GMD Intercept Success

On 5 Sep 2006 08:38:44 -0700, in a place far, far away, "Ed Kyle"
made the phosphor on my monitor glow in such a
way as to indicate that:

Jake McGuire wrote:
I guess we'll just disagree on this one. Hezbollah, as a non-state
actor, could manage to launch a bunch of artillery rockets at Israel
because they were cheap, and precisely because they didn't cause really
serious damage. Non-state actors don't have the ability to scrounge up
ICBMs, ..

I suspect that ICBMs will become more affordable, relatively
speaking, for U.S. adversaries in the future. The U.S. economy
is steadily weakening, relative to much of the rest of the world,
as the U.S. fritters its dollars away on more and more on
imported products.

How is that "frittering away our dollars"?

Rand Simberg wrote:
On 5 Sep 2006 08:38:44 -0700, in a place far, far away, "Ed Kyle"
made the phosphor on my monitor glow in such a
way as to indicate that:

Jake McGuire wrote:
I guess we'll just disagree on this one. Hezbollah, as a non-state
actor, could manage to launch a bunch of artillery rockets at Israel
because they were cheap, and precisely because they didn't cause really
serious damage. Non-state actors don't have the ability to scrounge up
ICBMs, ..

I suspect that ICBMs will become more affordable, relatively
speaking, for U.S. adversaries in the future. The U.S. economy
is steadily weakening, relative to much of the rest of the world,
as the U.S. fritters its dollars away on more and more on
imported products.

How is that "frittering away our dollars"?

U.S. GDP growth has slowed relative to earlier years and relative to
some other economies, as its trade deficit has grown. By
mid-century, the U.S. will no longer be the world's No. 1 economy,
and may be on the verge of falling to No. 3.

- Ed Kyle

On 5 Sep 2006 09:37:45 -0700, in a place far, far away, "Ed Kyle"
made the phosphor on my monitor glow in such a
way as to indicate that:

I suspect that ICBMs will become more affordable, relatively
speaking, for U.S. adversaries in the future. The U.S. economy
is steadily weakening, relative to much of the rest of the world,
as the U.S. fritters its dollars away on more and more on
imported products.

How is that "frittering away our dollars"?

U.S. GDP growth has slowed relative to earlier years and relative to
some other economies, as its trade deficit has grown.

Correlation is not causation.

By mid-century, the U.S. will no longer be the world's No. 1 economy,
and may be on the verge of falling to No. 3.

It's foolish to extrapolate a trend too far, but even if that's true,
it's not because of an imaginary "trade deficit." It's inevitable
that nations with much larger populations than ours will eventually
have economies larger as well, if their standard of living continues
to increase.

Sander Vesik wrote:
Jordan wrote:

The main problem I see with your proposed strategy, _even if America
KNEW the ICBM's were conventional-armed_, is that, as soon as a North
Korean ICBM hit an American city, there would be immediate popular
support in America for doing whatever amount of damage to North Korea
was required to eliminate the threat. Americans under these
circumstances would get angry at North Korea rather than afraid to
continue the fight, because they would be quite aware that America has
the power to annihilate the entire North Korean population, if
necessary.

You don't understand too things - how deterrents work ...

I understand exactly how deterrents work. Or fail to work.

... and what North Korean leadership is concerned about. ...

_Nobody_ is really sure of what the North Korean "leadership" (by which
one must ultimately mean Kim Jong Il) is concerned about. He's insane.
That's the _problem_.

Deterrents work by the adversary
being able to make a promise of what will almost definitely happen
if the other party does something specific. Like take a sufficently
offensive action. What North Korea as a state is concerned about is
regime survival - it is thus irrelevant whetever anybody now living
in the regime doesn't survive the collapse of it.

