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[ Newsgroups: trimmed to s.s.h. ] LaDonna Wyss wrote: (LaDonna Wyss) wrote in message [ snip ] Like it or not, Challenger is on NASA. I was scanning through to see what other "intelligent" posts have been made in the past 24 hours, and I notice NO ONE has posted to this one since I wrote this reply. Because there was no particular reason to. NASA screwed up big time on Challenger, that's well documented, it's been discussed, and it's not in doubt. Amazing how the Peanut Gallery shuts up when they can no longer defend NASA.... Let's see, today you wrote ... I don't have time, energy, nor desire at the moment to play games; I've got too much going on with the fire today to deal with it. .... and you have not answered the technical questions put to you about Apollo AS-204. But you wish to know talk about Challenger and expect responses to that? If it makes you feel better, NASA screwed up on AS-204, STS-107, MPL, MCO, WIRE, Galileo, MER, ... .... and you can read about lots more screwups in their public NASA Lessons Learned database, on their history pages, etc. to maximize your enjoyment. Now, please answer the technical questions about your "investigation." -- rk, Just an OldEngineer "Dealing properly with very rare events is one of the attributes that distinguishes a design that is fit for safety-critical systems from one that is not." -- John Rushby in "A Comparison of Bus Architectures for Safety- Critical Embedded Systems," March 2003 |
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"Scott Hedrick" wrote in message ...
"LaDonna Wyss" wrote in message om... I HATE like you-know-what to be a NASA apologist here But you're so *good* at being an apologist- just ask Betty! Forget for a moment about o-rings and other theories. IT WAS TOO COLD!!! At the time, there was no data that it was too cold to launch, and without such data that would not have been a good reason to cancel the launch. What *would* have been a good reason, and in fact was the reason why some engineers pushed for the cancellation, was that there was no data (not even test data) that supported launches under the existing temperature conditions. In short, it's not that there was no data against it, it was a bad idea to launch because there was no data *for* it. If, for example, it was humidity and not temperature that was the issue, there would rightfully have been less concern, because humidity hadn't shown itself to be a factor. There *was* data showing the effects of differing temperatures, but there was none for as low as the temperature was that morning. Perhaps it's the engineer in my soul, but with the launch conditions outside of the known range of success, if the boring eggheads had been in charge, Challenger would still be flying. Whoever said "take off your engineering hat and put on your management hat" should have been forced to personally crawl from whereever he said that to the home of each of the relatives of the astronauts and personally deliver an apology. Something you might seriously consider spending some time contemplating, LaToya, is that changing hats doesn't change the data. *That* is why we ask for verifiable references. We want to see the data *without* your spin. A refusal to consider the evidence against the preferred result then killed people, and in your case, it makes you look like a kook. Like it or not, Challenger is on NASA. And some of it was on the beach, and some of it was in the water, and some of it is on the sea floor... You have just proven beyond question your stupidity. Protocol is there for a reason. It is not up to anyone at NASA to decide whether or not he "doesn't know" it's too cold. PROTOCOL SAID IT WAS TOO COLD! Protocol says don't launch, you DON'T LAUNCH! (Don't tell me YOU were the dimwit who made that call?) LaDonna |
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From Scott Hedrick:
"LaDonna Wyss" wrote I HATE like you-know-what to be a NASA apologist here But you're so *good* at being an apologist- just ask Betty! Forget for a moment about o-rings and other theories. IT WAS TOO COLD!!! At the time, there was no data that it was too cold to launch, and without such data that would not have been a good reason to cancel the launch. What *would* have been a good reason, and in fact was the reason why some engineers pushed for the cancellation, was that there was no data (not even test data) that supported launches under the existing temperature conditions. In short, it's not that there was no data against it, it was a bad idea to launch because there was no data *for* it. If, for example, it was humidity and not temperature that was the issue, there would rightfully have been less concern, because humidity hadn't shown itself to be a factor. There *was* data showing the effects of differing temperatures, but there was none for as low as the temperature was that morning. Perhaps it's the engineer in my soul, but with the launch conditions outside of the known range of success, if the boring eggheads had been in charge, Challenger would still be flying. Whoever said "take off your engineering hat and put on your management hat" should have been forced to personally crawl from whereever he said that to the home of each of the relatives of the astronauts and personally deliver an apology. Something you might seriously consider spending some time contemplating, LaToya, is that changing hats doesn't change the data. *That* is why we ask for verifiable references. We want to see the data *without* your spin. A refusal to consider the evidence against the preferred result then killed people, and