![]() |
|
|
|
Thread Tools | Display Modes |
#1
|
|||
|
|||
![]()
Initially three fundamental laws of Nature were proposed:
1. The greenness of the crocodile exceeds its length. 2. In an adiabatically closed system the entropy increases. 3. The greater youthfulness of the travelling twin is due to acceleration. Then a century of deep thought and costly experimentation led to new revolutionary insights: "The length of some insects exceeds their greenness", "Entropy decreases in some microscopic systems", "Entropy increases because probability increases", Entropy cannot decrease because air molecules never assemble in the corner of the room", "The greater youthfulness of the travelling twin can be proved in the absence of any acceleration", "The twin at rest is older because the travelling twin is not inertial", "The twin paradox can only be solved by general relativity", "The twin paradox can be solved by special relativity" etc. Eventually the three fundamental laws, together with their developments, became an essential part of the civilization. No laws, no civilization. Accordingly, suggestions that the laws be eradicated altogether should be regarded as terroristic attacks against the civilization: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/archive/00000313/ Jos Uffink: "This summary leads to the question whether it is fruitful to see irreversibility or time-asymmetry as the essence of the second law. Is it not more straightforward, in view of the unargued statements of Kelvin, the bold claims of Clausius and the strained attempts of Planck, to give up this idea? I believe that Ehrenfest- Afanassjewa was right in her verdict that the discussion about the arrow of time as expressed in the second law of the thermodynamics is actually a RED HERRING." http://homepage.ntlworld.com/academ/...elativity.html "A more intriguing instance of this so-called 'time dilation' is the well-known 'twin paradox', where one of two twins goes for a journey and returns to find himself younger than his brother who remained behind. This case allows more scope for muddled thinking because acceleration can be brought into the discussion. Einstein maintained the greater youthfulness of the travelling twin, and admitted that it contradicts the principle of relativity, saying that acceleration must be the cause (Einstein 1918). In this he has been followed by relativists in a long controversy in many journals, much of which ably sustains the character of earlier speculations which Born describes as "monstrous" (Born 1956). Surely there are three conclusive reasons why acceleration can have nothing to do with the time dilation calculated: (i) By taking a sufficiently long journey the effects of acceleration at the start, turn-round and end could be made negligible compared with the uniform velocity time dilation which is proportional to the duration of the journey. (ii) If there is no uniform time dilation, and the effect, if any, is due to acceleration, then the use of a formula depending only on the steady velocity and its duration cannot be justified. (iii) There is, in principle, no need for acceleration. Twin A can get his velocity V before synchronizing his clock with that of twin B as he passes. He need not turn round: he could be passed by C who has a velocity V in the opposite direction, and who adjusts his clock to that of A as he passes. When C later passes B they can compare clock readings. As far as the theoretical experiment is concerned, C's clock can be considered to be A's clock returning without acceleration since, by hypothesis, all the clocks have the same rate when at rest together and change with motion in the same way independently of direction. [fn. I am indebted to Lord Halsbury for pointing this out to me.] (...) The three examples which have been dealt with above show clearly that the difficulties are not paradoxes) but genuine contradictions which follow inevitably from the principle of relativity and the physical interpretations of the Lorentz transformations. The special theory of relativity is therefore untenable as a physical theory." Pentcho Valev |
#2
|
|||
|
|||
![]()
Initially the civilization fought the looming absurdity and even
scored partial victories - e.g. the calorique and the ether, tumours used for the justification of the false axioms, were removed. Yet in the cases of thermodynamics and relativity tumours proved malignant and the civilization was overwhelmed by the metastases in the end: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/archive/00000313/ Jos Uffink: "Snow stands up for the view that exact science is, in its own right, an essential part of civilisation, and should not merely be valued for its technological applications. Anyone who does not know the Second Law of Thermodynamics, and is proud of it too, exposes oneself as a Philistine. Snow's plea will strike a chord with every physicist who has ever attended a birthday party. But his call for cultural recognition creates obligations too. Before one can claim that acquaintance with the Second Law is as indispensable to a cultural education as Macbeth or Hamlet, it should obviously be clear what this law states. This question is surprisingly difficult. The Second Law made its appearance in physics around 1850, but a half century later it was already surrounded by so much confusion that the British Association for the Advancement of Science decided to appoint a special committee with the task of providing clarity about the meaning of this law. However, its final report (Bryan 1891) did not settle the issue. Half a century later, the physicist/philosopher Bridgman still complained that there are almost as many formulations of the second law as there have been discussions of it (Bridgman 1941, p. 116). And even today, the Second Law remains so obscure that it continues to attract new efforts at clarification. A recent example is the work of Lieb and Yngvason (1999)......The historian of science and mathematician