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![]() Craig Fink wrote:" Not the right letter, but Privatizing Earth to LEO might be." Gee craig, not the right thread, as the original post was pertaining to an astronauts statements, http://www.stpns.net/view_article.ht...43251064362304 Gutierrez said the fault lies in two words - engineering arrogance. "NASA engineers were confident that they did everything right," Gutierrez said. "They were so sure everything would work as planned they didn't think an escape system was necessary. The fact is, if there had been an escape system on Columbia and Challenger, the crews could have survived." Actually the design shortcomings of the shuttle system had been known for along time before the challenger tragedy, (ie no crew escape system for more than a small percentage of the crew if in place, and only usable for a small percentage of the flight) and therefore it is the responsibility of managers and engineers to operate the space shuttle system safely within it's known parameters, (ie launching on jan 28 1986 was a managerial decision to launch in the coldest wheather despite engineers recommendations not to launch, and inspite of evidence of srb "o-ring" burnthrough on the previous launch sts-61c). tom |
#112
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Craig Fink wrote:" Not the right letter, but Privatizing Earth to LEO
might be." Gee craig, not the right thread, as the original post was pertaining to an astronauts statements, http://www.stpns.net/view_article.ht...43251064362304 Gutierrez said the fault lies in two words - engineering arrogance. "NASA engineers were confident that they did everything right," Gutierrez said. "They were so sure everything would work as planned they didn't think an escape system was necessary. The fact is, if there had been an escape system on Columbia and Challenger, the crews could have survived." Actually the design shortcomings of the shuttle system had been known for along time before the challenger tragedy, (ie no crew escape system for more than a small percentage of the crew if in place, and only usable for a small percentage of the flight) and therefore it is the responsibility of managers and engineers to operate the space shuttle system safely within it's known parameters, (ie launching on jan 28 1986 was a managerial decision to launch in the coldest wheather despite engineers recommendations not to launch, and inspite of evidence of srb "o-ring" burnthrough on the previous launch sts-61c). tom |
#113
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Craig Fink a écrit :
Not the right letter, but Privatizing Earth to LEO might be. So what would a letter to Michael Griffin look like to privatize Earth to LEO manned space flight? To get NASA to push for legislation to encourage it? What would the legislation look like to encourage, nurture, support and transition to thriving Earth to LEO market? Private Enterprise? If "Private Enterprise" is so phantastic, why must it be "nurtured" and "supported" with tax payer's money???? Damm it. It is PRIVATE so it doesn't need any public money! Ideas? Yes, let the market decide! |
#114
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jacob navia wrote:"If "Private Enterprise" is so phantastic, why must
it be "nurtured" and "supported" with tax payer's money???? Damm it. It is PRIVATE so it doesn't need any public money! Yes, let the market decide!" Not the right thread, as the original post was pertaining to an astronauts statements, http://www.stpns.net/view_article.ht...43251064362304 Gutierrez said the fault lies in two words - engineering arrogance. "NASA engineers were confident that they did everything right," Gutierrez said. "They were so sure everything would work as planned they didn't think an escape system was necessary. The fact is, if there had been an escape system on Columbia and Challenger, the crews could have survived." Actually the design shortcomings of the shuttle system had been known for along time before the challenger tragedy, (ie no crew escape system for more than a small percentage of the crew if in place, and only usable for a small percentage of the flight) and therefore it is the responsibility of managers and engineers to operate the space shuttle system safely within it's known parameters, (ie launching on jan 28 1986 was a managerial decision to launch in the coldest wheather despite engineers recommendations not to launch, and inspite of evidence of srb "o-ring" burnthrough on the previous launch sts-61c). Tom |
#115
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![]() wrote in message ... And as you are the only one who draw that conclusion, isn`t it your duty to allert higher managment, Congress or even the New York Times about it? (What some regulars here accused Boisjoly in 1986 failed to do) My experience at NASA is management will "roast" an engineer that attempts to allert them to a bad management decision that might be unsafe. Danny Dot www.mobbinggonemad.org snip |
#116
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Danny Dot wrote:"My experience at NASA is management will "roast" an
engineer that attempts to allert them to a bad management decision that might be unsafe.Danny Dot" The purpose of establishing the independent technical authority within nasa is so that "All programs should have the benefit of an independent engineering authority to ensure that technical standards are being met" according to the diaz report to the caib and that a flights readiness is independently verified. Now implementing the recommendations contained in the diaz report to the caib, in conjunction with a full quantitative risk assessment of the shuttle system would provide nasa managers the communication structure, information, and technology to manage and understand the technical input from engineers up and down the decision making process in determining flight readiness. Providing an independent authority in backing minority opinions who are opposed to declaring a flight is ready, should help improve communications and speed up the process for flight readiness determination as managers will have assistance in correlating the minority opinion with things such as previously granted waivers.. The establishment of the independent technical authority is a definite step in a positive direction for nasa, as they are currently implementing a partial quantitative risk assessment (qra), but a full shuttle system qra will assist nasa engineers and managers in operating the shuttle safely within it's capabilities throughout the