Fatal Shuttle Flaws -- Design or Operational?

At Edwards AFB on July 4, 1982, after the fourth space shuttle landing,
President Reagan declared the shuttle "operational." Despite twenty
more successful missions, Challenger caused many people (even at NASA)
to question Reagan's declaration. They proposed "design flaws" in
Challenger (and later in Columbia).

On the other hand, for many long years I have sought to bring attention
to *operational* flaws at NASA and Lockheed.

Let's briefly revisit Reagan's mandate to the Rogers Commission.
"Review the circumstances surrounding the accident to establish the
probable cause or causes of the accident," it orders. Can anyone deny
that Rogers ignored prelaunch operational negligence at the expense of
"design flaws?" Did not Gehman do the same?

Official radar-based records at NASA recently came to my attention
which refer with great frequency to "R&D project case files relating to
STS 51-L accident and investigation." That in itself was enough to
raise my eyebrows (because of Reagan's "operational" terminology and my
own experience with the operational nature of the subsequent pre-51-L
flights).

All of those records contain something even more disturbing, however.
They say, "NOTE: ACCESS TO RECORDS IS RESTRICTED TO NASA OFFICIALS
ONLY." In stark contrast, the Rogers Report itself states at the
outset: "In this case a vigorous investigation and full disclosure of
the facts were necessary."

Return now to the subject issue. Accepting the veracity of my present
disclosure, why should the public be kept in the dark about *how* these
"R&D project case files relat[e]" to the Challenger fatalities? Where
does Reagan's mandate authorize an investigative project described as
"R&D?"

Challenger's Ghost
Copyright 2005
All rights reserved.