If columbia hadnt been lost would the shuttle still be flying?

On Jan 29, 3:41*pm, JF Mezei wrote:
On 13-01-29 12:20, SalemHanna wrote:

But there's no way of knowing when the foam problem would have next
caused fatalities if left uncorrected,

The later part is of course the big question.

If let to its own devices, would NASA have eventually corrected the foam
problem ? They knew of it, but didn't put it in a high priority. And
while they wouldn't have retro-foamed existing tanks, they may have set
new standards for foaming new tanks which would have reduced the problems..

Also, post assembly complete, with reduced flight rate, the odds of an
accident happening would have also gone down.

if you read wayne hales article it makes a interesting point. they
didnt image columbia because his boss thought it hopeless and had
decided its best to not tell the astronauts.....

let them live to re entry happy rather than die in orbit after running
out of air......

the larger issue for the future, we should always have enough back up
capacity in case of a problem. like some emergency launch supplies to
orbit capacity.

In article f19ffb38-6157-4e04-bfe1-
, says...

if you read wayne hales article it makes a interesting point. they
didnt image columbia because his boss thought it hopeless and had
decided its best to not tell the astronauts.....

Cite? I don't often read is blog. But I will note that on the subject
of Challenger, his opinion on the cause is not consistent with your
belief that "management caused the failure". You should go back and
read the CAIB from cover to cover. Life is more complex than your
oversimplifications.

let them live to re entry happy rather than die in orbit after running
out of air......

the larger issue for the future, we should always have enough back up
capacity in case of a problem. like some emergency launch supplies to
orbit capacity.

This B.S. again? There isn't one credible scenario, even Columbia,
which would have absolutely required what you're asking for.

Jeff
--
"the perennial claim that hypersonic airbreathing propulsion would
magically make space launch cheaper is nonsense -- LOX is much cheaper
than advanced airbreathing engines, and so are the tanks to put it in
and the extra thrust to carry it." - Henry Spencer

On Feb 3, 7:44*pm, Jeff Findley wrote:
In article f19ffb38-6157-4e04-bfe1-
, says...



if you read wayne hales article it makes a interesting point. they
didnt image columbia because his boss thought it hopeless and had
decided its best to not tell the astronauts.....

Cite? *I don't often read is blog. *But I will note that on the subject
of Challenger, his opinion on the cause is not consistent with your
belief that "management caused the failure". *You should go back and
read the CAIB from cover to cover. *Life is more complex than your
oversimplifications.

let them live to re entry happy rather than die in orbit after running
out of air......

the larger issue for the future, we should always have enough back up
capacity in case of a problem. like some emergency launch supplies to
orbit capacity.

This B.S. again? *There isn't one credible scenario, even Columbia,
which would have absolutely required what you're asking for.

Jeff
--
"the perennial claim that hypersonic airbreathing propulsion would
magically make space launch cheaper is nonsense -- LOX is much cheaper
than advanced airbreathing engines, and so are the tanks to put it in
and the extra thrust to carry it." - Henry Spencer

WASHINGTON (AP) — A NASA top official wrestled with what he thought
was a hypothetical question: What should you tell the astronauts of a
doomed space shuttle Columbia?

When the NASA official raised the question in 2003 just days before
the accident that claimed seven astronauts' lives, managers thought —
wrongly — that Columbia's heat shield was fine. It wasn't. Columbia,
NASA's oldest shuttle, broke apart over Texas 10 years ago Friday upon
returning to Earth after a 16-day mission.

But the story of that question — retold a decade later — illustrates a
key lesson from the tragedy, says Wayne Hale, a flight director who
later ran the shuttle program for NASA.

That lesson: Never give up. No matter how hopeless.

And to illustrate the lesson, Hale in his blog tells for the first
time the story of his late boss who seemingly suggested doing just
that. The boss, mission operations chief Jon Harpold, asked the now-
retired Hale a what-if question after a meeting that determined —
wrongly — that Columbia was safe to land despite some damage after
takeoff.

"You know there is nothing we can do about damage to the (thermal
protection system)," Hale quotes Harpold a decade later. "If it has
been damaged, it's probably better not to know. I think the crew would
rather not know. Don't you think it would be better for them to have a
happy successful flight and die unexpectedly during entry than to stay
on orbit, knowing that there was nothing to be done until the air ran
out."

