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"Tom Merkle" wrote in message
The problem with this column is that it rests on so many false assumptions and strawmen that it makes GuthVenus look rational. Let's start with your main point in the article: There's another anti-OSP column this morning: http://www.spaceref.com/news/viewnews.html?id=870 There are as many views on this matter as there are people. Unfortunately, there is one point that sticks out to me as being wrong in the above mentioned column. That is, Don Peterson is against OSP because (among other reasons) there is no new technology in it. I think that reason is one aspect of why other projects have either failed to be completed or didn't end up working as advertised. It would be an appropriate goal for an experimental/research vehicle, but for a vehicle that is meant to become pseudo-operational? I don't think so. Why develop something new and exotic when there are already systems in place that would fulfill the requirements? It would simply inflate costs. Jon |
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On 24 Sep 2003 08:15:01 GMT, in a place far, far away,
(Tom Merkle) made the phosphor on my monitor glow in such a way as to indicate that: WHAT COULD NASA ACTUALLY DO BETTER OR DIFFERENT THAT WOULD HELP PUBLIC SPACE TRAVEL? It could be a better customer, with more ambition for manned spaceflight than sending a few government employees a year. It could stop wasting billions on dead-end projects. It would take too long to go into detail about how shaky the rest of your 'generous' economic analysis of shuttle vs. OSP is, but regardless of the exact numbers, it's based on two ENTIRELY false assumptions-- 1) that shuttle costs are fixed--obviously way wrong. Shuttle operating costs have already been projected to rise drastically in the coming years due to Post-Columbia changes and orbiter airframe aging. Numbers? 2) that shuttle represents "sunk costs" that are essentially free, while OSP will be starting from scratch. BS! Of course not, and I didn't write that. NASA knows this isn't true, based on the billions it spends on overhauling and maintaining the orbiters--that's right, all those people are paid for actually doing something! Who said they weren't? Those Development costs for the shuttle cannot be considered to be 'sunk,' since we have spent more than their development cost maintaining them since their construction. Those aren't development costs. OSP is not starting from scratch, either. Then that makes the projected development costs even more outrageous. In fact, the whole idea of using commercial production model economics on what is still an experimental government platform is pretty silly, as is the notion of waiting for the eventual successor to X-prize contestants to return man to orbital space. (Actually, that's not silly, it's sad. That's burning your 1480 Portugese caravel while you wait for the commercial development of an 1860 Yankee Clipper. It might happen eventually--but you'll miss out on 400 years of exploration in the meantime.) An interesting analogy, but it's not at all clear that it's a useful or appropriate one. Is thinking that everyone else is wrong a sign of schizophrenia--or merely arrogance? "Everyone else"? I don't think that my opinion is unique. I don't see any unanimity of support for OSP anywhere--in Congress, among the public, even at NASA itself. That statement is exactly the kind of arrogance to which I'm referring. I quote: "Much of NASA's "culture" problem is in fact a symptom rather than a cause -- a symptom of too many years of believing that all wisdom about things space resides at the agency, a belief nurtured by an often fawning and ignorant press and a political establishment that values pork over progress." In this view, everyone else is stupid--NASA, a 'fawning and ignorant press,' the political establishment. I didn't say they were stupid. Another interesting strawman. "It will require a much broader discussion of national space policy, far beyond NASA's role. Ultimately, only by addressing the true issues that hold us back in space, and expanding and encouraging the role of the private sector to pursue the dreams of individuals, rather than those of a monolithic space bureaucracy" So it's NASA's job to encourage the private sector to pursue the dreams of private individuals? Isn't that a little selfish? That's using public funds to accomplish private ends. It happens all the time. Shouldn't our 'monolithic' public agencies accomplish public ends, for the public good? Creating a new space industry that allows affordable access to orbit is a public good. NASA needs it, the DoD needs it, and it would create vast new wealth. In a free society, we generally leave the "dreams of individuals" up to individuals in the private sector. Why do anything different with regards to space? You must be living in some other "free society" than I do. When I'm no longer having to give up half of my income to support a welfare state, I'll be happy to end NASA funding as well. In fact, I'd be happy to end NASA funding for manned spaceflight right now, because it's providing poor value for the money. But if we're going to be spending billions of taxpayer dollars per year on manned spaceflight, I'd like to see it actually make some serious progress. OSP doesn't do that. -- simberg.interglobal.org * 310 372-7963 (CA) 307 739-1296 (Jackson Hole) interglobal space lines * 307 733-1715 (Fax) http://www.interglobal.org "Extraordinary launch vehicles require extraordinary markets..." Swap the first . and @ and throw out the ".trash" to email me. Here's my email address for autospammers: |
