Shuttle lift-off footage

Jeff Findley formulated the question :
In article om,
says...

On 14-07-16 08:21, Jeff Findley wrote:

In other words, the space shuttle was a very inefficient (mass wise),
and costly, way to deliver payloads to orbit.


A dump truck is also very inefficient. But it is required for certain
tasks that smaller more efficient trucks can't do.

The Shuttle was a versatile vehicle that acted both as a lada and as a
dump truck. But it was not "best in breed" for any of the missions since
specialized vehicles for specific tasks are more efficient.

But if you're going to have a single vehicle, having a versatile one is
your only way to go. The inefficiencies of the vehicule are somewhat
balanced against the efficiency of designing only 1 vehicle type.

While true, the shuttle flew many missions where the main mission was
deploying a satellite and very little else was done. These missions did
not make use of the shuttle's unique capabilities and could have been
flown on cheaper launch vehicles. The Challenger disaster put an end to
most of these flights (the "commercial" ones at least).

A bit like the Southwest Air argument of using only 1 aircraft type to
simplify costs for pilot skills, parts and maintenance and being able to
substitute one 737 for another when there is a breakdown. But the 737
is not the most efficient to transport large nunmber of people, nor
small number of people. But overall, for the Southwest, the
inefficiencies of the 737 on different missions is balanced/cancelled by
the efficiencies of having a single vehicle.

OK, so the shuttle's payload to ISS would have been 15 metric tonnes or
roughly 33,000 pounds ? Thart is like 10 times what Cygnus can do.

10x is not at all true for a typical ISS resupply mission. You're off
by about a factor of 5 because you're comparing apples and oranges.

For example, you can't just load up the shuttle payload bay with food,
clothing, and the like. It needs to be in some sort of container. That
container, for items which were delivered into the station, was the
MPLM. So you can't reasonably consider the MPLM itself to be "payload".

The maximum payload flown to ISS inside an MPLM was 12,748 lbs (STS-126,
ISS ULF 2, shuttle Endeavour, MPLM Leonardo). An MPLM itself massed
about 9,000 lbs, but that's not payload to ISS since it was not left at
ISS at the end of the mission. The exception being the last flight
where an MPLM was left at ISS to be used as a PLM or permanent logistics
module.

The "standard" Cygnus has a payload capacity of 4,400 lbs. The next
Cygnus to fly will be the "enhanced" version (larger pressurized volume)
with a payload capacity of 6,000 lbs. So, the enhanced Cygnus has
almost exactly 1/2 the payload capacity of an MPLM. Also, note that
Dragon payload is on par with Cygnus. Dragon's payload is 7,300 lbs,
which is a bit better than Cygnus.



To be fair, STS-126 took up some additional payload not contained in the
MPLM, but the Wikipedia entry on it isn't being fair (in much the same
way you are) by including the mass of the MPLM itself, so I can't make
out what parts of the additional "payload" were truly delivered to ISS
and which parts were counted as "payload" even though they were brought
back to earth at the end of the mission.

There was quite a bit of water delivered to ISS that wasn't in the
MPLM, and ISTR some science racks and quite a bit of freezer items were
carried in the crew cabin (mid deck?).

But I'm not looking anything up at this hour.

/dps

--
There's nothing inherently wrong with Big Data. What matters, as it
does for Arnold Lund in California or Richard Rothman in Baltimore, are
the questions -- old and new, good and bad -- this newest tool lets us
ask. (R. Lerhman, CSMonitor.com)

In article mn.b0497de711a02f72.127094@snitoo,
says...
There was quite a bit of water delivered to ISS that wasn't in the
MPLM, and ISTR some science racks and quite a bit of freezer items were
carried in the crew cabin (mid deck?).

But I'm not looking anything up at this hour.

True, but mass wise, those items were quite small compared to the mass
of the MPLM (and the items it contained) and other external payloads
mounted in the payload bay.

