Russia's Secret: Did Space Station Nearly Die The Day It Was Born?

Russia's Secret: Did Space Station Nearly Die The Day It Was Born?

MSNBC // Technology & Science // SPACE NEWS
Silent suspense surrounded birth of space station
Russians recall glitch that required fast thinking after 1998’s initial
launch
http://www.msnbc.com/news/996722.asp
By James Oberg, NBC NEWS SPACE ANALYST
Nov. 21 — Five years ago, when the very first section of the
international space station reached orbit, the entire program could have
teetered on the edge of failure. It was Nov. 20, 1998, and the project was
saved only through the last-minute intervention of some unsung Russian space
experts, who never told NASA how close they had come to disaster. Or at
least that’s the story told at the Russian space command center at
Krasnoznamensk, southwest of Moscow, where military personnel do the actual
communications with all 120 active Russian spacecraft.
From Krasnoznamensk, data are transmitted to the better-known
Mission Control Center in the northern Moscow suburb of Korolyov, where on
Nov. 20, 1998, foreign dignitaries and journalists were celebrating —
perhaps prematurely — the successful launch.

JimO wrote:

Russia's Secret: Did Space Station Nearly Die The Day It Was Born?

From the article:
"The module was the FGB, Russian for “Functional Cargo Block,”
code-named “Zarya.” Based on a design flown before (including one
spectacular Russian space station failure in May 1987 that the Russians
had not told NASA about), the hardware was part of the military side of
the Russian program and had special high-security radio links with Earth."
Does this refer to Polyus?

Pat

Pat Flannery writes:

JimO wrote:

Russia's Secret: Did Space Station Nearly Die The Day It Was Born?

"The module was the FGB, Russian for "Functional Cargo Block," code-named
"Zarya." Based on a design flown before (including one spectacular Russian
space station failure in May 1987 that the Russians had not told NASA about),
the hardware was part of the military side of the Russian program and had
special high-security radio links with Earth."
Does this refer to Polyus?

Yes, Polyus was launched on the first Energia on May 15, 1987.

Pat Flannery wrote in
:



JimO wrote:

Russia's Secret: Did Space Station Nearly Die The Day It Was Born?

From the article:
"The module was the FGB, Russian for “Functional Cargo Block,”
code-named “Zarya.” Based on a design flown before (including one
spectacular Russian space station failure in May 1987 that the
Russians had not told NASA about), the hardware was part of the
military side of the Russian program and had special high-security
radio links with Earth." Does this refer to Polyus?

Yes. The FGB was used as the orbit insertion/maneuvering stage for Polyus.


--
JRF

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Jorge R. Frank wrote:

Yes. The FGB was used as the orbit insertion/maneuvering stage for Polyus.


It's fascinating to speculate what would have happened it Polyus got
successfully into orbit, rather than malfunctioning and heading into the
ocean- I get the impression that the militarization of space would have
started pronto.

Pat

In article ,
"Jorge R. Frank" wrote:

Pat Flannery wrote in
:



JimO wrote:

Russia's Secret: Did Space Station Nearly Die The Day It Was Born?

From the article:
"The module was the FGB, Russian for “Functional Cargo Block,”
code-named “Zarya.” Based on a design flown before (including one
spectacular Russian space station failure in May 1987 that the
Russians had not told NASA about), the hardware was part of the
military side of the Russian program and had special high-security
radio links with Earth." Does this refer to Polyus?

Yes. The FGB was used as the orbit insertion/maneuvering stage for Polyus.

Interestingly, at the tail end of Space Station Freedom, as it was
morphing through Space Station Alpha on it's way to ISS, the final
"restructure/rephase" was to consider the option of using a
Lockheed-designed "service module" to perform the task later given to
FGB. It was not divulged how and why Lockheed had designed such a
module nor were we encouraged to ask; it was enough that we were told:
"It works and this is what it can do . . ." Obviously (moreso now than
in the summer of 1993), this was a core vehicle used for various
classified NRO payloads that NASA was essentially begging for permission
to use for early attitude and orbital control. It's unclear if NRO
simply refused or if they place so many roadblocks in the way of its use
that NASA was forced to go to the Russians on this aspect of the program.

Anyway, just another tidbit from the dusty archives of SSF/ISS trivia I
carry around with me . . .

--
Herb Schaltegger, B.S., J.D.
Reformed Aerospace Engineer
Columbia Loss FAQ:
http://www.io.com/~o_m/columbia_loss_faq_x.html

Herb Schaltegger wrote:

Interestingly, at the tail end of Space Station Freedom, as it was
morphing through Space Station Alpha on it's way to ISS, the final
"restructure/rephase" was to consider the option of using a
Lockheed-designed "service module" to perform the task later given to
FGB. It was not divulged how and why Lockheed had designed such a
module nor were we encouraged to ask; it was enough that we were told:
"It works and this is what it can do . . ." Obviously (moreso now than
in the summer of 1993), this was a core vehicle used for various
classified NRO payloads that NASA was essentially begging for permission
to use for early attitude and orbital control.

