Press Conference Re. MMT Transcripts Highlights

**What I find to be the most interesting parts from the Press
Conference with L.Ham, P.Engelhauf and L.Cain:

QUESTIONER: And what did you mean when you said January 21st that,
"Really, I don't think there's much we can do"?

MS. HAM: Now, back on the other question about on the 21st which when
I made a statement about what we could or couldn't do during the
flight, when I first was alerted to that, I couldn't even recall
making that statement. But, of course, I did go back, re-read the
transcript and listen to the tapes, and sure enough, I did say that.
Now, if you put that in context to what the MER manager was talking to
me about and the things that I was thinking, the way I recall this is
I was thinking out loud, and, of course, I do know that we do not have
TPS repair, tile repair or RCC repair capability that we fly as a kit
on the Orbiter. That was part of what I was thinking.
The other thing that I was trying -- thinking about was having the
engineering community go back and get a flight rationale from STS-1.
If you recall two flights prior to 107, we had the foam come off, a
pretty big chunk of foam from the same area that we were thinking came
off the 107, the bipod ramp, and it struck the SRB.
I was trying to remember back to October when we were at the flight
writing review for the STS-113, the next flight, trying to think about
what was our flight rationale, was it based on the fact that the
density, the properties of that foam could not do any damage to the
Orbiter. I couldn't recall, and I wanted the engineering to go back
and pull that data, so that we could confirm that.
If that was what the flight rationale was, then we would feel pretty
comfortable about this mission being safe. It didn't end up being what
the flight rationale was. That is where I was going with that.

QUESTIONER: For any of you, how should the request for imaging have
been handled? You make it sound like a very casual off-the-cuff
process, but what should the process have been to formally request
imaging that didn't happen?

MS. HAM: Well, the formal, I can explain. There is a formal route, but
even an informal route we typically work. If we hear about the
request, we can certainly act upon it, if we need to meet or just
pursue it.
The formal process would be that if someone brought it up at the MMT
or brought it up to someone when we would hold the meeting, they would
share with what we wanted to do, and then we go through the Mission
Ops Directorate to a [inaudible] position they have, flight dynamics
officer. He had some standard procedures that they work with the
Department of Defense or whoever it is to ask for the outside
assistance.

QUESTIONER: Linda, reading through the transcripts, there's a couple
of places where you ask [inaudible] issue only and we have seen pieces
of this size before, haven't we. McCormack says that you sort of
fumbling about what the size of the damage is and that the analysis
isn't complete and [inaudible] jump conclusions. You sort of cut him
off and say no burn-through means no catastrophic damage, localized
heating damage [inaudible] tile replacement.
In hindsight, 20/20 hindsight, were you sufficiently open to the idea
that this was a really serious problem?

MS. HAM: In 20/20 hindsight, you are asking 20/20 hindsight or what my
thought was then?

QUESTIONER: Well, it sounds like you were just kind of seeking
reassurance that everything was okay as opposed to digging in and
saying how do we know this, are we asking the right questions, do we
have the right people on this, have we [inaudible] this properly.

MS. HAM: I was asking to make -- I was trying to reiterate what Don
McCormack had already said to me, so that everyone in the room could
understand what he was saying.
When he said -- would make statements like no burn-through, that that
meant no safety-of-flight issue, I wanted -- I was trying to reassure
even myself that that was a true fact. I couldn't really [inaudible]
or jump to a conclusion that there could be no damage until they came
forward and -- catastrophic damage, until they came forward and
complete that analysis and tell me what the analysis showed.
Again, I don't have the engineering expertise, nor do I have the tools
to do that kind of analysis. So I didn't have a preconceived notion on
the damage or the possible consequences, and I needed to wait for them
to complete their work.

MR. CAIN: Just to add on that real quickly, ultimately it is my
understanding, anyway -- and as the entry flight director, I certainly
again will reiterate I wasn't aware of any of those, anybody being
concerned, and my understanding is that ultimately every person that
we are aware of, every single person and individual and group and part
of the team in the organization was in agreement that we didn't have a
safety-of-flight issue.
So, in the end, even those folks who -- or parts of the organization,
purportedly, anyway, who may have had a concern and were reluctant to
raise it in the end didn't have a concern is the way I understand it
today.

**my comment: Anyone have personal opinions on L.Cain and L.Ham?
P.Engelhauf? L.Cain especially seems a completely sweet, intelligent
person, well-spoken and straightforward. Same for Engelhauf. Ham, I
think, doesn't come across well as far as speaking well/making her
point in a concise and coherent manner. Is she better in real life?

