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"Stuf4" wrote in message
Sorry I am so late to the thread. I have addressed -107 type entry scenarios. If you don't like my analysis, there are specialists within the field who can give you their analysis as to how easy it could have been done. I was at the library yesterday and was surprised to find the AvWeek article titled "Crew Module Separated" (Sep-1-03,p31). This led me to go back to the CAIB report to find the section where crew module integrity was discussed: p77(of248) titled "STS-107 CREW SURVIVABILITY". The report is very clear in the fact that it was well after vehicle breakup that aerothermal loads finally caused the loss of integrity of the crew module. This tells me that a module designed for aerodynamic stability and given adequate thermal protection would have survived (or at least *could* have survived). Ah, yep. An initial design was completed in 1986 that would have allowed up to ***five*** crewmembers to sit in a reentry vehicle in the payload bay. The CDR and PLT would stay at the flight deck. In the case of loss of control, the reentry vehicle would be ejected out through the payload bay doors via an opening. Ironically the system would have served the dual purpose of docking device for ISS visits. Cost 1/2 billion dollars. Value, priceless. If NASA had allowed for completely automated reentry and the crew was just five.... Well "WTF" nothing will bring them back now. I feel sick that I did not say more, louder, sooner, and that I did not meet my writing objectives. Sorry, but nothing would have changed anyway I guess. http://www.google.com/groups?as_q=WT...gg&lr= &hl=en http://www.flatoday.com/news/space/s...spa051001b.htm -- Daniel Mount Charleston, not Charleston, SC |
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![]() From Bill Harris: In summary, it would have been easy to design the shuttle with crew escape capability covering the vast majority of ascent/entry I didn't think you could answer my question. I didn't ask about ascent. I specifically asked about the stage at where Columbia was lost. I have addressed -107 type entry scenarios. If you don't like my analysis, there are specialists within the field who can give you their analysis as to how easy it could have been done. You didn't answer my question then and you still haven't. I didn't ask about any hypothetical escape systems for the shuttle. I specifically asked what was the escape mechanism for ANY spacecraft during reentry. Meaning Mercury, Gemini, Apollo, Soyuz or the Shuttle. Try answering the question, mister. Bill Harris Sci-Fi Quote of the month: "We will never forgive and we will never forget." - Stilgar, "Dune" |
#33
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In message , Bill Harris
writes From Bill Harris: In summary, it would have been easy to design the shuttle with crew escape capability covering the vast majority of ascent/entry I didn't think you could answer my question. I didn't ask about ascent. I specifically asked about the stage at where Columbia was lost. I have addressed -107 type entry scenarios. If you don't like my analysis, there are specialists within the field who can give you their analysis as to how easy it could have been done. You didn't answer my question then and you still haven't. I didn't ask about any hypothetical escape systems for the shuttle. I specifically asked what was the escape mechanism for ANY spacecraft during reentry. Meaning Mercury, Gemini, Apollo, Soyuz or the Shuttle. Isn't the point that the shuttle is unlike any of the tin cans that preceded it? It's _huge_, perhaps big enough to add a capsule. And that's all the earlier craft were. -- "Forty millions of miles it was from us, more than forty millions of miles of void" |
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From Jonathan Silverlight:
In message , Bill Harris writes From Bill Harris: In summary, it would have been easy to design the shuttle with crew escape capability covering the vast majority of ascent/entry I didn't think you could answer my question. I didn't ask about ascent. I specifically asked about the stage at where Columbia was lost. I have addressed -107 type entry scenarios. If you don't like my analysis, there are specialists within the field who can give you their analysis as to how easy it could have been done. You didn't answer my question then and you still haven't. I didn't ask about any hypothetical escape systems for the shuttle. I specifically asked what was the escape mechanism for ANY spacecraft during reentry. Meaning Mercury, Gemini, Apollo, Soyuz or the Shuttle. Ahh! Thank you for the clarification, Bill. (I'll answer without being snippy.) OK, point taken. There was absolutely no escape mechanism for any preceding spacecraft for that phase of entry. There was a scare with Glenn and his heat shield, but everyone in Mercury, Gemini, Apollo, Skylab