in your case, it makes you look like a kook. I happen to see: "IT WAS TOO COLD!!!", and "...it was a bad idea to launch because there was no data *for* it." as one and the same argument. There is definite agreement in finding fault with MOD. Why they have never been pressed to this extent (formally, at least) is astounding. As far as the statement about switching hats from engineering to management, I see that as *perfectly legitimate*. If you honor every engineering concern about hazards to launch, you will NEVER LAUNCH. Engineers get paid to look at all the details. Managers get paid to decide what details are important and which need to be ignored so that the job can get done. People who are dismayed by that famous quote are ignorant to the necessities of proper management. Engineers define the risk. Managers accept the risk. The problem with 51-L is that managers accepted the risk that engineers defined as *out of bounds*. THAT is the travesty of Challenger. What makes it worse is that MOD went along with that horrendous management decision. What makes it worse ^2 is that no one seems to care about MOD's culpability. One can speculate that if MOD was not exhonorated in 51-L, then they might have felt more accountability about the -107 launch decision. In this light, fault for Columbia can be placed in part on the Rogers Commission themselves. If Neil, Sally and the gang had any reservations about their report being sanitized with respect to MOD, I expect that on the moring of February 1st, 2003, they felt a pang of regret for not having squawked louder about it. ~ CT |
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"LaDonna Wyss" wrote in message om... I was scanning through to see what other "intelligent" posts have been made in the past 24 hours, and I notice NO ONE has posted to this one since I wrote this reply. That's because, when checking for intelligent posts, it gets filtered out. How's your "team" these days? |
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"LaDonna Wyss" wrote in message om... You have just proven beyond question your stupidity. Yeah, I guess it was stupid of me to assume you were intelligent enough to understand my post, which actually supported you. Protocol is there for a reason. Yes, it is- why don't you follow it? PROTOCOL SAID IT WAS TOO COLD! Which protocol? If you know what the protocol said, then you must have read it. Please provide a reference. |
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"Stuf4" wrote in message om... Engineers define the risk. Managers accept the risk. Assuming that's true (and I think there's a good argument for it), you don't have the same group play both roles. (for example, in most (perhaps all?) med-flight operations, the pilot is required to make a go/no-go decision regarding weather conditions/safety, etc. BEFORE learning of the patient and status. One too many cases of, "well, it's a little boy dying, let's push the limits.) |
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"LaDonna Wyss" wrote You have just proven beyond question your stupidity. Protocol is there for a reason. It is not up to anyone at NASA to decide whether or not he "doesn't know" it's too cold. PROTOCOL SAID IT WAS TOO COLD! Protocol says don't launch, you DON'T LAUNCH! (Don't tell me YOU were the dimwit who made that call?) LaDonna This is not the way that responsible operators understand and use these concepts. The reason not to launch that morning was that it had not been shown by testing that it would be safe to launch under such conditions. There was no existing protocol or 'flight rule' or 'launch commit criterion that said "Do NOT launch". Your obvious sincerity is matched by your obvious ignorance and self-certainty. But your contribution to understanding this and the Apollo-204 catastrophe so far is zero, because of overwhelming flaws in your attitude. Jim O www.jamesoberg.com |
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(Stuf4) wrote in message . com... From Scott Hedrick: I happen to see: "IT WAS TOO COLD!!!", and "...it was a bad idea to launch because there was no data *for* it." as one and the same argument. *Almost*. It was not wrong to launch because it was too cold- it was wrong to launch because there was no data to support a launch decision, since the temperature was out of the known range of prior launches. It's the lack of data, not the temperature itself, which is important in this case- the same no-go condition would exist if the temperature was greater than that experienced during previous launches. Considering the potential results, a proper decision mode would be to *not* launch *unless* the known data supports launching. NASA had started launching until the data said don't launch, which may or may not be good for an unmanned experimental launcher (how else do you get data?), but is very bad for a manned, operational launcher. Changing hats doesn't change the existing data or create new data. |
#20
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"LaDonna Wyss" wrote in message om... (Stuf4) wrote in message . com... The problem with 51-L is that managers accepted the risk that engineers defined as *out of bounds*. THAT is the travesty of Challenger. What makes it worse is that MOD went along with that horrendous management decision. Agreed. LaDumbass, TRIM YOUR QUOTES! Otherwise, it looks like I have to concur with you and Stuffie. This is what happens when an intelligent, reasonable argument is presented. I wonder how much of management's attitude came from the decision to declare the shuttle operational? |
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