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A documentary entitled "Apollo 11: The Untold Story," which aired on
British TV Monday night, highlighted a Bellcomm report by one J. J. O'Connor (http://ntrs.nasa.gov/archive/nasa/ca...1979072576.pdf) about difficulties of safely aborting a mission during first-stage operation. Although the documentary gave few details, O'Connor's report clearly identifies two problems: 1. Break-up of the Launch Vehicle. During a high-Q abort, the first-stage engines would be shut down as part of the abort procedure The report indicates that this would cause the break-up -- and probably explosion -- of the vehicle within half a second. 2) Break-up of the Spacecraft. Loss of one first-stage engine would could cause the CM to separate from the SM. The documentary implied that nothing was ever done about these problems and that abort during the first two and a half minutes was simply unsurvivable. Because the documentary's tone was breathless and exaggerated, I gave little credence to this claim. To my surprise, however, O'Connor's report does seem to have suggest that MSC may have swept the launch-vehicle problem under the rug by simply re-defining the acceptable abort conditions. Was anything ever done about this? Some of the solutions suggested were interesting. Proposals to solve the launch-vehicle problem included commanding stage separation as part of the abort sequence in order to achieve a relatively graceful break-up. Another one was to keep the center F-1 engine burning during an abort. For the spacecraft-break-up problem, *jettisoning* the escape tower was one possibility: this apparently would have greatly reduced the stress on the CM/SM joint. It would, of course, also have left the crew with no escape tower! |
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![]() Proponent wrote: A documentary entitled "Apollo 11: The Untold Story," which aired on British TV Monday night, highlighted a Bellcomm report by one J. J. O'Connor (http://ntrs.nasa.gov/archive/nasa/ca...1979072576.pdf) about difficulties of safely aborting a mission during first-stage operation. Although the documentary gave few details, O'Connor's report clearly identifies two problems: 1. Break-up of the Launch Vehicle. During a high-Q abort, the first-stage engines would be shut down as part of the abort procedure The report indicates that this would cause the break-up -- and probably explosion -- of the vehicle within half a second. 2) Break-up of the Spacecraft. Loss of one first-stage engine would could cause the CM to separate from the SM. Was anything ever done about this? Henry Spencer wrote something about this in 1997 "http://yarchive.net/space/launchers/saturn_v.html" - Ed Kyle |
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![]() Ed Kyle wrote: Proponent wrote: A documentary entitled "Apollo 11: The Untold Story," which aired on British TV Monday night, highlighted a Bellcomm report by one J. J. O'Connor (http://ntrs.nasa.gov/archive/nasa/ca...1979072576.pdf) about difficulties of safely aborting a mission during first-stage operation. Although the documentary gave few details, O'Connor's report clearly identifies two problems: 1. Break-up of the Launch Vehicle. During a high-Q abort, the first-stage engines would be shut down as part of the abort procedure The report indicates that this would cause the break-up -- and probably explosion -- of the vehicle within half a second. 2) Break-up of the Spacecraft. Loss of one first-stage engine would could cause the CM to separate from the SM. Was anything ever done about this? Henry Spencer wrote something about this in 1997 "http://yarchive.net/space/launchers/saturn_v.html" - Ed Kyle The essential point is that the "High-Q" abort issue only dealt with conditions that lasted for a few seconds, peaking during the "Max-Q" point at about T+78 seconds. I doubt very much that Apollo astronauts were not aware of the weaknesses of their abort system. - Ed Kyle |
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Ed Kyle wrote:
I doubt very much that Apollo astronauts were not aware of the weaknesses of their abort system. And there was an auto-abort based on excessively rapid rotation, so the abort system should fire automatically if the Saturn V started to break up around max-Q. Of course that's no guarantee they'd survive, but it was better than expecting the astronauts to figure out there was a problem and fire the abort system. Mark |
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In article .com,
Proponent wrote: A documentary entitled "Apollo 11: The Untold Story," which aired on British TV Monday night, highlighted a Bellcomm report... (http://ntrs.nasa.gov/archive/nasa/ca...1979072576.pdf) They really needed to talk to someone who knew more about the technical history of the hardware... although such people are admittedly a bit thin on the ground. :-) The report's work was done about a year before the Saturn V first flew manned, and the hardware and procedures were changing steadily during that time. 1. Break-up of the Launch Vehicle. During a high-Q abort, the first-stage engines would be shut down as part of the abort procedure The report indicates that this would cause the break-up -- and probably explosion -- of the vehicle within half a second. Only during the fairly-brief high-q period -- 10-20 seconds -- and only if there were simultaneously strong bending forces imposed, e.g. from passing through windshear. And that's why there was an automatic abort if specified attitude rates were exceeded (or if a double engine failure occurred) during most of the first-stage flight. 2) Break-up of the Spacecraft. Loss of one first-stage engine could cause the CM to separate from the SM. Note, though, that the report says: "This is due to the fact that the engines are not canted to go through the vehicle center of gravity since this would significantly reduce payload capability." In fact, as flown, the outboard engines *were* canted somewhat about 20s after liftoff, bringing their thrust vectors closer to the center of mass, for this exact reason. (Admittedly, you have to read some pretty obscure documents to know about this.) Also, the third and final cause of automatic abort was loss of electrical continuity from IU to CM, an indication of structural failure somewhere in between. The documentary implied that nothing was ever done about these problems and that abort during the first two and a half minutes was simply unsurvivable. Nope. See above. In fact, there's a hint of some interesting history here. The report's discussion of the spacecraft-breakup problem notes the possibility of doing an automatic abort on a single engine failure, but says this "would require a change of abort philosophy and hardware". I wonder if MSC was previously trying for an all-manual abort system, and this was the point where they conceded that some automatic aborts were required. -- spsystems.net is temporarily off the air; | Henry Spencer mail to henry at zoo.utoronto.ca instead. | |
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