MSNBC (JimO) Scoops more Inside-NASA Shuttle Documents

(Stuf4) writes:

...which brings an interesting point regarding all those crews of 5
that NASA has launched. It must have a very interesting psychological
aspect for the one person stuck downstairs all by themself. Entry and
especially launch must be stressful enough when you have other people
to look at. Going it alone staring at a wall must have an extra level
of eerieness to it.

The upside is that you're the closest one to the emergency exit. ;-)

Jeff
--
Remove "no" and "spam" from email address to reply.
If it says "This is not spam!", it's surely a lie.

Stuf4 wrote:
[snip]

As is probably clear by now, I don't see good arguments for packing
the crew. I'd say that 5 is the most that would be prudent.

For me, a good argument is...

No significant changes are being made to the shuttle (aerodynamics,
propulsion, control, etc.) that would change its performance
characteristics. Since the shuttle has already been proven flightworthy
in the past and concerns that doomed Columbia are being addressed, then,
given the high launch and operations costs, the shuttle should be
utilized as intended to the maximum extent possible...with full crew
complement if required by the mission.

If, however, significant changes were made...e.g. new cockpit, new main
engines, new external tank design...then a "check flight" would be
warranted, with minimal crew.


...which brings an interesting point regarding all those crews of 5
that NASA has launched. It must have a very interesting psychological
aspect for the one person stuck downstairs all by themself. Entry and
especially launch must be stressful enough when you have other people
to look at. Going it alone staring at a wall must have an extra level
of eerieness to it.



I suppose...if you're feint hearted. I wonder if any of the remaining
Mercury astronauts would take that seat.

~ CT

From Dave Fowler:
The way I see it, NASA has sent up a trial balloon. They've "dipped
their toes into the deep end" offering statements to the effect that
two/three others will be added to the crew, while "playing in the
shallow end" taking the STS-114 official crew photo with only the four
of them.

And of course, they "way you see it" has little to do with reality.

The STS-114 crew photo was taken before February 1. It has been custom for
ferry crews to have a separate photo from expedition crews.

Taken before? Hmm, that would explain why the *big* patch that those
four are posing with also carries the names:

Bowersox, Budarin, Pettit / Malenchenko, Moschenko, Lu

"Mystery" solved! I expect that we've all seen core crew photos from
past ISS rotation missions and of course STS-114 was done the same
way. Please substitute the word "presenting" for "taking" as a
correction to my earlier
statement.

Do your homework, before playing "in the deep end".

I did go do some homework and was shocked at what I found...

"The crew size and make up is being discussed," said [shuttle program
manager, Bill] Parsons. "We know there won't be a crew rotation on the
next mission. So that is out. We also know it takes at least six crew
members to do all things that we need to do safely."

(From http://www.spaceflightnow.com/shuttl...030916houston/)

This is very different from a position that two or three crew members
will *probably* be added. What Bill is saying is that if a minimum
crew
of six isn't flown, then safety will be *compromised*. Wow. It will
be interesting to see how this gets resolved after painting himself
into
that corner.


~ CT

From stmx3:
Stuf4 wrote:
[snip]

As is probably clear by now, I don't see good arguments for packing
the crew. I'd say that 5 is the most that would be prudent.

For me, a good argument is...

No significant changes are being made to the shuttle (aerodynamics,
propulsion, control, etc.) that would change its performance
characteristics. Since the shuttle has already been proven flightworthy
in the past and concerns that doomed Columbia are being addressed, then,
given the high launch and operations costs, the shuttle should be
utilized as intended to the maximum extent possible...with full crew
complement if required by the mission.

I'd say that you are putting the cart before the horse. Full crew is
not required by the mission. Rather, the mission requires limited
crew.

The line of reasoning you present looks sound to me. What it lacks is
conservatism. A similar argument could have been made with the 12
flights after -51L. I'm glad they didn't pack those crews. Trust
requires confidence, and confidence requires performance.

The bottom line is that I don't share your confidence in the shuttle
because of failure in it's demonstrated performance.

Now if you were to say that 12 flights at a reduced crew is overly
conservative, then I would agree.

If, however, significant changes were made...e.g. new cockpit, new main
engines, new external tank design...then a "check flight" would be
warranted, with minimal crew.

You may have heard that on top of Return To Flight, there is a current
push within some JSC communities (such as CB) to launch -114 with a
brand new untried software load, known as "OI-30" (which stands for
Operational Increment #30, or something like that).

