MMT: "Any questions on that?" -- SILENCE

"James Oberg" writes:

I just listened to the NASA replay of the MMT audio tapes.

At 9:14:48 EDT after a three and half minute discussion, Linda Ham agrees
that there is no safety of flight issue, despite the absence of any test or
analysis data that a foam impact on RCC is safe -- they just assumed it
was -- and asks for any questions. The room was quiet as a tomb.

I'd think you'd want to separate your "safety board" from the mission
management team.

I've been working in software development for quite some time and have
observed that the products with higher quality tend to be those that
have a quality assurance team that's separate from the development
team. The development team is always under pressure to get projects
done on schedule. Quality often suffers because their boss only cares
that the project is released on schedule. These guys only seem to
speak in some dialect of Microsoft Project. Microsoft Project does
nothing to track quality, only schedule (I wonder if the MMT deals
with Microsoft Project).

The quality assurance team is responsible for running automated
testing, which catches some of the bugs by testing previously existing
functionality. They are also generally responsible for introducing
new tests based on the customer requirements for new projects. They
won't sign off on a project until it's clear that it has the
functionality and quality demanded by the customer. Their boss is
only concerned with quality, not schedule, so there isn't much
pressure to sign off on projects that have clearly missed their
quality goals.

Jeff
--
Remove "no" and "spam" from email address to reply.
If it says "This is not spam!", it's surely a lie.

"James Oberg" writes:

I just listened to the NASA replay of the MMT audio tapes.

At 9:14:48 EDT after a three and half minute discussion, Linda Ham agrees
that there is no safety of flight issue, despite the absence of any test or
analysis data that a foam impact on RCC is safe -- they just assumed it
was -- and asks for any questions. The room was quiet as a tomb.

Something else I noticed from another meeting (1/24), Linda Ham says,
"Right, okay, same thing you told me about in my office, we've seen
pieces of this size before, haven't we?". She never gets an answer
because there's an interruption that a remote site isn't hearing
everything, and she wraps up the foam discussion immediately afterwards.

I interpret this to mean either someone told her that this foam piece
was no larger than any previously seen, or that she believed that she
had been told that. In fact, the foam piece was about twice as big as
any seen before, and the vast majority of previous foam strikes were
much smaller.

(ElleninLosAngeles) wrote in message . com...
...

on the 24th:
Engelauf: Um, other than that there is not a lot to report. I will say
that the crew did send down a note last night asking if anybody was
talking about an extension day. If we're going to go with that. And we
sent up to the crew about 16 second video clip of the strike just so
they are armed if they get any questions in the press conferences or
that sort of thing. We made it very clear to them, no concerns.
Ham: When is the press conference? Is it today?
Engelauf: Later today.
Ham: They may get asked because the press is aware of it. I?
Engelauf: The press is aware of it I know folks have asked me because
the press corp at the Cape has been asking. We wanted to make sure
that they are properly?.
Ham: Okay, next on the temperature. Um did they see an increase when
they exercised back there?

also on the 24th:
MER/Don McCormack: Okay, and also we uh received uh received the data
from the systems integration guys of the potential ranges of sizes and
impact angles and where it might of hit and the guys have gone off an
done an analysis, they've used uh they've used a tool they refer to as
"crater" which is there official evaluation tool to determine the
potential size of the damage um they went off and done all that work
and they've done thermal analysis of the areas of wherethere may be
damaged tiles uh the analysis is not complete there is one case yet
they wish to run but were just kind of jumping to the conclusion of
all that um they do show obviously there's potential for significant
tile damage here but, but they do not indicate that the thermal
analysis does not indicate that there is a potential
for a burn through, there could be localized heating damage um
obviously there is a lot of uncertainty in all this in terms of the
size of the debris and where it hit and angle of incidence and uh its
difficult
Ham: No burn-through means, no catastrophic damage and localized
heating damage would mean a tile replacement?
Don: It would mean possible impact to turnaround repairs and that sort
of thing but we do not see any kind of safety of flight issue here yet
in anything that we've looked at
Ham: No safety of flight and no issue for this mission nothing that
we're going to do different, there may be a turn around?
Don: Right, Right, It could potentially hit the RCC and we don't
indicate, other than possible coating damage or something, we don't
see any issue if it hit the
RCC so. Although we could again, although we could have some
significant tile damage, we don't see a safety of flight issue.
Ham: What do you mean by that?
Don: Well it could be down to the uh, we could loose an entire tile, I
mean and then the ramp into and out of that it could be a significant
area of tile damage down to the SIP {strain isolation panel} perhaps
um it could be a significant piece missing but um
Ham: Would be a turn around issue only?
Don: Right?*Some discussion going on the background, mic did not pick
it up clearly.
Ham: Right, okay, same thing that you told me about the other day in
my office, we've seen pieces of this size before, haven't we?
Mike Leinbach: Hey, Linda, we are missing part of that conversation.
Ham: Right
(Man's voice): Linda we can't hear the speaker.
Ham: He was just reiterating, it was Calvin {Schomburg}, that he does
not
believe that there is any uh burn throughs so no safety of flight kind
of issue, it'smore of a turn around issue similar to what we have had
on other flights. That's it? All right, any questions on that? Okay,
Vanessa?

