Shuttle Safety [was: Re...

In article .com,
(columbiaaccidentinvestigation)
wrote:

*From:* "columbiaaccidentinvestigation"

*Date:* 24 Jul 2006 10:25:51 -0700

Our discussion about orbiter safety can be healthy and progressive

No it can't because you are insisting on something that is impossible -
i.e. that safety has to be the number one priority.

rather than on the basis of adequate scientific evidence.

Starting costing it up then.

Given the fact I have cited nasa's own sources in demonstrating that
possible compromises in the safety margins the
administrator/engineers/managers rely on for their decision making
process,

Of course you have. They are not "possible compromises". They _are_
compromises. That is the point, you always have to make compromises if
you have a finite amount of funds and a finite amount of time.

it is therefore not my happiness that determines validity,
just as your emotional demands for funding sources does not, but what
does is the scientific body of knowledge from which I have based my
conclusions that the current shuttle pra does not reflect reality.

I can't even parse that. What do you mean?

It all starts by us subjectively deciding that safety is the
highest priority,

Why should we subjectively decide that? I thought you were trying to be
objective. Why shouldn't we start by objectively deciding that we have
$X million available to us and a deadline of 2010? Surely it is better
to start with objective statements than subjective decisions?

which will provide the program the best chance to safely
complete the stated operational mission of space station construction
by 2010.

Why should it be a "best chance" - doesn't that imply probability and
risk?

What do you mean by "best chance" in any case? Better than what?


Malcolm B

The budgetary process is subjective, as legislators decide on more than
scientific merits if a project is worth funding, and since the
legislators partially account for their constituents subjective
political views in budgetary funding and appropriations, therfore
making safety first in our space program is a subjective decision that
is up to the voting public to ensure the safest program orbiter flight
crews. The docemented termination of safety uprgrades like the EAPU
for budgetary purposes occurred in the same time frame nasa pulled
money directly from the shuttle program, for a future project, a
subjective decision that placed a future program as a higher priority
over a safety upgrade for the orbiter.

CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Order Code RS21411
Updated February 13, 2003
NASA's Space Shuttle Program: Space
Shuttle Appropriations FY1992-FY2002
Daniel Morgan and Amanda Jacobs
Resources, Science, and Industry Division
CRS-5
"f The FY2001 conference report reduced funding for Human Space
Flight by $40 million
to provide additional funds for the Mars Lander program. This change
was requested by NASA
after submission of its regular budget request. The conference report
specified that $30 million
of the reduction should come from space shuttle reserves and $10
million should come from "the
commercialization and technology program." The latter appears to be
the Technology and
Commercialization Initiative (HTCI), which was funded as part of
Investments and Support, not
as part of Space Shuttle. Some budget history material produced by NASA
includes the full $40
million as a reduction in space shuttle funding. Only the $30 million
reduction is reflected in
Table 1."
Note: ASRM is the Advanced Solid Rocket Motor program.
Source: CRS, from congressional committee reports.


Malcolm Bacchus wrote:
In article .com,
(columbiaaccidentinvestigation)
wrote:

*From:* "columbiaaccidentinvestigation"

*Date:* 24 Jul 2006 10:25:51 -0700

Our discussion about orbiter safety can be healthy and progressive

No it can't because you are insisting on something that is impossible -
i.e. that safety has to be the number one priority.

rather than on the basis of adequate scientific evidence.

Starting costing it up then.

Given the fact I have cited nasa's own sources in demonstrating that
possible compromises in the safety margins the
administrator/engineers/managers rely on for their decision making
process,

Of course you have. They are not "possible compromises". They _are_
compromises. That is the point, you always have to make compromises if
you have a finite amount of funds and a finite amount of time.

it is therefore not my happiness that determines validity,
just as your emotional demands for funding sources does not, but what
does is the scientific body of knowledge from which I have based my
conclusions that the current shuttle pra does not reflect reality.

I can't even parse that. What do you mean?

It all starts by us subjectively deciding that safety is the
highest priority,

Why should we subjectively decide that? I thought you were trying to be
objective. Why shouldn't we start by objectively deciding that we have
$X million available to us and a deadline of 2010? Surely it is better
to start with objective statements than subjective decisions?

which will provide the program the best chance to safely
complete the stated operational mission of space station construction
by 2010.

Why should it be a "best chance" - doesn't that imply probability and
risk?