Not the most conservative approach. Bugs are found in each rev. I
guess their hope is that the bugs that get through aren't the
"Texas-size flying cockroach" kind of bugs.

This new software, ironically, capitalizes on the advantages of MEDS.

...which brings an interesting point regarding all those crews of 5
that NASA has launched. It must have a very interesting psychological
aspect for the one person stuck downstairs all by themself. Entry and
especially launch must be stressful enough when you have other people
to look at. Going it alone staring at a wall must have an extra level
of eerieness to it.

I suppose...if you're feint hearted. I wonder if any of the remaining
Mercury astronauts would take that seat.

I'm sure that without exception they all would. For two reasons: I'd
say that they would be tempted by the prospect of recapturing their
fame as John Glenn did. Also, for the reason that when you're as old
as they are, you don't have as much to lose. The "bang/whimper"
thing.

But I don't see it as an issue of being feint hearted. Each and every
seat in the shuttle is a terrifying place to be on launch day.


~ CT

From Jeff Findley:
...which brings an interesting point regarding all those crews of 5
that NASA has launched. It must have a very interesting psychological
aspect for the one person stuck downstairs all by themself. Entry and
especially launch must be stressful enough when you have other people
to look at. Going it alone staring at a wall must have an extra level
of eerieness to it.

The upside is that you're the closest one to the emergency exit. ;-)

....and get to drive the tank!


~ CT

Stuf4 wrote:
From stmx3:

Stuf4 wrote:
[snip]

As is probably clear by now, I don't see good arguments for packing
the crew. I'd say that 5 is the most that would be prudent.

For me, a good argument is...

No significant changes are being made to the shuttle (aerodynamics,
propulsion, control, etc.) that would change its performance
characteristics. Since the shuttle has already been proven flightworthy
in the past and concerns that doomed Columbia are being addressed, then,
given the high launch and operations costs, the shuttle should be
utilized as intended to the maximum extent possible...with full crew
complement if required by the mission.


I'd say that you are putting the cart before the horse. Full crew is
not required by the mission. Rather, the mission requires limited
crew.

Are you saying that the upcoming mission does not require a full crew
and NASA is planning on assigning more than necessary? That's hard for
me to believe but I'm not well-versed on the politics of crew selection.
But if it is true, then the additional crew members will be placed
needlessly at risk. Perhaps this thread should be revived once final
crew selection is made.


The line of reasoning you present looks sound to me. What it lacks is
conservatism. A similar argument could have been made with the 12
flights after -51L. I'm glad they didn't pack those crews. Trust
requires confidence, and confidence requires performance.


According to a response to your post regarding the crews for the 12 post
Challenger flights, the missions changed and consequently required
smaller crews. That indicates NASA was sensitive to not unnecessarily
risking lives. Something happened after those 12 flights...a creeping
complacency?...that gave NASA reason to believe they could start doing
more with the shuttle. I don't know if they passed a certain safety
upgrade milestone or if they fell under budgetary or schedule pressures
or if they slowly became blinded to the risk.

The bottom line is that I don't share your confidence in the shuttle
because of failure in it's demonstrated performance.

Now if you were to say that 12 flights at a reduced crew is overly
conservative, then I would agree.

Where do you draw the line, then? 6 flights? 3? At what point do you
start to consider that the shuttle is "operational"? I say that if you
accept the risk and have a history of experience and no major non-flight
tested changes are made, then go all out and do the missions that have
been previously planned, with a full complement if necessary.

But don't say 12 flights is too conservative while 1 is not conservative
enough...risk does not decrease with each successful launch.

That being said, there is public perception and politics to deal with,
and these may be justification for flying smaller crews for a time (that
time being based on the half-life for the storm to die down).



If, however, significant changes were made...e.g. new cockpit, new main
engines, new external tank design...then a "check flight" would be
warranted, with minimal crew.


You may have heard that on top of Return To Flight, there is a current
push within some JSC communities (such as CB) to launch -114 with a
brand new untried software load, known as "OI-30" (which stands for
Operational Increment #30, or something like that).

Not the most conservative approach. Bugs are found in each rev. I
guess their hope is that the bugs that get through aren't the
"Texas-size flying cockroach" kind of bugs.

No, I haven't heard. I'm not sure what the software testing program is
like. I have heard that it was a major component of getting ISS off the
ground, with many one-one's with G. Abbey every Saturday...

