Satellite vulnerability concerns in CORONA days

After a while, more on CORONA vulnerability concerns and possible
remedial measures.

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SECRET
CORONA


[Handwritten]: Noted by DCI.
[Initial]: R [?]

[STAMPED]: 16 Sep 1965


MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Vulnerability of the CORONA System
to Soviet Countermeasures


1. This memorandum is in response to your request
for information on the actions that would be taken to
enhance the survivability of the CORONA photographic
reconnaissance satellite vehicle in the face of Soviet
countermeasures.

2. The general responsibility for providing
protection systems for the CORONA vehicle lies with
[ REDACTED ] Space Systems
Division [REDACTED] ). There is an [REDACTED] officer desig-
nated with the responsibility of insuring that adequate
protection measures are available in the contingency
that the Soviets should initiate an active program to
lnterfere with our satellite reconnaissance capability.
The Office of Special Projects, DDS&T, is knowledgeable
of the status of these vulnerability reduction programs.
Also, the DDS&T does at times provide to SSD information
concerning the status of the Soviet anti-satellite
capabilities. To date, however, these relations have
been informal in character. The Office of Special Protects
has taken action to obtain an immediate status report
on the CORONA vulnerability program and will undertake
to keep you informed of any new developments. What
follows below is a brief summary of the current status
of that study as we understand it.


Declassified and Released by the NRO
In Accordance with E.O. 12958
[Date Obscured, perhaps November 1997]

CORONA Handle via [REDACTED,
SECRET probably BYEMAN]
[Illegible] ONLY

[page 1]




SECRET
CORONA


SUBJECT: Vulnerability of the CORONA System
to Soviet Countermeasures



3. There now exists a capability for augmenting the
CORONA vehicle with a limited decoy capability on a quick
reaction basis. This decoy system will undoubtedly
enhance the survivability of CORONA. There has recently
been tested a small solid rocket propulsion system which
can be strapped on the Agena as required to provide the
capability for changing the orbit of the satellite vehicle
several times during the course of the mission. This also
will increase the probability of CORONA surviving in that
it complicates the Soviet's tracking and interception
problem. It is currently planned to flight test sometime
this fall a chaff dispensing system. If this system proves
effective, it too will be placed on the shelf to provide
an additional quick reaction vulnerability reduction
capability. The DDS&T has no knowledge of the operational
plan that will be followed in the face of Soviet anti-
satellite actions, nor have we conducted an independent
evaluation of the effectiveness of the survivability aids
outlined above.

4. At various times in the past the Office of
Special Projects has conducted limited studies to identify
additional techniques applicable to satellite vulnerability
reduction. These studies have covered chaff, decoy, radar
cross section reduction, as well as sophisticated electronic
jamming systems. There is no doubt that the survivability
of low altitude satellites in general can be greatly
enhanced by proper choice of equipment and operational
techniques. However, it is not clear what performance
penalties must be paid in the case of the CORONA system to
achieve a satisfactory survivability level should the
Soviets elect to initiate an aggressive anti-satellite
program.


[SIGNED]
ALBERT D. WHEELON
Deputy Director
for
Science and Technology




CORONA Handle via [REDACTED,
SECRET probably BYEMAN]
[Illegible] ONLY


[page 2]

-
30 April 1962



MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director (Research)

SUBJECT : Soviet Anti-ICBM and Anti-Satellite
Capability


1. On 30 April the DCI mentioned that he was somewhat con-
cerned by a statement made by Secretary McNamara to the President
to the effect that the Nike-Zeus would be capable in one year's time
of knocking down ICBMs and satellites. The DCI is concerned as to
whether we are paying adequate attention to the Soviet capability
for countermeasures, although he is skeptical as to the degree of
advance in the anti-missile missile field. He would like to have you
and Dr. Charyk review the situation, perhaps preparing a study on it.

2. In connection with the degree of our offensive capability,
the DCI suggests more secrecy on launchings, varying orbits, and
perhaps equipping the vehicle for changing the orbit upon command.

3. With reference to his request for a discussion on Samos,
you may wish to discuss this matter with him at the same time.




(signed) Lyman B. Kirkpatrick

Lyman B. Kirkpatrick
Executive Director



LBK/[REDACTED]
Distribution:
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]



[REDACTED] [Lined out]:SECRET


[Handwritten]:Copy [Redacted]