NASA marks anniversary of -- huh? Are they SERIOUS?!

Rand Simberg wrote:
On 21 Feb 2006 11:08:37 -0800, in a place far, far away,
made the phosphor on my monitor glow in such a
way as to indicate that:

Those bumped from the A-4 program would have had virtually *no* chance
to make any useful contributions to the A-Bomb project.

That says less about their utility than it does about the
ineffectiveness of German decision making,

It says rather a lot about *both*. Again, what utility to an atom bomb
project would an aerodynamicist be?

It depends on how specialized he was, and what his background was, and
how adaptable he was.

OK. Then why do you assume the A-4 program damaged the German Abopmb
program? Couldn't the Abomb program ahve gotten it's human resources
just as easily from, say, the Type XXI and Type XXIII U-Boat
development staff? How about the Porsche and Henschal tank works?
Dornier and Messerschmitt? The BMW and Junkers turbojet design teams?
What made the A-4 so special that people who devoted themselves to
rockets did so at the expense of nuclear physics?

On 21 Feb 2006 10:17:38 -0800, in a place far, far away,
made the phosphor on my monitor glow in such a
way as to indicate that:

What nuclear scientists and engineers were snapped up by the A-4 program???

What nuclear scientists and engineers existed in Germany at all? Or
rocket scientists and engineers, for that matter? They were
engineers, and they learned on the job. They would have done the same
thing if they'd had to, on nuclear programs.


Or been sent to the Eastern Front.

Or not.

What chance would an A-4 aerodynamicist have on a nuclear physics
project??? The skills don't translate. And it's not like the
aerodynamicist - or anyone else from the A-4 program, for that matter -
could, after getting his pink slip, turn in an application a tthe Atom
Bomb Project.

They could if the Germans had been smart.

Those bumped from the A-4 program would have had virtually *no* chance
to make any useful contributions to the A-Bomb project.

That says less about their utility than it does about the
ineffectiveness of German decision making, which is what this thread
is all about.

On 21 Feb 2006 11:08:37 -0800, in a place far, far away,
made the phosphor on my monitor glow in such a
way as to indicate that:

Those bumped from the A-4 program would have had virtually *no* chance
to make any useful contributions to the A-Bomb project.

That says less about their utility than it does about the
ineffectiveness of German decision making,

It says rather a lot about *both*. Again, what utility to an atom bomb
project would an aerodynamicist be?

It depends on how specialized he was, and what his background was, and
how adaptable he was.

On 21 Feb 2006 12:47:03 -0800, in a place far, far away,
made the phosphor on my monitor glow in such a
way as to indicate that:

Those bumped from the A-4 program would have had virtually *no* chance
to make any useful contributions to the A-Bomb project.

That says less about their utility than it does about the
ineffectiveness of German decision making,

It says rather a lot about *both*. Again, what utility to an atom bomb
project would an aerodynamicist be?

It depends on how specialized he was, and what his background was, and
how adaptable he was.

OK. Then why do you assume the A-4 program damaged the German Abopmb
program? Couldn't the Abomb program ahve gotten it's human resources
just as easily from, say, the Type XXI and Type XXIII U-Boat
development staff? How about the Porsche and Henschal tank works?
Dornier and Messerschmitt? The BMW and Junkers turbojet design teams?

Sure.

All of the above.

What made the A-4 so special that people who devoted themselves to
rockets did so at the expense of nuclear physics?

The fact that it was a relatively militarily useless program.

"Gene Cash" wrote in message
...
writes:

Of course the German who did the most to aid the allied victory was
Hitler. After 1940 most of his strategic decisions were disasters

I've always thought an Allied assassination of Hitler would have been a
huge mistake. It would have made him a martyr and it would have put
people in charge that knew what they were doing.

Those people mostly didn't want the war in the first place.

Rand Simberg wrote:
On Tue, 21 Feb 2006 00:21:46 +0800, in a place far, far away, "Neil
Gerace" made the phosphor on my monitor glow in
such a way as to indicate that:
snip
Either way I don't think Germany had the materials to make enough bombers to
do any damage to the country which had by then become the main enemy.

They did if they'd also managed to develop the bomb, another potential
oppurtunity cost of the V-2 program...
I am highly skeptical that not pursuing the V-2 program would have
given them the resources to pursue two large scale engineering
projects: long range bomber development and nuclear weapon development.
Nuclear weapon development alone would have been a stretch.

On the plus side the Germans had one of the best nuclear
experimentalists in Hahn, perhaps the best pure theorist in Heisenberg,
and the world's largest supply of Uranium after their capture of
Belgium.

On the negative side:
1. Germany was highly short of resources. While the US commitment to
three different means of producing fissile material (electromagnetic
U-235 separation, diffusive U-235 separation, and graphite moderated
reactor Pu-239 production) led to a more costly effort than was
strictly necessary, even the cheapest single approach required
significant resources.

