NASA Astronaut on Columbia Repair (and others)

In message , Pat Flannery
writes


The Guy In Ireland wrote:

"Story Musgrave's standing reentry really set a bad example in that
regard. "

Sorry whats that all about? Did he stand for a reentry and why did he?


It was his last flight, so he stood up during the whole reentry and
filmed it through the front cabin windows.

In Arthur Clarke's "The Sands of Mars" a pilot says 'I once took-off
standing up, just for a bet, though it was a damn silly thing to do".

On Tue, 14 Nov 2006 22:44:00 +0000, Jonathan Silverlight wrote:

In message , Pat Flannery
writes


The Guy In Ireland wrote:

"Story Musgrave's standing reentry really set a bad example in that
regard. "

Sorry whats that all about? Did he stand for a reentry and why did he?


It was his last flight, so he stood up during the whole reentry and
filmed it through the front cabin windows.

In Arthur Clarke's "The Sands of Mars" a pilot says 'I once took-off
standing up, just for a bet, though it was a damn silly thing to do".

Hummm, sounds like a must see film, Musgrave's that is. When offshore, I
like to stand on the foredeck touching the rigging but not using it for
balance. Feel the wind, waves and motion of the boat. Become one with the
boat so to speak, wonder if those were Musgrave's thoughts.

wrote in
:


Remember the question why NASA did not release their results on the
in orbit repair options for Columbia?

Incorrect. The results were released with the CAIB report, both as a
chapter in the main report and as an appendix.

The only "results" they released was a statement that their tests were
inconclusive. No report what they tested, how they tested neither
the results they got.

They did no materials testing, only analysis, and very limited analysis
at that. They didn't just say the analysis was inconclusive. They said
more than that.

"The assessment of the level of difficulty of the repair operation
is high. The level of risk to the crew is moderate and the risk of doing
additional damage to the Orbiter is high (i.e. enlarging the wing leading
edge breach). The overall assessment of the expectation of task success
is moderate to low, depending on damage site characteristics and the
required repair technique."

"The results while inconclusive, do not indicate this option was likely
to succeed."

It seems the results were too
unwanted obvious:

Gutierrez is wrong. And it turns out, so were NASA's results from the
CAIB report. The three years of work that have gone into RCC repair
capability since that report have made clear that the in-flight
repair options for Columbia would not have worked.

What is your source? Was it you who said something the same line over
a year ago claiming some knowledge of NASA tests not yet released? As
we got no source it was dismissed as one of the many Columbia Usenet
myths. But maybe there is a report out now. I`m not the only one eager
to read it!

It depends on what you mean by "report". NASA has published no report
directly addressing Columbia repair on STS-107. But then again, that's
not necessary. What I did was to read the CAIB report, both Volume 1
section 6.4 and Appendix D.13, and make careful note of the assumptions
both stated and implicit. Then I read on NASA's work on RCC repair and
entry aerothermodynamics since the CAIB report was published. This work
does not directly address 107, but the results of it invalidate the
assumptions from CAIB. It's as simple as that.

First, the results of the RCC impact tests at SwRI demonstrate that the
area around the hole in panel 8L almost certainly had surrounding areas
where the RCC was cracked and delaminated. Arcjet tests at Ames and JSC
demonstrate that RCC damage propagates rapidly along these cracks. So it
doesn't matter what the crew puts in the hole behind the panel to try to
stop the flow of superheated air; the damage will quickly spread and
allow the superheated air to simply go around the repair.

Second, due to the improvised materials, the repair would not have been
smooth enough to prevent an early boundary layer transition. RCC is rated
to 3000 deg F, the lower surface black tiles to 2200 deg F. The shock
ahead of the vehicle contains superheated air at temperatures up to
10,000 deg F. It is the laminar (smooth) boundary layer that protects the
TPS from these extreme temperatures. Normally, the boundary layer trips
to turbulent well after the period of peak heating but rough surfaces can
result in early transitions. A transition prior to Mach 21 can cause
vehicle damage and a transition prior to Mach 24 can cause loss of
vehicle. The improvised Columbia repair would likely have gone turbulent
right from the beginning of entry (Mach 25), exposing the RCC panel and
the trailing black tiles to the superheated air. Columbia's damage
occurred at just about the worst possible location since the shock from
the nose cap intersects the shock from the leading edge between RCC
panels 5 and 13, depending on Mach number.

--
JRF

Reply-to address spam-proofed - to reply by E-mail,
check "Organization" (I am not assimilated) and
think one step ahead of IBM.

Craig Fink wrote:

Hummm, sounds like a must see film, Musgrave's that is.


Lookie what I found - Story Musgrave's film:
javascript:LaunchVideo('/tech/2003/02/05/vo.reentry.1997.nasa.','300k');
This has narration.

Pat

On Tue, 14 Nov 2006 18:32:02 -0600, Pat Flannery wrote
(in article ):



Craig Fink wrote:

Hummm, sounds like a must see film, Musgrave's that is.


Lookie what I found - Story Musgrave's film:
javascript:LaunchVideo('/tech/2003/02/05/vo.reentry.1997.nasa.','300k');
This has narration.

