That's a phrase we hear a lot today -- that "everyone should have known"
about safety issues, about the fragility of the RCC, about risks that
should never be taken.

I was just reading the Apollo 17 mission requirements document, and saw
something I've seen before. Mission planning for EVAs was constrained
based on walkback in the case of a Rover failure or return to the LM in
case of a PLSS failure. The simultaneous occurrence of a PLSS and Rover
failure was specifically excluded from consideration.

But, think about it. What would be the most likely cause of a PLSS
failure? I'd think the most likely cause for a PLSS that had been
working perfectly to fail at any considerable distance from the LM would
be a catastrophic Rover accident. Say, the Rover hit a large rock at its
maximum speed that destroyed one front wheel assembly, flipped the
vehicle, and damaged one of the crew's PLSSes.

If that had happened on any of the J missions, and one or both of the
crew had died in the attempt to get back to the LM, "everyone should have
known" that a Rover accident was the most likely cause of a PLSS failure.
Right?

And yet, had the double failure situation been planned for and EVAs
limited to them, we would have been robbed of a great bounty of
exploration.

I guess all I'm saying is that risk is not *always* unwarranted. And
when you become unwilling to take *any* risks, you cease even trying to
accomplish great things.

--

It's not the pace of life I mind; | Doug Van Dorn
it's the sudden stop at the end... |