What do you mean by "best chance" in any case? Better than what?


Malcolm B

In article .com,
(columbiaaccidentinvestigation)
wrote:

*From:* "columbiaaccidentinvestigation"

*Date:* 24 Jul 2006 12:29:42 -0700

The budgetary process is subjective, as legislators decide on more
than
scientific merits if a project is worth funding, and since the
legislators partially account for their constituents subjective
political views in budgetary funding and appropriations, therfore
making safety first in our space program is a subjective decision that
is up to the voting public to ensure the safest program orbiter flight
crews.

I'm sorry, you've lost me again in your long sentences.

You are saying that the decision is that "It is up to the voting public
to ensure that the safest program orbiter flight crews." ?

Why is it?

What does "safest" mean?
_Does_ it have a meaning?
Safest compared with what? Safest compared to other program orbiter
flight crews? Safest compared with driving along the highway?
Safest compared with staying in bed?

What do you mean?

Malcolm B

Once again nasa's own words that safety to the public and flight
crews is paramount (section 1.1.3) In writing it's own procedures
and guidelines, nasa uses the word paramount witch means: safety is of
chief concern or importance: safety tending first to one's paramount
needs. (definition of paramount from dictionary.com)


http://human.space.edu/old/docs/NPG7120.5B.pdf
NASA Procedures and Guidelines
NPG: 7120.5B
Effective Date: November 21, 2002
Expiration Date: November 21, 2007
NASA Program and Project Management Processes and
Requirements
Responsible Office: AE/Office of Chief Engineer
page 8
"CHAPTER 1. Overview
This chapter provides an introduction to the document, highlights the
Agency's framework for managing programs and projects, specifies
major themes which are reflected throughout the document, describes the
PAPAC process, and describes the structure of the document.
1.1 Introduction
1.1.1 NASA defines programs as major activities within an Enterprise
that have defined goals, objectives, requirements, and funding levels,
and consist of one or more projects. Projects are significant
activities designated by a program and characterized as having defined
goals, objectives, requirements, Life-Cycle Costs (LCC), a beginning,
and an end.
1.1.2 Successful management of programs and projects has always been a
key requirement for
NASA to meet its mission.
1.1.3 To accomplish this, NASA--
a. Emphasizes that safety of the public, its flight crews, its
employees, and its critical assets are of paramount importance."
tom


Malcolm Bacchus wrote:
In article .com,
(columbiaaccidentinvestigation)
wrote:

*From:* "columbiaaccidentinvestigation"

*Date:* 24 Jul 2006 12:29:42 -0700

The budgetary process is subjective, as legislators decide on more
than
scientific merits if a project is worth funding, and since the
legislators partially account for their constituents subjective
political views in budgetary funding and appropriations, therfore
making safety first in our space program is a subjective decision that
is up to the voting public to ensure the safest program orbiter flight
crews.

I'm sorry, you've lost me again in your long sentences.

You are saying that the decision is that "It is up to the voting public
to ensure that the safest program orbiter flight crews." ?

Why is it?

What does "safest" mean?
_Does_ it have a meaning?
Safest compared with what? Safest compared to other program orbiter
flight crews? Safest compared with driving along the highway?
Safest compared with staying in bed?

What do you mean?

Malcolm B

That might be relevant in a different part of the thread, so feel free
to cross-post that answer elsewhere and I'll pick it up. But it didn't
answer my question in my last post which was:

You are saying that the decision is that "It is up to the voting
public to ensure that the safest program orbiter flight crews." ?

Why is it?

What does "safest" mean?
_Does_ it have a meaning?
Safest compared with what? Safest compared to other program orbiter
flight crews? Safest compared with driving along the highway?
Safest compared with staying in bed?

What do you mean?


Malcolm B

You have asked many questions one of which is the definition of safety
once again nasas own words.
Safety: The freedom from those conditions that can cause death, injury,
occupational illness, damage to or loss of equipment or property, or
damage to the environment. (*28)

Previously in this thread, you stated in message # 88 of this thread
you stated
"Safety is not and cannot be the first priority.
Malcolm B "

And I posted nasas own regulations that show you to be factually
incorrect. Once again nasa's own words that safety to the public and
flight crews is paramount (section 1.1.3) In writing it's own
procedures and guidelines, nasa uses the word paramount witch means:
safety is of chief concern or importance: safety tending first to one's
paramount needs (dictionary.com) (*29)