Truesdell made a detailed study of the historical development of thermodynamics in the period 1822-1854. He characterises the theory, even in its present state, as 'a dismal swamp of obscurity' (1980, p. 6) and 'a prime example to show that physicists are not exempt from the madness of crowds' (ibid. p. 8).......Clausius' verbal statement of the second law makes no sense.... All that remains is a Mosaic prohibition ; a century of philosophers and journalists have acclaimed this commandment ; a century of mathematicians have shuddered and averted their eyes from the unclean.....Seven times in the past thirty years have I tried to follow the argument Clausius offers....and seven times has it blanked and gravelled me.... I cannot explain what I cannot understand.....This summary leads to the question whether it is fruitful to see irreversibility or time-asymmetry as the essence of the second law. Is it not more straightforward, in view of the unargued statements of Kelvin, the bold claims of Clausius and the strained attempts of Planck, to give up this idea? I believe that Ehrenfest-Afanassjewa was right in her verdict that the discussion about the arrow of time as expressed in the second law of the thermodynamics is actually a RED HERRING." http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/con...ent=a909857880 Peter Hayes "The Ideology of Relativity: The Case of the Clock Paradox" : Social Epistemology, Volume 23, Issue 1 January 2009, pages 57-78 Peter Hayes: "In the interwar period there was a significant school of thought that repudiated Einstein's theory of relativity on the grounds that it contained elementary inconsistencies. Some of these critics held extreme right-wing and anti-Semitic views, and this has tended to discredit their technical objections to relativity as being scientifically shallow. This paper investigates an alternative possibility: that the critics were right and that the success of Einstein's theory in overcoming them was due to its strengths as an ideology rather than as a science. The clock paradox illustrates how relativity theory does indeed contain inconsistencies that make it scientifically problematic. These same inconsistencies, however, make the theory ideologically powerful. The implications of this argument are examined with respect to Thomas Kuhn and Karl Popper's accounts of the philosophy of science. (...) The prediction that clocks will move at different rates is particularly well known, and the problem of explaining how this can be so without violating the principle of relativity is particularly obvious. The clock paradox, however, is only one of a number of simple objections that have been raised to different aspects of Einstein's theory of relativity. (Much of this criticism is quite apart from and often predates the apparent contradiction between relativity theory and quantum mechanics.) It is rare to find any attempt at a detailed rebuttal of these criticisms by professional physicists. However, physicists do sometimes give a general response to criticisms that relativity theory is syncretic by asserting that Einstein is logically consistent, but that to explain why is so difficult that critics lack the capacity to understand the argument. In this way, the handy claim that there are unspecified, highly complex resolutions of simple apparent inconsistencies in the theory can be linked to the charge that antirelativists have only a shallow understanding of the matter, probably gleaned from misleading popular accounts of the theory. (...) The argument for complexity reverses the scientific preference for simplicity. Faced with obvious inconsistencies, the simple response is to conclude that Einstein's claims for the explanatory scope of the special and general theory are overstated. To conclude instead that that relativity theory is right for reasons that are highly complex is to replace Occam's razor with a potato masher. (...) The defence of complexity implies that the novice wishing to enter the profession of theoretical physics must accept relativity on faith. It implicitly concedes that, without an understanding of relativity theory's higher complexities, it appears illogical, which means that popular "explanations" of relativity are necessarily misleading. But given Einstein's fame, physicists do not approach the theory for the first time once they have developed their expertise. Rather, they are exposed to and probably examined on popular explanations of relativity in their early training. How are youngsters new to the discipline meant to respond to these accounts? Are they misled by false explanations and only later inculcated with true ones? What happens to those who are not misled? Are they supposed to accept relativity merely on the grounds of authority? The argument of complexity suggests that to pass the first steps necessary to join the physics profession, students must either be willing to suspend disbelief and go along with a theory that appears illogical; or fail to notice the apparent inconsistencies in the theory; or notice the inconsistencies and maintain a guilty silence in the belief that this merely shows that they are unable to understand the theory. The gatekeepers of professional physics in the universities and research institutes are disinclined to support or employ anyone who raises problems over the elementary inconsistencies of relativity. A winnowing out process has made it very difficult for critics of Einstein to achieve or maintain professional status. Relativists are then able to use the argument of authority to discredit these critics. Were relativists to admit that Einstein may have made a series of elementary logical errors, they would be faced with the embarrassing question of why this had not been noticed earlier. Under these circumstances the marginalisation of antirelativists, unjustified on scientific grounds, is eminently justifiable on grounds of realpolitik. Supporters of relativity theory have protected