"ElleninLosAngeles" wrote:
**my comment: Anyone have personal opinions on L.Cain and L.Ham?
P.Engelhauf?

Yes. They are all three consumate professionals.

I worked many flights with all of them in various roles -- as peer Flight
Controllers in different positions, as well as once they became Flight
Directors. All three of them are extremely competent, and were well-suited
for the roles they played.

If Linda didn't "come across well" to you in this press conference, then
chalk it up to being somewhat distraught over what has happened and to
perhaps some level of unease with the media... not very surprising in either
case, IMHBCO.

Roger
--
Roger Balettie
former Flight Dynamics Officer
Space Shuttle Mission Control
http://www.balettie.com/

"Roger Balettie" wrote in message
. ..
I worked many flights with all of them in various roles -- as peer Flight
Controllers in different positions, as well as once they became Flight
Directors. All three of them are extremely competent, and were
well-suited
for the roles they played.

This makes me wonder... Is there such a thing as a BAD Flight Controller or
Director? By the time somebody gets to that position, they've been pretty
well-screened, and the differences between people would be personal and not
so much professional, I imagine.

"Terrence Daniels" wrote:
This makes me wonder... Is there such a thing as a BAD Flight Controller
or
Director? By the time somebody gets to that position, they've been pretty
well-screened, and the differences between people would be personal and
not
so much professional, I imagine.

Don't get me wrong... we're not a bunch of unemotional automatons. To the
contrary, the passion that *is* spaceflight runs deep in everyone who
aspires to work in the MCC or any of the associated crew training positions.
There are, as in every walk of life, people with different skill sets...
*and* different personality traits. The goal of management is to try to fit
people with the appropriate flight requirements.

But, you are correct in the assessment that, by the time they're actually
supporting a mission, many opportunities for weeding out the folks that, for
one reason or another, aren't cut out for real-time flight operations have
occurred.

While it's not impossible, it's pretty rare that a
not-as-qualified-as-possible person gets through the process. The
pre-certification simulations and training are intense, and the training
team attempts to throw every conceivable failure scenario (including
combinations!) that they can come up with at the hapless trainee.

Working an actual mission is usually a piece of cake, compared to the
simulations... *especially* the certification sims!

Roger
--
Roger Balettie
former Flight Dynamics Officer
Space Shuttle Mission Control
http://www.balettie.com/

In article ,
says...

snip

While it's not impossible, it's pretty rare that a
not-as-qualified-as-possible person gets through the process. The
pre-certification simulations and training are intense, and the training
team attempts to throw every conceivable failure scenario (including
combinations!) that they can come up with at the hapless trainee.

Working an actual mission is usually a piece of cake, compared to the
simulations... *especially* the certification sims!

I can understand that, though how often do the certification sims toss
you situations that are unrecoverable by their very nature? How often do
they give vague clues of potential LOCV problems that are very hard to
follow up, and that require you to seek outside engineering evaluations?
Just curious...

As for the concept that all flight controllers are equal, I'd have to
think that some are more equal than others. I certainly don't have the
on-the-job experience you do, Roger, and I defer to you in this, of
course. But I have heard that, during Apollo, there were people
considered "lead" controllers at their positions, who were actively
sought over their peers by various of the flight directors. Aaron Cohen,
John Aaron, Jerry Bostick and John Llewellyn are names that come to mind.

I always got the feeling that Gene Kranz's Apollo 13 Tiger Team gathered
all of the best at their positions, leaving some unlucky White Team
members to realize that, even if they were on the "number one" team at
the beginning of the flight, Kranz obviously felt that they weren't the
best at their positions. Sy Leibergot comes to mind -- granted he was
traumatized by the accident, but it had to be tough to get shoved aside
by John Aaron when the flight turned hairy.

--

It's not the pace of life I mind; | Doug Van Dorn
it's the sudden stop at the end... |

"Doug..." wrote:
I can understand that, though how often do the certification sims toss
you situations that are unrecoverable by their very nature?

Cert sims? Rarely, if ever.

There *are* scenarios, though, where generic or flight-specific simulation
mistakes made by the MCC team or the crew in the simulator *can* lead to a
"Bad Day T", including LOCV. Flight Controllers do *FAR* more
non-cert-simulations than certification runs. The intent, though, is to
always give the Flight Control team and the crew "outs" so that, if they
read all of the clues, they can avoid those "Bad Days T".