When Harpold raised the question with Hale in 2003, managers had
already concluded that Columbia's heat shield was fine. They told
astronauts they weren't worried about damage from foam insulation
coming off the massive shuttle fuel tank during launch, hitting a wing
that allowed superheated gases in when the shuttle re-entered the
atmosphere. No one was aware of the seriousness of the damage at the
time.

This was a what-if type question that conveyed a fatalistic attitude
about the heat shield system being unfixable, which was "a wrong-
headed cultural norm that we had all bought into," Hale said in a
Thursday telephone interview.

"There was never any debate about what to tell the crew," he said.

In fact, NASA officials were overconfident in the heat shield on
Columbia. A day after launch, NASA saw video of the foam from the
shuttle's fuel tank hit the shuttle wing, something that had happened
before. NASA officials studied the damage and determined it wasn't a
problem.

NASA managers even sent the crew a 15-second video clip of the foam
strike and "made it very clear to them no, no concerns," according to
the independent board that later investigated the accident. Eight
times, NASA had the opportunity to get a closer look at the damage—
using military satellites — and NASA mistakenly ignored those chances
to see how bad the problem was, the accident board concluded.

And had NASA realized the severity of the problem, the space agency
would not have just let the astronauts die without a fight or a word,
despite Harpold's hypothetical question, Hale said.

"We would have pulled out all the stops. There would have been no
stone left unturned. We would have had the entire nation working on
it," Hale said. Ultimately, Hale said he thinks whatever NASA would
have tried in 2003 with limited time and knowledge probably would have
failed.

And the astronauts would have been told about the problem and their
fate had engineers really known what was happening, Hale said.

When NASA started flying shuttles again, Hale told the new team of
mission managers: "We are never ever going to say that there is
nothing we can do."

NASA developed an in-flight heat shield repair kit.

The space shuttles were retired in 2011. Harpold died in 2004.

Hale said he is now writing about the issue because he wanted future
space officials not to make the mistakes he and his colleagues did.
The loss of the Columbia astronauts — people he knew — still weighs on
Hale.

"You never get over it. It's always present with you," Hale said.
"These are people I knew well. Several of them, I worked closely with.
I was responsible for their safety. It's never going to go away."

___

Online:

Wayne Hale's blog: http://waynehale.wordpress.com/


so wayne believes the effort would of failed? why would that have
been? time was short, care packages of food oxygen etc could of
extended the crews lives long enough till another orbiter could of
rescued the crew......

but nasa has no emergency supplies to orbit capacity, one day that
could be useful for ISS or a soyuz in trouble........

Reading between the lines of waynes statement they may not have imaged
the orbiter because his boss thought it wouldnt of mattered.......

at least thats my take on his statement

*But I will note that on the subject
of Challenger, his opinion on the cause is not consistent with your
belief that "management caused the failure". *You should go back and
read the CAIB from cover to cover. *Life is more complex than your
oversimplifications.


challenger and columbia were both management failures, partially
burned thru o rings, partial wing burn thru......

the failures were clearly visible, management ignored the clear
indicators of coming disaster, and the crews died

In article 0742dbcf-7f3c-47d3-ad57-
, says...

WASHINGTON (AP) ? A NASA top official wrestled with what he thought
was a hypothetical question: What should you tell the astronauts of a
doomed space shuttle Columbia?

When the NASA official raised the question in 2003 just days before
the accident that claimed seven astronauts' lives, managers thought ?
wrongly ? that Columbia's heat shield was fine. It wasn't. Columbia,
NASA's oldest shuttle, broke apart over Texas 10 years ago Friday upon
returning to Earth after a 16-day mission.

But the story of that question ? retold a decade later ? illustrates a
key lesson from the tragedy, says Wayne Hale, a flight director who
later ran the shuttle program for NASA.

That lesson: Never give up. No matter how hopeless.

And to illustrate the lesson, Hale in his blog tells for the first
time the story of his late boss who seemingly suggested doing just
that. The boss, mission operations chief Jon Harpold, asked the now-
retired Hale a what-if question after a meeting that determined ?
wrongly ? that Columbia was safe to land despite some damage after
takeoff.

"You know there is nothing we can do about damage to the (thermal
protection system)," Hale quotes Harpold a decade later. "If it has
been damaged, it's probably better not to know. I think the crew would
rather not know. Don't you think it would be better for them to have a
happy successful flight and die unexpectedly during entry than to stay
on orbit, knowing that there was nothing to be done until the air ran
out."