both the theory and their own reputations by shutting their opponents out of professional discourse. (...) The argument that Einstein fomented an ideological rather than a scientific revolution helps to explain of one of the features of this revolution that puzzled Kuhn: despite the apparent scope of the general theory, very little has come out of it. Viewing relativity theory as an ideology also helps to account for Poppers doubts over whether special theory can be retained, given experimental results in quantum mechanics and Einsteins questionable approach to defining simultaneity. Both Kuhn and Popper have looked to the other branch of the theory - Popper to the general and Kuhn to the special - to try and retain their view of Einstein as a revolutionary scientist. According to the view proposed here, this only indicates how special and general theories function together as an ideology, as when one side of the theory is called into question, the other can be called upon to rescue it. The triumph of relativity theory represents the triumph of ideology not only in the profession of physics bur also in the philosophy of science. These conclusions are of considerable interest to both theoretical physics and to social epistemology. It would, however, be naïve to think that theoretical physicists will take the slightest notice of them." Pentcho Valev |
#3
|
|||
|
|||
![]()
On Oct 9, 9:54*am, Pentcho Valev wrote:
.... http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/con...ent=a909857880 Peter Hayes "The Ideology of Relativity: The Case of the Clock Paradox" : Social Epistemology, Volume 23, Issue 1 January 2009, pages 57-78 Peter Hayes: "... The argument of complexity suggests that to pass the first steps necessary to join the physics profession, students must either be willing to suspend disbelief and go along with a theory that appears illogical; or fail to notice the apparent inconsistencies in the theory; or notice the inconsistencies and maintain a guilty silence in the belief that this merely shows that they are unable to understand the theory. The gatekeepers of professional physics in the universities and research institutes are disinclined to support or employ anyone who raises problems over the elementary inconsistencies of relativity. A winnowing out process has made it very difficult for critics of Einstein to achieve or maintain professional status. Relativists are then able to use the argument of authority to discredit these critics. Were relativists to admit that Einstein may have made a series of elementary logical errors, they would be faced with the embarrassing question of why this had not been noticed earlier. Under these circumstances the marginalisation of antirelativists, unjustified on scientific grounds, is eminently justifiable on grounds of realpolitik. Supporters of relativity theory have protected both the theory and their own reputations by shutting their opponents out of professional discourse. ..." Pentcho Valev Very true! Suppose the Relativity is now 'bundled out' through a solid experimental invalidation, how many Physicists will actually feel sorry for the Relativity as well for Einstein? Say a thousand or ten thousand? GSS http://book.fundamentalphysics.info |
#4
|
|||
|
|||
![]()
In 1824 Carnot's theorem (the prototype of the second law of
thermodynamics) was deducible from the following axioms: AXIOM 1: Heat is an indestructible substance (cannot be converted into work in the heat engine). AXIOM 2: Perpetuum mobile of the first kind is impossible. In 1850 Carnot's theorem became deducible from the following axioms: AXIOM 1: Heat is not an indestructible substance (can be converted into work in the heat engine). AXIOM 2: Perpetuum mobile of the first kind is impossible. AXIOM 3: Reversible transfer of heat from cold to hot is possible if spontaneous transfer of heat from cold to hot is possible. AXIOM 4: Spontaneous transfer of heat from cold to hot is impossible: http://web.lemoyne.edu/~giunta/Clausius.html "Ueber die bewegende Kraft der Warme", 1850, Rudolf Clausius: "Carnot assumed, as has already been mentioned, that the equivalent of the work done by heat is found in the mere transfer of heat from a hotter to a colder body, while the quantity of heat remains undiminished. The latter part of this assumption--namely, that the quantity of heat remains undiminished--contradicts our former principle, and must therefore be rejected... (...) It is this maximum of work which must be compared with the heat transferred. When this is done it appears that there is in fact ground for asserting, with Carnot, that it depends only on the quantity of the heat transferred and on the temperatures t and tau of the two bodies A and B, but not on the nature of the substance by means of which the work is done. (...) If we now suppose that there are two substances of which the one can produce more work than the other by the transfer of a given amount of heat, or, what comes to the same thing, needs to transfer less heat from A to B to produce a given quantity of work, we may use these two substances alternately by producing work with one of them in the above process. At the end of the operations both bodies are in their original condition; further, the work produced will have exactly counterbalanced the work done, and therefore, by our former principle, the quantity of heat can have neither increased nor diminished. The only change will occur in the distribution of the heat, since more heat will be transferred from B to A than from A to B, and so on the whole heat will be transferred from B to A. By repeating these two processes alternately it would be possible, without any expenditure of force or any other change, to transfer as much heat as we please from a cold to a hot body, and this is not in accord with the other relations of heat, since it always shows a tendency to equalize temperature differences and therefore to pass from hotter to colder bodies." In 1887 the