How often do they give vague clues of potential LOCV problems that
are very hard to follow up, and that require you to seek outside
engineering evaluations?

I can remember more than a few simulation scenarios where, had it been a
"real flight", I would have needed to have called in external resources...
and at least a few missions where I did.

As for the concept that all flight controllers are equal, I'd have to
think that some are more equal than others.

No doubt! I'm sorry if I gave the impression that they were!

My intent was to point out that the "minimum standards" bar is set very
high, so that everyone who *does* sit on console has a pretty good set of
skills, both personal and technical, for their position.

But I have heard that, during Apollo, there were people
considered "lead" controllers at their positions, who were
actively sought over their peers by various of the flight directors.

There still are.

Roger
--
Roger Balettie
former Flight Dynamics Officer
Space Shuttle Mission Control
http://www.balettie.com/

"Roger Balettie" wrote:
There *are* scenarios, though, where generic or flight-specific simulation
mistakes made by the MCC team or the crew in the simulator *can* lead to a
"Bad Day T", including LOCV.

bleargh I was trying to be clever and using the "tm" sign... but it came
out as a "T".

That should be "Bad Day (tm)". :P

Roger
--
Roger Balettie
former Flight Dynamics Officer
Space Shuttle Mission Control
http://www.balettie.com/

I can't remember a time when you were *not* "trying to be
clever," but putting your foot in your mouth is your forte.
I guess that's why you and Berndt understand each other.

--
John Thomas Maxson, Retired Engineer (Aerospace)
Author, The Betrayal of Mission 51-L (www.mission51l.com)


Roger Balettie wrote in message
...
"Roger Balettie" wrote:

There *are* scenarios, though, where generic or flight-specific
simulation
mistakes made by the MCC team or the crew in the simulator *can* lead to
a
"Bad Day T", including LOCV.

bleargh I was trying to be clever and using the "tm" sign... but it
came
out as a "T".

That should be "Bad Day (tm)". :P

Roger
--
Roger Balettie
former Flight Dynamics Officer
Space Shuttle Mission Control
http://www.balettie.com/

Roger Balettie spake unto the ether:

[ sims]

: The intent, though is to
: always give the Flight Control team and the crew "outs" so that, if they
: read all of the clues, they can avoid those "Bad Days TM".

Here's something I asked about a little while ago, but got no
follow-ups:

Maybe every 18-24 months there should be a large-scale integrated
sim that *is* LOCV (Loss of Crew and Vehicle). Surely there are enough
obscure failure combinations involving Crit-1 items to choose from. Make
it something in the spirit the Kobayashi Maru sim from "Star Trek II: The
Wrath of Khan", i.e., something that is no-win by design, a test of
everyone's character. I bet that it would really uncover the cracks in the
system...and *then* NASA should proceed with whatever fixes would be needed,
just as if it were a true LOCV.

It would be emotionally harrowing, but probably beneficial to the
overall program. People need to think and train for the unthinkable. I
remember a quote from (IIRC) Jack Swigert after Apollo 13, something to
the effect that, had the Apollo 13 scenario been given in a sim, the
astronauts would have complained that it wasn't realistic; but after
living through it, they wouldn't object to anything SimSup felt like
throwing at them.

Comments from real Mission Control folks?

*Rich*
--
Richard F. Drushel, Ph.D. | "Aplysia californica" is your taxonomic
Department of Biology, Slug Division | nomenclature. / A slug, by any other
Case Western Reserve University | name, is still a slug by nature.
Cleveland, Ohio 44106-7080 U.S.A. | -- apologies to Data, "Ode to Spot"

"Richard F. Drushel, Ph.D." wrote:
Maybe every 18-24 months there should be a large-scale integrated
sim that *is* LOCV (Loss of Crew and Vehicle).

You don't want to advertise it like that, though... if you *know* going in
that there's no way to save the Kobayashi Maru, what point is there in
trying hard to *do* so?

... a test of everyone's character.

We get lots of that.

Seriously, though, simulations that take place over an 8-hour period are
tough to represent the amount of off-line analysis and discussions that take
place during a real mission. We *do* have what are called "long sims" that
may take place over 2-3 days, with the teams getting a chance to actually
exercise some long-range planning.

Roger
--
Roger Balettie
former Flight Dynamics Officer
Space Shuttle Mission Control
http://www.balettie.com/