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![]() Rusty wrote: Wasn't the Viking design based on V-2 technology in the beginning? Rusty There was obviously a lot of input in the design from examination of how the V-2 was made and worked, right down to the choice of propellants. But Aerobee was pretty much an all-American design, and you can see it evolving on its own even if there hadn't been a V-2. The trick is the timeframe...having the V-2 to serve as a example that a large rocket was possible served as a major incentive to build them, and I think things would have advanced slower without it. Certainly we never had the incentive to build something big along the lines of Goddard's "basic rocket" in the 1930's. Pat |
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Pat Flannery wrote:
The trick is the timeframe...having the V-2 to serve as a example that a large rocket was possible served as a major incentive to build them, and I think things would have advanced slower without it. I didn't have a "trick" in mind (and probably shouldn't have phrased the question so much in alt.history.what-if style). It's really a two-stage :-) question: If no Peenemunde program and no V-2, how long for *scientific* motivations and budgets to push us to sounding rockets a la Aerobee? AND If no prospect of nuclear warheads, how long for *scientific* motivations and budgets to push us from something like Aerobee to orbit, with Vanguard or the like? Or would a first commercial commsat or first miltary spysat have done the trick? In a way, it's a question about Big Science and the associated Big Bleeding-Edge Engineering, which historians agree was very much a legacy of WWII. After radar, jets, the V-2 and the A-bomb, scientists who previously had thought $50K was big money had access to millions, so we would stay ahead with wonder weapons (or at any rate not be surprised by somebody else's wonder weapons). But to what extent would the US or USSR have seen a high-explosive-only uber-V-2, antipodeal bomber etc. as a wonder weapon worth pursuing? I remember a "won't it be great?" IGY poster in my classroom in 1956, and in hindsight I know that planning for it had been going on since 1952-1953. Would a satellite (rather then just a slew of up-and-down instrument packages to the exosphere) have been part of the mix if the scientists hadn't had the benefit of pedal-to-the-metal engineering towards the R-7, Redstone, Atlas etc? |
#13
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Monte Davis wrote:
If no Peenemunde program and no V-2, how long for *scientific* motivations and budgets to push us to sounding rockets a la Aerobee? I suspect that although there were no formal long-range missile programs in the immediate post-war period, a major motivation for upper-atmosphere research was the possibility of developing long-range missiles that would fly through the upper atmosphere. Thus, I suspect that the V-2 indirectly stimulated Aerobee and Viking. Hence, without the V-2, large sounding rockets would have come much later. On the plus side, without the German Army's interest in the V-2, Germany's amateur group, the VfR (Verein fuer Raumfahrt, i.e., Union for Space Travel), would have retained Wernher von Braun and its own accomplishments would probably have been more extensive, although high-altitude sounding rockets would still have been unlikely. If no prospect of nuclear warheads, how long for *scientific* motivations and budgets to push us from something like Aerobee to orbit, with Vanguard or the like? Or would a first commercial commsat or first miltary spysat have done the trick? It strikes me as unlikely that communications satellites by themselves would have justified the expense of developing orbital launch vehicles. Spy satellites seem a much more likely motivation, since, being military, they could draw on large budgets. Without nuclear weapons, however, the Soviet Union probably would not have seem frightening enough to warrant satellites. And the Soviets would probably not have bothered to develop spy satellites either, since they had many more opportunities for traditional, on-the-ground intelligence gathering. With commercially-viable uses of space other than communications satellites being for the most part economically marginal today, even after decades of governments covering sunk costs, I doubt that any other commercial application would have yet spurred the development of orbital technology. That leaves pure scientific research as the likely motivation. The question is then at what stage would US GDP have grown sufficiently that satellites would have been affordable in the context of a government willing to spend x percent per year on pure research. In this regard, what was the total cost, excluding sounding rockets and satellites, of the US contribution to the IGY? How much money was spent on pre-IGY antarctic research? What was typical US government spending on astronomy in the late 50s? |
#14
