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In article ,
jeff findley wrote: "Jorge R. Frank" writes: I would have preferred to see all three bids funded to a fly-off, as the DoD often does with aircraft procurements. It would have cost the government more up-front but would be far less likely to result in failure. It looks like CEV may be taking this approach. Let's hope so, especially for the crew launch/entry module. Since the CEV appears to be a more modular vehicle, there isn't really any reason to give all of the pieces to one contractor. You may want a prime contractor to oversee everything, but that doesn't mean that entire modules couldn't be subcontracted out. Jeff That approach was tried for SSF. Work Package 1 was all the pressurized elements and internal systems, contracted to Boeing. Work Package 2 was the integrated truss and external systems like the TCS radiators, integration of the PV arrays with the truss and power storage/distribution systems, external GNC stuff, etc, contracted to McDonnell Douglas; Work Package 3 disappeared early on and I can't remember all of what they were to do - earth observation science stuff, I think; WP 4 was solely the external electrical stuff like batteries, power regulators, etc., IIRC. WP1 wasn't really in charge although it was sort of seen as "first among equals." There was (theoretically) a central SSF Program Office at NASA HQ that was in charge but they were far-removed from things happening in the detailed design process and not very effective at all at controlling the various Center contracting offices for the various work packages (which were at MSFC, JSC and Goddard), let alone influencing the contractors directly. Anyway, the hassles of having so many organizations involved with so many facets of the design process really slowed things down and complicated matters greatly. Just flowing interface requirements properly across so many organizations and people was a tremendous chore. A single, central management entity is really going to be necessary to ensure that everyone is using the same requirements, that all changes get flowed through, costed out properly, and implemented uniformly, etc. The best example I can think of a system like this is how Boeing managed and integrated the Saturn booster program, despite not actually building much if any of it, or how operations at many/all of the various National Laboratories are subcontracted out. -- Herb Schaltegger, B.S., J.D. Reformed Aerospace Engineer Columbia Loss FAQ: http://www.io.com/~o_m/columbia_loss_faq_x.html |
#112
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On Thu, 15 Apr 2004 09:37:15 -0500, in a place far, far away, Herb
Schaltegger made the phosphor on my monitor glow in such a way as to indicate that: Since the CEV appears to be a more modular vehicle, there isn't really any reason to give all of the pieces to one contractor. You may want a prime contractor to oversee everything, but that doesn't mean that entire modules couldn't be subcontracted out. Jeff That approach was tried for SSF. Work Package 1 was all the pressurized elements and internal systems, contracted to Boeing. Work Package 2 was the integrated truss and external systems like the TCS radiators, integration of the PV arrays with the truss and power storage/distribution systems, external GNC stuff, etc, contracted to McDonnell Douglas; Work Package 3 disappeared early on and I can't remember all of what they were to do - earth observation science stuff, I think; WP 4 was solely the external electrical stuff like batteries, power regulators, etc., IIRC. WP1 wasn't really in charge although it was sort of seen as "first among equals." There was (theoretically) a central SSF Program Office at NASA HQ that was in charge but they were far-removed from things happening in the detailed design process and not very effective at all at controlling the various Center contracting offices for the various work packages (which were at MSFC, JSC and Goddard), let alone influencing the contractors directly. The mistake with ISS was not having work packages per se, but in splitting up the NASA management for them (for obvious political reasons, since the primary purpose of the program was to give NASA something to do after the end of the Shuttle development). Multiple contractors could have been managed if they'd had a single government manager. |
#113
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Herb Schaltegger writes:
Anyway, the hassles of having so many organizations involved with so many facets of the design process really slowed things down and complicated matters greatly. Just flowing interface requirements properly across so many organizations and people was a tremendous chore. A single, central management entity is really going to be necessary to ensure that everyone is using the same requirements, that all changes get flowed through, costed out properly, and implemented uniformly, etc. The best example I can think of a system like this is how Boeing managed and integrated the Saturn booster program, despite not actually building much if any of it, or how operations at many/all of the various National Laboratories are subcontracted out. That's what I meant by having a prime contractor. The prime contractor would be in charge of the entire CEV program, but could subcontract out various modules. For example, the TLI stage and its tankage could be subcontracted out, but the prime contractor gets to worry about how it integrates with the other parts. If two modules don't fit or can't talk to each other, it's the prime contractor's fault. Jeff -- Remove "no" and "spam" from email address to reply. If it says "This is not spam!", it's surely a lie. |
#114
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In re the ISS, Rand Simberg is cited as stating that the mistake of ISS is