null result of the Michelson-Morley experiment was deducible from the following axioms: AXIOM 1: The speed of light varies with the speed of the emitter as predicted by Newton's emission theory of light. AXIOM 2: All inertial frames are equivalent: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/arch.../02/Norton.pdf John Norton: "Einstein regarded the Michelson-Morley experiment as evidence for the principle of relativity, whereas later writers almost universally use it as support for the light postulate of special relativity......THE MICHELSON-MORLEY EXPERIMENT IS FULLY COMPATIBLE WITH AN EMISSION THEORY OF LIGHT THAT CONTRADICTS THE LIGHT POSTULATE." http://www.pitt.edu/~jdnorton/papers/companion.doc John Norton: "These efforts were long misled by an exaggeration of the importance of one experiment, the Michelson-Morley experiment, even though Einstein later had trouble recalling if he even knew of the experiment prior to his 1905 paper. This one experiment, in isolation, has little force. Its null result happened to be fully compatible with Newton's own emission theory of light. Located in the context of late 19th century electrodynamics when ether-based, wave theories of light predominated, however, it presented a serious problem that exercised the greatest theoretician of the day." In 1892 the null result of the Michelson-Morley experiment became deducible from the following axioms: AXIOM 1: The speed of light does not vary with the speed of the emitter. AXIOM 2: All inertial frames are equivalent. AXIOM 3: Objects moving through the ether contract in the direction of their movement. Pentcho Valev |
#5
|
|||
|
|||
![]()
On Oct 10, 9:16*am, Pentcho Valev wrote:
I have English translations of both books. I have perused them. You are wrong. The two texts do not contradict each other. If you have copies of these books, I suggest that you reread them. The word "caloric" means entropy. "Entropy" has properties consistent with an indestructible substance. "Entropy" can not be converted to work. Clausius says that entropy can do work. Clausius says that entropy can carry energy. Clausius does not say that entropy can be converted to work. In 1824 Carnot's theorem (the prototype of the second law of thermodynamics) was deducible from the following axioms: AXIOM 1: Heat is an indestructible substance (cannot be converted into work in the heat engine). AXIOM 2: Perpetuum mobile of the first kind is impossible. "Reflections on the Motive Power of Fire" by Sadi Carnot (1824). Carnot says on the first page: "Everyone knows that heat can produce motions. That it possesses vast motive-power no one can doubt, when the steam engine is so well known." Heat posses motive power. It is not power. Heat (caloric) is a substance that can do work. In 1850 Carnot's theorem became deducible from the following axioms: AXIOM 1: Heat is not an indestructible substance (can be converted into work in the heat engine). "Motive Power of Heat, and on the Laws which can be deduced from the Theory of Heat" by Rudolf Clausius. Clausius says on the first page: "Carnot showed that whenever work was done by heat and no permanent change occurs in the condition of the working body, a certain quantity of heat passes from a colder to a hotter body." Let me explain. Heat isn't "converted" to work, according to Clausius. Heat (caloric) "does" work. Heat is not energy. Both Carnot and Clausius use the word "heat" to mean what we now call entropy. I don't know French. Perhaps you can explain to me how my English translations erred |:-) |
#6
|
|||
|
|||
![]()
The philosophy of Postscientism:
Karl Popper: "On the other hand, I also realized that we must not exclude immunizations, not even all which introduce ad hoc auxiliary hypothesis....All this shows not only that some degree of dogmatism is fruitful, even in science, but also that logically speaking falsifiability or testability cannot be regarded as a very sharp criterion." Thomas Kuhn: "Something even more fundamental than standards and values is, however, also at stake. I have so far argued only that paradigms are constitutive of science. Now I wish to display a sense in which they are constitutive of nature as well." Paul Feyerabend: "Today science prevails not because of its comparative merits but because the show has been rigged in its favour." http://bertie.ccsu.edu/naturesci/PhilSci/Lakatos.html "Lakatos distinguished between two parts of a scientific theory: its "hard core" which contains its basic assumptions (or axioms, when set out formally and explicitly), and its "protective belt", a surrounding defensive set of "ad hoc" (produced for the occasion) hypotheses. (...) In Lakatos' model, we have to explicitly take into account the "ad hoc hypotheses" which serve as the protective belt. The protective belt serves to deflect "refuting" propositions from the core assumptions..." Lakatos' protective belt philosophy creates the following dilemma. The null result of the Michelson-Morley experiment confirms the equation c'=c+v given by Newton's emission theory of light and refutes Einstein's 1905 light postulate (c'=c). In the absence of ad hoc auxiliary hypotheses this is a true statement so one can accept it and leave it at that. If, however, one wants the null result of the Michelson-Morley experiment to confirm c'=c and refute c'=c+v, one has to advance ad hoc auxiliary hypotheses (length contraction, time dilation). That is, one has to procrusteanize the reality into conformity with the following idiocies: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VSRIy...related&search http://math.ucr.edu/home/baez/physic...barn_pole.html "These are the props. You own a barn, 40m long, with automatic doors at either end, that can be opened and closed simultaneously by a switch. You also have a pole, 80m long, which of course won't fit in the barn. Now someone takes the pole and tries to run (at nearly the speed of light) through the barn with the pole horizontal. Special Relativity (SR) says that a moving object is contracted in the direction of motion: this is called the Lorentz Contraction. So, if the pole is set in motion lengthwise, then it will contract in the reference frame of a stationary observer.....So, as the pole passes through the barn, there is an instant when it is completely within the barn. At that instant, you close both doors simultaneously, with your switch. Of course, you open them again pretty quickly, but at least momentarily you had the contracted pole shut up in your barn. The runner emerges from the far door unscathed.....If the doors are kept shut the rod will obviously smash into the barn door at one end. If the door withstands this the leading end of the rod will come to rest in the frame of reference of the stationary observer. There can be no such thing as a rigid rod in relativity so the trailing end will not stop immediately and the rod will be compressed beyond the amount it was Lorentz contracted. If it does not explode under the strain and it is sufficiently elastic it will come to rest and start to spring back to its natural shape but since it is too big for the barn the other end is now going to crash into the back door and the rod will be trapped in a compressed state inside the barn." http://www.quebecscience.qc.ca/Revolutions "Cependant, si une fusée de 100 m passait devant nous à une vitesse proche de celle de la lumière, elle pourrait sembler ne mesurer que 50 m, ou même moins. Bien sûr, la question qui vient tout de suite à l'esprit est: «Cette contraction n'est-elle qu'une illusion?» Il semble tout à fait incroyable que le simple mouvement puisse comprimer un objet aussi rigide qu'une fusée. Et pourtant, la contraction est réelle... mais SANS COMPRESSION physique de l'objet! Ainsi, une fusée de 100 m passant à toute vitesse dans un tunnel de 60 m pourrait être entièrement contenue dans ce tunnel pendant une fraction de seconde, durant laquelle il serait possible de fermer des portes aux deux bouts! La fusée est donc réellement plus courte. Pourtant, il n'y a PAS DE COMPRESSION matérielle ou physique de l'engin. Comment est-ce possible?" http://alcor.concordia.ca/~scol/semi...ts/Durand.html "La contraction une longueur est un phénomène à la fois réel mais sans déformation structurelle. C'est un phénomène réel (et non pas une illusion) car, par exemple, une perche dont la longueur au repos est plus grande que la longueur au repos d'une grange peut réellement être contenue dans cette dernière si elle se déplace assez rapidement. Par contre, il ne peut y avoir de contraction structurelle de la perche, i.e de déformation matérielle de l'objet, car la contraction de sa longueur aurait aussi lieu si c'était plutôt l'observateur qui se mettait en mouvement sans changer l'état de mouvement de la perche. Autrement dit, sans changer l'état de la perche, en se mettant soi- même en mouvement, on change sa longueur: ce n'est donc clairement pas une contraction matérielle (l'état de la perche est le même dans les deux cas)." http://hyperphysics.phy-astr.gsu.edu.../bugrivet.html "The bug-rivet paradox is a variation on the twin paradox and is similar to the pole-barn paradox.....The end of the rivet hits the bottom of the hole before the head of the rivet hits the wall. So it looks like the bug is squashed.....All this is nonsense from the bug's point of view. The rivet head hits the wall when the rivet end is just 0.35 cm down in the hole! The rivet doesn't get close to the bug....The paradox is not resolved." Pentcho Valev |
#7
|
|||
|
|||
![]()
On 11 أكتوبر, 12:06, Pentcho Valev wrote:
The philosophy of Postscientism: Karl Popper: "On the other hand, I also realized that we must not exclude immunizations, not even all which introduce ad hoc auxiliary hypothesis....All this shows not only that some degree of dogmatism is fruitful, even in science, but also that logically speaking falsifiability or testability cannot be regarded as a very sharp criterion." Thomas Kuhn: "Something even more fundamental than standards and values is, however, also at stake. I have so far argued only that paradigms are constitutive of science. Now I wish to display a sense in which they are constitutive of nature as well." Paul Feyerabend: "Today science prevails not because of its comparative merits but because the show has been rigged in its favour." http://bertie.ccsu.edu/naturesci/PhilSci/Lakatos.html "Lakatos distinguished between two parts of a scientific theory: its "hard core" which contains its basic assumptions (or axioms, when set out formally and explicitly), and its "protective belt", a surrounding defensive set of "ad hoc" (produced for the occasion) hypotheses. (...) In Lakatos' model, we have to explicitly take into account the "ad hoc hypotheses" which serve as the protective belt. The protective belt serves to deflect "refuting" propositions from the core assumptions..." Lakatos' protective belt philosophy creates the following dilemma. The null result of the Michelson-Morley experiment confirms the equation c'=c+v given by Newton's emission theory of light and refutes Einstein's 1905 light postulate (c'=c). In the absence of ad hoc auxiliary hypotheses this is a true statement so one can accept it and leave it at that. If, however, one wants the null result of the Michelson-Morley experiment to confirm c'=c and refute c'=c+v, one has to advance ad hoc auxiliary hypotheses (length contraction, time dilation). That is, one has to procrusteanize the reality into conformity with the following idiocies: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VSRIy...related&search http://math.ucr.edu/home/baez/physic...barn_pole.html "These are the props. You own a barn, 40m long, with automatic doors at either end, that can be opened and closed simultaneously by a switch. You also have a pole, 80m long, which of course won't fit in the barn. Now someone takes the pole and tries to run (at nearly the speed of light) through the barn with the pole horizontal. Special