Hale also admits shuttle's shortcomings

This is what I liked best from what Hale said:
"The achievements that the shuttle has produced will be heralded in
the history books of future years. Don't believe the critics when they
sell her short."

Nevertheless, he continued, "those of us who know her best know her
shortcomings. She is terribly complex; she is extraordinarily
difficult to prepare for flight, she is too expensive to operate, and
frankly, she is not as safe as we need our human transport vehicle to
be."

I think NASA tried too hard to hide the "too expensive to operate"
problems with the shuttle. We really should have moved on to a new
project already, rather than fly old technology which could be
improved upon. Hopefully, NASA gets lots of $$$ to start a new
moon/Mars project.
-Ellen

"ElleninLosAngeles" wrote:

Nevertheless, he continued, "those of us who know her best know her
shortcomings.... ...and
frankly, she is not as safe as we need our human transport vehicle to
be."

To all those here that have argued that they [the astronauts and NASA] know
the risks and accept them, think again. The risks are too high, especially
without a viable way out. In short we need a reasonable escape system and
it will happen on the next generation manned space launch vehicle. No it
won't be perfect as no escape system is, but it will give the astronauts a
*chance* to escape and that is all anybody can really ask for. It is what I
have advocated here all along. If NASA had listened to its engineers in
1981, 82, and 83, the Challenger crew likely would have survived that
accident (assuming that management did not listen to the engineers on the
night of the 27th). Columbia would not have flown as it did, or at least
not to where it went in any event.



--

Daniel
http://www.challengerdisaster.info
Mount Charleston, not Charleston, SC

"Charleston" wrote:
To all those here that have argued that they [the astronauts and NASA]
know the risks and accept them, think again.

Daniel --

There's a huge difference between just "accepting them" and being realistic
as to the risks, mitigating those risks, and doing everything possible to
make sure that those risks don't turn into critical failures.

It was obvious (in hindsight) that NASA had a series of "cockpit management"
failures on the ground that allowed certain risks to develop into the
Columbia Accident.

The goal, of course, is to have a completely risk-free system.

That goal, of course, is hypothetical, as there will *always* be risks
inherent in manned spaceflight.

The actual accomplishment is managing those risks in such a way that you
asymptotically minimize the chance of them developing into something truly
tragic.

Columbia would not have flown as it did, or at least
not to where it went in any event.

You can't say that... at least with the certainty of the statement above.
There was no *real-time* indication of impact or damage... much less one
that could have led to a *real-time* decision to abort the ascent.

Roger
--
Roger Balettie
former Flight Dynamics Officer
Space Shuttle Mission Control
http://www.balettie.com/

"Roger Balettie" wrote:
"Charleston" wrote:

To all those here that have argued that they [the astronauts and NASA]
know the risks and accept them, think again.

There's a huge difference between just "accepting them" and being
realistic
as to the risks, mitigating those risks, and doing everything possible to
make sure that those risks don't turn into critical failures.

NASA not only accepted the risks but often without even understanding them.
That is if we can believe they were as ignorant as they portrayed themselves
on issues like the Thermal Protection System. So I suggest to you and
others, "being realistic as to the risks" requires that common sense
prevail. Common sense prevailing requires that one really understand the
risks before one launches and that the serious risks that can be mitigated
are mitigated before every launch. For you to suggests that NASA understood
the risks, well... Up until Challenger STS 51-L, NASA pushed the edge of
the envelope until it broke. Then! they decided it was a developmental
vehicle, correct? So don't lecture me about being realistic. IF NASA
really understood and appreciated the risks, are you going to argue we would
have lost Challenger and Columbia the way we did? Any manager who felt the
Shuttle was operational, should not have been a manager in 1986. Managing
is about doing the most and the best you can witht the resources you have.
So please don't lecture me about management/risks because NASA did not get
it.

It was obvious (in hindsight) that NASA had a series of "cockpit
management"
failures on the ground that allowed certain risks to develop into the
Columbia Accident.

Nope. I think you are just making excuses for NASA. It was plainly obvious
in perfect FORESIGHT that NASA had a management problem. From the March 7,
2000, Space Shuttle Independant Assessment Report (SIAT,
[http://www.hq.nasa.gov/osf/siat.pdf])
we have this from page 27.

"7. The Problem Resolution and Corrective Action system should be revised
using state-of-the-art database

design and information management techniques."