splitting up the management thereof for political reasons. The writer is of the opinion that ISS is the classic mistake of running Space out of the Foreign Ministry's office, instead of the appropriate commission or ministry. In the UN, that duty is the UN Commission on Space; in the USA, NASA. And so forth. The writer goes one further step: the sooner that the Government Agencies can spin off Space into two divisions -- Science & Exploration, and Commerce & Industry (including Colonization & Settlement -- the latter to be handled under the private sector) the better. -- Leonard C Robinson "The Historian Remembers, and speculates on what might have been. "The Visionary Remembers, and speculates on what may yet be." |
#115
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Herb Schaltegger writes:
The best example I can think of a system like this is how Boeing managed and integrated the Saturn booster program, despite not actually building much if any of it, or how operations at many/all of the various National Laboratories are subcontracted out. Or for an example outside of the space program, you have the FBM/SWS program which not only has multiple 'prime' contractors, but (had) multiple locations where the prime contractors hardware came together for final assembly. Also their were multiple locations where the hardware was operated, not only the boats themselves, but the training and testing/support centers. SSPO (under varying acronyms) served as a goverment single point of contact, but there was also a contractor (VITRO) who oversaw various interfaces. D. -- Touch-twice life. Eat. Drink. Laugh. |
#116
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"Jorge R. Frank" writes:
The particular flight profile was not relevant; the overall goal (an SSTO RLV with low per-flight cost) was. So the RFP was written generally enough for competing approaches to be tried - otherwise, the RFP would have been a disguised sole-source solicitation to MDAC, since they were the only ones proposing an SSTO with that particular flight profile. Not necessarily; if the RFP were written differently, I think that Lockheed and Rockwell would have proposed vehicles that matched the DC-X flight profile. I was a bit surprised to see NASA write the RFP generally; usually, they are guilty of overspecifying it to the point that you can tell they had a particular company/product in mind and wrote the RFP to practically assure that only that product could win. At least in this area, NASA got X-33 right, in my opinion. Let me put it this way... suppose X-33 had actually worked, instead of failing : would there have been a "next stage" that would _not_ have been tied to the Lockheed design's configuration? I'm beginning to think X-33 should have been less ambitious to begin with, so that they could have done experimental flight structures and materials, or advanced heat shielding, without any sort of experimental engines necessary. -- Phil Fraering http://newsfromthefridge.typepad.com "Something's just not right..." "Sweetie, we're criminals. If everything were right, we'd all be in jail." |
#117
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![]() Rand Simberg wrote: On Fri, 26 Mar 2004 19:59:37 -0800, in a place far, far away, Steve Hix made the phosphor on my monitor glow in such a way as to indicate that: The local election boards in Florida in 2000 were dominated by Democrat local control, and the state supreme court was dominated by Democrats. And they still couldn't get enough to win. Because the Governor and Secretary of State were Republicans. Even the NYT, Times and Newsweek gave up on that line of argument shortly after the election. Yes, but Dick won't. He still fantasizes that Al Gore is president. People who fantasize that George Bush won the election fair and square, and that it was *Al Gore* who tried to steal it, should not throw stones. |
#118
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On or about Sat, 24 Apr 2004 04:58:56 GMT, Dick Morris
made the sensational claim that: People who fantasize that George Bush won the election fair and square, Um, he did. and that it was *Al Gore* who tried to steal it, should not throw It was. Having said that, what really should have happened would have put Gore in the White House. -- This is a siggy | To E-mail, do note | Just because something It's properly formatted | who you mean to reply-to | is possible, doesn't No person, none, care | and it will reach me | mean it can happen |
#119
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In article ,
LooseChanj wrote: On or about Sat, 24 Apr 2004 04:58:56 GMT, Dick Morris made the sensational claim that: People who fantasize that George Bush won the election fair and square, Um, he did. and that it was *Al Gore* who tried to steal it, should not throw It was. Having said that, what really should have happened would have put Gore in the White House. Having won his home state (my home state, as a matter of fact) would have obviated the circus in Florida. That he didn't underscores a couple of things, not the least of which is how much his campaign just didn't grasp the demographic changes back at home while he was off being a Friend of Bill and loyal shield carrier for 8 years. -- Herb Schaltegger, B.S., J.D. Reformed Aerospace Engineer Columbia Loss FAQ: http://www.io.com/~o_m/columbia_loss_faq_x.html |
#120
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On Sat, 24 Apr 2004 21:32:18 GMT, in a place far, far away, LooseChanj
made the phosphor on my monitor glow in such a way as to indicate that: and that it was *Al Gore* who tried to steal it, should not throw It was. Having said that, what really should have happened would have put Gore in the White House. A couple years earlier. It's not clear whether he would have stayed there in 2000, though as an incumbent, he probably would have been tougher to beat. |
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