![]() |
|
|
Thread Tools | Display Modes |
#72
|
|||
|
|||
![]()
In article , (Brian Tung) wrote:
Bob Kolker wrote: On top of all this they claimed the odds of disaster were something like one in ten thousand per orbiter. Jeepers wrote: Cite? Assuming by "orbiter" he means the shuttle, a figure of about that magnitude was mentioned in Feynman's book, What Do You Care What Other People Think? It has a whole section devoted to his work on the Challenger disaster, including NASA management's intransigence on the matter of the shuttle's reliability. Brian Tung It was also mentioned as a "gut feeling" by NASA personell, WITHOUT study or actual risk assessment, back in 1996. The risk acessment number has fluctuated between 1 in 78 to 1 in 145. the reality is 2 in 113 I'd support another 70 missions, AND I'd volunteer to be onboard. -----= Posted via Newsfeeds.Com, Uncensored Usenet News =----- http://www.newsfeeds.com - The #1 Newsgroup Service in the World! -----== Over 100,000 Newsgroups - 19 Different Servers! =----- |
#73
|
|||
|
|||
![]()
In article , (Brian Tung) wrote:
Bob Kolker wrote: On top of all this they claimed the odds of disaster were something like one in ten thousand per orbiter. Jeepers wrote: Cite? Assuming by "orbiter" he means the shuttle, a figure of about that magnitude was mentioned in Feynman's book, What Do You Care What Other People Think? It has a whole section devoted to his work on the Challenger disaster, including NASA management's intransigence on the matter of the shuttle's reliability. Brian Tung It was also mentioned as a "gut feeling" by NASA personell, WITHOUT study or actual risk assessment, back in 1996. The risk acessment number has fluctuated between 1 in 78 to 1 in 145. the reality is 2 in 113 I'd support another 70 missions, AND I'd volunteer to be onboard. -----= Posted via Newsfeeds.Com, Uncensored Usenet News =----- http://www.newsfeeds.com - The #1 Newsgroup Service in the World! -----== Over 100,000 Newsgroups - 19 Different Servers! =----- |
#74
|
|||
|
|||
![]()
I think the number was even higher, something like 25,000:1. I haven't
read Feynman's book in some time, but I believe the engineer doing the original calculations got a number less than 50:1. This was not satisfactory to his manager who doubled the number, possibly justifying it to himself that doing so would be within the bounds of an "engineering estimate," and this multiplication happened all the way up the chain. The Challenger disaster happened because the management at both NASA and Morton-Thiokol ignored the advice of their own engineers not to permit a launch. The Apollo 1 fire happened under similar circumstances, when a manager overrode objections to over-pressurizing the capsule with pure Oxygen. The Columbia appears to be more of the same. In article , (Brian Tung) wrote: Bob Kolker wrote: On top of all this they claimed the odds of disaster were something like one in ten thousand per orbiter. Jeepers wrote: Cite? Assuming by "orbiter" he means the shuttle, a figure of about that magnitude was mentioned in Feynman's book, What Do You Care What Other People Think? It has a whole section devoted to his work on the Challenger disaster, including NASA management's intransigence on the matter of the shuttle's reliability. Brian Tung The Astronomy Corner at http://astro.isi.edu/ Unofficial C5+ Home Page at http://astro.isi.edu/c5plus/ The PleiadAtlas Home Page at http://astro.isi.edu/pleiadatlas/ My Own Personal FAQ (SAA) at http://astro.isi.edu/reference/faq.txt |
#75
|
|||
|
|||
![]()
I think the number was even higher, something like 25,000:1. I haven't