If you told me that the MEDs screens come to life with the MS Windows
logo, I'd say we should start evacuating Titusville!


This new software, ironically, capitalizes on the advantages of MEDS.


...which brings an interesting point regarding all those crews of 5
that NASA has launched. It must have a very interesting psychological
aspect for the one person stuck downstairs all by themself. Entry and
especially launch must be stressful enough when you have other people
to look at. Going it alone staring at a wall must have an extra level
of eerieness to it.


I suppose...if you're feint hearted. I wonder if any of the remaining
Mercury astronauts would take that seat.


I'm sure that without exception they all would. For two reasons: I'd
say that they would be tempted by the prospect of recapturing their
fame as John Glenn did. Also, for the reason that when you're as old
as they are, you don't have as much to lose. The "bang/whimper"
thing.

But I don't see it as an issue of being feint hearted. Each and every
seat in the shuttle is a terrifying place to be on launch day.


No doubt...acquiring that much kinetic energy in such a short time takes
guts. If you don't come to grips with that, you should get out of the
program. Besides, there are worse ways to die.


~ CT

From stmx3:
snip
I'd say that you are putting the cart before the horse. Full crew is
not required by the mission. Rather, the mission requires limited
crew.

Are you saying that the upcoming mission does not require a full crew
and NASA is planning on assigning more than necessary? That's hard for
me to believe but I'm not well-versed on the politics of crew selection.
But if it is true, then the additional crew members will be placed
needlessly at risk. Perhaps this thread should be revived once final
crew selection is made.

The view I've presented is that the core crew of four is enough to
accomplish the mission. This stands in stark contrast to the quote of
the space shuttle program mgr saying that six is the minimum number to
safely do the flight. This is the corner that I see he painted
himself into.

And yes, I agree that this thread will take on more relevance once
that decision has been made.

(...as was seen with that old argument regarding Ilan's classification
as a PS, not an MS.)

The line of reasoning you present looks sound to me. What it lacks is
conservatism. A similar argument could have been made with the 12
flights after -51L. I'm glad they didn't pack those crews. Trust
requires confidence, and confidence requires performance.


According to a response to your post regarding the crews for the 12 post
Challenger flights, the missions changed and consequently required
smaller crews. That indicates NASA was sensitive to not unnecessarily
risking lives. Something happened after those 12 flights...a creeping
complacency?...that gave NASA reason to believe they could start doing
more with the shuttle. I don't know if they passed a certain safety
upgrade milestone or if they fell under budgetary or schedule pressures
or if they slowly became blinded to the risk.

I see it as a matter of confidence, as previously stated. I don't see
much significant change in the level of risk during that period. Nor
in NASA's perception of that risk.

The bottom line is that I don't share your confidence in the shuttle
because of failure in it's demonstrated performance.

Now if you were to say that 12 flights at a reduced crew is overly
conservative, then I would agree.

Where do you draw the line, then? 6 flights? 3? At what point do you
start to consider that the shuttle is "operational"? I say that if you
accept the risk and have a history of experience and no major non-flight
tested changes are made, then go all out and do the missions that have
been previously planned, with a full complement if necessary.

ISS crew swapout is going to force that decision. I'd say that a
1-flt ramp up is reasonable. Fly -114 with a reduced crew and if
there are no severe issues, then that could establish confidence to
play space-taxi on the next launch.

But don't say 12 flights is too conservative while 1 is not conservative
enough...risk does not decrease with each successful launch.

But our awareness of risk *does*. This was the warning from STS-112.
It shouted out that SOFI needed more attention. It got ignored.

This is why confidence building is needed. You may think that you
have a handle on the risks, but empirical evidence can show you
otherwise.

That being said, there is public perception and politics to deal with,
and these may be justification for flying smaller crews for a time (that
time being based on the half-life for the storm to die down).

I'm not big on the strategy of adapting for the sake of perception.
Leadership is about *shaping* perception to facilitate your forward
progress.

A weathervane will never chart a course.

If, however, significant changes were made...e.g. new cockpit, new main
engines, new external tank design...then a "check flight" would be
warranted, with minimal crew.


You may have heard that on top of Return To Flight, there is a current
push within some JSC communities (such as CB) to launch -114 with a
brand new untried software load, known as "OI-30" (which stands for
Operational Increment #30, or something like that).

Not the most conservative approach. Bugs are found in each rev. I
guess their hope is that the bugs that get through aren't the
"Texas-size flying cockroach" kind of bugs.

