Oct PopSci: "Get Out Now!" (Shuttle Escape System)

I just got back from the grocery store after having paged through the
October Popular Science cover story, "Get Out Now!" It has some
excellent info on shuttle escape:

http://www.popsci.com/popsci/aviatio...3779-4,00.html

Excerpt:

"The Challenger accident was eminently survivable," says Gutierrez,
pilot of STS 40 and commander of STS 59. "Had the Challenger crew had
ejection seats, they'd have been drinking beers at one of the bars in
Canaveral that evening." More provocatively, Gutierrez makes the same
claim for Columbia. "You put the [mid-deck] crew in a capsule in the
payload bay," he says. "The capsule would be statically and
dynamically stable." If the shuttle was determined unsafe for return,
the capsule would eject into space. A small retro-rocket would slow it
to a safe entry speed, "and they would ride that hummer to the
ground."


~ CT

"Stuf4" wrote in message
m...
I just got back from the grocery store after having paged through the
October Popular Science cover story, "Get Out Now!" It has some
excellent info on shuttle escape:

http://www.popsci.com/popsci/aviatio...3779-4,00.html

Excerpt:

"The Challenger accident was eminently survivable," says Gutierrez,
pilot of STS 40 and commander of STS 59. "Had the Challenger crew had
ejection seats, they'd have been drinking beers at one of the bars in
Canaveral that evening." More provocatively, Gutierrez makes the same
claim for Columbia. "You put the [mid-deck] crew in a capsule in the
payload bay," he says. "The capsule would be statically and
dynamically stable." If the shuttle was determined unsafe for return,
the capsule would eject into space. A small retro-rocket would slow it
to a safe entry speed, "and they would ride that hummer to the
ground."

It still bothers me, especially after the rejection I received here on this
group on this issue. Oh well. At least I am not alone and that does help.
As for Columbia, I actually have the simple line drawings for the escape
system in the payload bay. I discussed it here a few days ago responding to
you IIRC, and here on this group some time ago.

--

Daniel
Mount Charleston, not Charleston, SC

(Stuf4) wrote:

I just got back from the grocery store after having paged through the
October Popular Science cover story, "Get Out Now!" It has some
excellent info on shuttle escape:

It's about the same level of accuracy and completeness we've come to
expect from Popular Science, I.E., none noticeable at all.

D.
--
The STS-107 Columbia Loss FAQ can be found
at the following URLs:

Text-Only Version:
http://www.io.com/~o_m/columbia_loss_faq.html

Enhanced HTML Version:
http://www.io.com/~o_m/columbia_loss_faq_x.html

Corrections, comments, and additions should be
e-mailed to , as well as posted to
sci.space.history and sci.space.shuttle for
discussion.

It's about the same level of accuracy and completeness we've come to
expect from Popular Science, I.E., none noticeable at all.


Certinally true of challenger and backed up by a just retired pad rat I met in
florida/

Ideally a capsule lifeboatr could return on its own too.

(Stuf4) wrote in message om...
I just got back from the grocery store after having paged through the
October Popular Science cover story, "Get Out Now!" It has some
excellent info on shuttle escape:

http://www.popsci.com/popsci/aviatio...3779-4,00.html

Excerpt:

"The Challenger accident was eminently survivable," says Gutierrez,
pilot of STS 40 and commander of STS 59. "Had the Challenger crew had
ejection seats, they'd have been drinking beers at one of the bars in
Canaveral that evening." More provocatively, Gutierrez makes the same
claim for Columbia. "You put the [mid-deck] crew in a capsule in the
payload bay," he says. "The capsule would be statically and
dynamically stable." If the shuttle was determined unsafe for return,
the capsule would eject into space. A small retro-rocket would slow it
to a safe entry speed, "and they would ride that hummer to the
ground."


One of several problems with these concepts is that if there
had been crew rescue capability, there would have been no room
(or hauling capacity) for the payloads carried on these two
missions.

- Ed Kyle

From Ed Kyle:
One of several problems with these concepts is that if there
had been crew rescue capability, there would have been no room
(or hauling capacity) for the payloads carried on these two
missions.

There were lightweight solutions for crew escape where the payload
penalty would have been measured in GAS cans.