on the 27th:
MER/Don McCormack: Yeah, Linda, on Friday I mentioned the thermal
analysis that we're looking at and I had stated that we had looked at
five of six areas. Just wanted to
let you know that we looked at the sixth location which was an area on
the main landing gear door. The Integration folks think this is a low
probability area as far as, you know,
maybe sustaining a hit there but we went ahead and looked at it. We
looked at????..
...



What I can't understand is if there were NASA engineers who had
doubts about this analysis why this wasn't communicated to the
managers making SAFETY decisions. You really can't blame the managers
if the engineers make bad analyses or other engineers who have
different opinions don't communicate them.

An excerpt from the CAIB press briefing on April 8:

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
"A REPORTER: Washington Post. For Dr. Ride. I'm wondering, Dr. Ride,
in your interviewing and putting together this storyboard that you
were talking about on decision-making, have you come across anyone yet
who felt that his concerns about the condition of the left wing during
the mission or the need to photograph it were not listened to or given
short shrift.

DR. RIDE: We've now interviewed, I would say, most of the
engineering-level folks who were involved in the debris assessment
team and basically the team that was formed immediately after it was
realized that there was impact, to assess that impact. That team met
as a whole on, I want to say, January 21st. It might have been January
20th that this particular meeting occurred where they believed that,
coming out of this meeting, the concluding idea of the meeting was to
request imagery. Then they made an attempt to go through actually a
few different channels, and we're still tracing down exactly what
happened through each channel, to get the imagery taken.

They had what you can appreciate is real good engineering reasons for
wanting the imagery. You know, this is a pretty complicated process
that they go through. It was a large team, and it was a large team
because there are several steps that are required in this. You know,
the first step was just analyzing the video from the launch and
determining there was something that had come off and had hit the
orbiter.

So the first step was about how big is this piece. And that's the
photo folks. They give the size of the piece and location that it came
from to the transport folks, who then take a look at the aerodynamic
fields between the orbiter and the tank and say, okay, well, so where
did this thing probably hit and at what angle. There was a fair amount
of uncertainty in that. In fact, a large amount of uncertainty in
that.

So their responsibility was then to pass that on. You know, it
probably hit going this fast at this angle in that place, but they
couldn't pin it down and they didn't pretend to be able to pin it
down. Their job was to hand that to the impact people who would, you
know, say, okay, it was coming this fast, at this angle, so it created
this much damage. But they didn't really feel that they had accurate
input to make their assessment.

They would then hand off the tile damage that they calculated to the
thermal people, who would calculate the potential thermal damage to
the orbiter. So there was this whole string of engineers who were all
in this meeting together who all said: We need to constrain this
problem more. We need some more information. We need some more data.
We could use some images. Let's go request imagery.

Now the question is why didn't that request make it to the program
managers and up into the system. We think it's a little too early to
characterize all the different places where that broke down, but it's
everything from just missed communication, you know, to areas in the
system that might not have appreciated the importance of the imagery,
might not have appreciated what, in fact, it could give them. Just a
variety of different reasons. So it turns out that this is not a
simple story to be putting together, but that's about where we are at
the moment.

A REPORTER: Where was the meeting held and how many were in
attendance?

DR. RIDE: It was tens of people in attendance, and it was an
engineering meeting at JSC."
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
http://www.caib.us/events/press_brie...ranscript.html



Bob Clark

Brian Gaff wrote:

Hmm, having read that, there are a few comments.