I contend that if NASA had actually followed the recommendations in the SIAT
report in the year 2000, that the Columbia accident would not have happened.
From page 36 of the SIAT report we have:



"It is clear to the SIAT from this assessment that the problem tracking and
reporting system requires significant

improvements and enhancements. The recommended changes address not only the
database and search and

trend tools, but also concern the reporting and tracking requirements and
procedures themselves. Complete,

consistent, and relevant information must be directly accessible and quickly
available for risk management and

decision making. It is the belief of the SIAT that such information is
neither entered, entered correctly, nor readily

retrieved in the existing system. The findings and recommendations given
above must be fully addressed."



and from page 47:



"While the Shuttle has a very extensive Risk Management process, the SIAT
was very concerned with what it

perceived as Risk Management process erosion created by the desire to reduce
costs. This is inappropriate

in an area that the SIAT believes should be under continuous examination for
improvement in effectiveness

with cost reduction being secondary. Specific SIAT findings address concerns
such as: moving from NASA

oversight to insight; increasing implementation of self-inspection; reducing
Safety and Mission Assurance

functions and personnel; managing risk by relying on system redundancy and
abort modes; and the use of

only rudimentary trending and qualitative risk assessment techniques. It
seemed clear to the SIAT that

oversight processes of considerable value, including Safety and Mission
Assurance, and Quality Assurance,

have been diluted or removed from the program. The SIAT feels strongly that
NASA Safety and Mission

Assurance should be restored to the process in its previous role of an
independent oversight body, and not

be simply a "safety auditor." The SIAT also believes that the Aerospace
Safety Advisory Panel membership

should turnover more frequently to ensure an independent perspective.
Technologies of significant potential

use for enhancing Shuttle safety are rapidly advancing and require expert
representation on the Aerospace

Safety Advisory Panel. While system redundancy is a very sound element of
the program, it should not be

relied upon as a primary risk management strategy; more consideration should
be given to risk

understanding, minimization and avoidance."


I can say it no better than it has been written by the experts above.


The goal, of course, is to have a completely risk-free system.

That goal, of course, is hypothetical, as there will *always* be risks
inherent in manned spaceflight.

Correct, however, there is a difference between inherent risks and
acceptable risks.

The actual accomplishment is managing those risks in such a way that you
asymptotically minimize the chance of them developing into something truly
tragic.

Columbia would not have flown as it did, or at least
not to where it went in any event.

You can't say that... at least with the certainty of the statement above.
There was no *real-time* indication of impact or damage... much less one
that could have led to a *real-time* decision to abort the ascent.

I did say it and I stand by it. I gave you some information to chew on.
Please provide some evidence that if NASA had correctly managed the risks
they would have flown STS 107 the way they did.

--

Daniel
http://www.challengerdisaster.info
Mount Charleston, not Charleston, SC

"Charleston" wrote:
IF NASA really understood and appreciated the risks, are you going
to argue we would have lost Challenger and Columbia the way we did?

No, that would be an ignorant position to take. A true and complete
understanding of the flight temperature regime of the SRBs and a true and
complete knowledge of the fragility of the RCC and the damage that can be
caused by ET foam debris would most certainly have been valuable knowledge
prior to both STS-51L and STS-107. Unfortunately, there are people in the
decision-making loop that have made mistakes in the past by discounting said
information and flying anyway.

You said that there have been claims that NASA "kn(e)w the risks and
accept(ed) them", and that those who held that position should "think
again".

I stated that "accepting the risks" in too simplistic a statement. The
good-faith examination of systems that were under observation and accepting
the risks after such an examination are two distinctly different things.
*That* was my point.

Now... having said that, the leading edge RCC panels were *not* thought to
have been as brittle or susceptible to the type of damage seen in the post
STS-107 tests and suspected to be the primary catalyst for the ultimate loss
of Columbia and her crew. Somewhere, in the thought-processes that went
into the post-ascent film review of the foam strike, there were obvious and
ultimately fatal mistakes made. Those mistakes were also compounded by the
lack of approval for imaging and other possible options that may have
pointed out the damage to Columbia's left wing.

There has never been such a cavalier and simplistic "blanket acceptance of
any and all risks" without some thought going into said acceptance. As
pointed out above, there have been errors made in the data-gathering,
analysis, and subsequent actions in the past.

Nope. I think you are just making excuses for NASA.

Incorrect, Daniel... NASA made mistakes.

Correction -- *people* at NASA made mistakes... to the best of my
knowledge, I've never said otherwise.

It was plainly obvious in perfect FORESIGHT that NASA had a management
problem.

Bob? Why are you on Daniel's USENET account?

The goal, of course, is to have a completely risk-free system.

That goal, of course, is hypothetical, as there will *always* be risks
inherent in manned spaceflight.

Correct, however, there is a difference between inherent risks and
acceptable risks.

Again, and to the best of my knowledge, I've never said otherwise.

Columbia would not have flown as it did, or at least
not to where it went in any event.

You can't say that... at least with the certainty of the statement
above.
There was no *real-time* indication of impact or damage... much less
one
that could have led to a *real-time* decision to abort the ascent.

I did say it and I stand by it.

That statement is way too simplistic... especially given 20/20 hindsight.

Please provide some evidence that if NASA had correctly managed the risks
they would have flown STS 107 the way they did.

Again... way too simplistic a statement. To which risks are you referring?
What does "the way they did" mean?