When Harpold raised the question with Hale in 2003, managers had
already concluded that Columbia's heat shield was fine. They told
astronauts they weren't worried about damage from foam insulation
coming off the massive shuttle fuel tank during launch, hitting a wing
that allowed superheated gases in when the shuttle re-entered the
atmosphere. No one was aware of the seriousness of the damage at the
time.

This was a what-if type question that conveyed a fatalistic attitude
about the heat shield system being unfixable, which was "a wrong-
headed cultural norm that we had all bought into," Hale said in a
Thursday telephone interview.

"There was never any debate about what to tell the crew," he said.

In fact, NASA officials were overconfident in the heat shield on
Columbia. A day after launch, NASA saw video of the foam from the
shuttle's fuel tank hit the shuttle wing, something that had happened
before. NASA officials studied the damage and determined it wasn't a
problem.

NASA managers even sent the crew a 15-second video clip of the foam
strike and "made it very clear to them no, no concerns," according to
the independent board that later investigated the accident. Eight
times, NASA had the opportunity to get a closer look at the damage?
using military satellites ? and NASA mistakenly ignored those chances
to see how bad the problem was, the accident board concluded.

And had NASA realized the severity of the problem, the space agency
would not have just let the astronauts die without a fight or a word,
despite Harpold's hypothetical question, Hale said.

"We would have pulled out all the stops. There would have been no
stone left unturned. We would have had the entire nation working on
it," Hale said. Ultimately, Hale said he thinks whatever NASA would
have tried in 2003 with limited time and knowledge probably would have
failed.

And the astronauts would have been told about the problem and their
fate had engineers really known what was happening, Hale said.

When NASA started flying shuttles again, Hale told the new team of
mission managers: "We are never ever going to say that there is
nothing we can do."

NASA developed an in-flight heat shield repair kit.

The space shuttles were retired in 2011. Harpold died in 2004.

Hale said he is now writing about the issue because he wanted future
space officials not to make the mistakes he and his colleagues did.
The loss of the Columbia astronauts ? people he knew ? still weighs on
Hale.

"You never get over it. It's always present with you," Hale said.
"These are people I knew well. Several of them, I worked closely with.
I was responsible for their safety. It's never going to go away."

___

Online:

Wayne Hale's blog: http://waynehale.wordpress.com/


so wayne believes the effort would of failed? why would that have
been? time was short, care packages of food oxygen etc could of
extended the crews lives long enough till another orbiter could of
rescued the crew......

No one at the time believed that there was a problem with the TPS.
Based on the best information they had at the time, they made the best
call they could. You're leaping to conclusions far beyond a reasonable
"what could have been".

but nasa has no emergency supplies to orbit capacity, one day that
could be useful for ISS or a soyuz in trouble........

No credible scenario exists to justify this capability, especially since
all manned spaceflight by the US is going up on Russian Soyuz capsules
to ISS. ISS is the "safe haven" in any current credible scenario.

Reading between the lines of waynes statement they may not have imaged
the orbiter because his boss thought it wouldnt of mattered.......

at least thats my take on his statement

Do note that his statements are made in hindsight.

Jeff
--
"the perennial claim that hypersonic airbreathing propulsion would
magically make space launch cheaper is nonsense -- LOX is much cheaper
than advanced airbreathing engines, and so are the tanks to put it in
and the extra thrust to carry it." - Henry Spencer

In article 60960c39-cb2b-4b7a-abb5-4d3345d0e909
@f6g2000yqm.googlegroups.com, says...

*But I will note that on the subject
of Challenger, his opinion on the cause is not consistent with your
belief that "management caused the failure". *You should go back and
read the CAIB from cover to cover. *Life is more complex than your
oversimplifications.


challenger and columbia were both management failures, partially
burned thru o rings, partial wing burn thru......

the failures were clearly visible, management ignored the clear
indicators of coming disaster, and the crews died

You repeatedly saying this absolutely, positively, does NOT make it
true. In both situations, there is NOT a single failure which led to
the accident.

Again, go re-read both accident investigation reports from cover to
cover. I have. Either you have not read them both, or your reading
comprehension is pathetic.

Even Wayne Hale noted that he believed the "management caused the
Challenger failure" myth. That is, until he went back and actually
*read* the CAIB. Do note that this myth came from the media over-
simplifying the report to "sound bite" length, which is EXACTLY what
you're doing.

Real life is more complicated than a "sound bite". If you don't realize
that, your "conclusions" aren't worth the bytes they take up on Usenet.

