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Pre-Columbia Criticism of NASA's Safety Culture in the late 1990's



 
 
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  #31  
Old September 10th 03, 07:51 AM
Charleston
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Default Pre-Columbia Criticism of NASA's Safety Culture in the late 1990's

"Stuf4" wrote in message

Sorry I am so late to the thread.

I have addressed -107 type entry scenarios. If you don't like my
analysis, there are specialists within the field who can give you
their analysis as to how easy it could have been done.

I was at the library yesterday and was surprised to find the AvWeek
article titled "Crew Module Separated" (Sep-1-03,p31). This led me to
go back to the CAIB report to find the section where crew module
integrity was discussed: p77(of248) titled "STS-107 CREW
SURVIVABILITY". The report is very clear in the fact that it was well
after vehicle breakup that aerothermal loads finally caused the loss
of integrity of the crew module. This tells me that a module designed
for aerodynamic stability and given adequate thermal protection would
have survived (or at least *could* have survived).


Ah, yep. An initial design was completed in 1986 that would have allowed up
to ***five*** crewmembers to sit in a reentry vehicle in the payload bay.
The CDR and PLT would stay at the flight deck. In the case of loss of
control, the reentry vehicle would be ejected out through the payload bay
doors via an opening. Ironically the system would have served the dual
purpose of docking device for ISS visits. Cost 1/2 billion dollars. Value,
priceless.

If NASA had allowed for completely automated reentry and the crew was just
five.... Well "WTF" nothing will bring them back now. I feel sick that I
did not say more, louder, sooner, and that I did not meet my writing
objectives. Sorry, but nothing would have changed anyway I guess.

http://www.google.com/groups?as_q=WT...gg&lr= &hl=en

http://www.flatoday.com/news/space/s...spa051001b.htm

--

Daniel
Mount Charleston, not Charleston, SC


  #32  
Old September 10th 03, 01:33 PM
Bill Harris
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Default Pre-Columbia Criticism of NASA's Safety Culture in the late 1990's


From Bill Harris:
In summary, it would have been easy to design the shuttle with crew escape
capability covering the vast majority of ascent/entry

I didn't think you could answer my question.

I didn't ask about ascent. I specifically asked about the stage at where
Columbia was lost.


I have addressed -107 type entry scenarios. If you don't like my
analysis, there are specialists within the field who can give you
their analysis as to how easy it could have been done.


You didn't answer my question then and you still haven't. I didn't ask about
any hypothetical escape systems for the shuttle. I specifically asked what was
the escape mechanism for ANY spacecraft during reentry. Meaning Mercury,
Gemini, Apollo, Soyuz or the Shuttle.

Try answering the question, mister.

Bill Harris

Sci-Fi Quote of the month:
"We will never forgive and we will never forget." - Stilgar, "Dune"
  #33  
Old September 10th 03, 07:07 PM
Jonathan Silverlight
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Default Pre-Columbia Criticism of NASA's Safety Culture in the late 1990's

In message , Bill Harris
writes

From Bill Harris:
In summary, it would have been easy to design the shuttle with crew escape
capability covering the vast majority of ascent/entry

I didn't think you could answer my question.

I didn't ask about ascent. I specifically asked about the stage at where
Columbia was lost.


I have addressed -107 type entry scenarios. If you don't like my
analysis, there are specialists within the field who can give you
their analysis as to how easy it could have been done.


You didn't answer my question then and you still haven't. I didn't ask about
any hypothetical escape systems for the shuttle. I specifically asked what was
the escape mechanism for ANY spacecraft during reentry. Meaning Mercury,
Gemini, Apollo, Soyuz or the Shuttle.


Isn't the point that the shuttle is unlike any of the tin cans that
preceded it? It's _huge_, perhaps big enough to add a capsule. And
that's all the earlier craft were.
--
"Forty millions of miles it was from us, more than forty millions of miles of
void"
  #34  
Old September 11th 03, 03:37 AM
Stuf4
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Default Pre-Columbia Criticism of NASA's Safety Culture in the late 1990's

From Jonathan Silverlight:
In message , Bill Harris
writes

From Bill Harris:
In summary, it would have been easy to design the shuttle with crew escape
capability covering the vast majority of ascent/entry

I didn't think you could answer my question.

I didn't ask about ascent. I specifically asked about the stage at where
Columbia was lost.