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![]() Monte Davis wrote: If no prospect of nuclear warheads, how long for *scientific* motivations and budgets to push us from something like Aerobee to orbit, with Vanguard or the like? Or would a first commercial commsat or first miltary spysat have done the trick? There are so many variables in that question that I don't know if it can even be answered in any real form. Without a nuclear weapon (or some sort of other highly destructive payload such as Anthrax or Smallpox) a strategic SSM doesn't make a lot of sense unless you can give it some form of terminal guidance to hit a specific target with great accuracy. What made things fluky was that both the German's and ourselves came up with one part of a terrifying weapons system technology that when put together worked extremely well as a combined system- the nuclear warheaded SSM. What really would have seriously stymied space exploration isn't a world without V-2s, it's a world without the atomic bomb. If it hadn't been possible to build, then the drive to build long-range rockets might never of happened. I went digging around for when the WAC Corporal program got started, and what gets even it rolling is reports that the Germans are playing around with long-range artillery rockets, although I doubt anyone involved in the WAC Corporal program knows about the Manhattan Project, so the design is very modest in size. In a atomic bomb free world the bomber, not SSM, may be king, due to the need for dropping its bombload with accuracy, requiring some guidance input from the bombardier. In a way, it's a question about Big Science and the associated Big Bleeding-Edge Engineering, which historians agree was very much a legacy of WWII. After radar, jets, the V-2 and the A-bomb, scientists who previously had thought $50K was big money had access to millions, so we would stay ahead with wonder weapons (or at any rate not be surprised by somebody else's wonder weapons). But to what extent would the US or USSR have seen a high-explosive-only uber-V-2, antipodeal bomber etc. as a wonder weapon worth pursuing? I remember a "won't it be great?" IGY poster in my classroom in 1956, and in hindsight I know that planning for it had been going on since 1952-1953. Would a satellite (rather then just a slew of up-and-down instrument packages to the exosphere) have been part of the mix if the scientists hadn't had the benefit of pedal-to-the-metal engineering towards the R-7, Redstone, Atlas etc? That's a good question indeed...you might end up with something like the Antipodal Bomber being developed, and that slowly evolving into something like the Space Shuttle in the way the X-15 was to lead to Dyna-Soar. One incentive for hypersonic superbombers even with conventional payloads is that the impact of the bomb at those velocities makes it highly destructive from the viewpoint of kinetic energy alone. The "Rods From God" concept may have shown up decades earlier. Pat |
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Pat Flannery wrote:
The "Rods From God" concept may have shown up decades earlier. If only via some dense piece falling off during tests. "WTF!?!? Did you *arm* that XB-227, Colonel?" "N-no sir, General, sir." "Then how do you explain that $#%^ CRATER 200 miles east of Nellis?" "Let me get back to you on that, sir..." |
#16
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In article ,
Jim Oberg wrote: 'Scout' rockets also were big stacks of solids that could have come along as sounding rockets, then orbital vehicles. Without missiles, I doubt that the technology for high-performance solid rockets would have developed. The real incentive for solids was things that had to sit in a magazine or a silo for years, and then be ready to go on a moment's notice. Of course, "missiles" doesn't have to mean *ballistic* missiles. Rockets were in active development, and in some cases in use, for various tactical military roles late in WW2. -- spsystems.net is temporarily off the air; | Henry Spencer mail to henry at zoo.utoronto.ca instead. | |
#17
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Or would a first commercial commsat or first military spysat have done the trick?
Well, who knows? I could argue that, if the Cold War had developed more or less as it did sans ICBMs (but with intercontinental bombers), the US would have been driven to develop reconnaissance capabilities similar to the U2 - CORONA succession anyway. The crux of this is that the US had pretty much zip in the way of other intelligence capabilities that would allow militarily useful reconnoitering of what was going on in the interior of the USSR and, more importantly, where to send the bombers if it came to such a pass. SIGINT was important, but generally not adequate for the purpose. HUMINT didn't come close. Or not. As said, quien sabe? |
#18
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![]() Henry Spencer wrote: Without missiles, I doubt that the technology for high-performance solid rockets would have developed. The real incentive for solids was things that had to sit in a magazine or a silo for years, and then be ready to go on a moment's notice. Scout's first stage was a direct outgrowth of work on the Polaris project. Pat |
#19
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In article ,
Monte Davis wrote: Similarly, even *with* the V-2 but without the A-bomb, you might have seen considerable work on military missiles... but with only high-explosive warheads... Bear in mind that there are other types of weapons of mass destruction. The British were immensely relieved when the warheads of the first V-2s turned out to be just high explosive; they'd been worried about gas or germs or radioactive isotopes. (And the Germans actually had a good non-nuclear payload for even fairly inaccurate missiles, since they'd discovered the first nerve gases.) OK -- assume that impetus hadn't existed. In 1952 the Lord writes in letters of fire in the ionosphe "No ICBMs, OR ELSE!!!" and afflicts von Braun, Korolyov et al with leprosy and boils just to get the point across. Cold War, yes... Eisenhower and Khrushchev and Kennedy, yes... but no ICBMs. Note that this isn't the same as no V-2s. The feasibility of large liquid-fuel rockets still gets established, even if heavenly intervention precludes their most obvious use. Also, you have to assume that the heavenly grounding order includes IRBMs as well as ICBMs. Thor saw as much use as Atlas in the US space program; the Mercury capsule was originally going to fly on a Thor with a new upper stage. In that