Jeff
--
"the perennial claim that hypersonic airbreathing propulsion would
magically make space launch cheaper is nonsense -- LOX is much cheaper
than advanced airbreathing engines, and so are the tanks to put it in
and the extra thrust to carry it." - Henry Spencer

On Feb 4, 9:48*am, Jeff Findley wrote:
In article 0742dbcf-7f3c-47d3-ad57-
, says...







WASHINGTON (AP) ? A NASA top official wrestled with what he thought
was a hypothetical question: What should you tell the astronauts of a
doomed space shuttle Columbia?

When the NASA official raised the question in 2003 just days before
the accident that claimed seven astronauts' lives, managers thought ?
wrongly ? that Columbia's heat shield was fine. It wasn't. Columbia,
NASA's oldest shuttle, broke apart over Texas 10 years ago Friday upon
returning to Earth after a 16-day mission.

But the story of that question ? retold a decade later ? illustrates a
key lesson from the tragedy, says Wayne Hale, a flight director who
later ran the shuttle program for NASA.

That lesson: Never give up. No matter how hopeless.

And to illustrate the lesson, Hale in his blog tells for the first
time the story of his late boss who seemingly suggested doing just
that. The boss, mission operations chief Jon Harpold, asked the now-
retired Hale a what-if question after a meeting that determined ?
wrongly ? that Columbia was safe to land despite some damage after
takeoff.

"You know there is nothing we can do about damage to the (thermal
protection system)," Hale quotes Harpold a decade later. "If it has
been damaged, it's probably better not to know. I think the crew would
rather not know. Don't you think it would be better for them to have a
happy successful flight and die unexpectedly during entry than to stay
on orbit, knowing that there was nothing to be done until the air ran
out."

When Harpold raised the question with Hale in 2003, managers had
already concluded that Columbia's heat shield was fine. They told
astronauts they weren't worried about damage from foam insulation
coming off the massive shuttle fuel tank during launch, hitting a wing
that allowed superheated gases in when the shuttle re-entered the
atmosphere. No one was aware of the seriousness of the damage at the
time.

This was a what-if type question that conveyed a fatalistic attitude
about the heat shield system being unfixable, which was "a wrong-
headed cultural norm that we had all bought into," Hale said in a
Thursday telephone interview.

"There was never any debate about what to tell the crew," he said.

In fact, NASA officials were overconfident in the heat shield on
Columbia. A day after launch, NASA saw video of the foam from the
shuttle's fuel tank hit the shuttle wing, something that had happened
before. NASA officials studied the damage and determined it wasn't a
problem.

NASA managers even sent the crew a 15-second video clip of the foam
strike and "made it very clear to them no, no concerns," according to
the independent board that later investigated the accident. Eight
times, NASA had the opportunity to get a closer look at the damage?
using military satellites ? and NASA mistakenly ignored those chances
to see how bad the problem was, the accident board concluded.

And had NASA realized the severity of the problem, the space agency
would not have just let the astronauts die without a fight or a word,
despite Harpold's hypothetical question, Hale said.

"We would have pulled out all the stops. There would have been no
stone left unturned. We would have had the entire nation working on
it," Hale said. Ultimately, Hale said he thinks whatever NASA would
have tried in 2003 with limited time and knowledge probably would have
failed.

And the astronauts would have been told about the problem and their
fate had engineers really known what was happening, Hale said.

When NASA started flying shuttles again, Hale told the new team of
mission managers: "We are never ever going to say that there is
nothing we can do."

NASA developed an in-flight heat shield repair kit.

The space shuttles were retired in 2011. Harpold died in 2004.

Hale said he is now writing about the issue because he wanted future
space officials not to make the mistakes he and his colleagues did.
The loss of the Columbia astronauts ? people he knew ? still weighs on
Hale.

"You never get over it. It's always present with you," Hale said.
"These are people I knew well. Several of them, I worked closely with.
I was responsible for their safety. It's never going to go away."

___

Online:

Wayne Hale's blog:http://waynehale.wordpress.com/

so wayne believes the effort would of failed? why would that have
been? time was short, care packages of food oxygen etc could of
extended the crews lives long enough till another orbiter could of
rescued the crew......

No one at the time believed that there was a problem with the TPS.
Based on the best information they had at the time, they made the best
call they could. *You're leaping to conclusions far beyond a reasonable
"what could have been".

but nasa has no emergency supplies to orbit capacity, one day that
could be useful for ISS or a soyuz in trouble........