Now why is it important for the voting public to acknowledge safety
should be the first priority in our space program, because the
"people branch" of government or congress responds to the voters.
The congress also controls the funding intricacies that go into nasa
budget, as many decisions are made in the conference committee between
the house and senate where the final numbers reported to the main
bodies, voted on and sent to the president. And as with the
cancellation of the eapu there was a distinct separation in the
subjective funding of a future project, over the recommended safety
upgrades for the orbiter.
In 2002 prior to the Columbia tragedy the omb determined the EAPU
project cost overruns, and decreasing safety benefits were the reason
nasa decreased priorities for the eapu, with it's advisory panels
support (*30). But the asap in 2001 stated the reason nasa was
reducing the status of the eapu, was for weight, and cost issues, not
decreased safety benefits as the omb stated (*31). The audit report on
nasas safety upgrades was published 7 month prior to the Columbia
tragedy where nasa once again realized their risk analysis did not
reflect reality, the omb stated death of crew and loss of vehicle risks
being 1 in 556 missions, a number that is not correct based on Columbia
and challenger (*32). The phase III safety upgrade was canceled and
funding earmarked for the eapu, was redirected for a future project
(*33)
In fiscal year 2002 nasa requested from congress $ 3,283.8M, the house
bill funded $ 3,318.8M, the senate bill funded $ 3,333.8M, and the
final numbers based on the conference committee mark up was $ 3,278.8 M
for nasa (*34). The appropriations committee markup sessions can
propose additional funds projects based on subjective merit, and so in
fy2002 funding for nasas additional projects from the house was an
additional +$35m for refurbishment of the vehicle assembly building,
the senate approved + $50M for safety upgrades, but the conference
committee report contained: +$25m for vehicle assembly building, +$20m
for safety, upgrades -$50m from cancellation of the Electric Auxiliary
Power Unit program (*35).
Tom


***citations

(*28)
http://nodis3.gsfc.nasa.gov/displayA...age_na me=all
Subject: Human-Rating Requirements for Space Systems NASA
Procedural Requirements NPR 8705.2A
Effective Date: February 07, 2005
Expiration Date: February 07, 2010
COMPLIANCE IS MANDATORY
B.41 Risk: The combination of (1) the probability (qualitative or
quantitative) including associated uncertainty that the space system
will experience an undesired event (or sequences of events) such as
internal system or component failure or an external event and (2) the
magnitude of the consequences (personnel, public, mission impacts) and
associated uncertainties given that the undesired event(s) occur(s).
B.44 Safety: The freedom from those conditions that can cause death,
injury, occupational illness, damage to or loss of equipment or
property, or damage to the environment.

(*29)
http://human.space.edu/old/docs/NPG7120.5B.pdf
NASA Procedures and Guidelines
NPG: 7120.5B
Effective Date: November 21, 2002
Expiration Date: November 21, 2007
NASA Program and Project Management Processes and
Requirements
Responsible Office: AE/Office of Chief Engineer
page 8
"CHAPTER 1. Overview
This chapter provides an introduction to the document, highlights the
Agency's framework for managing programs and projects, specifies
major themes which are reflected throughout the document, describes the
PAPAC process, and describes the structure of the document.
1.1 Introduction
1.1.1 NASA defines programs as major activities within an Enterprise
that have defined goals, objectives, requirements, and funding levels,
and consist of one or more projects. Projects are significant
activities designated by a program and characterized as having defined
goals, objectives, requirements, Life-Cycle Costs (LCC), a beginning,
and an end.
1.1.2 Successful management of programs and projects has always been a
key requirement for
NASA to meet its mission.
1.1.3 To accomplish this, NASA--
a. Emphasizes that safety of the public, its flight crews, its
employees, and its critical assets are of paramount importance."


