financial corruption and technical incompetence as was Lockheed management prior to the Challenger catastrophe. I should probably mention for those of you 40-45 years of age or younger that flight simulators at the time of the ApolloOne fire bore little resemblance to the digital flight simulators I helped develop in the late seventies and early eighties. In other words, putting even a good prototype of a Challenger-era Singer-Link flight simulator onboard for the Apollo One Plugs-Out Test would have been out of the question. You should probably be thinking more in terms of analog, or an alternate circuitry configuration which was designed (although perhaps not correctly implemented) to be switchable from external to internal power.. John Maxson |
#5
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wrote in message ... How am I supposed to "cite" a telephone conversation? Try this: "Telephone interview with [name of person], [relevant credit of person], (date of call)" For example: "Telephone interview with Douglass Borisky, Senior Revising Editor of the Columbia Law Review (Apr. 10, 1986)." As shown in _A Uniform System of Citation_, 14th Edition, published by Harvard Law Review, Cambridge, Massachusettes, page 88. Surely an investigator as skilled as yourself should have been able to figure out something as trivial as how to cite a phone conversation. The citation for the valves is in the VOICE TRANSCRIPT. 23:06 is when he reports 12 gray bars. See? That's better. You included a specific _time_ with a specific _claim_. If you did that on a regular basis you'd have a lot fewer problems. I'll bet it didn't even hurt all that much. You'll have to pull up the valve photograph on Scott's website for the schematic. It's on the first page as an "exhibit." It's erroneously labelled something like "A & C React Valves" or something like that. You'll be able to tell which one it is; there are only a couple of schematics in the group (OH, it might say "logic." You'll just have to check the list.) Fair enough. And NO, I'm looking into why Ed had 12 grey bars when he should only have had ten. Why not? That's part of what a good investigator would do. Unless you check it out, you don't know it's irrelevant. Something was wrong, but I don't know what yet. Fair enough. |
#6
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wrote in message
... The citation for the valves is in the VOICE TRANSCRIPT. 23:06 is when he reports 12 gray bars. You'll have to pull up the valve photograph on Scott's website for the schematic. It's on the first page as an "exhibit." It's erroneously labelled something like "A & C React Valves" or something like that. You'll be able to tell which one it is; there are only a couple of schematics in the group (OH, it might say "logic." You'll just have to check the list.) And NO, I'm looking into why Ed had 12 grey bars when he should only have had ten. Something was wrong, but I don't know what yet. LaDonna One thing that's wrong *now* (concerning the subject topic) is that it began with an allegation of a Plugs-Out "RCS response simulator" ( see http://tinyurl.com/2x8ne) and mutated to an allegation of yet another supposed Grissom-scenario refutation, namely, "CM/RCS/SM/Load Simulator Bank wires." I think much of the problem you're facing here in this group, LaDonna, can be attributed to the fact that you're not getting criticism or advice from qualified electrical engineers familiar with the Apollo One spacecraft's RCS system. You might try cross-posting to sci.space.tech. In the 'newsgroups' block, make it look like this: sci.space.history,sci.space.tech John Maxson |
#7
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"John Maxson" wrote in message ...
"LaDonna Wyss" wrote in message om... For those of you who have been insisting that these load simulators completely take the place of any actual functioning of the valves in the RCS, I have news for you. I've spent the past almost seven hours having conversations with various people on this and other Apollo One issues. One of those people is a person who has become a friend of mine; he was also a friend of Gus Grissom's. He worked for Chrysler (who was one of many contractors on Apollo One) until shortly before the fire. He left because his protests about safety went unanswered. I asked him about these simulators--by the way, his job was GSE. That's all he did. He said, and I'm about to quote, that the Plug's Out Test, "It's a mess." Because of those simulators, you have some systems being operated on external power, others on internal power, and it would basically take a genius to sort out which was which. There is NOT going to be a simple answer to this one. That particular test is too convoluted. What I DO know is this: Two of the twelve valves Ed tried to open did not open. THAT was no simulation; it was a fact, and it is documented via schematic. You're just going to have to stand by and wait to see where all the chips fall on that one. LaDonna I worked on the Saturn program (digital random vibration analysis, mostly in SCAT and SAP originally, before the days of FAP) at the Slidell Computing Facility in 1965, as well as with Dr. Wehrner von Braun's telemetry engineers at MSFC on trips to Huntsville that year. I met him once, during a meeting in the cafeteria. I also became well acquainted with a brilliant NASA engineer working at Michaud. He later wrote part of the Rogers Report while at MSFC and more recently he was transferred to Goddard or Langley as a very high-ranking NASA director. I can confirm that Chrysler management during the 1965-1966 time period was in approximately the same state of financial corruption and technical incompetence as was Lockheed management prior to the Challenger catastrophe. I should probably mention for those of you 40-45 years of age or younger that flight simulators at the time of the ApolloOne fire bore little resemblance to the digital flight simulators I helped develop in the late seventies and early eighties. In other words, putting even a good prototype of a Challenger-era Singer-Link flight simulator onboard for the Apollo One Plugs-Out Test would have been out of the question. You should probably be thinking more in terms of analog, or an alternate circuitry configuration which was designed (although perhaps not correctly implemented) to be switchable from external to internal power.. John Maxson That's EXACTLY right, Mr. Maxson, and I thank you very much for that contribution. The person to whom I referred in the beginning of this thread has told me more than once that one of the many problems with Apollo One was the fact that it was possible to be on both external and internal power AT THE SAME TIME, which was a prescription for disaster. There is much to be deciphered about these load simulators, but you are absolutely correct in all of what you said, including the fact these were not some computerized game where everything was some sort of software. It was quite antiquated and not anything resembling the simulators we see today. Thanks again. LaDonna |
#8
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"John Maxson" wrote in message ... I worked on the Saturn program (digital random vibration analysis, mostly in SCAT and SAP originally, before the days of FAP) = sniffed farts to guess what the engineer ate for lunch as he swept the floor. |
#9
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"John Maxson" wrote in message ...