fleets retirement process. Diaz report to the caib page and pertinent factors Diaz report to the caib page a-9 Caib report recomnedations Engineering Authority that is responsible for technical requirements and all waivers tto them, and will build a disciplined, systematic approach to identifying, analyzing, and controlling hazards throughout the life cycle of the Shuttle System. The independent technical authority does the following as a minimum: · Develop and maintain technical standards for all Space Shuttle Program projects and elements · Be the sole waiver-granting authority for all technical standards · Conduct trend and risk analysis at the sub-system, system, and enterprise levels · Own the failure mode, effects analysis and hazard reporting systems · Conduct integrated hazard analysis · Decide what is and is not an anomalous event · Independently verify launch readiness · Approve the provisions of the recertification program called for in Recommendation R9.1-1 The Technical Engineering Authority should be funded directly from NASA Headquarters, and should have no connection to or responsibility for schedule or program cost. Diaz summary discussion All programs should have the benefit of an independent engineering authority to ensure that technical standards are being met. No programs should have the ability to waive technical standards or compromise a standard without the review and approval of an appropriate engineering authority. All projects and programs should conduct risk analysis consistent with Agency policy regarding risk management. All Centers should have the capability in either their engineering or Safety and Mission Assurance (SMA) organizations to perform and or review failure modes and effects analysis, and hazard analysis. For manned and unmanned flights and launches, Centers should establish flight, mission, or launch readiness certification processes that include verification by the independent engineering and SMA organizations. Independence is defined as both organizational (outside the operations, project or program structure) as well as financial (funding allocation decisions made or approved) at the first organizational level that owns both the operation, project or program and the center engineering and SMA" tom |
#117
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![]() jacob navia wrote: Craig Fink a écrit : Not the right letter, but Privatizing Earth to LEO might be. So what would a letter to Michael Griffin look like to privatize Earth to LEO manned space flight? To get NASA to push for legislation to encourage it? What would the legislation look like to encourage, nurture, support and transition to thriving Earth to LEO market? Private Enterprise? If "Private Enterprise" is so phantastic, why must it be "nurtured" and "supported" with tax payer's money???? Damm it. It is PRIVATE so it doesn't need any public money! That is lazy fair... Ideas? Yes, let the market decide! |
#118
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![]() Eric Chomko wrote: jacob navia wrote: Craig Fink a écrit : Not the right letter, but Privatizing Earth to LEO might be. So what would a letter to Michael Griffin look like to privatize Earth to LEO manned space flight? To get NASA to push for legislation to encourage it? What would the legislation look like to encourage, nurture, support and transition to thriving Earth to LEO market? Private Enterprise? If "Private Enterprise" is so phantastic, why must it be "nurtured" and "supported" with tax payer's money???? Damm it. It is PRIVATE so it doesn't need any public money! That is lazy fair..." Not the right thread, as the original post was pertaining to an astronauts statements, http://www.stpns.net/view_article.ht...43251064362304 Gutierrez said the fault lies in two words - engineering arrogance. "NASA engineers were confident that they did everything right," Gutierrez said. "They were so sure everything would work as planned they didn't think an escape system was necessary. The fact is, if there had been an escape system on Columbia and Challenger, the crews could have survived." Actually the design shortcomings of the shuttle system had been known for along time before the challenger tragedy, (ie no crew escape system for more than a small percentage of the crew if in place, and only usable for a small percentage of the flight) and therefore it is the responsibility of managers and engineers to operate the space shuttle system safely within it's known parameters, (ie launching on jan 28 1986 was a managerial decision to launch in the coldest wheather despite engineers recommendations not to launch, and inspite of evidence of srb "o-ring" burnthrough on the previous launch sts-61c). Tom |
#119
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Eric Chomko wrote:
jacob navia wrote: Craig Fink a écrit : Not the right letter, but Privatizing Earth to LEO might be. So what would a letter to Michael Griffin look like to privatize Earth to LEO manned space flight? To get NASA to push for legislation to encourage it? What would the legislation look like to encourage, nurture, support and transition to thriving Earth to LEO market? Private Enterprise? If "Private Enterprise" is so phantastic, why must it be "nurtured" and "supported" with tax payer's money???? Damm it. It is PRIVATE so it doesn't need any public money! That is lazy fair... Ideas? Yes, let the market decide!" Not the right thread, as the original post was pertaining to an astronauts statements, http://www.stpns.net/view_article.ht...43251064362304 Gutierrez said the fault lies in two words - engineering arrogance. "NASA engineers were confident that they did everything right," Gutierrez said. "They were so sure everything would work as planned they didn't think an escape system was necessary. The fact is, if there had been an escape system on Columbia and Challenger, the crews could have survived." Actually the design shortcomings of the shuttle system had been known for along time before the challenger tragedy, (ie no crew escape system for more than a small percentage of the crew if in place, and only usable for a small percentage of the flight) and therefore it is the responsibility of managers and engineers to operate the space shuttle system safely within it's known parameters, (ie launching on jan 28 1986 was a managerial decision to launch in the coldest wheather despite engineers recommendations not to launch, and inspite of evidence of srb "o-ring" burnthrough on the previous launch sts-61c). Tom |
#120
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