(*30)
AUDIT REPORT
SPACE SHUTTLE SAFETY UPGRADES
July 01, 2002 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
National Aeronautics and
Space Administration
Page 13
Appendix B.
NASA Fiscal Year 2003 Budget Status Report
on Shuttle Safety Upgrades
The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) reviews programs throughout
the Federal Government to identify strong and weak performers. The
budget seeks to redirect funds where appropriate from lesser-performing
programs to higher priority or more effective programs. Particularly,
when low-performing programs are in priority areas, deficiencies will
be addressed through reforms to improve performance. OMB rated the
Space Shuttle Safety Upgrade Program ineffective and explained that the
Program needed to address large cost overruns24 and schedule delays to
improve Space Shuttle safety through effective investments.
OMB's Overall Performance Rating. OMB's review concluded that NASA
continues to invest in improving Space Shuttle safety, but some of the
planned investments are experiencing significant problems (as depicted
below). For example, the Electric Auxiliary Power Unit was the highest
priority safety upgrade last year (fiscal year 2001), but delays,
technical difficulties, decreasing safety benefits, and a tripling of
its projected cost led NASA, with the support of its advisory
committee, to cancel the project."
(*31)
Asap 2001 annual report
page 19 par 7
"The Electric Auxiliary Power Unit (EAPU) has been reduced from a
development program to
a technology study due to cost and weight overruns."


(*32, *33, *34, *35)
AUDIT REPORT
SPACE SHUTTLE SAFETY UPGRADES
July 01, 2002 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
National Aeronautics and
Space Administration
Page 3
Audit of Space Shuttle Safety Upgrades
Introduction
The Space Shuttle is the only U.S. vehicle that can launch humans and
payloads into space and safely return them from an Earth orbit. Since
the Space Shuttle Challenger mishap,1 NASA has improved the safety of
the Space Shuttle; the estimated risk of catastrophic failure during
launch decreased from 1 in 78 missions in 1986 to 1 in 556 missions
today. The continued safe operation of the Space Shuttle is a top
priority and is essential in NASA's ability to support the assembly
and operations of the International Space Station.
....
During the audit, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) issued
"Fiscal Year 2003 Budget of the U.S. Government," which assessed
the Space Shuttle Safety Upgrades Program as ineffective. The basis of
OMB's assessment was NASA's large cost overruns(3) and schedule
delays in improving the safety of Space Shuttle. Appendix B contains
further details on OMB's conclusions.
(3)OMB considered the cost increase from NASA's estimates provided
early in project formulation as the cost overruns."

(*33)
CRS-5
"f The FY2001 conference report reduced funding for Human Space
Flight by $40 million
to provide additional funds for the Mars Lander program. This change
was requested by NASA
after submission of its regular budget request. The conference report
specified that $30 million
of the reduction should come from space shuttle reserves and $10
million should come from "the
commercialization and technology program." The latter appears to be
the Technology and
Commercialization Initiative (HTCI), which was funded as part of
Investments and Support, not
as part of Space Shuttle. Some budget history material produced by NASA
includes the full $40
million as a reduction in space shuttle funding. Only the $30 million
reduction is reflected in
Table 1."


(*34)
CRS-2
Table 1. Requested and Appropriated Funding for the
Space Shuttle Program
(dollars in millions)
"FY2002 requested $ 3,283.8, house $ 3,318.8, senate $ 3,333.8M,
conference committee $ 3,278.8 M."

(*35)
CRS-4
"Table 2. Explanations Given in Appropriations Reports for
Congressional Changes versus Administration Budget Requests
for the Space Shuttle Program
FY2002 house: +$35m for refurbishment of the vehicle assembly
building, Senate approved + $50M for safety upgrades, conference
committee: +$25m for vehicle assembly building, +$20m for safety,
upgrades -$50m from cancellation of the Electric Auxiliary Power Unit
program ."


Malcolm Bacchus wrote:
That might be relevant in a different part of the thread, so feel free
to cross-post that answer elsewhere and I'll pick it up. But it didn't
answer my question in my last post which was:

You are saying that the decision is that "It is up to the voting
public to ensure that the safest program orbiter flight crews." ?

Why is it?

What does "safest" mean?
_Does_ it have a meaning?
Safest compared with what? Safest compared to other program orbiter
flight crews? Safest compared with driving along the highway?
Safest compared with staying in bed?

What do you mean?


Malcolm B

Possibly, but at this point in the discussion, I asked you to explain
and expand on the statements you made:

You are saying that the decision is that "It is up to the voting
public to ensure that the safest program orbiter flight crews." ?

Why is it?

What does "safest" mean?
Does it have a meaning?
Safest compared with what? Safest compared to other program orbiter
flight crews? Safest compared with driving along the highway?
Safest compared with staying in bed?

Can you elaborate, in your words, on what you meant by that statement
and what you mean, in your statements, by "safest"?