Firstly, it seems that everyone is assuming that the tiles are the main
worry in this situation, and the rcc is not a worry. Folk are seemingly
assuming its just too strong to be damaged. With hindsight, we can see that
is not the case of course, but were there ever any tests carried out to
this area in the past? Looks from my poking about as if there were never any
tests because no impact should ever hit that high up.

As I say, hindsight can make most of look like idiots, but in this case I'd
have thought an alarm bell of a foam hit that high might have been just
loud enough to hear, or is it just that the present generation of people
'assume' that the previous bunch had covered this or just did not appreciate
the behaviour of such a brittle substance of that age?

Brian

--
Brian Gaff....

It generally looks like they believed that the impact happened about
a foot or so back from where it apparently took place. Given the
tools and timing available, this is not bad, just not good enough in
this case.

There has been a fair amount of impact testing on aircraft wing and
tail leading edges at similar energy levels (4# @500 ft/s vs 2# @
700ft/s).
These structures are generally constructed of metal or composite in a
single thin sheet or thin-faced honeycomb and have proven to be rather
tough, with most off-center hits simply bouncing off with limited
damage.

A comparison to these results simply based on the relative ultimate
strengths of the materials involved could have lead to a false sense of
security. The tests done on the shuttle leading edges for low mass
high velocity impacts may have reinforced this feeling. In this case,
the overall structure does not have time to respond, so things like the
overall stiffness or strength of the target do not play much of a role.
A .025 oz. object at 25000 ft/s has the same kinetic energy as a 2#
object
at 700 ft/s, but only 3% of the inertia.

In the case of high mass, low velocity impacts material elongation
capability counts as much or more that strength and even new
carbon/carbon
is not noted for its ductility. Some folks wanting to make everything
on
an aircraft a casting have run into the same trap with impact prone
components. The element held up to all the static ultimate and fatigue
loads, but shattered when hit by a 500 ft/s 4# bird.

Thanks, eric, very informative post.

"jeff findley"
the products with higher quality tend to be those that
have a quality assurance team that's separate from the development
team

The CAIB has looked at the US nuclear submarine program for guidance on how to
handle safety issues, and the experience of the Navy is at some variance with
the "separate quality team" concept" in that the regular crew looks out for
off-nominal conditions, and the off-nominal condition is corrected.

One thing that made this more workable for the Navy than for NASA is that the
Navy crew racked up thousands of hours at their jobs, while flight operations at
NASA are intermittent.

(Robert Clark) wrote in message om...
...
MER/Don McCormack: Okay, and also we uh received uh received the data
from the systems integration guys of the potential ranges of sizes and
impact angles and where it might of hit and the guys have gone off an
done an analysis, they've used uh they've used a tool they refer to as
"crater" which is there official evaluation tool to determine the
potential size of the damage um they went off and done all that work
and they've done thermal analysis of the areas of wherethere may be
damaged tiles uh the analysis is not complete there is one case yet
they wish to run but were just kind of jumping to the conclusion of
all that um they do show obviously there's potential for significant
tile damage here but, but they do not indicate that the thermal
analysis does not indicate that there is a potential
for a burn through, there could be localized heating damage um
obviously there is a lot of uncertainty in all this in terms of the
size of the debris and where it hit and angle of incidence and uh its
difficult
Ham: No burn-through means, no catastrophic damage and localized
heating damage would mean a tile replacement?
Don: It would mean possible impact to turnaround repairs and that sort
of thing but we do not see any kind of safety of flight issue here yet
in anything that we've looked at
....

I really don't like McCormack's phrasing he

"they've done thermal analysis of the areas of wherethere may be
damaged tiles uh the analysis is not complete there is one case yet
they wish to run but were just kind of jumping to the conclusion of
all that um they do show obviously there's potential for significant
tile damage here but, BUT THEY DO NOT INDICATE THAT THE THERMAL
ANALYSIS DOES NOT INDICATE THAT THERE IS A POTENTIAL FOR A BURN
THROUGH, there could be localized heating damage um obviously there is
a lot of uncertainty in all this in terms of the size of the debris
and where it hit and angle of incidence and uh its difficult"

Use of the double-negative is common but it is often confusing.
LOGICALLY what this phrase should mean is that the thermal analysis
people WERE ALLOWING FOR THE POSSIBILITY OF CATASTROPHIC DAMAGE.
However, from the rest of the statement I gather what he means is
that the analyses argues against catastrophic damage.
Nevertheless, I wonder if his phrasing here REALLY was giving the
actual state of affairs: the analysis could not in fact rule out
catastrophic damage to the orbiter. Perhaps this is straying too much
into speculation but perhaps subconsciously he did want to get across
the limitations of the analyses then completed or could be completed
given the data.
Linda Ham then jumps on the common English understanding of his
phrasing that it means there is was no catastrophic damage.
Then no one seemed to contradict that interpretation - unless some of
the unintelligible comments were from people who wanted clarification
on this point.



