![]() |
|
|
Thread Tools | Display Modes |
#1
|
|||
|
|||
![]()
"columbiaaccidentinvestigation"'s argument seems to be that any changes
to the shuttle, even ones made with the objective of making it safer, put it into a flight regime that has not been tested. The only way to address this concern is to never change anything ever. Is this the way to do anything new in space? The point of the launch decision is that even in the case of foam shedding from the tank impacting the thermal protection system, the effect will be on re-entry-- the launch itself is safe up through the time the shuttle gets to orbit. As noted, if there is a foam impact event, the astronauts transfer to the space station, and shuttle is inspected on orbit to determine the nature and extent of damage. It's then either reparied, or the astronauts are returned by a different mission. Uncerrtainty about the foam is a question about a possible loss of the vehicle, and not loss of astronauts. Since "columbiaaccidentinvestigation" is arguing that any changes whatsoever put the shuttle into a regime where the only way to validate the change is by flying ("columbiaaccidentinvestigation" claims not to trust wind tunnel results), this seems the only sensible thing to do. -- Franklin Jefferson ***My blog: Jefferson's Democracy*** http://franklinjefferson.blogspot.com |
Thread Tools | |
Display Modes | |
|
|
![]() |
||||
Thread | Thread Starter | Forum | Replies | Last Post |
Unofficial Space Shuttle Launch Guide | Steven S. Pietrobon | Space Shuttle | 1 | June 1st 06 04:57 PM |
JimO writings on shuttle disaster, recovery | Jim Oberg | Space Shuttle | 0 | July 11th 05 06:32 PM |
Calculation of Shuttle 1/100,000 probability of failure | perfb | Space Shuttle | 8 | July 15th 04 09:09 PM |
The wrong approach | Bill Johnston | Policy | 22 | January 28th 04 02:11 PM |
CAIB report highlights and comments | Marshall Perrin | Space Shuttle | 11 | September 2nd 03 04:40 AM |