Malcolm B

Ok macolm, You asked
"What does "safest" mean? Does it have a meaning? Safest compared with what? Safest compared to other program orbiter flight crews?"

Then you asked
" You are saying that the decision is that "It is up to the voting
public to ensure that the safest program orbiter flight crews." ?
Why is it?"

Good questions.
The short answer is money needed to prevent another tragedy. (but
please before you "snip" just read the long answer if you want an
explanation)

As space geeks we need to place safety as a highest priority in our
space program, in order to be consistent with own nasa's policies,
and to encourage our politicians to not let previous tragedies happen
again. Nasa defines safety (or freedom from death or injury (*28) to
flight crews and the public as paramount, or the top concern (*29), and
utilizes a risk management cycle to continuously improve safety.
Implicitly if nasa places safety as the highest concern, and nasa then
implements a system to improve safety a result will be to make the
program "safer" (or better) than before. As space geeks we can
choose to be consistent with nasa's policy for placing safety as a
top concern, and push to achieve the top most funding for orbiter
safety upgrades, in providing the best in "safety" or "safest"
space program for our astronauts. Congressional members partially
reflect their constituent's views in funding programs and by the
people stating we want the "safest" space program for our
astronauts, congress will reflect in funding such a high standard as
well. The most important response to constituents or space geeks
concerns for making a safer space progam congressional members could
have, is to provide the funding for meeting the high goal of safety
first. As noted by the asap in 2005 the "aviators" (*17)or
astronauts requested the standardization of nasa centers information a
step necessary for integration into a quantitative risk basement qra.
But the money has not been appropriated for a program wide qra, and
with the example of the eapu, budgetary concerns are trumping safety
upgrades. Therefore one way to motivate our legislators to uphold the
funding needed for a shuttle program qra, is that they vote safety
first, as we request the "safest" shuttle program, in attempting to
prevent past tragedies from repeating themselves.

The decision makers inside nasa working within the guidelines and
procedures for performing safe human space flight assess and manage the
risks for mission failures based on the results of tools such as a
probable risk assessment (pra). Nasa manager training states that risk
always involves the likelihood an undesired event will occur. And nasa
also states risk should consider the severity of the consequence of
that event should it occur. (*36) Or essentially risk equals likelihood
and severity. Nasa breaks mission risk in to two categories for
decision makers, the first mission risk is comprised of 2 elements
safety risks (such as the crew's freedom from death or injury) and
technical risks. The second category of risk for nasa decision makers
is programmatic risks such as cost and schedule Nasa decision makers
manage risks in a continuous cycle of communication and documentation
for tracking, controlling, identifying, analyzing and planning to
always reduce the risks for mission loss and death of a crew (*37).
The benefit of using a continuous cycle in risk management is it always
improving nasa decision makers understanding of the risks associated
with the shuttle system.

Why have a qra because Astronauts and aviators requested it.
In 1996 the nasa administrator wanted "a better tool to base upgrade
decisions on risk" (*38), when confronted with the questions of how
much investment is worth a certain amount risk reduction. Various
elements comprise the probable risks assessment including failure mode
and effects, and fault tree analysis, but are isolated in their failure
mode interdependencies. During the orbiters lifetime nasa funded
different risk analysis of the program, one being the post challenger
risk assessment in 1988 which stated the current risk analyses "do
not establish objectively the levels of the various risks associated
with the failure modes and hazards."(*39), and a study by
pate-cornell in 2000 (*40) and ERI Consulting & Co. in 2000 (*9)which
concluded the current pra underestimates risk estimations, and does not
reflect real failure modes in certain components ( ** a correction
from before, I previously stated the current pra overarches, that was
in correct as the current pra was performed from the bottom up, and
overarching risk analyses such as the qra start from the top down
sorry**) Therefore because the current risk analysis is shown to be
deficient, and it is part of nasa's continuous risk management cycle
to improve the risk analysis for decision makers, upgrading the risk
analysis tool itself from the current pra, to an updated integrated
qra, is a logical step to improve flight crew safety. Updating and
integrating the current risk assessment tool with standardized
information from nasa centers will provide decision makers the best way
to safely complete the orbiters stated mission, and retire the fleet
while ensuring compliance with all human space flight procedures.
tom

(*28)
http://nodis3.gsfc.nasa.gov/displayA...age_na me=all
Subject: Human-Rating Requirements for Space Systems NASA
Procedural Requirements NPR 8705.2A
Effective Date: February 07, 2005
Expiration Date: February 07, 2010
COMPLIANCE IS MANDATORY
B.41 Risk: The combination of (1) the probability (qualitative or
quantitative) including associated uncertainty that the space system
will experience an undesired event (or sequences of events) such as
internal system or component failure or an external event and (2) the
magnitude of the consequences (personnel, public, mission impacts) and
associated uncertainties given that the undesired event(s) occur(s).
B.44 Safety: The freedom from those conditions that can cause death,
injury, occupational illness, damage to or loss of equipment or
property, or damage to the environment.