read Feynman's book in some time, but I believe the engineer doing the original calculations got a number less than 50:1. This was not satisfactory to his manager who doubled the number, possibly justifying it to himself that doing so would be within the bounds of an "engineering estimate," and this multiplication happened all the way up the chain. The Challenger disaster happened because the management at both NASA and Morton-Thiokol ignored the advice of their own engineers not to permit a launch. The Apollo 1 fire happened under similar circumstances, when a manager overrode objections to over-pressurizing the capsule with pure Oxygen. The Columbia appears to be more of the same. In article , (Brian Tung) wrote: Bob Kolker wrote: On top of all this they claimed the odds of disaster were something like one in ten thousand per orbiter. Jeepers wrote: Cite? Assuming by "orbiter" he means the shuttle, a figure of about that magnitude was mentioned in Feynman's book, What Do You Care What Other People Think? It has a whole section devoted to his work on the Challenger disaster, including NASA management's intransigence on the matter of the shuttle's reliability. Brian Tung The Astronomy Corner at http://astro.isi.edu/ Unofficial C5+ Home Page at http://astro.isi.edu/c5plus/ The PleiadAtlas Home Page at http://astro.isi.edu/pleiadatlas/ My Own Personal FAQ (SAA) at http://astro.isi.edu/reference/faq.txt |
#76
|
|||
|
|||
![]()
I think the number was even higher, something like 25,000:1. I haven't
read Feynman's book in some time, but I believe the engineer doing the original calculations got a number less than 50:1. This was not satisfactory to his manager who doubled the number, possibly justifying it to himself that doing so would be within the bounds of an "engineering estimate," and this multiplication happened all the way up the chain. The Challenger disaster happened because the management at both NASA and Morton-Thiokol ignored the advice of their own engineers not to permit a launch. The Apollo 1 fire happened under similar circumstances, when a manager overrode objections to over-pressurizing the capsule with pure Oxygen. The Columbia appears to be more of the same. In article , (Brian Tung) wrote: Bob Kolker wrote: On top of all this they claimed the odds of disaster were something like one in ten thousand per orbiter. Jeepers wrote: Cite? Assuming by "orbiter" he means the shuttle, a figure of about that magnitude was mentioned in Feynman's book, What Do You Care What Other People Think? It has a whole section devoted to his work on the Challenger disaster, including NASA management's intransigence on the matter of the shuttle's reliability. Brian Tung The Astronomy Corner at http://astro.isi.edu/ Unofficial C5+ Home Page at http://astro.isi.edu/c5plus/ The PleiadAtlas Home Page at http://astro.isi.edu/pleiadatlas/ My Own Personal FAQ (SAA) at http://astro.isi.edu/reference/faq.txt |
#77
|
|||
|
|||
![]() Sam Wormley wrote: In more ways than you'll ever know Bob. Do be so kind as to list some of these ways I will never know. Bob Kolker |
#78
|
|||
|
|||
![]() Sam Wormley wrote: In more ways than you'll ever know Bob. Do be so kind as to list some of these ways I will never know. Bob Kolker |
#79
|
|||
|
|||
![]() Sam Wormley wrote: In more ways than you'll ever know Bob. Do be so kind as to list some of these ways I will never know. Bob Kolker |
#80
|
|||
|
|||
![]() Ron Kihara wrote: The Columbia appears to be more of the same. NASA hasn't changed a bit. Whenever an engineer brings up a safety issue that interferes with a do or die launch the engineer is told - do shut up- or your career will die. They have been doing this for going on 20 years. Bob Kolker |
Thread Tools | |
Display Modes | |
|
|
![]() |
||||
Thread | Thread Starter | Forum | Replies | Last Post |
Mars Exploration Rover Update - April 17, 2004 | Ron | Astronomy Misc | 0 | April 19th 04 06:44 AM |
Space Calendar - March 26, 2004 | Ron | Astronomy Misc | 0 | March 26th 04 04:05 PM |
Mars Rover Pictures Raise 'Blueberry Muffin' Questions | Ron | Astronomy Misc | 0 | February 10th 04 12:05 AM |
Spirit Condition Upgraded as Twin Rover Nears Mars | Ron | Astronomy Misc | 53 | January 27th 04 07:08 PM |
Mars Rover Opportunity Mission Status - July 18, 2003 | Ron Baalke | Astronomy Misc | 0 | July 19th 03 01:56 AM |