This probably gives the recon satellites the ability to change their
orbital parameters on-station; both to evade interception and to make
their time of passage over interesting photo targets less predictable.

It's unclear if NRO
simply refused or if they place so many roadblocks in the way of its use
that NASA was forced to go to the Russians on this aspect of the program.

It would have meant people would get a detailed look at its design, and
a lot of its capabilities could have been deduced from that.

Pat

In article ,
Herb Schaltegger wrote:
Lockheed-designed "service module" to perform the task later given to
FGB. It was not divulged how and why Lockheed had designed such a
module nor were we encouraged to ask; it was enough that we were told:
"It works and this is what it can do . . ."

Aviation Week speculated that it was the KH-11 spysat bus; the numbers
seemed about right.

...It's unclear if NRO
simply refused or if they place so many roadblocks in the way of its use
that NASA was forced to go to the Russians on this aspect of the program.

I don't think they were *forced* to do it, so much as they found it a more
attractive alternative. The FGB module had in-orbit refueling capability,
had rather more ACS authority than the Lockheed bus (which was marginal in
this area and might have needed upgrading), and looked cheaper. Moreover,
NASA historically has been very reluctant to get involved with highly
classified stuff, just because it is so much hassle.
--
MOST launched 30 June; first light, 29 July; 5arcsec | Henry Spencer
pointing, 10 Sept; first science, early Oct; all well. |

(Henry Spencer) wrote in
:

In article ,
Herb Schaltegger wrote:
Lockheed-designed "service module" to perform the task later given to
FGB. It was not divulged how and why Lockheed had designed such a
module nor were we encouraged to ask; it was enough that we were told:
"It works and this is what it can do . . ."

Aviation Week speculated that it was the KH-11 spysat bus; the numbers
seemed about right.

Given that Lockheed was the prime contractor on KH-11, HST, and Bus-1, that
KH-11 is said to closely resemble HST, and that Bus-1's cylindrical shape
seems to be a good fit for the base of HST, that sounds reasonable.

...It's unclear if NRO
simply refused or if they place so many roadblocks in the way of its
use that NASA was forced to go to the Russians on this aspect of the
program.

I don't think they were *forced* to do it, so much as they found it a
more attractive alternative. The FGB module had in-orbit refueling
capability, had rather more ACS authority than the Lockheed bus (which
was marginal in this area and might have needed upgrading), and looked
cheaper. Moreover, NASA historically has been very reluctant to get
involved with highly classified stuff, just because it is so much
hassle.

Case in point being the compartmentalization within HST contractors
Lockheed and Perkin-Elmer.

Interestingly, in 1997, when NASA was looking for backup options in the
event the Russians failed to launch the ISS service module, rather than
going back to Lockheed/Bus-1, they went to the Naval Research Laboratory
and their Interim Control Module (ICM). Like Bus-1, ICM is a propulsion
module used on some top-secret NRO birds, and was designed to be compatible
with both the Space Shuttle and Titan launch vehicles.

Should be an interesting story why NASA preferred to deal with NRL vice
Lockheed.

--
JRF

Reply-to address spam-proofed - to reply by E-mail,
check "Organization" (I am not assimilated) and
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Pat Flannery wrote in
:

Herb Schaltegger wrote:

Interestingly, at the tail end of Space Station Freedom, as it was
morphing through Space Station Alpha on it's way to ISS, the final
"restructure/rephase" was to consider the option of using a
Lockheed-designed "service module" to perform the task later given to
FGB. It was not divulged how and why Lockheed had designed such a
module nor were we encouraged to ask; it was enough that we were told:
"It works and this is what it can do . . ." Obviously (moreso now than
in the summer of 1993), this was a core vehicle used for various
classified NRO payloads that NASA was essentially begging for permission
to use for early attitude and orbital control.

This probably gives the recon satellites the ability to change their
orbital parameters on-station; both to evade interception and to make
their time of passage over interesting photo targets less predictable.

More the latter than the former; neither superpower actually deployed ASAT
capability. But photorecon birds are generally in sun-synchronous orbits,
so that their passage over a given target is near the same local time every
day. That makes photo analysis easier but also makes overflights
predictable. As you say, periodic maneuvers will change the overflight
times.

--
JRF

Reply-to address spam-proofed - to reply by E-mail,
check "Organization" (I am not assimilated) and
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