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On Wed, 24 Sep 2003 06:48:17 CST, in a place far, far away, "Jon
Berndt" made the phosphor on my monitor glow in such a way as to indicate that: "Tom Merkle" wrote in message The problem with this column is that it rests on so many false assumptions and strawmen that it makes GuthVenus look rational. Let's start with your main point in the article: There's another anti-OSP column this morning: http://www.spaceref.com/news/viewnews.html?id=870 There are as many views on this matter as there are people. Unfortunately, there is one point that sticks out to me as being wrong in the above mentioned column. That is, Don Peterson is against OSP because (among other reasons) there is no new technology in it. Yes, that's about the only *good* thing about it, IMO. -- simberg.interglobal.org * 310 372-7963 (CA) 307 739-1296 (Jackson Hole) interglobal space lines * 307 733-1715 (Fax) http://www.interglobal.org "Extraordinary launch vehicles require extraordinary markets..." Swap the first . and @ and throw out the ".trash" to email me. Here's my email address for autospammers: |
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![]() Jon Berndt wrote: There's another anti-OSP column this morning: http://www.spaceref.com/news/viewnews.html?id=870 There are as many views on this matter as there are people. Unfortunately, there is one point that sticks out to me as being wrong in the above mentioned column. That is, Don Peterson is against OSP because (among other reasons) there is no new technology in it. I think that reason is one aspect of why other projects have either failed to be completed or didn't end up working as advertised. I noticed the same thing in the article; what exactly is the benefit of a revolutionary new technology in regards to an operational as opposed to experimental vehicle? If we want to get it done quickly and on a budget then using proven technology that we have experience with would seem to be the way to go. We have a classic example of the other approach in the X-33 project; which broke one of the Skunk Work's hard-learned lessons- never use more than one major new technology in any new project. They had learned that the hard way with the CL-400's liquid hydrogen fuel/hydrogen expander motors and the A-12's titanium structure/turboramjet engines- major headaches ensued on both those programs; but with X-33, they proposed to use new lightweight metallic TPS tiles, the linear plug nozzle motor, and the composite hydrogen tank...trying all three at once was asking for trouble; and that's just what they got. Occam's razor would suggest a ballistic capsule approach for OSP; as that's the one that gives you the highest payload to orbit for vehicle weight and therefore launch vehicle size. The aerodynamics of such a design are very well understood in both the ascent and reentry regimens, and such a vehicle can be built comparatively fast and cheap if we don't start adding bells and whistles to the design. Further it's comparatively small size and simplicity compared to the Shuttle would greatly simplify maintenance and need reduced ground personnel numbers- thereby lowering operating costs, while at the same time making the transfer of safety concern information more efficient and timely, due to the fewer total people involved. Pat |
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In sci.space.policy Rand Simberg wrote:
On 24 Sep 2003 08:15:01 GMT, in a place far, far away, (Tom Merkle) made the phosphor on my monitor glow in such a way as to indicate that: WHAT COULD NASA ACTUALLY DO BETTER OR DIFFERENT THAT WOULD HELP PUBLIC SPACE TRAVEL? It could be a better customer, with more ambition for manned spaceflight than sending a few government employees a year. It could stop wasting billions on dead-end projects. And precicely whom would they be buying that service from? Unless you can demonstrate that NASA would not make use of 3rd party cheap access to space, this claim is without merrit. So it's NASA's job to encourage the private sector to pursue the dreams of private individuals? Isn't that a little selfish? That's using public funds to accomplish private ends. It happens all the time. Doesn't mean it should be so. -- Sander +++ Out of cheese error +++ |
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On Thu, 25 Sep 2003 07:27:50 CST, in a place far, far away, Sander