I suppose the bigger point here is that it's hard to compare the shuttle
to other craft. What counts as payload? To make the numbers for the
shuttle look better, "payload" on a mission included things like the
mass of the MPLM itself (and other structures in the payload bay which
were sometimes left at ISS and sometimes returned to earth). The MPLM
was only ever left at ISS once (the last MPLM flight was a "PLM"
delivered to ISS as a permanent module).

That's clearly unfair when comparing the "payload" to ISS of the shuttle
versus Cygnus or Dragon, who don't get to count the mass of the
spaceship itself as "payload".

I suspect comparing commercial crew vehicles will be equally difficult,
especially if they replace the role of the Soyuz as an emergency return
craft, which is something the shuttle could not do at all.

Jeff
--
"the perennial claim that hypersonic airbreathing propulsion would
magically make space launch cheaper is nonsense -- LOX is much cheaper
than advanced airbreathing engines, and so are the tanks to put it in
and the extra thrust to carry it." - Henry Spencer

"Jeff Findley" wrote in message
...

In article mn.b0497de711a02f72.127094@snitoo,
says...
There was quite a bit of water delivered to ISS that wasn't in the
MPLM, and ISTR some science racks and quite a bit of freezer items were
carried in the crew cabin (mid deck?).

But I'm not looking anything up at this hour.

True, but mass wise, those items were quite small compared to the mass
of the MPLM (and the items it contained) and other external payloads
mounted in the payload bay.

I suppose the bigger point here is that it's hard to compare the shuttle
to other craft. What counts as payload? To make the numbers for the
shuttle look better, "payload" on a mission included things like the
mass of the MPLM itself (and other structures in the payload bay which
were sometimes left at ISS and sometimes returned to earth). The MPLM
was only ever left at ISS once (the last MPLM flight was a "PLM"
delivered to ISS as a permanent module).

That's clearly unfair when comparing the "payload" to ISS of the shuttle
versus Cygnus or Dragon, who don't get to count the mass of the
spaceship itself as "payload".


Probably correct. I'd probably argue the MPLM is more properly compared to
the Dragon itself, just the container.

The one real advantage right now I think the MPLM/shuttle had was larger
download masses, which permitted equipment to be brought back for inspection
repair. Not worth paying extra for it necessarily, but a nice side-effect
if you can get it.


I suspect comparing commercial crew vehicles will be equally difficult,
especially if they replace the role of the Soyuz as an emergency return
craft, which is something the shuttle could not do at all.

Jeff

--
Greg D. Moore http://greenmountainsoftware.wordpress.com/
CEO QuiCR: Quick, Crowdsourced Responses. http://www.quicr.net

In article ,
says...


"Jeff Findley" wrote in message
l-september.org...

In article ,
says...

On the other hand, I think there's a fair argument for considering the
incremental cost of a shuttle flight
(in part because the development costs were sunk and the government
doesn't
need to pay them back, and in part because in theory, with no NEW
development, the R&D costs tend to be spread out across more flights.)

In that case the incremental cost varied, but generally would could argue
about $100-$250M/flight (we'll go with $250M).

In that case, the shuttle was a clear win.

Sorry, but the "incremental cost" argument is just the sort of
accounting I take offense to. It's my understanding that the
"incremental cost" is the cost to add one additional flight to the
manifest. In other words, completely ignore all of the fixed costs
which you pay even if there are zero shuttle flights (e.g. post
Challenger or post Columbia before flights resumed).

You can take offense all you want, but it's a perfectly valid way of looking
at things.

If Southwest can get an extra flight out of a 737 a day, they don't look at
the total cost of the 737, just the incremental costs of the additional
fuel, crew costs, ramp costs, etc.

Except the shuttle was never run like a 737. Each mission was special
and had scores of engineers working on payload integration, astronaut
training, and etc. Plus there was always the addition of experiments in
the crew cabin, hitch-hiker payloads in the bay, EVAs (to test new tools
and techniques), and etc. Imagine the cost of an airline flight if a
737 crew had to test some new piece of hardware on each and every flight
that required days of training with the hardware being tested.