Relativity (SR) says that a moving object is contracted in the direction of motion: this is called the Lorentz Contraction. So, if the pole is set in motion lengthwise, then it will contract in the reference frame of a stationary observer.....So, as the pole passes through the barn, there is an instant when it is completely within the barn. At that instant, you close both doors simultaneously, with your switch. Of course, you open them again pretty quickly, but at least momentarily you had the contracted pole shut up in your barn. The runner emerges from the far door unscathed.....If the doors are kept shut the rod will obviously smash into the barn door at one end. If the door withstands this the leading end of the rod will come to rest in the frame of reference of the stationary observer. There can be no such thing as a rigid rod in relativity so the trailing end will not stop immediately and the rod will be compressed beyond the amount it was Lorentz contracted. If it does not explode under the strain and it is sufficiently elastic it will come to rest and start to spring back to its natural shape but since it is too big for the barn the other end is now going to crash into the back door and the rod will be trapped in a compressed state inside the barn." http://www.quebecscience.qc.ca/Revolutions "Cependant, si une fusée de 100 m passait devant nous Ã* une vitesse proche de celle de la lumière, elle pourrait sembler ne mesurer que 50 m, ou même moins. Bien sûr, la question qui vient tout de suite Ã* l'esprit est: «Cette contraction n'est-elle qu'une illusion?» Il semble tout Ã* fait incroyable que le simple mouvement puisse comprimer un objet aussi rigide qu'une fusée. Et pourtant, la contraction est réelle... mais SANS COMPRESSION physique de l'objet! Ainsi, une fusée de 100 m passant Ã* toute vitesse dans un tunnel de 60 m pourrait être entièrement contenue dans ce tunnel pendant une fraction de seconde, durant laquelle il serait possible de fermer des portes aux deux bouts! La fusée est donc réellement plus courte. Pourtant, il n'y a PAS DE COMPRESSION matérielle ou physique de l'engin. Comment est-ce possible?" http://alcor.concordia.ca/~scol/semi...stracts/Durand.... "La contraction une longueur est un phénomène Ã* la fois réel mais sans déformation structurelle. C'est un phénomène réel (et non pas une illusion) car, par exemple, une perche dont la longueur au repos est plus grande que la longueur au repos d'une grange peut réellement être contenue dans cette dernière si elle se déplace assez rapidement. Par contre, il ne peut y avoir de contraction structurelle de la perche, i.e de déformation matérielle de l'objet, car la contraction de sa longueur aurait aussi lieu si c'était plutôt l'observateur qui se mettait en mouvement sans changer l'état de mouvement de la perche. Autrement dit, sans changer l'état de la perche, en se mettant soi- même en mouvement, on change sa longueur: ce n'est donc clairement pas une contraction matérielle (l'état de la perche est le même dans les deux cas)." http://hyperphysics.phy-astr.gsu.edu.../bugrivet.html "The bug-rivet paradox is a variation on the twin paradox and is similar to the pole-barn paradox.....The end of the rivet hits the bottom of the hole before the head of the rivet hits the wall. So it looks like the bug is squashed.....All this is nonsense from the bug's point of view. The rivet head hits the wall when the rivet end is just 0.35 cm down in the hole! The rivet doesn't get close to the bug....The paradox is not resolved." Pentcho Valev the best |
#8
|
|||
|
|||
![]()
On Oct 11, 5:06*am, Pentcho Valev wrote:
The philosophy of Postscientism: Karl Popper: "On the other hand, I also realized that we must not exclude immunizations, not even all which introduce ad hoc auxiliary hypothesis....All this shows not only that some degree of dogmatism is fruitful, even in science, but also that logically speaking falsifiability or testability cannot be regarded as a very sharp criterion." You replied to my post without addressing the main issue of that post. I did not make any comment about relativity. I was objecting to your claims as concerns thermodynamics. Your arguments make no sense in English. Part of your problem is that you don't know English very well. However, both Clausius and Carnot wrote in French. I suspect your command of French is as poor as your command of English, but I can't be sure. Carnot and Clausius are talking about the same thing. There is no logical contradiction in their theories. The word "caloric" in their monographs refers to entropy, not energy. As to that experiment you like to quote concerning this bridge made of water. The experimental results neither contradict the second law of thermodynamics nor do they constitute a perpetual motion machine. The two beakers are not at different temperatures (degrees). They are at different electrical potentials (volts). The two beakers do not constitute a closed system because electric current is being provided to the beakers. The system is not in steady state because the temperature of the water is increasing with time. There is no motion of the water from one beaker to the other since both beakers remain full. Any motion that occurs is not perpetual, since the bridge collapses (due to increasing temperature). Thus, the reference that you cite has nothing to do with a violation of the second law. Thank you for the link, though. It is a very interesting experiment. It reminds me of the movie "The Abyss." The aliens in the story manipulate water. I didn't think such manipulation was possible. However, here it is. Hollywood science fiction is right once more! The second law was never violated, though. Not even in the fictional world of this movie. |
#9
|
|||
|
|||
![]()
On Oct 13, 3:33*am, Darwin123 wrote:
: Part of your problem is that you don't know English very well. : I suspect your command of French is as poor as your command of English, but I can't be sure. Pink crocodiles do not exist, thus therefor as a result therefrom derived one must conclude therefrom thereafter that the greenness of the crocodile must exceeds its length because the length of the pink crocodile is unquestionably zero. Or do you believe in pink crocodiles? |
#10
|
|||
|
|||
![]()
http://www.opfocus.org/index.php?topic=story&v=8&s=4
"The speed of light is a universal constant - or is it? Some evidence seems to suggest it might actually be slowing down. Will we soon have to revise our cosmological beliefs? If light were slowing down, we would have to revise many of our astronomical beliefs: from the age of the Universe to the distances between galaxies, from the dark matter to the definition of many physical constants. What a tremendous set of implications! Some evidence that this might indeed be the case starts piling up, as recently reported by Yves-Henri Sanejouand from the University of Nantes in France." The set of implications is too tremendous for the civilization to be able to get rid of Einstein's 1905 false constant-speed-of-light postulate. In a sense "getting rid of the false constant-speed-of- light postulate" is tantamount to "getting rid of itself": http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedi..._alquimica.jpg http://www.ekkehard-friebe.de/wallace.htm The farce of physics Bryan Wallace "Einstein's special relativity theory with his second postulate that the speed of light in space is constant is the linchpin that holds the whole range of modern physics theories together. Shatter this postulate, and modern physics becomes an elaborate farce! (...) The speed of light is c+v." http://arxiv.org/PS_cache/astro-ph/p.../0305457v3.pdf New varying speed of light theories Joao Magueijo "In sharp contrast, the constancy of the speed of light has remain sacred, and the term "heresy" is occasionally used in relation to "varying speed of light theories". The reason is clear: the constancy of c, unlike the constancy of G or e, is the pillar of special relativity and thus of modern physics. Varying c theories are expected to cause much more structural damage to physics formalism than other varying constant theories." Pentcho Valev wrote: Initially the civilization fought the looming absurdity and even scored partial victories - e.g. the calorique and the ether, tumours used for the justification of the false axioms, were removed. Yet in the cases of thermodynamics and relativity tumours proved malignant and the civilization was overwhelmed by the metastases in the end: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/archive/00000313/ Jos Uffink: "Snow stands up for the view that exact science is, in its own right, an essential part of civilisation, and should not merely be valued for its technological applications. Anyone who does not know the Second Law of Thermodynamics, and is proud of it too, exposes oneself as a Philistine. Snow's plea will strike a chord with every physicist who has ever attended a birthday party. But his call for cultural recognition creates obligations too. Before one can claim that acquaintance with the Second Law is as indispensable to a cultural education as Macbeth or Hamlet, it should obviously be clear what this law states. This question is surprisingly difficult. The Second Law made its appearance in physics around 1850, but a half century later it was already surrounded by so much confusion that the British Association for the Advancement of Science decided to appoint a special committee with the task of providing clarity about the meaning of this law. However, its final report (Bryan 1891) did not settle the issue. Half a century later, the physicist/philosopher Bridgman still complained that there are almost as many formulations of the second law as there have been discussions of it (Bridgman 1941, p. 116). And even today, the Second Law remains so obscure that it continues to attract new efforts at clarification. A recent example is the work of Lieb and Yngvason (1999)......The historian of science and mathematician Truesdell made a detailed study of the historical development of thermodynamics in the period 1822-1854. He characterises the theory, even in its present state, as 'a dismal swamp of obscurity' (1980, p. 6) and 'a prime example to show that physicists are not exempt from the madness of crowds' (ibid. p. 8).......Clausius' verbal statement of the second law makes no sense.... All that remains is a Mosaic prohibition ; a century of philosophers and journalists have acclaimed this commandment ; a century of mathematicians have shuddered and averted their eyes from the unclean.....Seven times in the past thirty years have I tried to follow the argument Clausius offers....and seven times has it blanked and gravelled me.... I cannot explain what I cannot understand.....This summary leads to the question whether it is fruitful to see irreversibility or time-asymmetry as the essence of the second law. Is it not more straightforward, in view of the unargued statements of Kelvin, the bold claims of Clausius and the strained attempts of Planck, to give up this idea? I believe that Ehrenfest-Afanassjewa was right in her verdict that the discussion about the arrow of time as expressed in the second law of the thermodynamics is actually a RED HERRING." http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/con...ent=a909857880 Peter Hayes "The Ideology of Relativity: The Case of the Clock Paradox" : Social Epistemology, Volume 23, Issue 1 January 2009, pages 57-78 Peter Hayes: "In the interwar period there was a significant school of thought that repudiated Einstein's theory of relativity on the grounds that it contained elementary inconsistencies. Some of these critics held extreme right-wing and anti-Semitic views, and this has tended to discredit their technical objections to relativity as being scientifically shallow. This paper investigates an alternative possibility: that the critics were right and that the success of Einstein's