We all understand this. That's why North Korea worries us. North
Korea's economy is so fragile that it is driven to demand tribute from
the rest of the world simply to survive. This makes North Korea highly
aggressive, since North Korea might quite plausibly launch a war of
aggression with virtually no chance of victory simply because she was
not paid enough tribute. This cannot be said of most states -- even
most _Terrorist States_ are saner than that.

Consequently it is not relevant what the US response to the use of
the NK deterrent would be as it would be used (like any deterrent)
once a point of no return was reached.

Well, actually it's _highly_ relevant to the way that the situation
would actually develop. Your scenario of a campaign lasting "days,
weeks or months" during which North Korea bombards American cities with
conventional ICBM's and America restricts her actions to intercepting
them with ABM's and launching limited conventional strikes against the
launch sites -- or, conversely, appeases North Korea to avoid such a
campaign -- assumes that the American political dynamic is the same
during peace as during an unprovoked war launched against America in
which American civilians are dying.

American (recent) history instead suggests that the American people
would respond with white-hot rage, and the President's role would be
not so much selling them on a total war as convincing them that it
would be wise to show _some_ restraint. It's true that the initial
rage over 9/11 has faded among many Americans _by now_, but remember
that 9/11 happened almost 5 years ago and was not repeated. Your
scenario is of 9/11 being repeated for "days, weeks, or months," and
under those circumstances you would see public calls for genocide
against North Korea.

Seriously. Remember the phrase about "Japanese only being spoken in
Hell?" That was _not_ a radical fringe belief during World War II,
which was provoked by a far less heinous action.

- Jordan

Ed Kyle wrote:
Jake McGuire wrote:

Right. Since killing small numbers of civilians to convince a country
that it needs to abandon some military venture has ALWAYS worked in the
past.

-jake

Consider who has decided to use such weapons in the past.
Hitler (V-1/V-2), Sadaam (Scud), and Nasrallah (short-range
rockets), among others. Folks who did not, or have not,
necessarily always exhibited sound strategic judgement.

Part of their lack of sound strategic judgement was using their
missiles in such a fashion.

But they did manage to kill quite a few people and cause a bit
of chaos. London's children and mothers had to leave town
again.

Not only did that fail to advance Hitler's war aims, but it resulted in
Jadis the White Witch losing control of Narnia.

Sadaam kept CNN busy chasing lost Patriots across
Arabia and Tel Aviv.

Um, so? How did this significantly advance his war aims?

Nasrallah's rockets all but shut down
the northern part of Israel for a month. The latter barrage
may have shortened the war and may play a role in the
downfall of a government.

The latter barrage _was largely responsible for_ the war in the first
place, and has probably convinced Israel that she now has to ensure
that Hezbullah never again is allowed to base within range of Israel.
Israel did not end her own attacks until she had assurances of an
international force whose main job would be to keep Hezbullah out.

The mere presence of such weapons could have a powerful
impact on U.S. strategy far beyond their limited tactical
effect. Today, U.S. citizens don't expect their cities to
be attacked when the Pentagon bombs or invades another
country. How much would U.S. citizens rein in their
Pentagon if they knew that future such attacks would bring
missiles with conventional warheads raining down on them?

_Until_ such an attack was launched, American citizens would not take
the threat seriously. _When_ such an attack was launched, American
citizens would be demanding revenge and destruction of the threat, not
the "reining in" of the Pentagon.

And by the way, "the Pentagon" has very little to do with deciding
whether or not America goes to war ... do you know how the US system of
government actually works? The key decisionmakers are, in order, the
President, the Senate (especially the Foreign Policy committee), and
the House. The Joint Chiefs of Staff may influence the President's
decisions by their advice, but the President makes the decision to
launch or end military action, with the Senate and House having the
power to sanction or deny sanction to such actions.

- Jordan

Ed Kyle wrote:

But I wonder what the difference would be between today,
when the U.S. can attack at will with little fear of counterstrike,
and a future when more and more potential adversaries will
be able to counterstrike. And not just a one-day attack, but
over and over again for days and weeks and months.