The flip side to this problem was that NASA always had far too many
astronauts for the size of the shuttle fleet and the number of missions
it flew each year. When an astronaut doesn't fly even once a year for
the length of their career, something is horribly wrong with the way the
program is being run. Again, imagine the costs if a 737 crew only flew
once a month instead of several times a week.

And I think it's an important point. For a couple of reasons:
It shows how badly the government managed the program. Congress was very
willing to fund the shuttle at high costs, but rarely provide any extra
money for extra flights that could have been flown (though one can argue
it's a chicken/egg problem. No more flights because no more payloads, no
more payloads because Congress wasn't willing to fund them.)

True, but NASA was part of that problem. NASA rarely flew a mission
that wasn't packed to the gills with as many "extras" as they could
squeeze in. You can claim that cost may not be part of the "incremental
cost" of a shuttle flight, but Congress had to appropriate those funds
so NASA could pay for all those "extras" and when you added it all up
and asked Congress for the grand total, they never wanted to fund it
all.

Ultimately, this goes to Musk's (and others) business plan: You have
to fly
often. (of course Musk also avoided the mistake of the shuttle program and
optimized for costs from day one. Congress didn't. They spent less
upfront, made bigger leaps and then hoped the cost savings would come.)

Concluding my point was the shuttle is a lesson in both directions:
1) Certain things NOT to do.
Don't make large technological leaps (SRBs, SSMS, tiles)
Don't skimp upfront (SRBs vs LFBBs)

The two problems went hand in hand. The large technological leaps
required a very large investment. So when the inevitable happened
(budget and schedule didn't match the funds and time available),
compromises were made to the design resulting in what you call skimping
up front. The sorts of compromises made had a large impact on fixed
costs.

So the bigger of the two sins was the collection of large technological
leaps required. NASA repeated this horrific mistake when it picked the
winning X-33 contract (despite the success of the VTVL DC-X which
preceded it). I'm quite happy that SpaceX is following in the footsteps
of the DC-X and not the X-33.

Jeff
--
"the perennial claim that hypersonic airbreathing propulsion would
magically make space launch cheaper is nonsense -- LOX is much cheaper
than advanced airbreathing engines, and so are the tanks to put it in
and the extra thrust to carry it." - Henry Spencer

In article ,
says...


Probably correct. I'd probably argue the MPLM is more properly compared to
the Dragon itself, just the container.

The one real advantage right now I think the MPLM/shuttle had was larger
download masses, which permitted equipment to be brought back for inspection
repair. Not worth paying extra for it necessarily, but a nice side-effect
if you can get it.

Agreed. Large down-mass is "nice to have", not a necessity. At least
Dragon has some down-mass capability, unlike Cygnus. Clearly down-mass
wasn't as important to NASA as up-mass when awarding the contracts for
commercial cargo.

Jeff
--
"the perennial claim that hypersonic airbreathing propulsion would
magically make space launch cheaper is nonsense -- LOX is much cheaper
than advanced airbreathing engines, and so are the tanks to put it in
and the extra thrust to carry it." - Henry Spencer

"Jeff Findley" wrote in message
l-september.org...

In article ,
says...

If Southwest can get an extra flight out of a 737 a day, they don't look
at
the total cost of the 737, just the incremental costs of the additional
fuel, crew costs, ramp costs, etc.

Except the shuttle was never run like a 737. Each mission was special
and had scores of engineers working on payload integration, astronaut
training, and etc. Plus there was always the addition of experiments in
the crew cabin, hitch-hiker payloads in the bay, EVAs (to test new tools
and techniques), and etc. Imagine the cost of an airline flight if a
737 crew had to test some new piece of hardware on each and every flight
that required days of training with the hardware being tested.

Ayup, all symptoms in my mind of one of the huge problems with the shuttle.
And you touch upon a related one below.