(*29)
http://human.space.edu/old/docs/NPG7120.5B.pdf
NASA Procedures and Guidelines
NPG: 7120.5B
Effective Date: November 21, 2002
Expiration Date: November 21, 2007
NASA Program and Project Management Processes and
Requirements
Responsible Office: AE/Office of Chief Engineer
page 8
"CHAPTER 1. Overview
This chapter provides an introduction to the document, highlights the
Agency's framework for managing programs and projects, specifies
major themes which are reflected throughout the document, describes the
PAPAC process, and describes the structure of the document.
1.1 Introduction
1.1.1 NASA defines programs as major activities within an Enterprise
that have defined goals, objectives, requirements, and funding levels,
and consist of one or more projects. Projects are significant
activities designated by a program and characterized as having defined
goals, objectives, requirements, Life-Cycle Costs (LCC), a beginning,
and an end.
1.1.2 Successful management of programs and projects has always been a
key requirement for
NASA to meet its mission.
1.1.3 To accomplish this, NASA--
a. Emphasizes that safety of the public, its flight crews, its
employees, and its critical assets are of paramount importance."

(*17)
ASAP
Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel December 2005
Page 18, 19
STANDARDIZATION
Mr. Marshall stated that the ASAP is not trying to deny center
individuality. NASA has some standardization, but the agency is missing
an opportunity to leverage wonderful pro grams that are ongoing at
centers - there continues to be a need to do this. General Gideon felt
that the standardization requests seem to come from the aviators. He
agreed that while there is uniqueness in NASA, t h e re is a greater
need for standardization. Mr.Williams expressed sensitivity to the
different abilities of the centers, but noted that, when these unique
abilities are not shared, and opportunity is lost. Dr. Esogbue added
that while centers can be creative and different, minimum standards
must be maintained. Admiral Dyer remarked that there are things at
individual centers that absolutely sparkle, and that he was excited
about taking good ideas from one center and sharing it with others.
NASA appears to have some aspects of the Articles of Confederation in
its center-splintered culture. Dr. Esogbue stated that NASA has
embraced the "Lessons Learned " concept; thus, standardization of
the better lessons learned from the "sparkling" centers, should be
an extension of the concept."


(*36)
http://www7.nationalacademies.org/as...esentation.pdf
NASA Perspective on Risk Assessment Panel on
Risk Aversion-Flying in the Face of Uncertainty Risk Aversion-Flying in
the Face of Uncertainty
NRC Workshop on Stepping Stones in Space NRC Workshop on Stepping
Stones in Space February 24, 2004
Michael G. Stamatelatos, Ph.D.,Director
Safety and Assurance Requirements Division
Office of Safety and Mission Assurance
NASA Headquarters
page 2
"What Does Formally Constitute Risk?
Risk =Likelihood and Severity
Risk always involves the likelihood that an undesired event will occur.
Qualitative or Quantitative
Risk should consider the severity of consequence of the event, should
it occur.Qualitative orQuantitative "

(*37,38)
http://www.sra.org/docs/Stamatelatos.pdf
Mission Success Starts With Safety
(*37)
Page 18
TRACK Monitor risk metrics and verify/validate mitigation actions
CONTROLReplan mitigations, close risks, invoke contingency plans, or
track risks IDENTIFY Identify risk issues and concerns
ANALYZEEvaluate (impact/severity, probability, time frame), classify,
and prioritize risks
PLAN Decide what, if anything, should be done about risks"

(*38)
page 19
PRA Returns to NASA
"Then, on July 29, 1996, the NASA Administrator stated:
"Since I came to NASA [1992], we've spent billions of dollars on
Shuttle upgrades without knowing how much they improve safety. I want a
tool to help base upgrade decisions on risk."
The Administrator wanted to know if the Shuttle was "safe enough"
and how to make it safer. NASA then began development of a tool to
answer these questions. This is how QRASwas born."