Again, this "over and over again" is totally dependent on America
_tolerating_ the situation. The President would have the power to end
it at any time by ordering an unrestricted nuclear bombardment of the
foe (this would, among other things, rupture the supply lines to the
missiles, even if the missiles managed to remain hidden and hence
unbombarded). The President knows this, _and the American PEOPLE know
it_ (in fact, the American people if anything _over_-estimate the power
of nuclear weapons).

The enemy would, quite likely, be buying its own annihilation by the
use of this tactic.

- Jordan

On 5 Sep 2006 11:30:04 -0700, in a place far, far away, "Jordan"
made the phosphor on my monitor glow in such
a way as to indicate that:


Ed Kyle wrote:

But I wonder what the difference would be between today,
when the U.S. can attack at will with little fear of counterstrike,
and a future when more and more potential adversaries will
be able to counterstrike. And not just a one-day attack, but
over and over again for days and weeks and months.

Again, this "over and over again" is totally dependent on America
_tolerating_ the situation. The President would have the power to end
it at any time by ordering an unrestricted nuclear bombardment of the
foe (this would, among other things, rupture the supply lines to the
missiles, even if the missiles managed to remain hidden and hence
unbombarded). The President knows this, _and the American PEOPLE know
it_ (in fact, the American people if anything _over_-estimate the power
of nuclear weapons).

The enemy would, quite likely, be buying its own annihilation by the
use of this tactic.

Yes. The old saying is that "rubble doesn't make trouble."

Ed Kyle wrote:

I suspect that ICBMs will become more affordable, relatively
speaking, for U.S. adversaries in the future.

Quite true, because of overall technological progress.

This is, however, not only also but _more_ true for ABM's and BMD
systems, since they are higher-tech on the whole than ICBM's.

The U.S. economy
is steadily weakening, relative to much of the rest of the world,
as the U.S. fritters its dollars away on more and more on
imported products.

*sigh*

Another person who doesn't understand economics.

Google on "comparative advantage." Then read a book on economic
history. The exact claim that you just made has been made for, among
other situations, Britain in the 18th century.

The relatively richer non-U.S. nations will be
able to afford more and more weapons, relative to the U.S.
arsenal, as time passes.

There is absolutely no reason to believe that the Terrorist States will
be more economically successful than America. Historically,
totalitarianism and xenophobia are not engines of economic progress.

As I'm sure you are aware, wars
are ultimately fought by economies rather than by arms.

They are, in fact, ultimately fought by arms purchased by the wealth
generated by a healthy economy.

In addition, ICBM costs themselves would come down
considerably if the missiles were designed to haul conventional
warheads. Unit production runs for such missiles would be
in the thousands, rather than in the hundreds, providing
economies of scale.

How does this follow? The cost of the nuclear warhead is a fraction of
the cost of the whole missile. Conventional ICBM's would be _somewhat_
cheaper than nuclear ICBM's, but not to the extent that you imagine.

The missiles wouldn't be costly
monsters like the U.S. Peacekeeper either. They would be
smaller, lighter, cheaper mobile missiles like the Russian's
Topol or the U.S. Small-ICBM concept - or even something
like the proportedly cheap SpaceX Falcon.

While still having the range to hit America? _And_ carrying
penetration aids to get through ABM's and other BMD systems? And
what's America doing while all this is going on, just watching
helplessly?

One thousand
such missiles could be had for perhaps $12 billion in the U.S.,
and probably for much less if produced in a third-world country.
$12 billion is only five day's worth of the U.S. trade deficit,
and would only be 0.2% of Iran's GDP over a ten-year period.

And yet at that price a Terrorist State leader could purchase the
nuclear destruction of his _own_ country -- what a bargain.