case, when do you think the first satellite would have reached orbit? The first human? Where would we be today in space? With V-2s but no ICBMs, the first satellite probably happens in the late 1950s, just like it actually did. The early US satellite launchers were derivatives of sounding rockets and tactical missiles. And quite apart from scientific applications, spy satellites would remain of intense interest to the Cold War US military, preoccupied with trying to assess the capabilities and activities of a secretive enemy with a closed, tightly regimented society. The absence of ICBMs would make spysats a bit less urgent, though. Whether the Soviets would be in a position to beat the US to the first satellite (or the first manned spaceflight) is a better question. Most likely not. I would expect strong military interest in a Thor-Agena class rocket as a way to orbit spy satellites -- Jupiter-C and Vanguard wouldn't be enough for that -- although development wouldn't be done at the breakneck pace of the real late 50s. That rocket with a heftier upper stage might well suffice for Mercury-class manned flights and early planetary probes, perhaps in the late 1960s. Still larger rockets would be slow to appear, and their developers might well value reusability and low cost over rapid development. They would probably benefit from a more extensive hypersonic-aircraft technology base, since the cancellation of projects like the B-70 and the F-103 owed a lot to competition from ICBMs. For a guess, you get a big reusable orbital ferry rocket circa 1980. It wouldn't resemble the Shuttle much -- the payload would be smaller, the engines probably wouldn't burn LH2, and there would be much more emphasis on low operating cost. Military manned spaceflight might be stillborn just like it was in the real world, killed by competition from unmanned spysats... although with things happening more slowly, there would be time to build up more momentum, and you might see military Mercury flights and experiments with rendezvous as a way to build a small MOL-class military space station. Possibly the ferry rocket would be partly or entirely a military project. If so, military manned spaceflight might well continue, with much-reduced costs and stronger institutional commitments acting to preserve it despite the unmanned competition. Whether anything like NASA would be created, and when, is a good question; it was motivated partly by the urgency of the Space Race. Possibly it might appear as the government's chosen vehicle for manned beyond-LEO exploration, with the ferry rocket starting to make that practical (using orbital assembly) and the military not very interested. Like pre-Sputnik Vanguard, it would have been much hyped but not very well funded, so progress would be slow despite the large advantage conferred by having an off-the-shelf ferry rocket and off-the-shelf technology for small space stations and orbital assembly. So, where would we be today? As a wild guess... We'd be celebrating the tenth anniversary of the first lunar landing. The expedition that will plant the first permanent lunar base is in final assembly at NASA's orbital operations base; they'd hoped to have it done for the anniversary, but funding was tight and it ran late, despite the reduction in costs when NASA started accepting commercial fuel deliveries at the ops base. The second space hotel is in construction, and people are hoping that some real competition will bring the first one's prices down. The military and NASA are still flying their first-generation ferry rockets, which are looking pretty dated despite numerous incremental improvements along the way; with the Cold War over and commercial second-generation ferries now flying, Congress has balked at funding a new government design. There is talk of commercial lunar flights and even a non-profit private Mars expedition, which NASA is not pleased about (but its own Mars plans, not very far along, lost most of their funding recently, after the NSF's Viking landers found no signs of life). -- spsystems.net is temporarily off the air; | Henry Spencer mail to henry at zoo.utoronto.ca instead. | |
#20
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In article ,
Monte Davis wrote: If no Peenemunde program and no V-2, how long for *scientific* motivations and budgets to push us to sounding rockets a la Aerobee? Probably not long. That was what Goddard was funded to build, remember. (And he probably could have done it, with a more focused effort; he was quite generously funded, by the standards of the day, but kept going off on tangents as new ideas struck, rather than concentrating on getting results from one line of development.) If no prospect of nuclear warheads, how long for *scientific* motivations and budgets to push us from something like Aerobee to orbit, with Vanguard or the like? Or would a first commercial commsat or first miltary spysat have done the trick? Spysats would have been a strong driver... once people were persuaded to take the idea seriously, which would have taken a while. I remember a "won't it be great?" IGY poster in my classroom in 1956, and in hindsight I know that planning for it had been going on since 1952-1953. Would a satellite (rather then just a slew of up-and-down instrument packages to the exosphere) have been part of the mix if the scientists hadn't had the benefit of pedal-to-the-metal engineering towards the R-7, Redstone, Atlas etc? I think there would still have been interest... but the initial design study would probably have concluded that the launcher for it was too ambitious a project to be ready in time. -- spsystems.net is temporarily off the air; | Henry Spencer mail to henry at zoo.utoronto.ca instead. | |
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