No credible scenario exists to justify this capability, especially since
all manned spaceflight by the US is going up on Russian Soyuz capsules
to ISS. *ISS is the "safe haven" in any current credible scenario.

Reading between the lines of waynes statement they may not have imaged
the orbiter because his boss thought it wouldnt of mattered.......

at least thats my take on his statement

Do note that his statements are made in hindsight.

Jeff


do note that earlier shuttle flights had returned wth wing damage
approaching burn thru but no one cared....

"bob haller" wrote in message
...

On Jan 29, 3:41 pm, JF Mezei wrote:
On 13-01-29 12:20, SalemHanna wrote:

But there's no way of knowing when the foam problem would have next
caused fatalities if left uncorrected,

The later part is of course the big question.

If let to its own devices, would NASA have eventually corrected the foam
problem ? They knew of it, but didn't put it in a high priority. And
while they wouldn't have retro-foamed existing tanks, they may have set
new standards for foaming new tanks which would have reduced the
problems.

Also, post assembly complete, with reduced flight rate, the odds of an
accident happening would have also gone down.

if you read wayne hales article it makes a interesting point. they
didnt image columbia because his boss thought it hopeless and had
decided its best to not tell the astronauts.....

Umm, I've been reading Wayne's blog. I don't see where he made that point.

He does admit he thought he had asked someone to inquire about imaging, the
other person recalls being asked what it would take or something like that.

He admits there was a failure to communicate there.

He also discusses the compartmentalization of information and ability to
communicate, especially with the military (most flight controllers had
allowed any security clearance they had to elapse after the DOD flights
ended).


let them live to re entry happy rather than die in orbit after running
out of air......


Again, discussed purely in the hypothetical. Unfortunately ABC news in on
article and others picked up on it made it sound like NASA officials knew
what was going to happen.


the larger issue for the future, we should always have enough back up
capacity in case of a problem. like some emergency launch supplies to
orbit capacity.



--
Greg D. Moore http://greenmountainsoftware.wordpress.com/
CEO QuiCR: Quick, Crowdsourced Responses. http://www.quicr.net

"bob haller" wrote in message
...

On Feb 4, 9:48 am, Jeff Findley wrote:
In article 0742dbcf-7f3c-47d3-ad57-
, says...







WASHINGTON (AP) ? A NASA top official wrestled with what he thought
was a hypothetical question: What should you tell the astronauts of a
doomed space shuttle Columbia?

When the NASA official raised the question in 2003 just days before
the accident that claimed seven astronauts' lives, managers thought ?
wrongly ? that Columbia's heat shield was fine. It wasn't. Columbia,
NASA's oldest shuttle, broke apart over Texas 10 years ago Friday upon
returning to Earth after a 16-day mission.

But the story of that question ? retold a decade later ? illustrates a
key lesson from the tragedy, says Wayne Hale, a flight director who
later ran the shuttle program for NASA.

That lesson: Never give up. No matter how hopeless.

And to illustrate the lesson, Hale in his blog tells for the first
time the story of his late boss who seemingly suggested doing just
that. The boss, mission operations chief Jon Harpold, asked the now-
retired Hale a what-if question after a meeting that determined ?
wrongly ? that Columbia was safe to land despite some damage after
takeoff.

"You know there is nothing we can do about damage to the (thermal
protection system)," Hale quotes Harpold a decade later. "If it has
been damaged, it's probably better not to know. I think the crew would
rather not know. Don't you think it would be better for them to have a
happy successful flight and die unexpectedly during entry than to stay
on orbit, knowing that there was nothing to be done until the air ran
out."

When Harpold raised the question with Hale in 2003, managers had
already concluded that Columbia's heat shield was fine. They told
astronauts they weren't worried about damage from foam insulation
coming off the massive shuttle fuel tank during launch, hitting a wing
that allowed superheated gases in when the shuttle re-entered the
atmosphere. No one was aware of the seriousness of the damage at the
time.

This was a what-if type question that conveyed a fatalistic attitude
about the heat shield system being unfixable, which was "a wrong-
headed cultural norm that we had all bought into," Hale said in a
Thursday telephone interview.

"There was never any debate about what to tell the crew," he said.

In fact, NASA officials were overconfident in the heat shield on
Columbia. A day after launch, NASA saw video of the foam from the
shuttle's fuel tank hit the shuttle wing, something that had happened
before. NASA officials studied the damage and determined it wasn't a
problem.