Pat

That's not a real URL, Patrick.

No booze for you!

;-)

--
Herb Schaltegger
"You can run on for a long time . . . sooner or later, God'll cut you
down." - Johnny Cash
http://www.angryherb.net

Jorge R. Frank wrote:

wrote in
:



Remember the question why NASA did not release their results on the
in orbit repair options for Columbia?


Incorrect. The results were released with the CAIB report, both as a
chapter in the main report and as an appendix.


The only "results" they released was a statement that their tests were
inconclusive. No report what they tested, how they tested neither
the results they got.



They did no materials testing, only analysis, and very limited analysis
at that. They didn't just say the analysis was inconclusive. They said
more than that.

"The assessment of the level of difficulty of the repair operation
is high. The level of risk to the crew is moderate and the risk of doing
additional damage to the Orbiter is high (i.e. enlarging the wing leading
edge breach). The overall assessment of the expectation of task success
is moderate to low, depending on damage site characteristics and the
required repair technique."

"The results while inconclusive, do not indicate this option was likely
to succeed."



It seems the results were too
unwanted obvious:


Gutierrez is wrong. And it turns out, so were NASA's results from the
CAIB report. The three years of work that have gone into RCC repair
capability since that report have made clear that the in-flight
repair options for Columbia would not have worked.


What is your source? Was it you who said something the same line over
a year ago claiming some knowledge of NASA tests not yet released? As
we got no source it was dismissed as one of the many Columbia Usenet
myths. But maybe there is a report out now. I`m not the only one eager
to read it!



It depends on what you mean by "report". NASA has published no report
directly addressing Columbia repair on STS-107. But then again, that's
not necessary. What I did was to read the CAIB report, both Volume 1
section 6.4 and Appendix D.13, and make careful note of the assumptions
both stated and implicit. Then I read on NASA's work on RCC repair and
entry aerothermodynamics since the CAIB report was published. This work
does not directly address 107, but the results of it invalidate the
assumptions from CAIB. It's as simple as that.



I think the odds of this working are about 1% at best.
It still doesn't address the problem of what the EVAing astronauts are
supposed to hold onto while they are putting stuff into the hole, or the
fact that bags of water will boil and explode as soon as they get
depressurized in the airlock, or water coming out of some sort of
jury-rigged hose is going to emerge as a spray of superfine droplets,
not come out as a stream that will flow into the hole.
You might be able to get the hole filled in with the hose, but it would
be anything but smooth, and you'd have chunks of ice around it that
would break free and do more damage as heating started on reentry.

Pat

Pat Flannery wrote:


Lookie what I found - Story Musgrave's film:
javascript:LaunchVideo('/tech/2003/02/05/vo.reentry.1997.nasa.','300k');
This has narration.

If that doesn't work, it's on this webpage:
http://edition.cnn.com/2003/TECH/spa...ure/index.html
"Video" box on the right hand side.

pat

Pat

"Pat Flannery" wrote
I think the odds of this working are about 1% at best.
It still doesn't address the problem of what the EVAing astronauts are
supposed to hold onto while they are putting stuff into the hole, ....

Actually that was the least of their problems -- they would be holding onto
the PLB door, the centerline edge of which would have been positioned
within a few feet of the damaged RCC area. They could have rigged a
workable foot restraint attached to handholds along that edge.

"Pat Flannery" wrote in message
...


Had there been warning, you also bet that there wouldn't have been
anybody in the ship doing entry without helmets and gloves -- an
appalling failure of safety practices, in real life, but sadly consistent
with safety standards that had crept up on some (not all, or even most)
of the team.


Yeah, that was a real sloppy thing to do. They were getting very lax about
things, and Story Musgrave's standing reentry really set a bad example in
that regard.

the thing that still galls me about that particular Musgrave Maneuver is
that, the evening of the Columbia disaster, he was on CNN *bragging* about
doing that entry, going on and on about all the neat stuff he saw out the
window. At some point he must have seen Miles's face, or he just suddenly
realized what he was saying, because he got very serious all of a sudden,
and they cut to somebody else.

Trauma makes people do and say some very unfortunate things.

--
Terrell Miller


"Just...take...the...****ing...flower...darlin g"
Terrell's dating style according to OKCupid.com

"Jorge R. Frank" wrote in message
...
Normally, the boundary layer trips
to turbulent well after the period of peak heating but rough surfaces can
result in early transitions. A transition prior to Mach 21 can cause
vehicle damage and a transition prior to Mach 24 can cause loss of
vehicle. The improvised Columbia repair would likely have gone turbulent
right from the beginning of entry (Mach 25), exposing the RCC panel and
the trailing black tiles to the superheated air. Columbia's damage
occurred at just about the worst possible location since the shock from
the nose cap intersects the shock from the leading edge between RCC
panels 5 and 13, depending on Mach number.

That's what some of these boneheads don't understand- you can't just use a
spatula and smooth it by eye. It has to be smooth to an extremely fine
degree to hold off (not prevent) boundary layer separation.

I'm afraid it's not something that Real Men (tm) are going to be able to do
off the cuff hanging on the end of a robot arm.