Pat Flannery wrote:
Derek Lyons wrote:

That's not really a good example, as the strainers were not part of
the design. They were added by the builder on his own hook.

I didn't know that part of the story...

It's not often told... as exceeding specs is usually regarded as a
Good Thing, but in this instance it wasn't.

that design change sounds like something that Rickover would go
completely ballistic over...

It's unclear how influential he was in designing the 593's. Sources
are really unclear how extensive his influence was. At any rate,
Rickover worked hard to distance himself from the accident. (And
quietly changed the reactor operating procedures anyhow.)

what I always thought was ironic was that a device that is supposed to
improve the sub's safety is at least partially responsible for sinking it.

As Henry says, complexity in pursuit of safety is no virtue.

There is another case something like this I can think of off the top of
my head...Lockheed didn't realize that the canopy of the U-2 actually
got stronger as the height increased and the air temperature dropped.
This led to the aircraft's ejection seat starting up its rails, striking
the canopy, and bouncing right back down into the cockpit:
http://www.ejectionsite.com/u2seat.htm

And folks wonder why the military tests the **** out of everything.

D.
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