theory in overcoming them was due to its strengths as an ideology rather than as a science. The clock paradox illustrates how relativity theory does indeed contain inconsistencies that make it scientifically problematic. These same inconsistencies, however, make the theory ideologically powerful. The implications of this argument are examined with respect to Thomas Kuhn and Karl Popper's accounts of the philosophy of science. (...) The prediction that clocks will move at different rates is particularly well known, and the problem of explaining how this can be so without violating the principle of relativity is particularly obvious. The clock paradox, however, is only one of a number of simple objections that have been raised to different aspects of Einstein's theory of relativity. (Much of this criticism is quite apart from and often predates the apparent contradiction between relativity theory and quantum mechanics.) It is rare to find any attempt at a detailed rebuttal of these criticisms by professional physicists. However, physicists do sometimes give a general response to criticisms that relativity theory is syncretic by asserting that Einstein is logically consistent, but that to explain why is so difficult that critics lack the capacity to understand the argument. In this way, the handy claim that there are unspecified, highly complex resolutions of simple apparent inconsistencies in the theory can be linked to the charge that antirelativists have only a shallow understanding of the matter, probably gleaned from misleading popular accounts of the theory. (...) The argument for complexity reverses the scientific preference for simplicity. Faced with obvious inconsistencies, the simple response is to conclude that Einstein's claims for the explanatory scope of the special and general theory are overstated. To conclude instead that that relativity theory is right for reasons that are highly complex is to replace Occam's razor with a potato masher. (...) The defence of complexity implies that the novice wishing to enter the profession of theoretical physics must accept relativity on faith. It implicitly concedes that, without an understanding of relativity theory's higher complexities, it appears illogical, which means that popular "explanations" of relativity are necessarily misleading. But given Einstein's fame, physicists do not approach the theory for the first time once they have developed their expertise. Rather, they are exposed to and probably examined on popular explanations of relativity in their early training. How are youngsters new to the discipline meant to respond to these accounts? Are they misled by false explanations and only later inculcated with true ones? What happens to those who are not misled? Are they supposed to accept relativity merely on the grounds of authority? The argument of complexity suggests that to pass the first steps necessary to join the physics profession, students must either be willing to suspend disbelief and go along with a theory that appears illogical; or fail to notice the apparent inconsistencies in the theory; or notice the inconsistencies and maintain a guilty silence in the belief that this merely shows that they are unable to understand the theory. The gatekeepers of professional physics in the universities and research institutes are disinclined to support or employ anyone who raises problems over the elementary inconsistencies of relativity. A winnowing out process has made it very difficult for critics of Einstein to achieve or maintain professional status. Relativists are then able to use the argument of authority to discredit these critics. Were relativists to admit that Einstein may have made a series of elementary logical errors, they would be faced with the embarrassing question of why this had not been noticed earlier. Under these circumstances the marginalisation of antirelativists, unjustified on scientific grounds, is eminently justifiable on grounds of realpolitik. Supporters of relativity theory have protected both the theory and their own reputations by shutting their opponents out of professional discourse. (...) The argument that Einstein fomented an ideological rather than a scientific revolution helps to explain of one of the features of this revolution that puzzled Kuhn: despite the apparent scope of the general theory, very little has come out of it. Viewing relativity theory as an ideology also helps to account for Poppers doubts over whether special theory can be retained, given experimental results in quantum mechanics and Einsteins questionable approach to defining simultaneity. Both Kuhn and Popper have looked to the other branch of the theory - Popper to the general and Kuhn to the special - to try and retain their view of Einstein as a revolutionary scientist. According to the view proposed here, this only indicates how special and general theories function together as an ideology, as when one side of the theory is called into question, the other can be called upon to rescue it. The triumph of relativity theory represents the triumph of ideology not only in the profession of physics bur also in the philosophy of science. These conclusions are of considerable interest to both theoretical physics and to social epistemology. It would, however, be naïve to think that theoretical physicists will take the slightest notice of them." Pentcho Valev |
|
Thread Tools | |
Display Modes | |
|
|
![]() |
||||
Thread | Thread Starter | Forum | Replies | Last Post |
THE END OF POSTSCIENTISM | Pentcho Valev | Astronomy Misc | 15 | November 4th 10 03:26 AM |
ETHICS IN THE ERA OF POSTSCIENTISM | Pentcho Valev | Astronomy Misc | 12 | December 8th 09 02:22 PM |
A FEATURE OF POSTSCIENTISM | Pentcho Valev | Astronomy Misc | 6 | July 3rd 09 03:37 PM |
THE ESSENCE OF POSTSCIENTISM | Pentcho Valev | Astronomy Misc | 13 | January 4th 09 07:22 AM |
TRUTH IN THE ERA OF POSTSCIENTISM | Pentcho Valev | Astronomy Misc | 6 | December 21st 08 11:13 AM |