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The next generation, a plan
This is very back of the envelope. I'll start by saying I have no major objections to Orion per se. I do wonder if it's all worth it. But as a capsule, eh, it's ok. I do think Ares I is a waste. My suggestion. We drop back 20 (maybe even 40) and punt. Let's keep the shuttle flying at least through 2015 (and consider plans for beyond). In the meantime, let's rescope Orion to a 4.5m or so diameter capsule so it can be carried in the shuttle. First use would be an ACRV for the station. Let's get of depending completely on the Russians. Then later move towards launching it on an EELV for lunar and NEA missions. Ares V can continue to move forward at a slow pace. There's nothing resting on it. But in the meantime, we continue to use the shuttle to resupply the ISS and start to consider a station at a much lower latitude to be used as a fuel depot. This can be man-tended at first and have 3-4 pressurized modules and then larger tanks attached over time. Nothing revolutionary here (and a lot of it subject to criticism) but I think politically it's got more chance than the current Ares I/V boondoggle. -- Greg Moore SQL Server DBA Consulting Remote and Onsite available! Email: sql (at) greenms.com http://www.greenms.com/sqlserver.html |
#2
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The next generation, a plan
I think that if we are to consider a new space station at a lower
orbital inclination, I would suggest building one from some ISS- derived hardware; the gyroscopes, truss, solar arrays, connecting node modules, ect, but use the large Bigelow Aerospace inflatable modules for research, fuel storage, and crew quarters. -Mike |
#3
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The next generation, a plan
wrote in message
... I think that if we are to consider a new space station at a lower orbital inclination, I would suggest building one from some ISS- derived hardware; the gyroscopes, truss, solar arrays, connecting node modules, ect, but use the large Bigelow Aerospace inflatable modules for research, fuel storage, and crew quarters. -Mike That's sort of my thinking. For one thing, we need to stop thinking in terms of space station and start thinking in terms of space stations. We don't need something on the scale of another ISS for this. I'm thinking something like the Propulsion module (not built I know), a Node and then 1-2 Bigelow modules and then fuel tanks. Main goal would be on-orbit fuel supply and assembly. Start out man-tended and build up over time. -- Greg Moore SQL Server DBA Consulting Remote and Onsite available! Email: sql (at) greenms.com http://www.greenms.com/sqlserver.html |
#4
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The next generation, a plan
On Tue, 2 Sep 2008 21:44:45 -0400, "Greg D. Moore \(Strider\)"
wrote: We don't need something on the scale of another ISS for this. I'm thinking something like the Propulsion module (not built I know), An ATV should be adaptable for this. Brian |
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The next generation, a plan
On Wed, 03 Sep 2008 07:54:13 GMT, "Brian Gaff"
wrote: You also need to plan for an unpopular event, namely the loss of another orbiter. These are old craft, and short of building new ones, something is likely to break, I feel. The Air Force is flying hundreds of C-130s, B-52s and KC-135s that are much older than the Shuttle. Northwest Airlines is flying DC-9s much older than the Shuttle. Age is not a problem with proper maintenance. The real danger is a problem appearing but management ignoring their engineers, which is what caused the two Shuttle accidents. That could happen with a brand new vehicle just as easily. Brian |
#7
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The next generation, a plan
"Greg D. Moore \(Strider\)" wrote:
This is very back of the envelope. It's a half generation at best - as the question of what to launch Orion on when the Shuttle does retire isn't really addressed, just deferred. From a programmatic point of view, if you want a new booster in 2015 you need to be getting a good start on it right about now. I'm not certain that a commercial booster is a fully workable solution, as that means betting that they will be available in their current form in eight years, and that they will _remain_ available across the (currently uncertain) life of Orion. Betting on a commercial solution can possibly leave you hanging when the market changes. D. -- Touch-twice life. Eat. Drink. Laugh. http://derekl1963.livejournal.com/ -Resolved: To be more temperate in my postings. Oct 5th, 2004 JDL |
