EVA inspection of STS-107 was "easy" possible

May 28, 10:02 PM

NASA ignored spacewalk inspection options

Expert: Astronauts could have looked over wing damage

By John Kelly
FLORIDA TODAY

HOUSTON -- NASA mission managers never asked the astronaut corps or
agency spacewalk experts if Columbia's astronauts could venture outside
to inspect the shuttle's damaged left wing, Florida Today has learned.

If they had, they could have learned firsthand of the broken heatshield
and possibly set in motion efforts to rescue the crew.

A renowned spacewalk expert has told the Columbia Accident Investigation
Board that such an excursion would have been easy if managers running
the mission had only asked.

"They never asked," board member Maj. Gen. Kenneth Hess said Tuesday.

Even before hearing the final damage analysis by shuttle engineers,
the Mission Management Team had assumed an inspection spacewalk was
not necessary because they were convinced there was no serious damage
for the astronauts to see, Hess said.

NASA has long discounted the notion that Columbia's astronauts could
have done a spacewalk to get a closer look at the wing, which would
have resolved early in the mission any questions about whether or not
the ship's heat shield would hold up during atmospheric reentry.

Agency officials called such a spacewalk dangerous, and maybe impossible.
But accomplished astronaut and spacewalk choreographer Story Musgrave
has told the accident board that's not true.

"All of this comes down to a simple razor edge decision: Do I walk or
not walk?" said Musgrave, a retired astronaut with more than two
decades experience in space flight, spacewalking and working in mission
control.

Facing an urgent need for solid information about damage to the heat
shield, the veteran explorer said, "All those managers had to do was ask."

The odds against pulling off a risky rescue mission fast enough to
save Columbia's seven astronauts is not nearly as relevant to
investigators as the knowledge that NASA did have options if
decision-makers' minds were open to them.

Columbia broke apart and burned as it reentered the atmosphere Feb. 1.
All seven astronauts died.

Investigators inside and outside the agency now believe superhot gas
penetrated the shuttle's wing in the same place where a piece of foam
insulation from the external fuel tank struck Columbia 82 seconds into
its launch on Jan. 16.

NASA engineers captured the debris strike on film, prompting an
engineering assessment of the damage that ultimately led to a decision
that Columbia's heat shield would hold up.

Hess, whose regular job is heading the U.S. Air Force's safety office,
said mission managers held "strong assumptions" that foam debris had
hit the orbiter many times before and was no more than a maintenance
nuisance. The final engineering assessment reinforced that assumption,
confirming for managers that the debris strike did not pose a safety threat.

Outgoing shuttle program manager Ron Dittemore has said NASA didn't
try a spacewalk because there was no technique for crew members to
spacewalk underneath the orbiter where there is nothing to hold onto.

"None of that was correct," Musgrave said.

Soon after hearing Dittemore's assessment, a skeptical Musgrave imagined
a dozen or so variations of the two-man spacewalk that would have put an
astronaut's eyes and, if necessary, his hands on the parts of the wing
that might be damaged.

Musgrave later went to the hangars at Kennedy Space Center, measuring
distances and double-checking geometry of actual shuttle wings to see
whether the spacewalks forming in his mind were possible. That look at
a shuttle wing confirmed he was right.

"It's not difficult and not dangerous," Musgrave said. "There is zero
risk involved. It's a 15-minute walk."

Instead, NASA did a theoretical damage assessment based on flawed
computer modeling and past experience of shuttles coming home safely
even with foam-battered heat shields.

NASA and outside investigators have said one weakness of the damage
assessment was that nobody ever actually looked at the underside of
the wing.

By not considering an inspection spacewalk early in the mission, NASA
missed its best chance to get a good look. NASA also passed up a chance
to request spy-satellite photos of the ship.

NASA spokesman James Hartsfield said Tuesday that the mission management
team did not opt for a spacewalk primarily because of the engineering
assessment.

Told the board and others were questioning the decision not to do a
spacewalk as part of the damage assessment, Hartsfield said, "The board
is the one conducting the investigation. They've interviewed all the
right people who were involved. I'm certainly not going to call their
conclusions into question."


Easy procedure

Musgrave, considered a spacewalk guru by NASA colleagues, told Florida
Today that he easily developed a spacewalk procedure to get an astronaut
in position to see and maybe even photograph damage to the leading edge
panels and heat shield tiles below the wing.