2. Germany was short of time. Accurate predictions of the quantities
required for a bomb, required accurate measurements of cross sections,
and detailed numerical modeling by a relatively large body of (human)
computers. Neither were available in late 1941 early 1942 when the
German scientists were asked about the feasibility of nuclear weapons.
Without accurate cross sections and models estimates of the amount of
material required varied by several orders of magnitude, which in turn
led to large uncertainties in the time required. Germany could afford
to develop nuclear weapons if the effort took less than two years, it
could not afford to wait five years, particularly if the end result
would be a weapon so heavy it could not be delivered by an available
aircraft.

3. Personality and organizational issues hindered communication. Having
three different nuclear reactor efforts with leaders that did not get
along with one another was not conducive to progress.

4. The German scientists, particularly Heisenberg, were skeptical of
the feasibility of U-235 separation. But even if they decided to pursue
that route, U-235 separation is energy intensive, even for centrifugal
methods. In 1944 and 1945 Germany was increasingly constrained by its
energy supplies.

5. Focus on Pu-239 production meant that even if they were successful
in material production, the German nuclear weapons designers would
eventually have to confront the issue of pre-ignition, and the
subtleties of implosion design.

6. Errors in Carbon cross section measurements, due to insufficiently
pure Carbon, led to a more expensive approach of heavy-water reactors,
and a reliance on a single source of heavy water. While the problems
with Carbon purity was recognized by some, the competition for
resources meant the follow-on measurements were underfunded.

7. Allied recognition of the implications of Germany's interest in
heavy water meant that they put in a large (eventually successful)
effort into denying Germany that single source.

8. If the Germans had decided to develop nuclear weapons, Heisenberg's
potential effect on the resulting program is difficult to evaluate.
Given his reputation, his involvement was critical. His documented
estimates of material requirements varied by several orders of
magnitude: i.e., from a few tens of kilograms to a few tons. His most
influential estimates, at the time of that feasibility evaluations were
required, were on the high end of that range. It is unclear from the
available hard documentation whether that overestimate was due to a
combination of poor cross sections and an oversimplified model, or the
result of deliberate obstruction on his part. Comments by Heisenberg
and others on how his motives and abilities might have affected his
estimates are highly suspect. If the overestimate was unintentional
then detailed collaboration with others would have led to the rapid
correction of problems, if they were deliberate, then he could have
greatly delayed progress. (Note the Farm Hall transcripts are only an
additional source of confusion on this point. The first day after
hearing of Hiroshima, he repeats his estimate of several tons of
material. Another day, after being reminded that he had made lower
estimates at one time, he gives a more reasonable (a few tens of
kilograms of U-235) and well justified estimate of the material
required. Why did he repeat that overestimate that first day, when he
knew how to obtain a more accurate estimate? Forgetfulness, an
unwillingness to correct the most widely known number, a desire to
mislead the allies, or a combination of a disbelief in the feasibility
of U-235 separation and a lack of Pu data?)

wrote in message
oups.com...
Rand Simberg wrote:

On the plus side the Germans had one of the best nuclear
experimentalists in Hahn

Much of whose work was actually done by Lise Meitner.

wrote
I am highly skeptical that not pursuing the V-2 program would have
given them the resources to pursue two large scale engineering
projects: long range bomber development and nuclear weapon development.
Nuclear weapon development alone would have been a stretch.


I concur. My concern is that more jet interceptors and tanks would
have held off Allied armies well into 1945, with the consequent need
for using the US A-bomb on Germany, leaving none for the Pacific
Theatre until 1946... with millions more deaths in both theatres.

Sensible thesis -- but that 'short period' could have been
adequate for swinging the theatre need of the US nukes
from the Pacific to Europe.

And it wasn't just engineering talent and hi-tech
manufacture, it was stuff like fuel production
diverted to the V-programs.



wrote in message
ups.com...

Rand Simberg wrote:
snip

The issue wasn't the cost of the vehicles, but the opportunity cost of
all the engineers who had developed them, who might otherwise have
been doing something useful, like building a long-range bomber.

I am surprised at that opinion. Given Allied air superiority I am
skeptical that a long range bomber would have been effective for the
Germans. Even with air superiority the Allies often had daunting losses
in their air raids until the war was almost over. Further I had the
impression that the development and production of the B29 required
American resources comparable to the development of nuclear weapons,
i.e., more than the Germans devoted to the V2.

An effective counter to Allied air superiority might have been useful,
e.g. a jet design that wass optimized as a fighhter, and not a fighter
bomber combination. But given the large Allied jet production rates by
the end of the war, even such a ddesign would have had a significant
impact for only a short period.

Rand Simberg wrote:

What made the A-4 so special that people who devoted themselves to
rockets did so at the expense of nuclear physics?

The fact that it was a relatively militarily useless program.

Non- responsive.