~ CT

Stuf4 wrote:

I just got back from the grocery store after having paged through the
October Popular Science cover story, "Get Out Now!" It has some
excellent info on shuttle escape:

http://www.popsci.com/popsci/aviatio...3779-4,00.html

Excerpt:

"The Challenger accident was eminently survivable," says Gutierrez,
pilot of STS 40 and commander of STS 59. "Had the Challenger crew had
ejection seats, they'd have been drinking beers at one of the bars in
Canaveral that evening." More provocatively, Gutierrez makes the same
claim for Columbia. "You put the [mid-deck] crew in a capsule in the
payload bay," he says. "The capsule would be statically and
dynamically stable." If the shuttle was determined unsafe for return,
the capsule would eject into space. A small retro-rocket would slow it
to a safe entry speed, "and they would ride that hummer to the
ground."


~ CT

Good article, it's right along the lines of what I would have envision an
escape pod should look like. Zero-Zero ejection. Meaning from zero altitude
at liftoff to zero altitude at landing and every in between.

Have a heavy lift mission, use a crew of two and minimize the weight
penalty. In reality, it would most likely increase payload to orbit by
minimizing the crew.

Taking passengers to the space station, leave the bigger crew escape pod
docked to the space station. A little creative engineering and the crew
escape pod could have a reasonable entry lift to drag ratio to reduce
g-loads.

Too bad the CAIB didn't suggest it as a return to flight requirement.
Realistically, I guess the CAIB must have been under the same type of
"let's fly soon" (or schedule) pressure that they accused NASA of being
under.

Craig Fink

From Craig Fink:
snip
Good article, it's right along the lines of what I would have envision an
escape pod should look like. Zero-Zero ejection. Meaning from zero altitude
at liftoff to zero altitude at landing and every in between.

(The standard definition of zero-zero refers to the envelope with
respect to altitude and airspeed. If you can survive an ejection from
zero altitude with zero airspeed you have a zero-zero system.)

Have a heavy lift mission, use a crew of two and minimize the weight
penalty. In reality, it would most likely increase payload to orbit by
minimizing the crew.

Taking passengers to the space station, leave the bigger crew escape pod
docked to the space station. A little creative engineering and the crew
escape pod could have a reasonable entry lift to drag ratio to reduce
g-loads.

Too bad the CAIB didn't suggest it as a return to flight requirement.
Realistically, I guess the CAIB must have been under the same type of
"let's fly soon" (or schedule) pressure that they accused NASA of being
under.

CAIB took seven months (!) to crank out a report that states the
obvious, leaving out key factors that aren't so obvious. Gehman had
little schedule pressure. NASA, too, had little schedule pressure.

How ironic that the investigation concluded that schedule pressure was
a key factor when the STS-107 mission had been slated for launch in
May 2000 (so many slips that the -107 mission got bracketed by STS-113
and STS-114).

That is *not* schedule pressure. The proper term is mismanagement.


(This forum had lengthy discussions questioning the decision to slip
STS-107 under the auspices of flow liner issues.)


~ CT

....regarding "schedule pressure", recall that Ilan Ramon showed up for
training at JSC way back in July 1998. With all of the delays, his
"training" spanned four-and-a-half years.

(One comparison is Christa McAuliffe who was selected in July 1985 and
then trained for half a year for 51L.)


~ CT

Stuf4 wrote:
[snip]


CAIB took seven months (!) to crank out a report that states the
obvious, leaving out key factors that aren't so obvious. Gehman had
little schedule pressure. NASA, too, had little schedule pressure.

How ironic that the investigation concluded that schedule pressure was
a key factor when the STS-107 mission had been slated for launch in
May 2000 (so many slips that the -107 mission got bracketed by STS-113
and STS-114).

That is *not* schedule pressure. The proper term is mismanagement.


(This forum had lengthy discussions questioning the decision to slip
STS-107 under the auspices of flow liner issues.)


~ CT

Did you really read the report? I think the board makes a pretty clear
case of schedule pressure driven by the Node 2 target date. Perhaps
following the STS-112 foam strike, more analysis would have been done to
resolve the issue if managers didn't have a "Countdown to NODE 2 Launch"
screensaver running. Of course, this is speculation.

Also, all events leading to the scheduling slip of 107 were directly
attributable to fleet grounding issues or ISS resupply/crew changeover
issues. You call that mismanagement? Again, I think that was driven by
schedule pressures.