Using variations of standard spacewalk techniques, he said Columbia
astronauts David Brown and Michael Anderson could have worked in tandem
to document the damage in the early days of the mission -- perhaps in
time to alter future decisions.

If they had known, an internal agency study done at the request of the
investigation board found NASA could have hurriedly launched Atlantis
on a rescue mission. The study, first reported last week by Florida
Today, found such a rescue mission was risky, but possible.

Dittemore said in the days after the accident that NASA did not ask
for military telescopes or spy satellites to photograph the shuttle
because past experience showed such pictures wouldn't be good enough
to see damage to heat shield tiles.

Spacewalking astronauts would have had a much closer look.


Tethered walk

Musgrave told the accident board in private testimony that NASA could
have sent Brown and Anderson out of the cargo bay near the left wing.
One of a series of latches along the centerline of the open payload
bay door provided a sturdy enough structure for one of the spacewalkers
to attach a cable, or tether, to secure himself to the vehicle within
a few feet of the front edge of the wing.

"It's a beautiful walk," Musgrave said.

The tethered astronaut -- Brown, for example -- would then act much
like the robot arm does on other spacewalks outside the shuttle and
space station. Brown would grab and strap the other astronaut's feet
to his arms. Then he would swing Anderson out over the front edge of
the wing, in the same place NASA engineers estimated the orbiter was
hit by launch debris.

A little more work on procedures would have given NASA the ability
to put a spacewalker in position to repair the damage, if ground
controllers decided that was necessary and would make enough of a
difference to get the ship home safely.


Other ideas

At the Johnson Space Center in Houston, teams in the astronaut office
and extravehicular activity (EVA) office could have come up with the
same or similar spacewalks in a matter of hours had the mission management
team asked, Musgrave said. The EVA teams could have been ready with a
plan to get the astronauts out of Columbia's hatch on the very next day,
he predicted.

Musgrave is not the first to say a spacewalk was possible. Current
astronaut and veteran spacewalker Mike Lopez-Alegria told Florida Today
just days after the accident that astronauts do have ways to get beneath
the orbiter, including a procedure they train for before every mission.

Anderson and Brown were rookie spacewalkers, but were trained to handle
the access door spacewalk and extensively trained in generic spacewalking
skills. They were more than capable, Musgrave and other astronauts said.

"Another thing that's important is you've involved the people whose lives
matter," Musgrave said. "You've involved them in the process of how you
come home. There's a particular moral element to that."


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May 28, 10:02 PM

NASA ignored spacewalk inspection options

Expert: Astronauts could have looked over wing damage

By John Kelly
FLORIDA TODAY

Bit behind the times, don't you think? (May 28)
--
Alan Erskine
alanerskine(at)optusnet.com.au
John Howard - Australia's GW Bush

Surely this is the old 'if we had known then, what we know now' syndrome at
work again. You cannot turn the clock back, but you can go back there in
your mind and see how the mistake occurred. You cannot bring them back. As
was said in that article, the experience up until then was that impacts are
non events. If there was a fault it was complacency, and not getting some
other opinions and backing the thing up with the best imagery you could
get.

Also, let me say, that from the description we have had of the pictures of
the impact, the areas of interest could be quite big, but yes, I do think
that mistakes were made, but understandable ones given the history.

Brian

--
Brian Gaff....
graphics are great, but the blind can't hear them
Email:
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I feel that some of the responsibility for the inspection of the wing or lack
thereof would fall on CDR Husband.

Admittedly, the Stitch memo on Jan 23 downplayed the foam event, but after
viewing the film on Jan 25, it would have been reasonable for CDR Husband to use
his command discretion to attempt a visual inspection.

(Peter Stickney) wrote in
:

(I don't know if they caught
the re-entry of the object; probably not.)

I think you're correct. All the radar sites that they delog'ed were CONUS,
and the projected re-entry was in the south Pacific.

What has yet to be deternined is the probably damage cased to the RCC
by the foam strike during ascent. Thus far, trials have been held
using fiberglass stand-ins for the RCC, firing a similalry sized foam
chunk at the same impact valocities, but they haven't published the
results of any trials of the RCC materiel itself.

Well, kinda. They did do an RCC test last month, but it was to test an
impact in the panel 5/6 area, not the 8/9 area where the impact is now
believed to have occurred. The panel 5/6 test resulted in a hairline crack
in the RCC, barely visible on the outside.