The flip side to this problem was that NASA always had far too many
astronauts for the size of the shuttle fleet and the number of missions
it flew each year. When an astronaut doesn't fly even once a year for
the length of their career, something is horribly wrong with the way the
program is being run. Again, imagine the costs if a 737 crew only flew
once a month instead of several times a week.

Even if you just flew once or twice a year, things would have improved.

Imagine if NASA had basically dedicated one life science flight every 6
months, i.e. basically reflying the same Spacelab, but with the experiments
swapped out.

Same say for an Earth sciences flight. Flight crew re-training is minimal
and the payload specialists only have to train for their experiments.

(I believe Henry Spencer was a big proponent of this and I believe at least
one commission suggested exactly this.)

And I think it's an important point. For a couple of reasons:
It shows how badly the government managed the program. Congress was very
willing to fund the shuttle at high costs, but rarely provide any extra
money for extra flights that could have been flown (though one can argue
it's a chicken/egg problem. No more flights because no more payloads, no
more payloads because Congress wasn't willing to fund them.)

True, but NASA was part of that problem. NASA rarely flew a mission
that wasn't packed to the gills with as many "extras" as they could
squeeze in. You can claim that cost may not be part of the "incremental
cost" of a shuttle flight, but Congress had to appropriate those funds
so NASA could pay for all those "extras" and when you added it all up
and asked Congress for the grand total, they never wanted to fund it
all.


I think it was sort of a chicken and egg problem. You have as few flights,
you load up as much as you can, so costs go up, so you can't afford more
flights, etc.


Ultimately, this goes to Musk's (and others) business plan: You have
to fly
often. (of course Musk also avoided the mistake of the shuttle program
and
optimized for costs from day one. Congress didn't. They spent less
upfront, made bigger leaps and then hoped the cost savings would come.)

Concluding my point was the shuttle is a lesson in both directions:
1) Certain things NOT to do.
Don't make large technological leaps (SRBs, SSMS, tiles)
Don't skimp upfront (SRBs vs LFBBs)

The two problems went hand in hand. The large technological leaps
required a very large investment. So when the inevitable happened
(budget and schedule didn't match the funds and time available),
compromises were made to the design resulting in what you call skimping
up front. The sorts of compromises made had a large impact on fixed
costs.

Agreed 100%


So the bigger of the two sins was the collection of large technological
leaps required. NASA repeated this horrific mistake when it picked the
winning X-33 contract (despite the success of the VTVL DC-X which
preceded it). I'm quite happy that SpaceX is following in the footsteps
of the DC-X and not the X-33.


Yeah. I think the shuttle was a somewhat honest, though horribly naïve
attempt to fly cheaply (even if it was obvious it would never be as cheap as
some were claiming).

X-33 was very obviously a jobs program. SLS even more so.

Like I say, I fully expect Falcon 9Heavy to fly far more flights and loft
far more payload than SLS ever will. And at a fraction of a price.


Jeff

--
Greg D. Moore http://greenmountainsoftware.wordpress.com/
CEO QuiCR: Quick, Crowdsourced Responses. http://www.quicr.net

"Jeff Findley" wrote in message
l-september.org...

In article ,
says...


Probably correct. I'd probably argue the MPLM is more properly compared
to
the Dragon itself, just the container.

The one real advantage right now I think the MPLM/shuttle had was larger
download masses, which permitted equipment to be brought back for
inspection
repair. Not worth paying extra for it necessarily, but a nice
side-effect
if you can get it.

Agreed. Large down-mass is "nice to have", not a necessity. At least
Dragon has some down-mass capability, unlike Cygnus. Clearly down-mass
wasn't as important to NASA as up-mass when awarding the contracts for
commercial cargo.

That said, I do expect a future generation craft to have substantial
downmass, simply because as our presence in space grows, so will the need
for such things.

But, again, it's the right approach, fly what's needed now, with a little
extra... add on to that.. and evolve.