(*39)
Post-Challenger
Evaluation of
Space Shuttle
Risk Assessment
and Management
Prepared by the
Committee on Shuttle Criticality
Review and Hazard Analysis Audit
of the
Aeronautics and Space Engineering Board
with staff support from the
Space Applications Board
Commission on Engineering and Technical Systems
National Research Council
Page 8 col 2, par 3
1.3.11 Focus on Risk Management
The current safety assessment processes used by
NASA do not establish objectively the levels of the
various risks associated with the failure modes and
hazards.

(*40) " Probabilistic Risk Analysis for the NASA Space Shuttle:
A Brief History and Current Work by Elisabeth Paté-Cornell, Stanford
University,
and Robin Dillon, Virginia Tech Submitted for publication in
Reliability Engineering and System Safety April, 2000"



(*9)
REVIEW OF RISK MANAGEMENT PRACTICES IN
VARIOUS ORGANIZATIONS AND INDUSTRIES
January 2000 By:
ERI Consulting & Co.
CH-6343 Rotkreuz Switzerland
Prepared for: European Space Agency
The European Space Research and Technology Centre (ESTEC)
Page 18
Challenger accident in January of 1986 changed most of their minds but
by no means all.
Some still clung to the belief that the accident was a "fluke" and
would never have happened if the shuttle had been launched within the
original launch envelope.
However, despite continued skepticism, since both the Rogers (1986) and
Slay (1988)
investigation teams had strongly encouraged NASA to undertake efforts
in quantitative risk assessment, two pilot studies were initiated in
1987. These two studies were focused upon single shuttle orbiter
systems: the Auxiliary Propulsion Unit or APU, and the Main Propulsion
Pressurization System. The former study was conducted by a joint
McDonnell Douglas and Pickard, Lowe, and Garrick team and was completed
in 1988 and the latter study was conducted by Lockheed with some
support from SAIC in 1989. While the studies were limited in their
scope, they showed particular weaknesses in the qualitative FMEA/CIL
approach. In particular, the APU study indicated that about 30% of the
risk was missed by concentrating on Criticality 1 CILs alone, and that
some of the major (in terms of probability contribution) Criticality 1
CILs, such as hydrazine, were overlooked in the component oriented
FMEAs."


Malcolm Bacchus wrote:
Possibly, but at this point in the discussion, I asked you to explain
and expand on the statements you made:

You are saying that the decision is that "It is up to the voting
public to ensure that the safest program orbiter flight crews." ?

Why is it?

What does "safest" mean?
Does it have a meaning?
Safest compared with what? Safest compared to other program orbiter
flight crews? Safest compared with driving along the highway?
Safest compared with staying in bed?

Can you elaborate, in your words, on what you meant by that statement
and what you mean, in your statements, by "safest"?

Malcolm B

In article .com,
(columbiaaccidentinvestigation)
wrote:

*From:* "columbiaaccidentinvestigation"

*Date:* 26 Jul 2006 00:26:00 -0700

The short answer is money needed to prevent another tragedy.

Why? Why not just accept that accidents (don't call them tragedies
please - they are only tragedies because people make such a fuss about
them) occur in exploration?

As space geeks we need to place safety as a highest priority in our
space program,

Why?

in order to be consistent with own nasa's policies,

I am not convinced that it _is_ or should be NASA's policy. I see what
they say in your *28 but they do not say safety is the highest priority
to the total exclusion of getting the job done within budget and time.
Indeed most of your quotations are concerned with better estimating the
cost/benefit equation of potential risk reduction measures. That
indicates to me that they see safety as one of three key items
(safety/cost/time) in meeting targets but not as the overarching and
sole criteria of success.

and to encourage our politicians to not let previous tragedies happen
again.

Why? See above.

utilizes a risk management cycle to continuously improve safety.
Implicitly if nasa places safety as the highest concern, and nasa then
implements a system to improve safety a result will be to make the
program "safer" (or better) than before.

Agreed. But "safer" does not mean "safest".

As space geeks we can
choose to be consistent with nasa's policy for placing safety as a
top concern, and push to achieve the top most funding for orbiter
safety upgrades, in providing the best in "safety" or "safest"
space program for our astronauts.

And what do you do as a consistent space geek when the government says
"no more money is available"? Do you fly or don't you?