Roger
--
Roger Balettie
former Flight Dynamics Officer
Space Shuttle Mission Control
http://www.balettie.com/

"Roger Balettie" wrote in message news:

Bob? Why are you on Daniel's USENET account?

LOL. That was funny.

-Ellen

"Roger Balettie" wrote:
"Charleston" wrote:

IF NASA really understood and appreciated the risks, are you going
to argue we would have lost Challenger and Columbia the way we did?

No, that would be an ignorant position to take.

Correct. We agree. So then a fair review of the historical record since
STS 51-L is in order if one wants to argue what the managers knew and when
they it. I believe that a sufficient record exists to point to the fact
that NASA did not recognize and resolve Criticality One problems in a
consistent manner. The truth is there in the details. There were too many
diving catches when what NASA really needed was more players on the team.
It reminds me of the juggler who keeps adding balls to his act. Eventually,
even though he is a great juggler, he drops a ball because he can't track
them all.

A true and complete
understanding of the flight temperature regime of the SRBs and a true and
complete knowledge of the fragility of the RCC and the damage that can be
caused by ET foam debris would most certainly have been valuable knowledge
prior to both STS-51L and STS-107.

After the first 24 flights the SRB o-ring database was sufficient to ground
the fleet. In fact STS 51-C, and then STS 61-A should have both definetely
stopped the flights. After 106 flights, the evidence was there that NASA
did not understand its vehicles, or even its Thermal Protection System,
despite repeated damage to the TPS and and failures of the ET TPS and the
orbiters as well. We are talking about a Criticality One system. The eyes
were winking but no one was looking in an appropriate manner. The SIAT
report as much as says so. They even discussed the "Diving Catches" that
saved flights before STS 107.

Unfortunately, there are people in the
decision-making loop that have made mistakes in the past by discounting
said
information and flying anyway.

Yes. I agree and I think that is really one of my recurring points here. I
dare say it has been for some time.

You said that there have been claims that NASA "kn(e)w the risks and
accept(ed) them", and that those who held that position should "think
again".

Why not quote me directly????

"To all those ****here**** that have argued that they [the astronauts and
NASA] know
the risks and accept them, think again."

****emphasis added****

I stated that "accepting the risks" in too simplistic a statement. The
good-faith examination of systems that were under observation and
accepting
the risks after such an examination are two distinctly different things.
*That* was my point.

You have cut out the guts of my response so I see no point here.

Now... having said that, the leading edge RCC panels were *not* thought to
have been as brittle or susceptible to the type of damage seen in the post
STS-107 tests and suspected to be the primary catalyst for the ultimate
loss
of Columbia and her crew. Somewhere, in the thought-processes that went
into the post-ascent film review of the foam strike, there were obvious
and
ultimately fatal mistakes made. Those mistakes were also compounded by
the
lack of approval for imaging and other possible options that may have
pointed out the damage to Columbia's left wing.

You seem to miss the point entirely. It is not about tender RCC. It is
about the failure of NASA to properly assess the failure modes of
Criticality One systems--the Thermal Protection System of the External Tank.
It is even more basic than that actually. The whole TPS issue was actually
addressed in fair detail beginning with STS 26. NASA even went so far as to
perform DTOs to examine the ET to see where the TPS was failing. Sony
Corporation actually provided NASA with HDTV launch cameras (yes HDTV in the
80s) so that a higher resolution could be used to review the launches in
more detail. NASA did not buy those HDTV cameras even though they were
awsome. Sony took them home somewhere in the STS 30s, IIRC.

There has never been such a cavalier and simplistic "blanket acceptance of
any and all risks" without some thought going into said acceptance. As
pointed out above, there have been errors made in the data-gathering,
analysis, and subsequent actions in the past.

Yes I think the SIAT report does a good job of pointing that out in a most
professional manner.

Nope. I think you are just making excuses for NASA.

Incorrect, Daniel... NASA made mistakes.

Correction -- *people* at NASA made mistakes... to the best of my
knowledge, I've never said otherwise.

My apologies. It just came across that way. I think I read too much into
your words.

snip

That statement is way too simplistic... especially given 20/20 hindsight.

Please provide some evidence that if NASA had correctly managed the
risks
they would have flown STS 107 the way they did.

Again... way too simplistic a statement. To which risks are you
referring?
What does "the way they did" mean?

Let's move on. You have made your points. I have made mine. We agree for
the most part and that is about as good as it gets.

--

Daniel
http://www.challengerdisaster.info
Mount Charleston, not Charleston, SC

Bob? Why are you on Daniel's USENET account?

LOL. That was funny.

-Ellen


I have NO IDEA. Things looked wierd when I posted. Some sort of bug I guess.

"Roger Balettie" wrote in message news:

Bob? Why are you on Daniel's USENET account?


Wish I knew how this occured I could have LOTS of FUN here

A few posters would admit they are ^&*(
Geez I wonder what happened?