- Jordan

Ed Kyle wrote:
Jordan wrote:

Ed, this is sheer fantasy, unless you are assuming an American
President who is idealistically determined not to decisively strike
back, to the point of making political losses by his party inevitable,
and even perhaps to the point of risking impeachment. Under the
conditions you describe, the political pressure would mount on the
American President to use "whatever means necessary" to stop the
attacks -- and the most obvious means would be our own air and missile
power, including perhaps nuclear weapons.

First, recent history shows that there isn't a decisive way to strike
back to stop missile attacks, save for boots on the ground.

Destroying the country or at least the military of the country
launching the attack would probably do it. Israel can't do this, or
even decisively use "boots on the ground," _because we restrain
Israel_. Who are you envisioning restraining us?

Boots on the ground is a much different kind of war than the high-altitude
low-casualty air conflicts that the U.S. has engaged in during the
last few decades. Boots on the ground evens the playing field a bit.

We just _fought_ that kind of war with Saddam Hussein, and crushed him
in about a month. Under the current conditions in Iraq, no insurgency
is in a position to run ICBM production lines much less set up
launchers to attack the American homeland.

Second, on what basis would the U.S. be able to justify a nuclear
response to a conventional attack?

"Justify" to whom?

The American government is primarily the servant of the American
people, who would be the ones _demanding_ a decisive end to the
bombardment. Other countries might not like it, but the populations of
other countries don't get to vote in American elections.

If the U.S. engages in a war,
during which its bombers strike civilian targets like bridges and
power plants, etc., (inevitably killing civilians) why shouldn't
the other participant in said war have a right to counterattack
against the U.S. mainland?

Of course it does. And we, of course, have the right to attack that
other country with any and all weapons we possess. Including nuclear
ones.

Why should U.S. civilians think that
they are not susceptible to becoming fully involved in any war
that their government becomes involved in? History shows that
it is becoming rare for civilians *not* to be caught up in modern
warfare.

Ok, and thus the civilian population of the country launching the
conventional ICBM bombardment would be "caught up" in the "modern war"
their regime had started, when our nuclear missiles scoured their land
with fire.

I think that the fantasy is to believe that the U.S. can forever
protect its civilians from involvement in modern warfare.

Who stated this belief?

I do think, however, based on firm historical experience, that attacks
on the American homeland will enrage the American population, and given
the correlation of forces between America and any Terrorist State or
combination of such States, the effect of an enraged American
population will be the destruction of the State which launched the
attacks. Which makes your proposed strategy very unlikely to succeed,
unless you define "success" as "kill a few thousand Americans, then
have yourself and your whole regime, possibly your whole country, be
destroyed."

If you define "success" that way, then ... bring it on.

- Jordan

Rand Simberg wrote:
On 5 Sep 2006 11:30:04 -0700, in a place far, far away, "Jordan"
made the phosphor on my monitor glow in such

The enemy would, quite likely, be buying its own annihilation by the
use of this tactic.

Yes. The old saying is that "rubble doesn't make trouble."

By the way, please don't mistake my argument for a desire to annihilate
large portions of foreign populations, even the populations of
Terrorist States. I'm merely pointing out that the American government
acts at the sentiment of and in the self-interest of the American
people, and here both sentiment and self-interest would dictate the use
of whatever level of force was needed to stop the attacks.

Kyle thinks that it would instead lead to the American appeasement of
the attackers. The problem with this is that sentiment would desire
revenge, and self-interest would dictate that a stronger country with
valuable resources not yield to extortion, since by doing so it would
practically guarantee many repetitions of such extortion attempts in
the future.

By and large, the rest of the world grasps this, which is why there
have been few attacks on the American homeland from the end of the
Indian Wars on. The exceptions were Pancho Villa (who nearly got
Northern Mexico annexed by America, and was saved by the bell of
American entry into the Great War) and Al Qaeda (the 1993 and 9/11/2001
attacks on the World Trade Center, which resulted in the fall of
pro-Terrorist regimes in Afghanistan and Iraq).

Deterrence may fail to deter the inept or insane, but few volunteer to
copy their examples.

- Jordan