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The next generation, a plan
Brian Thorn wrote:
On Wed, 03 Sep 2008 07:54:13 GMT, "Brian Gaff" wrote: The Air Force is flying hundreds of C-130s, B-52s and KC-135s that are much older than the Shuttle. Northwest Airlines is flying DC-9s much older than the Shuttle. As I mentioned in another thread, those aircraft are in fact much 'younger' than you suppose. (Especially for the -130's which have been subject to an ongoing procurement program.) Age is not a problem with proper maintenance. And that maintenance gets ever more expensive with age, as ever more maintenance is required. The real danger is a problem appearing but management ignoring their engineers, which is what caused the two Shuttle accidents. I don't know of any Shuttle accidents in which the engineers were not also complicit. D. -- Touch-twice life. Eat. Drink. Laugh. http://derekl1963.livejournal.com/ -Resolved: To be more temperate in my postings. Oct 5th, 2004 JDL |
#9
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The next generation, a plan
"Derek Lyons" wrote in message ... Brian Thorn wrote: On Wed, 03 Sep 2008 07:54:13 GMT, "Brian Gaff" wrote: The Air Force is flying hundreds of C-130s, B-52s and KC-135s that are much older than the Shuttle. Northwest Airlines is flying DC-9s much older than the Shuttle. As I mentioned in another thread, those aircraft are in fact much 'younger' than you suppose. (Especially for the -130's which have been subject to an ongoing procurement program.) Age is not a problem with proper maintenance. And that maintenance gets ever more expensive with age, as ever more maintenance is required. The real danger is a problem appearing but management ignoring their engineers, which is what caused the two Shuttle accidents. I don't know of any Shuttle accidents in which the engineers were not also complicit. If you have read the entire Roger's Commission Report on the Challenger disaster, then you came away with far different conclusions than I. For different reasons, engineers at both Thiokol and Rockwell were convinced that the Challenger should not launch that day. At the very top, the actual managers making the go/no go decision didn't know about those concerns. The failure was in middle management and with the safety decision making processes being applied. Report of the PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident http://history.nasa.gov/rogersrep/genindex.htm The good stuff is in Chapter 5 and 7: Chapter V: The Contributing Cause of The Accident. http://history.nasa.gov/rogersrep/v1ch5.htm Chapter VII: The Silent Safety Program. http://history.nasa.gov/rogersrep/v1ch7.htm Here's the first paragraph from Chapter 7: The Commission was surprised to realize after many hours of testimony that NASA's safety staff was never mentioned. No witness related the approval or disapproval of the reliability engineers, and none expressed the satisfaction or dissatisfaction of the quality assurance staff. No one thought to invite a safety representative or a reliability and quality assurance engineer to the January 27, 1986, teleconference between Marshall and Thiokol. Similarly, there was no representative of safety on the Mission Management Team that made key decisions during the countdown on January 28, 1986. The Commission is concerned about the symptoms that it sees. Jeff -- A clever person solves a problem. A wise person avoids it. -- Einstein |
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The next generation, a plan
"Jeff Findley" wrote:
If you have read the entire Roger's Commission Report on the Challenger disaster, then you came away with far different conclusions than I. I have, but then I have also studied the other accounts and pondered upon them and thus reached my conclusions based on facts rather than seeking the bits the reinforce my biases. For different reasons, engineers at both Thiokol and Rockwell were convinced that the Challenger should not launch that day. At the very top, the actual managers making the go/no go decision didn't know about those concerns. The failure was in middle management and with the safety decision making processes being applied. Of course it never occurs to you to ask why middle management failed. It nevers occurs to ask why the judgement of the engineers was questioned. Soundbites are easy. Thinking is hard. D. -- Touch-twice life. Eat. Drink. Laugh. http://derekl1963.livejournal.com/ -Resolved: To be more temperate in my postings. Oct 5th, 2004 JDL |
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