and ASTP made it through OK (for the most part). The track record for Soyuz entry has been marred. But even then, an engineer might be tempted to conclude that since there has *never* been a thermal breech on entry, there is no need to design for crew escape on entry. Isn't the point that the shuttle is unlike any of the tin cans that preceded it? It's _huge_, perhaps big enough to add a capsule. And that's all the earlier craft were. Bill, here Jonathan is pointing to the crux of the matter. Elsewhere there has been discussion about _robust_ design. That is the key difference between the shuttle and these other piloted spacecraft that have preceded it. Capsules are designed so robustly that they serve as their own escape pod. If you're in the safest vehicle for getting home, then there's no need to get out of it. The space shuttle, on the other hand, is *not* the safest way to get home. It is designed for reusability as well as having a high crossrange capability. This is all gravy when it comes to a safe ride back to terra firma. The shuttle is not robust. It is so frail that a small chunk of foam can destroy it. It launches and enters on a thin margin of safety. This is why a smart design would give the crew another way back to the ground. Was this not a lesson learned from the X-15 program?! ....Mike Adams had no escape pod. Neil Armstrong served on the Rogers Commission. Neil had flown the X-15. I expect that he has a strong opinion on X-15 crew escape design that could have saved Mike Adams' life, and how this lesson from 1967 could have been carried over into the space shuttle as it was being designed only a few years after. But wasn't. ~ CT |
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From Jeff Findley:
(Derek Lyons) writes: Capsules have a horrible operational record. They are not a panacea. How do you arrive at this statement? The only death I can think of that was directly related to a capsule was Soyuz 1. ....and even Komarov's death has been attributed to Soyuz 1/2 having been rushed at the expense of safety concerns. Other deaths and near deaths were attributed to systems you'd have on *any* spacecraft. Soyuz has demonstrated impressive escape capability. ~ CT |
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"Stuf4" wrote
(Derek Lyons) writes: Capsules have a horrible operational record. They are not a panacea. Soyuz has demonstrated impressive escape capability. ~ CT I'm a little puzzled by Derek's statement. I've been trying to think back on bad capsule experiences, but can't come up with any other than Komarov's and Soyuz 11. How many times has the Soyuz aborted on the pad? I can recall one. In any case, the simplicity of a capsule seems to me to be appealing. I can't think of any advantages for a lifting body over a capsule other than a bit of crossrange. When you get into winged vehicles things start getting complicated for launch and entry both. Jon |
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jeff findley wrote:
(Derek Lyons) writes: Capsules have a horrible operational record. They are not a panacea. How do you arrive at this statement? The only death I can think of that was directly related to a capsule was Soyuz 1. Other deaths and near deaths were attributed to systems you'd have on *any* spacecraft. Pay attention to the thread Jeff, 'capsule' in the current context means 'escape capsule' (I.E. F-111) not 'space capsule' (I.E. Mercury). D. -- The STS-107 Columbia Loss FAQ can be found at the following URLs: Text-Only Version: http://www.io.com/~o_m/columbia_loss_faq.html Enhanced HTML Version: http://www.io.com/~o_m/columbia_loss_faq_x.html Corrections, comments, and additions should be e-mailed to , as well as posted to sci.space.history and sci.space.shuttle for discussion. |
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"Chuck Stewart" wrote:
On Thu, 11 Sep 2003 20:04:58 +0000, Jon Berndt wrote: I'm a little puzzled by Derek's statement. I've been trying to think back on bad capsule experiences, but can't come up with any other than Komarov's and Soyuz 11. Well, _if_ you count the Apollo 1 fire (bad capsule design), that makes 4... In Apollo 13 the problem was with the SM, not the capsule, but the SM was _required_ by the capsule... I think that's about as far as I can stretch it, myself. Derek... the howling mob has you surrounded, methinks ![]() The howling mob might try reading the text I quoted for context. I'd expect stuffy to ignore context, but the rest of you disappoint me. D. -- The STS-107 Columbia Loss FAQ can be found at the following URLs: Text-Only Version: http://www.io.com/~o_m/columbia_loss_faq.html Enhanced HTML Version: http://www.io.com/~o_m/columbia_loss_faq_x.html Corrections, comments, and additions should be e-mailed to , as well as posted to sci.space.history and sci.space.shuttle for discussion. |
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