wrote in message ... The citation for the valves is in the VOICE TRANSCRIPT. 23:06 is when he reports 12 gray bars. You'll have to pull up the valve photograph on Scott's website for the schematic. It's on the first page as an "exhibit." It's erroneously labelled something like "A & C React Valves" or something like that. You'll be able to tell which one it is; there are only a couple of schematics in the group (OH, it might say "logic." You'll just have to check the list.) And NO, I'm looking into why Ed had 12 grey bars when he should only have had ten. Something was wrong, but I don't know what yet. LaDonna One thing that's wrong *now* (concerning the subject topic) is that it began with an allegation of a Plugs-Out "RCS response simulator" ( see http://tinyurl.com/2x8ne) and mutated to an allegation of yet another supposed Grissom-scenario refutation, namely, "CM/RCS/SM/Load Simulator Bank wires." I think much of the problem you're facing here in this group, LaDonna, can be attributed to the fact that you're not getting criticism or advice from qualified electrical engineers familiar with the Apollo One spacecraft's RCS system. You might try cross-posting to sci.space.tech. In the 'newsgroups' block, make it look like this: sci.space.history,sci.space.tech John Maxson Thanks, Mr. Maxson. I realize 98% of the people posting are either hecklers or are pretending to know things they do not. I'm targetting the other 2%.... And frankly, I don't have time for yet ANOTHER newsgroup to spawn 45+ threads a day on this topic! LOL You're right, though. Especially with Alan Erskine's post over the weekend, the good old "blame the pilot" scenario is alive and well. Gus could just never "quite get it right." Well, the mistake these people are making is: This is the SAME mistake NASA made. DON'T P*** ME OFF!!!! NASA p***** me off December 5, 2002, which is why I'm here. These folks just haven't figured out yet that is NOT the best game plan if they expect to win.... :-) LaDonna |
#10
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"LaDonna Wyss" wrote:
Thanks, Mr. Maxson. I realize 98% of the people posting are either hecklers or are pretending to know things they do not. Well let's see who knows what, okay? One simple question LaDonna. Please answer it promptly. No need to sit on it a day or two. Where are the heaters you refer to in the quote below physically located? Are they physically located inside the Service Module or are they physically located outside the Service Module within the actual Service Module Reaction Control System quad itself? This is not a trick question. "...There is not just one heater--you need to look at the diagrams. Volume 2, Parts One and Two reprint the Apollo Operations Handbook, and there is an index in the very beginning of that reprint. The RCS is Section 2. (I don't have the book in front of me, but I'm sure you can find it from there.) There is a heater in each thruster assembly, with two thermo switches apiece. The surrounding materials are foam and the wire insulation (which by the way, was selected for its characteristic of "smoking and burning" QUICKLY--that is according to a handwritten note by Floyd Thompson on one of the memos I obtained at the Archives.)" Gus could just never "quite get it right." Well, the mistake these people are making is: This is the SAME mistake NASA made. DON'T P*** ME OFF!!!! NASA p***** me off December 5, 2002, which is why I'm here. These folks just haven't figured out yet that is NOT the best game plan if they expect to win.... Is it a game to you? Just another trophy to win? I don't believe I am making a mistake. I am simply attempting to methodically follow the evidence wherever it goes and I am pretty sure I know where it goes. Daniel |
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