Vesik made the phosphor on my monitor glow in such a way as to indicate that: In sci.space.policy Rand Simberg wrote: On 24 Sep 2003 08:15:01 GMT, in a place far, far away, (Tom Merkle) made the phosphor on my monitor glow in such a way as to indicate that: WHAT COULD NASA ACTUALLY DO BETTER OR DIFFERENT THAT WOULD HELP PUBLIC SPACE TRAVEL? It could be a better customer, with more ambition for manned spaceflight than sending a few government employees a year. It could stop wasting billions on dead-end projects. And precicely whom would they be buying that service from? Unless you can demonstrate that NASA would not make use of 3rd party cheap access to space, this claim is without merrit. I don't understand this comment. -- simberg.interglobal.org * 310 372-7963 (CA) 307 739-1296 (Jackson Hole) interglobal space lines * 307 733-1715 (Fax) http://www.interglobal.org "Extraordinary launch vehicles require extraordinary markets..." Swap the first . and @ and throw out the ".trash" to email me. Here's my email address for autospammers: |
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On Thu, 25 Sep 2003 11:28:13 CST, in a place far, far away,
(Tom Merkle) made the phosphor on my monitor glow in such a way as to indicate that: (Rand Simberg) wrote in message . .. On 24 Sep 2003 08:15:01 GMT, in a place far, far away, (Tom Merkle) made the phosphor on my monitor glow in such a way as to indicate that: WHAT COULD NASA ACTUALLY DO BETTER OR DIFFERENT THAT WOULD HELP PUBLIC SPACE TRAVEL? It could be a better customer, with more ambition for manned spaceflight than sending a few government employees a year. It could stop wasting billions on dead-end projects. Personally I think sending more than a few government employees into space a year should be funded by the private sector. The private sector is likeliest to come up with the total system that works the best and cheapest for a continuing space effort. I agree. Allowing a committee at NASA to pick commercial 'winners' and 'losers' who get limited contracts results in risk-averse, expensive approaches that are unsustainable when separated from government funding. Who proposed that? My point is that the whole idea of "amortizing development costs" is meaningless when development costs are so intertwined with operating costs. The idea of a separate "development phase" followed by an "operational phase" is one that is lifted from commercial industry and fits only poorly with the actual situation of an experimental vehicle that is still being tested every time it flies. Regardless, the development costs are still largely behind Shuttle. Cost of improvements are a different category. Those Development costs for the shuttle cannot be considered to be 'sunk,' since we have spent more than their development cost maintaining them since their construction. Those aren't development costs. So? no matter what 'type' of cost you label it, it's in the budget and it has to be spent to make the vehicle fly. Yes, and that was included in the analysis. OSP is not starting from scratch, either. Then that makes the projected development costs even more outrageous. which projections are you using? the favorable ones that say 3-4 billion, the unfavorable ones that say 6 billion, or your own that says 9 billion? The unfavorable ones that that say twelve or thirteen billion, which I generously reduced, even though most NASA programs tend to cost more, not less than originally estimated. In fact, the whole idea of using commercial production model economics on what is still an experimental government platform is pretty silly, as is the notion of waiting for the eventual successor to X-prize contestants to return man to orbital space. (Actually, that's not silly, it's sad. That's burning your 1480 Portugese caravel while you wait for the commercial development of an 1860 Yankee Clipper. It might happen eventually--but you'll miss out on 400 years of exploration in the meantime.) An interesting analogy, but it's not at all clear that it's a useful or appropriate one. Actually it's a metaphor. It looks like an analogy to me, but either way, I'm not sure that it's useful or appropriate. But in terms of better overall system design, expandibility, and safety, OSP makes lots of progress and is a huge departure from the one-vehicle-fits-all program NASA has been stuck using since the end of Apollo. I for one expect much more progress towards exploration beyond LEO once NASA is no longer wedded to the LEO-limited shuttle. I suspect that you'll be disappointed. -- simberg.interglobal.org * 310 372-7963 (CA) 307 739-1296 (Jackson Hole) interglobal space lines * 307 733-1715 (Fax) http://www.interglobal.org "Extraordinary launch vehicles require extraordinary markets..." Swap the first . and @ and throw out the ".trash" to email me. Here's my email address for autospammers: |
#59
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h (Rand Simberg) wrote in message . ..
