Task group panelists blast space shuttle management

Task group panelists blast space shuttle management
BY WILLIAM HARWOOD (CBS News space consultant)
http://www.spaceflightnow.com/shuttl...4/050817rtftg/
August 17, 2005

Seven members of an independent review panel today blasted NASA's
management of the post-Columbia shuttle program, blaming poor leadership for
ongoing, pervasive "cultural" problems and an erosion of engineering rigor
that raise questions about the agency's willingness to fly without a
thorough understanding of the risks involved.

In an "annex" at the end of the final report of the Return to Flight
Task Group, led by former Apollo astronaut Thomas Stafford and former
shuttle commander Richard Covey, seven of the 26 panel members wrote a
scathing set of personal observations detailing "persistent cultural
symptoms we observed throughout the assessment process."

Jim Oberg wrote:
Task group panelists blast space shuttle management
BY WILLIAM HARWOOD (CBS News space consultant)
http://www.spaceflightnow.com/shuttl...4/050817rtftg/
August 17, 2005

Seven members of an independent review panel today blasted NASA's
management of the post-Columbia shuttle program, blaming poor leadership for
ongoing, pervasive "cultural" problems and an erosion of engineering rigor
that raise questions about the agency's willingness to fly without a
thorough understanding of the risks involved.

In an "annex" at the end of the final report of the Return to Flight
Task Group, led by former Apollo astronaut Thomas Stafford and former
shuttle commander Richard Covey, seven of the 26 panel members wrote a
scathing set of personal observations detailing "persistent cultural
symptoms we observed throughout the assessment process."


I so love being right


--
Terrell Miller


"Suddenly, after nearly 30 years of scorn, Prog is cool again".
-Entertainment Weekly

On Wed, 17 Aug 2005, Jim Oberg was rewritten:

Task group panelists blast Bushwacky management.

Seven members of an independent review panel today blasted White
House management of the post Iraq invasion program, blaming poor
leadership for ongoing, pervasive "cultural" problems and an erosion of
military rigor that raise questions about the White House's willingness
to fight without a thorough understanding of the risks involved.

In an "annex" at the end of the final report of the Return to Iraq
Task Group, led by a former military adivsor and a former general, seven
of the 26 panel members wrote a scathing set of personal observations
detailing "persistent cultural symptoms we observed throughout the
assessment process."

William Elliot wrote in
t.com:


a bunch of off-topic garbage

Take it to alt.war.iraq - it doesn't belong in sci.space.shuttle.

plonk

--
JRF

Reply-to address spam-proofed - to reply by E-mail,
check "Organization" (I am not assimilated) and
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On Wed, 17 Aug 2005 22:08:55 GMT, "Jim Oberg"
wrote:

Task group panelists blast space shuttle management
BY WILLIAM HARWOOD (CBS News space consultant)
http://www.spaceflightnow.com/shuttl...4/050817rtftg/
August 17, 2005

snip

Well, let me comment on some of those points...

"They had to go from an engineering and organizational approach that
was focused on flying on a regular basis to one that went into almost
a development mode and in some areas, an engineering redesign mode,"
he said. "Now, when that happens ... there's going to be some hiccups.
It's not an easy transition, particularly when much of the design and
development capability had long been lost within the program because
of decision that had been made years ago."

And there it was just stated that the ISS will not be completed in any
acceptable form. A problem will now require the whole thing to be
built again. Lots of down time and minimal flights.

--

Citing "the enduring themes of dysfunctional organizational behavior,"
the group said a lack of personal accountability was pervasive in the
shuttle program, "from the failure to establish responsibility for the
loss of Columbia up to and including a failure to require an adequate
risk assessment of (the shuttle Discovery's recent) flight."

An interesting notion to find the person to blame for that piece of
falling foam. Or the other person who thought that foam hits were not
a serious problem. Not that they could have done anything had they
known anyway.

Well a adequate risk assessment for Discovery now has data to make an
adequate risk assessment. No flight test, no assessment.

--

Another factor affecting the rigor of NASA's engineering processes is
lax leadership, Crippen and his co-authors concluded. During a
February design certification review, "a senior program manager
commented that, 'It is no longer an important question as to whether
or not any given item is certified. Some things won't be certified ...
Items don't have to be certified to fly, and we can even get waivers
for the safety cert if need be.' It was astounding that there was no
rebuttal to this statement, even though the individual was not the
most senior person at the table."