Investigators are
prepping a series of trials using RCC panels that have flown on other
Orbiters, t ensure that the effects of repeated reentries on the
properties of the materials is taken into account.

Agreed. The upcoming test is in the panel 8/9 area, and is the most
realistic test. All the previous tests have been building up to this one.


--
JRF

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check "Organization" (I am not assimilated) and
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"Kent Betts" wrote in
:

I feel that some of the responsibility for the inspection of the wing
or lack thereof would fall on CDR Husband.

Admittedly, the Stitch memo on Jan 23 downplayed the foam event, but
after viewing the film on Jan 25, it would have been reasonable for
CDR Husband to use his command discretion to attempt a visual
inspection.

FYI, the video that Hanley emailed Husband ("e212.mpg") is the same video
that was widely circulated shortly after the accident. It's the "above-the-
wing" view, in slow motion. It used to be online at the KSC web site, but I
can't find it now.

--
JRF

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"Brian Gaff" wrote ...
Surely this is the old 'if we had known then, what we know now' syndrome at
work again.

I think failures fall roughly into the following categories, in decending order of
frequency. [Big overlap between 1 and 2]

1. Theoretically should have known the risk, but didn't.
2. /Somebody(ies)/ knew something about the risk - but the right people at the right
time didn't have all the info.
3. Knew the risk fairly accurately and it was deemed acceptable.
4. Came out of the blue.

What is actually much more likely to have happened is that NASA would have
started the rush prep for Atlantis, something would have screwed up with
zero chance of being fixed in time (or worse, they would have launched and
suffered a mission-threatening accident themselves), and STS107 would
*still* be stranded. That would have been infinitely *worse*, not better.

This is a nutty proposal but could NASA prep two orbiters for launch during
each mission?

Have one shuttle used to the mission itself with whatever payload is required
while the other is preped just for rescue. Have it matted to the ET/SRB
combination, maybe even trucked out to the launch pad. When the mission ends,
roll it back to the VAB and get it set up to fly the next mission.

Essentially have a backup-prime rotation for the shuttles themselves.

-A.L.

(MasterShrink) wrote in
:


What is actually much more likely to have happened is that NASA would
have started the rush prep for Atlantis, something would have screwed
up with zero chance of being fixed in time (or worse, they would have
launched and suffered a mission-threatening accident themselves), and
STS107 would *still* be stranded. That would have been infinitely
*worse*, not better.

This is a nutty proposal but could NASA prep two orbiters for launch
during each mission?

Have one shuttle used to the mission itself with whatever payload is
required while the other is preped just for rescue. Have it matted to
the ET/SRB combination, maybe even trucked out to the launch pad. When
the mission ends, roll it back to the VAB and get it set up to fly the
next mission.

With only three orbiters (and one in the shop for inspections/upgrades at
practically any given time), this would be pretty damn difficult.


--
JRF

Reply-to address spam-proofed - to reply by E-mail,
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In article ,
says...
(MasterShrink) wrote in
:


What is actually much more likely to have happened is that NASA would
have started the rush prep for Atlantis, something would have screwed
up with zero chance of being fixed in time (or worse, they would have
launched and suffered a mission-threatening accident themselves), and
STS107 would *still* be stranded. That would have been infinitely
*worse*, not better.

This is a nutty proposal but could NASA prep two orbiters for launch
during each mission?

Have one shuttle used to the mission itself with whatever payload is
required while the other is preped just for rescue. Have it matted to
the ET/SRB combination, maybe even trucked out to the launch pad. When
the mission ends, roll it back to the VAB and get it set up to fly the
next mission.

With only three orbiters (and one in the shop for inspections/upgrades at
practically any given time), this would be pretty damn difficult.

And correct me if I'm wrong, please, but doesn't flight prep expose the
orbiter systems to much of the "wear and tear" that occurs during a
flight cycle? Especially the tanking and plumbing for many of the
propellants (the hydrazine for the APUs, the OMS and RCS propellants,
etc.)? I know that one of the main limitations on Apollo launch delays
was the deterioration of seals in propellant lines -- once an Apollo was
loaded with fuel, it had to be launched within 90 days or else it had to
be unstacked and the seals replaced.

It would seem to me that prepping two birds for every launch would result
in a shortening of the life of the vehicles.

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