NASA managers even sent the crew a 15-second video clip of the foam
strike and "made it very clear to them no, no concerns," according to
the independent board that later investigated the accident. Eight
times, NASA had the opportunity to get a closer look at the damage?
using military satellites ? and NASA mistakenly ignored those chances
to see how bad the problem was, the accident board concluded.

And had NASA realized the severity of the problem, the space agency
would not have just let the astronauts die without a fight or a word,
despite Harpold's hypothetical question, Hale said.

"We would have pulled out all the stops. There would have been no
stone left unturned. We would have had the entire nation working on
it," Hale said. Ultimately, Hale said he thinks whatever NASA would
have tried in 2003 with limited time and knowledge probably would have
failed.

And the astronauts would have been told about the problem and their
fate had engineers really known what was happening, Hale said.

When NASA started flying shuttles again, Hale told the new team of
mission managers: "We are never ever going to say that there is
nothing we can do."

NASA developed an in-flight heat shield repair kit.

The space shuttles were retired in 2011. Harpold died in 2004.

Hale said he is now writing about the issue because he wanted future
space officials not to make the mistakes he and his colleagues did.
The loss of the Columbia astronauts ? people he knew ? still weighs on
Hale.

"You never get over it. It's always present with you," Hale said.
"These are people I knew well. Several of them, I worked closely with.
I was responsible for their safety. It's never going to go away."

___

Online:

Wayne Hale's blog:http://waynehale.wordpress.com/

so wayne believes the effort would of failed? why would that have
been? time was short, care packages of food oxygen etc could of
extended the crews lives long enough till another orbiter could of
rescued the crew......

No one at the time believed that there was a problem with the TPS.
Based on the best information they had at the time, they made the best
call they could. You're leaping to conclusions far beyond a reasonable
"what could have been".

but nasa has no emergency supplies to orbit capacity, one day that
could be useful for ISS or a soyuz in trouble........

No credible scenario exists to justify this capability, especially since
all manned spaceflight by the US is going up on Russian Soyuz capsules
to ISS. ISS is the "safe haven" in any current credible scenario.

Reading between the lines of waynes statement they may not have imaged
the orbiter because his boss thought it wouldnt of mattered.......

at least thats my take on his statement

Do note that his statements are made in hindsight.

Jeff


do note that earlier shuttle flights had returned wth wing damage
approaching burn thru but no one cared....

Yes, but NONE (as far as I can recall) had damage to the leading edge.

Wayne Hale in his blog discusses the (as does the CAIB I believe) fact that
no one really believed the leading edge could suffer the sort of damage it
did from the strike it suffered.

In addition, their analysis of the video of the hit showed no debris over
the wing. As such they were going based on CRATER estimates of damage to
the tiles underneath the wing.

Unfortunately, while they were right about the CRATER estimates, they were
wrong about the leading edge strength. And as he makes the point in his
blog, they were completely wrong in accepting ANY strikes.

I will point out that NASA is FAR from alone in this mistake. MANY
industries make the mistake accepting deviations from the norm as "ok".
This was a big part of the Challenger disaster. Folks knew about O-ring
issues, but were accepting it, despite the fact it was never supposed to
happen.





--
Greg D. Moore http://greenmountainsoftware.wordpress.com/
CEO QuiCR: Quick, Crowdsourced Responses. http://www.quicr.net

In article a7ae094a-939a-4086-a987-f260c9e27661
@n2g2000yqg.googlegroups.com, says...

On Feb 4, 9:48*am, Jeff Findley wrote:

Do note that his statements are made in hindsight.

do note that earlier shuttle flights had returned wth wing damage
approaching burn thru but no one cared....

True it happened. False that "no one cared".

You keep arguing for your little pet project of keeping launch vehicles
on standby with some random assortment of emergency supplies that might
come in handy, someday, for some highly unlikely scenario that seems to
exist only in your head.

It wouldn't surprise me to see you on an episode of "Doomsday Preppers",
because the zombie apocalypse might just happen, someday. Are you
prepared for the zombie apocalypse Bob?

Jeff
--
"the perennial claim that hypersonic airbreathing propulsion would
magically make space launch cheaper is nonsense -- LOX is much cheaper
than advanced airbreathing engines, and so are the tanks to put it in
and the extra thrust to carry it." - Henry Spencer