I have addressed -107 type entry scenarios. If you don't like my
analysis, there are specialists within the field who can give you
their analysis as to how easy it could have been done.


You didn't answer my question then and you still haven't. I didn't ask about
any hypothetical escape systems for the shuttle. I specifically asked what was
the escape mechanism for ANY spacecraft during reentry. Meaning Mercury,
Gemini, Apollo, Soyuz or the Shuttle.


Ahh! Thank you for the clarification, Bill. (I'll answer without
being snippy.)

OK, point taken. There was absolutely no escape mechanism for any
preceding spacecraft for that phase of entry. There was a scare with
Glenn and his heat shield, but everyone in Mercury, Gemini, Apollo,
Skylab and ASTP made it through OK (for the most part).

The track record for Soyuz entry has been marred. But even then, an
engineer might be tempted to conclude that since there has *never*
been a thermal breech on entry, there is no need to design for crew
escape on entry.

Isn't the point that the shuttle is unlike any of the tin cans that
preceded it? It's _huge_, perhaps big enough to add a capsule. And
that's all the earlier craft were.


Bill, here Jonathan is pointing to the crux of the matter. Elsewhere
there has been discussion about _robust_ design. That is the key
difference between the shuttle and these other piloted spacecraft that
have preceded it. Capsules are designed so robustly that they serve
as their own escape pod. If you're in the safest vehicle for getting
home, then there's no need to get out of it.

The space shuttle, on the other hand, is *not* the safest way to get
home. It is designed for reusability as well as having a high
crossrange capability. This is all gravy when it comes to a safe ride
back to terra firma.

The shuttle is not robust. It is so frail that a small chunk of foam
can destroy it. It launches and enters on a thin margin of safety.
This is why a smart design would give the crew another way back to the
ground.


Was this not a lesson learned from the X-15 program?!

....Mike Adams had no escape pod. Neil Armstrong served on the Rogers
Commission. Neil had flown the X-15. I expect that he has a strong
opinion on X-15 crew escape design that could have saved Mike Adams'
life, and how this lesson from 1967 could have been carried over into
the space shuttle as it was being designed only a few years after.
But wasn't.


~ CT
  #39  
Old September 12th 03, 09:31 AM
Derek Lyons
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Default Pre-Columbia Criticism of NASA's Safety Culture in the late 1990's

jeff findley wrote:

(Derek Lyons) writes:
Capsules have a horrible operational record. They are not a panacea.


How do you arrive at this statement? The only death I can think of
that was directly related to a capsule was Soyuz 1. Other deaths and
near deaths were attributed to systems you'd have on *any*
spacecraft.


Pay attention to the thread Jeff, 'capsule' in the current context
means 'escape capsule' (I.E. F-111) not 'space capsule' (I.E.
Mercury).

D.
--
The STS-107 Columbia Loss FAQ can be found
at the following URLs:

Text-Only Version:
http://www.io.com/~o_m/columbia_loss_faq.html

Enhanced HTML Version:
http://www.io.com/~o_m/columbia_loss_faq_x.html

Corrections, comments, and additions should be
e-mailed to , as well as posted to
sci.space.history and sci.space.shuttle for
discussion.
  #40  
Old September 12th 03, 09:32 AM
Derek Lyons
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Default Pre-Columbia Criticism of NASA's Safety Culture in the late 1990's

"Chuck Stewart" wrote:

On Thu, 11 Sep 2003 20:04:58 +0000, Jon Berndt wrote:

I'm a little puzzled by Derek's statement. I've been trying to think back
on bad capsule experiences, but can't come up with any other than
Komarov's and Soyuz 11.


Well, _if_ you count the Apollo 1 fire (bad capsule design), that makes
4... In Apollo 13 the problem was with the SM, not the capsule, but the
SM was _required_ by the capsule... I think that's about as far as I can
stretch it, myself.

Derek... the howling mob has you surrounded, methinks


The howling mob might try reading the text I quoted for context. I'd
expect stuffy to ignore context, but the rest of you disappoint me.

D.
--
The STS-107 Columbia Loss FAQ can be found
at the following URLs:

Text-Only Version:
http://www.io.com/~o_m/columbia_loss_faq.html

Enhanced HTML Version:
http://www.io.com/~o_m/columbia_loss_faq_x.html

Corrections, comments, and additions should be
e-mailed to , as well as posted to
sci.space.history and sci.space.shuttle for
discussion.
 




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