(here's a wild idea... want huge downmass, fly an inflatable heatshield
inside an Orion trunk, expand in orbit, attach your payload, land it.
Elegant, nope, practical, not very, but probably a cheap way for now to get
something more than we have now.)



Jeff

--
Greg D. Moore http://greenmountainsoftware.wordpress.com/
CEO QuiCR: Quick, Crowdsourced Responses. http://www.quicr.net

In article ,
says...

That said, I do expect a future generation craft to have substantial
downmass, simply because as our presence in space grows, so will the need
for such things.

But, again, it's the right approach, fly what's needed now, with a little
extra... add on to that.. and evolve.

(here's a wild idea... want huge downmass, fly an inflatable heatshield
inside an Orion trunk, expand in orbit, attach your payload, land it.
Elegant, nope, practical, not very, but probably a cheap way for now to get
something more than we have now.)

Agree completely. Such a solution would seem to be ideal for larger
"cargo" down-mass.

I'm happy to see NASA finally getting around to testing this sort of
technology which is also needed for bigger Mars missions. The last
rover landing using the "sky-crane" approach looked more than a bit
Rube-Goldberg to me.

Jeff
--
"the perennial claim that hypersonic airbreathing propulsion would
magically make space launch cheaper is nonsense -- LOX is much cheaper
than advanced airbreathing engines, and so are the tanks to put it in
and the extra thrust to carry it." - Henry Spencer

"Jeff Findley" wrote in message
...

In article ,
says...

That said, I do expect a future generation craft to have substantial
downmass, simply because as our presence in space grows, so will the need
for such things.

But, again, it's the right approach, fly what's needed now, with a little
extra... add on to that.. and evolve.

(here's a wild idea... want huge downmass, fly an inflatable heatshield
inside an Orion trunk, expand in orbit, attach your payload, land it.
Elegant, nope, practical, not very, but probably a cheap way for now to
get
something more than we have now.)

Agree completely. Such a solution would seem to be ideal for larger
"cargo" down-mass.

I'm happy to see NASA finally getting around to testing this sort of
technology which is also needed for bigger Mars missions. The last
rover landing using the "sky-crane" approach looked more than a bit
Rube-Goldberg to me.


You know, that test is exactly the sort of thing I want to see more of from
NASA.

I don't want them to build SLS.

I want them to build and test 20 different engine designs.
10 different structures and materials for tanks, etc.
i.e. try things out, and let industry use the results.

Much like what the N.A.C.A did with airfoils and the like.

NASA should be experimenting with the bleeding edge, but not trying to
exploit it.


Jeff

--
Greg D. Moore http://greenmountainsoftware.wordpress.com/
CEO QuiCR: Quick, Crowdsourced Responses. http://www.quicr.net

On Friday, July 25, 2014 10:20:32 AM UTC-4, Greg (Strider) Moore wrote:

I don't want them to build SLS.



I agree but, the money's been already spent. Shutting SLS down (still a good thing IMHO) will only prevent throwing good money after bad. But the bad money, money that could have been used for much more productive uses, is gone.


I want them to build and test 20 different engine designs.
10 different structures and materials for tanks, etc.
i.e. try things out, and let industry use the results.

Much like what the N.A.C.A did with airfoils and the like.


Gosh, getting that sense of deja vu all over again!

Where have I heard that before? hmmm... ;-)

I *distinctly* remember Pat chiding me for that stance! Asking if I was recommending NASA (as the new NACA) should refocus their work to building the world's first Solar Wind Tunnel. And I remember actually agreeing with that proposal! :-)

I'd love nothing better than the NASA charter being revised to make it the 21st century equivalent to the 20th century NACA. In fact a return to the old acronym would be a blessing! Only I'd propose a change to the wording behind the acronym. From National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics to the National Advancement Commission for Aerospace.

I *hate* the use of the word Administration in the NASA acronym. To me it represents all the *worst* aspects of having a "government in charge", socialist space program.

Been there, done that. Time to move on as they say...

Dave