Congressional members partially
reflect their constituent's views in funding programs and by the
people stating we want the "safest" space program for our
astronauts, congress will reflect in funding such a high standard as
well.

No they won't. This is cloud-cuckoo land. Most constituents will want
money spent on other projects not on the space programme and there is a
limited amount of cash. You say "we want the "safest" space programme"
and Congressional members will say "how much will it cost?". You say
"we don't care how much it costs, we won't fly until we have the
"safest" space programme for our astronauts. And they will reply "OK,
don't fly".

The most important response to constituents or space geeks
concerns for making a safer space progam congressional members could
have, is to provide the funding for meeting the high goal of safety
first.

Why stick with this unachievable objective of "the high goal of safety
first"? Try the objective of "exploration and advancement first"? Per
ardua ad astra.

As noted by the asap in 2005 the "aviators" (*17)or
astronauts requested the standardization of nasa centers information a
step necessary for integration into a quantitative risk basement qra.
But the money has not been appropriated for a program wide qra, and
with the example of the eapu, budgetary concerns are trumping safety
upgrades. Therefore one way to motivate our legislators to uphold the
funding needed for a shuttle program qra, is that they vote safety
first, as we request the "safest" shuttle program, in attempting to
prevent past tragedies from repeating themselves.

Same comment made again, and same reply. You are deluding yourself.
Legislators will not vote for safety first at any cost. They will vote
to close the programme down.

Why have a qra because Astronauts and aviators requested it.
In 1996 the nasa administrator wanted "a better tool to base upgrade
decisions on risk" (*38), when confronted with the questions of how
much investment is worth a certain amount risk reduction.

That's reasonable but it doesn't mean that safety comes first. If it
did you wouldn't need the tool. It is a tool to decide where safety
comes in the priority list for a given investment.

Therefore because the current risk analysis is shown to be
deficient, and it is part of nasa's continuous risk management cycle
to improve the risk analysis for decision makers, upgrading the risk
analysis tool itself from the current pra, to an updated integrated
qra, is a logical step to improve flight crew safety.

Actually it isn't logical. Whilst I agree that upgraded risk assessment
tools would be useful if NASA managers want them, you also have to ask
how expensive the upgraded risk assessment tools would be and whether
the cost in having them is, itself, justified. For instance, your view
on the upgraded risk assessment tools would presumably be different if
it cost $10,000 to implement or $1bn to implement.

Malcolm B

Your statement takes exception to NASA's own regulations, where
safety is defined as freedom from death or injury (*28), and if safety
is paramount (*29), then freedom from death or injury is paramount, or
chief concern. If you would like to rewrite nasa's policies for less
safe space travel than you will have to take that up with nasa
yourself.
tom

"I am not convinced that it _is_ or should be NASA's policy. I see
what
they say in your *28 but they do not say safety is the highest priority

to the total exclusion of getting the job done within budget and time.
Indeed most of your quotations are concerned with better estimating the

cost/benefit equation of potential risk reduction measures. That
indicates to me that they see safety as one of three key items
(safety/cost/time) in meeting targets but not as the overarching and
sole criteria of success."


(*28)
http://nodis3.gsfc.nasa.gov/displayA...N_PR_8705_002A...

Subject: Human-Rating Requirements for Space Systems NASA
Procedural Requirements NPR 8705.2A
Effective Date: February 07, 2005
Expiration Date: February 07, 2010
COMPLIANCE IS MANDATORY....
B.44 Safety: The freedom from those conditions that can cause death,
injury, occupational illness, damage to or loss of equipment or
property, or damage to the environment.

(*29)
http://human.space.edu/old/docs/NPG7120.5B.pdf
NASA Procedures and Guidelines
NPG: 7120.5B
Effective Date: November 21, 2002
Expiration Date: November 21, 2007
NASA Program and Project Management Processes and
Requirements
.... 1.1.3 To accomplish this, NASA--
a. Emphasizes that safety of the public, its flight crews, its
employees, and its critical assets are of paramount importance."

I am not convinced that it _is_ or should be NASA's policy. I see what
they say in your *28 but they do not say safety is the highest priority
to the total exclusion of getting the job done within budget and time.
Indeed most of your quotations are concerned with better estimating the
cost/benefit equation of potential risk reduction measures. That
indicates to me that they see safety as one of three key items
(safety/cost/time) in meeting targets but not as the overarching and
sole criteria of success.