Msnbc (Oberg): Why NASA's making the right decision

Jim Oberg wrote:

Had NASA decided two weeks ago to ignore the glitch, it would have been
a decision based on instinct alone.

(. . .)

The decision to launch this time, in the event of a sensor "hiccup" of a
very specific type, will be made in the full sunlight of massive amounts of
investigation, analysis, and cold-blooded calculations of safety principles.

The problem with this analysis is that it appears that the reason they
have moved to a "launch anyway" position is because they ran out of
things to try, and not because they came up with any significant new
information. At some point two weeks ago (before the reset) they made
a decision that there were too many risks to launch without
understanding the root cause of the failure; having failed to find the
root cause they have now decided this risk is worth taking. Yes, a
massive amount of work has been done, but that doesn't mean that a
large amount of new knowledge has been gained, or that the risk that
was previously assessed as too great before has lessened any.

Of course, it's more complex than this, and puckering up and accepting
this problem may indeed be the less risky course in the long run vs. a
rollback and disassembly, but to say this is "full sunlight" is, I
think, missing the point.

JGM

JGM wrote:
The problem with this analysis is that it appears that the reason they
have moved to a "launch anyway" position is because they ran out of
things to try, and not because they came up with any significant new
information. At some point two weeks ago (before the reset) they made
a decision that there were too many risks to launch without
understanding the root cause of the failure;


Two weeks ago, when they got a red blinking light on a console, they stopped
the launch because they didn't have any idea if this was an isolated problem
or something which was just an indication of an even bigger collection of
problems that would surface at or after launch.

*IF* in the two weeks since, they gained assurance/confidence that it is
really just this one sensor and that other sensors and other ET systems are
functioning perfectly, and *IF* they are confident that with 3 working
reliable sensors, they still have enough redundancy, and they know they can
isolate/disable the flaky sensor if need be, then it is quite different from 2
weeks ago.

In the end, in a mattere of hours now, they'll fill the tanks, see how the
sensors react, and that is when we'll know what NASA's real intentions are.

I suspect that the crew will be made aware of sensor glitches and would be
part of the decision loop on whether to launch or not launch. I doubt that
NASA would keep a sensor glitch secret. If it happens , let NASA make it quite
public their discussions with crews and let NASA make the convincing arguments
of why it is still safe to launch.

John Doe wrote:

*IF* in the two weeks since, they gained assurance/confidence that it is
really just this one sensor and that other sensors and other ET systems are
functioning perfectly, and *IF* they are confident that with 3 working
reliable sensors, they still have enough redundancy, and they know they can
isolate/disable the flaky sensor if need be, then it is quite different from 2
weeks ago.

Agreed, but only to the extent that it is. The main issue remains
unresolved, though. Pruning away the fault tree can be a misleadingly
reassuring process, because even though you seem to have eliminated a
lot os scary possibilities, at the end, *something happened and you
still don't know why*. Sometimes you can eliminate causes from the
equation, but you can't assess the risk of what *is* there without
knowing root cause.

In the end, in a mattere of hours now, they'll fill the tanks, see how the
sensors react, and that is when we'll know what NASA's real intentions are.

Yes, it seems to be a moot point now, and hopefully will remain so
(note, though, that none of the work done in the past weeks was aimed
at *fixing* the problem, so delcaring victory here is difficult). But
based on statements made in the last few days, they'd already decided
to go if the same error had come up in the same way.

Again, I'm not claiming that anybody at NASA has had bad judgement
about this issue, just taking issue with Jim Oberg's "sunlight"
analysis. Despite all the hand-wringing and changes made in the past 2
year, it's a risky business, and the gremlins seem to have conspired to
remind us of this.

JGM

"John Doe" wrote stuff

John's correct, I also had a 12-page set of minutes
of the MMT meeting with the blow-by-blow of the
arguments pro and con -- and I liked the look of the
no-holds-barred debate.

Jim Oberg ) wrote:
: Msnbc (Oberg): Why NASA's making the right decision

: Analysis, not wishful thinking, guiding shuttle officials

: http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/8700458/

: COMMENTARY By James Oberg //NBC News space analyst

: Special to MSNBC // 2:40 p.m. ET July 25, 2005



: HOUSTON - At first glance, NASA's decision to possibly launch even if a
: sensor glitch reappears suggests that the space agency was wrong two weeks
: ago to postpone the launch. However, the two decisions actually are very
: different, and indicate how much NASA's safety culture has improved.

: Had NASA decided two weeks ago to ignore the glitch, it would have been
: a decision based on instinct alone. Had that instinct proved right (that is,
: nobody dies), it would have begun the process of betraying the hard lessons
: of Challenger and Columbia. The odds are that the hardware flaws would not
: have had disastrous consequences - but the decision to fly anyway, in the
: face of them, could well have.

: The decision to launch this time, in the event of a sensor "hiccup" of a
: very specific type, will be made in the full sunlight of massive amounts of
: investigation, analysis, and cold-blooded calculations of safety principles.
: It may or may not have happy consequences (anything can happen, especially
: in space), but it will be fully consistent with the best practices of
: hazardous operations. These standards have in the past led to safe space
: flights, and past occurrences of forgetting such principles have been at the
: root of NASA's worst space disasters.



Right, what good is a "process" if no one actually follows it? And
processes are what is done. So,...

Eric

"Jim Oberg" wrote in message
...
Msnbc (Oberg): Why NASA's making the right decision

Analysis, not wishful thinking, guiding shuttle officials

http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/8700458/

COMMENTARY By James Oberg //NBC News space analyst

Special to MSNBC // 2:40 p.m. ET July 25, 2005



HOUSTON - At first glance, NASA's decision to possibly launch even if a
sensor glitch reappears suggests that the space agency was wrong two weeks
ago to postpone the launch. However, the two decisions actually are very
different, and indicate how much NASA's safety culture has improved.

Had NASA decided two weeks ago to ignore the glitch, it would have been
a decision based on instinct alone. Had that instinct proved right (that is,
nobody dies), it would have begun the process of betraying the hard lessons
of Challenger and Columbia. The odds are that the hardware flaws would not
have had disastrous consequences - but the decision to fly anyway, in the
face of them, could well have.

The decision to launch this time, in the event of a sensor "hiccup" of a
very specific type, will be made in the full sunlight of massive amounts of
investigation, analysis, and cold-blooded calculations of safety principles.



Collective intelligence is orders of magnitude greater than that of
any one. At launch time the decision was in the hands of a few, as it
was with the dictatorship of the o-rings, and the reentry.
The delay and the 'spotlight' reduces the risk enormously even if
the exact solution is never found.






It may or may not have happy consequences (anything can happen, especially
in space), but it will be fully consistent with the best practices of
hazardous operations. These standards have in the past led to safe space
flights, and past occurrences of forgetting such principles have been at the
root of NASA's worst space disasters.