On 24 Sep 2003 08:15:01 GMT, in a place far, far away, (Tom Merkle) made the phosphor on my monitor glow in such a way as to indicate that: WHAT COULD NASA ACTUALLY DO BETTER OR DIFFERENT THAT WOULD HELP PUBLIC SPACE TRAVEL? It could be a better customer, with more ambition for manned spaceflight than sending a few government employees a year. It could stop wasting billions on dead-end projects. Personally I think sending more than a few government employees into space a year should be funded by the private sector. The private sector is likeliest to come up with the total system that works the best and cheapest for a continuing space effort. Allowing a committee at NASA to pick commercial 'winners' and 'losers' who get limited contracts results in risk-averse, expensive approaches that are unsustainable when separated from government funding. Behold Boeing and Lockmart. Keep NASA out of the business of picking commercial winners and losers and have them focus on doing things the commercial sector has no interest in doing currently, like doing research enabling for a broader exploration program. It would take too long to go into detail about how shaky the rest of your 'generous' economic analysis of shuttle vs. OSP is, but regardless of the exact numbers, it's based on two ENTIRELY false assumptions-- 1) that shuttle costs are fixed--obviously way wrong. Shuttle operating costs have already been projected to rise drastically in the coming years due to Post-Columbia changes and orbiter airframe aging. Numbers? I concede that NASA hasn't admitted numbers yet. The projections of increasing cost have come from outsiders (journalists, members of congress) who note that the new restrictions on launch windows will further reduce flight rates, and that delays, missed opportunities due to increasing corrective maintenance (due to component age), and increased scrutiny on shuttle safety, are all bound to add cost to the program no matter what NASA says right now. 2) that shuttle represents "sunk costs" that are essentially free, while OSP will be starting from scratch. BS! Of course not, and I didn't write that. ok, so you object to the use of "free" in place of "unavoidable." But that's essentially what you're saying. you wrote three paragraphs emphasizing how expensive it's going to be to amortize OSP costs up front and then contrasted that with : "Note that we don't have to worry about amortizing Shuttle development costs- -they're already, in accounting terms, "sunk," and unavoidable, whereas the development costs for OSP are entirely avoidable, given a little fiscal sense. My point is that the whole idea of "amortizing development costs" is meaningless when development costs are so intertwined with operating costs. The idea of a separate "development phase" followed by an "operational phase" is one that is lifted from commercial industry and fits only poorly with the actual situation of an experimental vehicle that is still being tested every time it flies. NASA knows this isn't true, based on the billions it spends on overhauling and maintaining the orbiters--that's right, all those people are paid for actually doing something! Who said they weren't? Those Development costs for the shuttle cannot be considered to be 'sunk,' since we have spent more than their development cost maintaining them since their construction. Those aren't development costs. So? no matter what 'type' of cost you label it, it's in the budget and it has to be spent to make the vehicle fly. OSP is not starting from scratch, either. Then that makes the projected development costs even more outrageous. which projections are you using? the favorable ones that say 3-4 billion, the unfavorable ones that say 6 billion, or your own that says 9 billion? In fact, the whole idea of using commercial production model economics on what is still an experimental government platform is pretty silly, as is the notion of waiting for the eventual successor to X-prize contestants to return man to orbital space. (Actually, that's not silly, it's sad. That's burning your 1480 Portugese caravel while you wait for the commercial development of an 1860 Yankee Clipper. It might happen eventually--but you'll miss out on 400 years of exploration in the meantime.) An interesting analogy, but it's not at all clear that it's a useful or appropriate one. Actually it's a metaphor. In a free society, we generally leave the "dreams of individuals" up to individuals in the private sector. Why do anything different with regards to space? You must be living in some other "free society" than I do. When I'm no longer having to give up half of my income to support a welfare state, I'll be happy to end NASA funding as well. In fact, I'd be happy to end NASA funding for manned spaceflight right now, because it's providing poor value for the money. But if we're going to be spending billions of taxpayer dollars per year on manned spaceflight, I'd like to see it actually make some serious progress. OSP doesn't do that. You're right, OSP doesn't make serious progress towards lowering the cost of space travel for the average citizen--which is good, because that way it doesn't take away the profit motive from those who are working on it. But in terms of better overall system design, expandibility, and safety, OSP makes lots of progress and is a huge departure from the one-vehicle-fits-all program NASA has been stuck using since the end of Apollo. I for one expect much more progress towards exploration beyond LEO once NASA is no longer wedded to the LEO-limited shuttle. Tom Merkle |
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