Sweet. So just what did you say to pee this person off? I think that
comment should be hung on the door to the shuttle hanger. And it can
always pop up again at appropriate times.

--

"Throughout the return-to-flight effort, there has been a reluctance
to appropriately characterize the risks inherent in the space shuttle
program. As an example, it is has proven irresistible for some
officials to characterize the modified external tank as 'safer,' the
'safest ever,' or even 'fixed,' when neither the baseline of the 'old'
tanks nor the quantitative improvement of the 'new' design has been
established. The tank may well be safer, but without adequate risk
assessment based on objective evidence it is impossible to know."

Well I have also said all those terms. :-]

And certainly someone could go through all the previous shuttle
flights and to compile foam loss and damaged reports, where they would
then have their evidence. That evidence can then be used in a risk
assessment reports for following shuttle flights.

I think that would be a good thing.

Anyway, anyone who knows the shuttle well enough already knows that
this shuttle flight was a large improvement.

--

"The space shuttle program has been repeatedly cited for having too
many waivers, and has become reluctant to add additional waivers,
choosing instead to 'beat' the system by using other means," the panel
members wrote.

Well their B plan got busted. Looks like they will have to switch back
to the signing too many waivers problem.

Anyway, that is all my comments. I do not know their shuttle
maintenance well enough to see if they should be doing "best job" or
"meeting the design requirements".

A useful event anyway. Such a shame that increasing shuttle safety
will decrease ISS completion. Safety failure, or mission failure?

Cardman.

You know, whenever I read this sort of thing, I wonder what the people who
are critical would do in the same situation as those whom they criticise?

I'm not saying that criticism is invalid, just that often the issues and
trade offs are different depending on where you are viewing them from.

Be interesting to see what today's, press conf, is all about. Must be
something new or the telecon on Monday would have sufficed.

Brian

--
Brian Gaff....Note, this account does not accept Bcc: email.
graphics are great, but the blind can't hear them
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__________________________________________________ __________________________________________________ __________


"Terrell Miller" wrote in message
. ..
Jim Oberg wrote:
Task group panelists blast space shuttle management
BY WILLIAM HARWOOD (CBS News space consultant)
http://www.spaceflightnow.com/shuttl...4/050817rtftg/
August 17, 2005

Seven members of an independent review panel today blasted NASA's
management of the post-Columbia shuttle program, blaming poor leadership
for
ongoing, pervasive "cultural" problems and an erosion of engineering
rigor
that raise questions about the agency's willingness to fly without a
thorough understanding of the risks involved.

In an "annex" at the end of the final report of the Return to Flight
Task Group, led by former Apollo astronaut Thomas Stafford and former
shuttle commander Richard Covey, seven of the 26 panel members wrote a
scathing set of personal observations detailing "persistent cultural
symptoms we observed throughout the assessment process."


I so love being right


--
Terrell Miller


"Suddenly, after nearly 30 years of scorn, Prog is cool again".
-Entertainment Weekly

Brian Gaff wrote:
You know, whenever I read this sort of thing, I wonder what the people who
are critical would do in the same situation as those whom they criticise?

scrap the shuttle, invest in something useful. That may or may not lead
to future manned spaceflight for NASA, but it sure as hell will lead to
increased manned spaceflight for Americans one way or another.

In the meantime, NASA continues to do what it does best: unmanned
spaceflight at a small fraction of the cost of STS.



--
Terrell Miller


"Suddenly, after nearly 30 years of scorn, Prog is cool again".
-Entertainment Weekly

Interesting that the scathing comments came from Helms and several
other ex-shuttle astros.

Gene DiGennaro
Baltimore,Md.

On 18 Aug 2005 06:04:10 -0700, wrote:

Interesting that the scathing comments came from Helms and several
other ex-shuttle astros.

The "several other" being Dan Crippen...

Dale

Dale wrote in :

On 18 Aug 2005 06:04:10 -0700, wrote:

Interesting that the scathing comments came from Helms and several
other ex-shuttle astros.

The "several other" being Dan Crippen...

Don't confuse Dan (Congressional Budget Office) with Bob (ex-shuttle
astro). They're not related.


--
JRF

Reply-to address spam-proofed - to reply by E-mail,
check "Organization" (I am not assimilated) and
think one step ahead of IBM.