No, I haven't heard. I'm not sure what the software testing program is
like. I have heard that it was a major component of getting ISS off the
ground, with many one-one's with G. Abbey every Saturday...

What fun! Ha. There's one man I don't understand. How can someone
who looks so depressive have such a powerful career? It's a mystery
to me. The man was an Air Force _tanker_ pilot!

If you told me that the MEDs screens come to life with the MS Windows
logo, I'd say we should start evacuating Titusville!

Let's hope that Houston does better than Redmond in the reliability
department.

snip
I'm sure that without exception they all would. For two reasons: I'd
say that they would be tempted by the prospect of recapturing their
fame as John Glenn did. Also, for the reason that when you're as old
as they are, you don't have as much to lose. The "bang/whimper"
thing.

But I don't see it as an issue of being feint hearted. Each and every
seat in the shuttle is a terrifying place to be on launch day.


No doubt...acquiring that much kinetic energy in such a short time takes
guts. If you don't come to grips with that, you should get out of the
program. Besides, there are worse ways to die.

(Ed Givens comes to mind.)


~ CT

You may have heard that on top of Return To Flight, there is a current
push within some JSC communities (such as CB) to launch -114 with a
brand new untried software load, known as "OI-30" (which stands for
Operational Increment #30, or something like that).

Not the most conservative approach. Bugs are found in each rev. I
guess their hope is that the bugs that get through aren't the
"Texas-size flying cockroach" kind of bugs.

The people writing the Shuttle avionics software are one of very few -
maybe three to five - groups rated as "Level 5" by the Software Engineering
Institute - in fact, they're somewhat of a role model for that level.
No comparison to Redmond et al., who are around level 1 or 2.

Jan

Stuf4 wrote:
[snip]


I see it as a matter of confidence, as previously stated. I don't see
much significant change in the level of risk during that period. Nor
in NASA's perception of that risk.


[snip]

But don't say 12 flights is too conservative while 1 is not conservative
enough...risk does not decrease with each successful launch.


But our awareness of risk *does*. This was the warning from STS-112.
It shouted out that SOFI needed more attention. It got ignored.

Your statements appear contradictory. In the first, you imply NASA's
perception of the risk during the 12 flights following Challenger did
not change. In the 2nd, you say the awareness of the risk does change
over time. *THAT* was my earlier point...perhaps NASA became complacent
in assessing risk. Unless I am misreading you, you are not consistent
in your point of view.


This is why confidence building is needed. You may think that you
have a handle on the risks, but empirical evidence can show you
otherwise.

*Confidence building* is almost as nebulous as *safety culture*. You
should have the confidence before you risk lives. NASA's problem is
that they became OVERCONFIDENT (not yelling, just emphasizing).
Overconfidence comes from a successful flight, seemingly justifying the
risks you've taken. 50 or more successful flights lead to a safety
culture that doesn't insist on conducting stringent tests since this
imposes a risk and budget and schedule and besides, "we have confidence
that puny foam isn't going to bring down America's finest feat of
engineering."



That being said, there is public perception and politics to deal with,
and these may be justification for flying smaller crews for a time (that
time being based on the half-life for the storm to die down).


I'm not big on the strategy of adapting for the sake of perception.
Leadership is about *shaping* perception to facilitate your forward
progress.

I prefer to think that leadership is about leading. You're describing a
politician.

[snip]

No doubt...acquiring that much kinetic energy in such a short time takes
guts. If you don't come to grips with that, you should get out of the
program. Besides, there are worse ways to die.


(Ed Givens comes to mind.)

I take it he picked the leather upholstery over the antilock brakes.


~ CT

Jan C. Vorbrüggen wrote:
You may have heard that on top of Return To Flight, there is a current
push within some JSC communities (such as CB) to launch -114 with a
brand new untried software load, known as "OI-30" (which stands for
Operational Increment #30, or something like that).

Not the most conservative approach. Bugs are found in each rev. I
guess their hope is that the bugs that get through aren't the
"Texas-size flying cockroach" kind of bugs.


The people writing the Shuttle avionics software are one of very few -
maybe three to five - groups rated as "Level 5" by the Software Engineering
Institute - in fact, they're somewhat of a role model for that level.
No comparison to Redmond et al., who are around level 1 or 2.

Jan

Impressive! That speaks volumes as to the complexity of the code they
have had to deal with.