Bob Clark

"Kent Betts" writes:

"jeff findley"
the products with higher quality tend to be those that
have a quality assurance team that's separate from the development
team

The CAIB has looked at the US nuclear submarine program for guidance on how to
handle safety issues, and the experience of the Navy is at some variance with
the "separate quality team" concept" in that the regular crew looks out for
off-nominal conditions, and the off-nominal condition is corrected.

One thing that made this more workable for the Navy than for NASA is that the
Navy crew racked up thousands of hours at their jobs, while flight operations at
NASA are intermittent.

Perhaps part of this success at the Navy is the whole "nuclear" thing.
It's obvious to anyone on the job that a screw up with the nuclear
reactor is a "bad thing", especially when everyone making the
decisions is on the same ship and could potentially die if the wrong
decision is made. Self preservation is a big motivator here. The
assumption is naturally made that issues are safety issues, until
proven otherwise.

The recent press conference with Ham, and others, reveals that NASA's
current culture is in a mode where it was assumed that the shuttle
was safe until proven otherwise. Furthermore, they defended this
decision making process saying they were doing the best they could
with the information available. Unfortunately, they started with the
wrong base assumption, that the shuttle was safe until proven
otherwise. When presented with an impact case that had not been
investigated before, they accepted the assumption that RCC could
handle the impact.

This assumption that the shuttle is safe if something unexpected
happens must change.

Jeff
--
Remove "no" and "spam" from email address to reply.
If it says "This is not spam!", it's surely a lie.

Robert Clark wrote:
"they've done thermal analysis of the areas of wherethere may be
damaged tiles uh the analysis is not complete there is one case yet
they wish to run but were just kind of jumping to the conclusion of
all that um they do show obviously there's potential for significant
tile damage here but, BUT THEY DO NOT INDICATE THAT THE THERMAL
ANALYSIS DOES NOT INDICATE THAT THERE IS A POTENTIAL FOR A BURN
THROUGH, there could be localized heating damage um obviously there is
a lot of uncertainty in all this in terms of the size of the debris
and where it hit and angle of incidence and uh its difficult"

Use of the double-negative is common but it is often confusing.
LOGICALLY what this phrase should mean is that the thermal analysis
people WERE ALLOWING FOR THE POSSIBILITY OF CATASTROPHIC DAMAGE.
However, from the rest of the statement I gather what he means is
that the analyses argues against catastrophic damage.

It appears to be a double negative as written. I suspect that, as
spoken, there was a pause after the first part, as in "But they do not
indicate that the thermal analysis ... [pause] ... (it) does not
indicate that there is a potential for a burn through." I added the
[pause] and the unspoken (it). Many people speak this way. They start
a sentence and revise it in real time. You pause, back up a few words,
and continue.

I'll be listening to the audio myself when I get some time this weekend.
Not exactly a little light beach reading

--
bp
Proud Member of the Human O-Ring Society Since 2003

(Robert Clark) wrote in message . com...
"BUT THEY DO NOT INDICATE THAT THE THERMAL
ANALYSIS DOES NOT INDICATE THAT THERE IS A POTENTIAL FOR A BURN
THROUGH, there could be localized heating damage um obviously there is
a lot of uncertainty in all this in terms of the size of the debris
and where it hit and angle of incidence and uh its difficult"

Use of the double-negative is common but it is often confusing.
LOGICALLY what this phrase should mean is that the thermal analysis
people WERE ALLOWING FOR THE POSSIBILITY OF CATASTROPHIC DAMAGE.

I think you're misreading it. I see it as more like:

"BUT THEY DO NOT INDICATE THAT.... THE THERMAL ANALYSIS DOES NOT
INDICATE THAT THERE IS A POTENTIAL FOR A BURN THROUGH,"

In other words, that he started to say that there's no indication of a
burn-through, then paused and started again trying to say it more
precisely.

Mark